“Through the Wall”: Between Theology and Life (Column 39)

A quote from Eight Chapters by Maimonides, chapter 8:
And in this sense it may be said of a person when he stands up or sits down: that by the will of the blessed God he stood and sat—that is to say, that it was placed in his nature at the beginning of his creation that he would stand and sit by his own choice; not that He now wills, at the moment of his standing, that he should stand, or that he should not stand, just as He does not now will, at the moment of this stone’s falling, that it should fall. And the general principle in which we believe is this: just as the blessed God willed that man should be upright in stature, broad-chested, and possessed of fingers—so too He willed that he should move and rest of himself, and perform actions by his choice: with none compelling him to them, and none preventing him from them,

Throughout that whole chapter there, he seems to be aiming to say as you do: that the whole statement “everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven” in effect empties itself of content, since every act or situation has implications connected to fear of Heaven. In short, he’s cutting off Chazal’s beard.

I really didn’t understand. Why cancel one of the basic assumptions instead of using one of the thousands of contingent excuses? Is there an obligation to answer every practical question phrased logically with an essential answer?

Beyond that, a wedding with a groom who appears within three weeks is not necessarily a good thing. (And for some reason that was one of the basic assumptions.)

“From our point of view, the only ones required to use common sense are the mistaken secularists and Christians. They need to use it and realize that their beliefs are founded on falsehood, and repent. And what about their feelings and their tradition and their inner sense? We immediately scold them: after all, reason says otherwise, doesn’t it? But with us, faith is immune to criticism. With us, common sense is the advice of the evil inclination. So how do we know that it is we who are right and not they? After all, they relate to us the same way. Fine—but they are mistaken and we are right. Lenin already said that, didn’t he?”

Do you really not think there is a difference between us and them? After all, this is not a state of emptiness in which we come to examine which faith is correct—Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. We are speaking about a state after the understanding that Judaism is true: because of the more solid tradition than theirs, because of the blessing we have brought to the world more than any other nation (percentage-wise), because of the fulfillment of prophecies, and much more (among other things, things that you yourself wrote in one of the notebooks)..
That is, your claim is correct regarding the question whether Judaism is true at all. But after we have reached that conclusion and accepted it as truth, is it not correct to say that there is a difference between us and them in our approach to beliefs transmitted by tradition? Even then, are we obligated to examine and test everything by the standard of pure reason, with no importance at all given to tradition and the national feeling of all the commandment-observant throughout the generations? In my humble opinion, the background from which we come greatly affects the answer to this question.

And so too is Maimonides’ approach regarding miracles (brought in the Maharal’s introduction to Gevurot Hashem. Also see the recordings of my lectures here on the site about miracles). He explains that they too were embedded in the nature of the world from the outset and are not performed at the moment of occurrence.

Because even when there is something that is clearly good, we still do not expect it to happen. That’s why I said it’s not worth diverting the discussion.
Beyond that, in my view none of the contingent excuses stands up to critical scrutiny either. As I explained, these are ad hoc excuses that evade being put to the test of falsification.

When you demand that someone use his head, you cannot do so according to your own approach. You have to do it according to his. The secular person reached the conclusion that there is no God and that there was no revelation at Mount Sinai. The same goes for the Christian. So you tell him he must use his head. He will tell you, just as you tell me: I’m already past the initial examination; from here on only feeling and tradition operate.

Beyond that, you are speaking only about someone who has already done the rational examination. How many such people are there?

And third, the initial examination itself also has to stand up to critical scrutiny. It is not reasonable to make a decision once and then spend one’s whole life inventing excuses to keep the conclusion in place.

Hello Rabbi,

Why not give up the first assumption? Apparently in certain rare cases we do not understand what is truly good (or perhaps what is the lesser evil). All in all, we are exposed to very little information about the overall circumstances and the future to come, etc. I assume this is the motif in the story of Rabbi Akiva and the donkey, rooster, and lamp, and in the stories of “This too is for the good.”
Of course one should always try to understand what is good and act well, but retrospectively it may be that many things we thought were good are not so (and in practice it is very common that in retrospect we were mistaken even in cases where it was clear to us what was good).

Even in cases where the evil is human, one can say that the principle of free choice is so important that it is not revoked despite the appearance of evil (because revoking it would be worse). Of course this does not justify moral wrongs after the fact (“What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?”).

More power to you. It connects to a post I wrote a year ago on a similar subject:

Is a person’s match decreed from Heaven?
-=-=-=-=-=-=–=-=-=-=-=-=-
A) Seemingly, according to the plain meaning of the Gemara’s statement (Sotah 2a), the answer is yes:
“Forty days before the formation of the embryo, a heavenly voice goes forth and says: the daughter of so-and-so to so-and-so, the house of so-and-so to so-and-so, the field of so-and-so to so-and-so.”

B) Maimonides does not accept this saying in its plain sense (if at all). Marriage is a mitzvah, and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not decree in matters of mitzvot or transgressions, for “everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven,” and mitzvot fall under the category of fear of Heaven, so the Holy One does not intervene in this. A person can marry a woman in transgression (such as a divorcee to a priest) or marry a woman as a mitzvah—one fitting for him (chapter 8 in the introduction to Avot).

C) If so, how does he explain the saying in the Gemara? In one of his letters to Rabbi Ovadiah the convert, he explains that “the daughter of so-and-so to so-and-so” is a kind of encouragement through reward for the fulfillment of mitzvot: if a person fulfills the mitzvot, he *deserves* to be given a fine and worthy match.

D) It should be noted that there are also parallels to this Gemara (Moed Katan 18b) suggesting that through a person’s prayer one can change the “decree of the match,” as it says there, “lest another precede him through prayer.” And how is prayer different from a physical act? That is, if the decree can be nullified through prayer, then it is not really a decree.

E) It seems that the Pele Yoetz as well, under the entry “Match,” was perplexed by this Gemara—how a decree about a match could be possible—and with great difficulty answered that there is a special kind of decree that depends on a person’s effort and requests, and therefore a person must do all in his power to attain the woman suitable for him, in the language of the verse: “If a man were to give all the wealth of his house for love” (Song of Songs 8:7), and the Pele Yoetz concludes: “Such is the obligation” [= that this is how one must strive].

F) In any case, these are not binding beliefs but only conjectures.

The flaw in her argument is the assumption that she knows what is good for her and that the Holy One, blessed be He, is obligated to bring it about. That is a mistake, because while marriage is generally a good thing, it is not necessarily true that getting married now is what is good for her. That is why many things happen to people that seem bad to them. The argument seems dubious because of her pretension to understand the divine plan in such a simplistic way, not because we do not believe that everything is in the hands of Heaven. The honorable rabbi may not believe that and may even mock those who do, but that does not mean that this is the necessary conclusion.

With God’s help, 2 Kislev 5777

Trust in God, as the Hazon Ish explains in his book Faith and Trust, is not the feeling that God is obligated to fulfill my will, but rather the understanding that “there is a Master of the palace” and that the world is under the full control of its Creator and is managed with wisdom and justice, even if man does not understand the ways of his Leader. Not always is what we think is good truly good; not always do we deserve what we want. And often the good comes only after long-term processes of “descent for the sake of ascent.”

If the world is a jungle run randomly, there is no point in investing in improving it. After all, at any moment some “presumptuous giant hand” may come and destroy everything we have built. But when we understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, runs His world through “guided evolution,” with a tendency toward elevation and perfection, and demands of us to be “partners in the work of creation,” we understand that the task is not upon us to finish, yet neither are we free to desist from it. Then we act persistently out of an optimistic but cautious outlook.

A good example is the conduct of the Hasmoneans in the revolt against the Greek kingdom. Faith brought the audacity to go to war against an empire and to persist in the struggle for decades, but the moves were intelligent and calculated—bold military moves and sophisticated political moves that knew how to exploit the internal conflicts in the enemy camp and turn even military defeats into strategic victories,
Judaism not only survived, but was strengthened and hardened, and brought about the destabilization and collapse of idolatrous culture.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

On the two aspects of the trait of trust—“optimistic trust based on faith and hope, and devoted trust arising from love”—and the way to balance them, see Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein’s article, “Though He Slay Me, Yet Will I Trust in Him—Trust in God,” in his book By the Light of Your Face They Walk—Traits and Values in the Service of God, Herzog College and Yedioth Ahronoth, 2012, pp. 153–179.,

After all, it is obvious to all of us that it is good to get married, and there is no reason not to get married on the appointed day when the hall and the guests have already been invited. For the sake of the discussion I am willing to accept that perhaps we missed something and sometimes that is not true, but then at most one should change the argument from certainty to probability. That is, in most cases where a wedding has been set for a prearranged date, it will take place. If in one case it does not—I am willing to say that perhaps we missed something. But if we assume (as all of you and I do) that this will never happen, then the meaning is that even when it is good, it does not happen. Any other statement is mere evasion.
By the way, I commented on this very point itself (that of probability instead of certainty) in the section “Preliminary Pilpulim”; see there. That is also why I already wrote in the post itself that one should not run off to evasive corners. In principle, all of us are exactly at this point.

In the case of human evil, I completely accept that things are not in God’s hands. But my claim is that the same applies to natural evil. The explanation was even fairly similar (that the loss involved in deviating from the fixed laws of nature is not worth the prevention of the evil).

Hello Moshe. That is simply not true. I’ll copy for you what I wrote above to Evyatar:
After all, it is obvious to all of us that it is good to get married, and there is no reason not to get married on the appointed day when the hall and the guests have already been invited. For the sake of the discussion I am willing to accept that perhaps we missed something and sometimes that is not true, but then at most one should change the argument from certainty to probability. That is, in most cases where a wedding has been set for a prearranged date, it will take place. If in one case it does not—I am willing to say that perhaps we missed something. But if we assume (as all of you and I do) that this will never happen, then the meaning is that even when it is good, it does not happen. Any other statement is mere evasion.
By the way, I commented on this very point itself (that of probability instead of certainty) in the section “Preliminary Pilpulim”; see there. That is also why I already wrote in the post itself that one should not run off to evasive corners. In principle, all of us are exactly at this point.

Indeed, this is only one example among many. To say that everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, is simply a logical absurdity. Why then do we impose responsibility on human beings, and why do we go to a doctor, etc.? As I wrote, my choice to give up specifically the third assumption is due to these reasons and others like them.

S.Z.L., none of this is relevant to us. The question is whether God’s management of the world means that everything that happens here comes from Him, or not. That is the discussion. It is not important at the moment whether what happens is necessarily what I think of as good or not.
See also my response above to Evyatar and Moshe.

Rabbi, is the whole article coming only to teach us the obvious point that not every person and not every generation are worthy of miraculous providence?!

And a side remark on a sentence in the article (“A moving body moves because a force acts on it, not because the Holy One, blessed be He, decided that it would move”).
A body does not move because a force acts on it. We do not know why it moves. We call it inertia, but there is no explanation. (I saw that Feynman says this explicitly.)
I’m sure the rabbi is aware of this, but I still thought it worthwhile to be precise.

No. The sentence you cite is normative. I am speaking about facts, not norms. That is, not about what ought to be but about what actually is.

A body begins to move because of force. It continues to move because of inertia, and we know this as well as that. Imagine that I dare disagree even with Feynman (after Chazal, nothing is impossible anymore for a heretic like me). Just kidding… I assume Feynman did not write that (he understood physics very well).

A. I didn’t understand the importance of the distinction. Bottom line, we disagree with (or mock?) the Breslov woman because God does not bother, factually/normatively—what difference does it make—to perform miracles on demand.
B. I am a layman in physics (at least compared to you), but I think you are mistaken. There is no preference for a system at rest or in motion. In fact there is no “real” frame of reference relative to which one judges whether a body is moving or at rest. The very concept of “force” that you used is also unclear to me. What is force according to physicists? Something that causes a body to change velocity (or shape). Great explanation..

A. First one has to understand the difference and only afterward discuss its importance. I was dealing with the question whether God runs the world or not. It is commonly thought that He does—and I argued that He does not. Moreover, I argued that even those who declare that they think so do not really think so (as the attitude toward the Breslov woman casually reveals). If in your view there is nothing novel in this—you should read a bit on this site and see how people react to that statement.
The question whether not everyone deserves providential treatment presupposes that such treatment exists. That is what I am casting doubt on.

B. What can I do? It depends not on opinions but on facts. In order for a body to begin moving (that is, to accelerate), force is required. This does not have even the faintest shred of connection to the question of the frame of reference, nor to whether there is a real frame of reference or not.
If the concept of force is unclear to you—go and learn. In any case, I do not understand the conclusion you seek to draw from your mockery. Are you claiming that there is no such thing as force?

I must note that in light of your declarations of being a layman (and also in light of the incorrect content of what you wrote), I am somewhat surprised by the decisiveness with which you express yourself on subjects in which you are a layman.

One day I arrive at the study hall in Herzliya, located above the central synagogue, and I see mountains of Breslov books. It was hard to find the tractate Kiddushin that we are studying in Daf Yomi. Breslovism, like messianic Chabadism, flush with money and masters of PR, are taking over the Talmudic discourse. That too is of His blessed providence.
And all of you debating here, with Michi at your head—where do you get such confidence and faith, so decisive and complete? In the final analysis, is this an arbitrary decision you made, mainly because you were raised on it? Do you not have heretical doubts? Is this not just rote religiosity?

A good week,

A. You go on at length explaining why most religious people, in their intuition, do not agree with the bride’s conclusion, and from this you reach a general conclusion that certainly the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene in what happens in the world. But in my opinion the answer is much simpler and does not require such a learned explanation with such far-reaching conclusions.

The simple reason, in my opinion, is that to conjure up a groom within three weeks, without dates, without prior preparation, and without coordination, is something so improbable that it already falls under the category of a miracle (or close to it). And regarding miracles, the overwhelming majority of the Rishonim, led by Maimonides and Nachmanides, argue that one may not rely on a miracle, and they prove this from the Torah itself (this is shown by all the physical preparations we are commanded to make before going out to war, by the command to go to a doctor, and by other precautions such as a guardrail and the like). So all those believers are rightly astonished: by what “audacity,” and on what basis, does this bride think that the Holy One is obligated to provide her with a groom on the timetable she set? Why should God change the natural and normal conduct of the world for her?
If this is your intention in the final conclusion you raised, then you are breaking through an open door:
“If so, it is most reasonable to give up the third assumption. Not everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He. The fact that we do not believe that everything is in His hands is not a weakness, as they keep explaining to us (and as we explain to ourselves). This is indeed our faith, even if we deny it again and again.”
Indeed, this is our faith: we do not rely on miracles; no one thought otherwise. And most of the Rishonim agree with this, as stated.

If your intention is to say, as also seems from your comments, that regarding most things in the world there is no intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, then in my opinion one should not infer anything at all from the case discussed in the film to an ordinary and normal case, in which people believe that prayer to God and faith in Him do indeed help.
You wrote: “Is it not true that the Holy One, blessed be He, should see to this sooner or later? Something here smells wrong, but the assumptions fit the accepted religious outlook perfectly.” In my opinion this is mistaken. There is a difference between one time and another, and to most religious people it smells very good indeed to pray to God that He send them a match, and they also believe this will happen. Just not as an ultimatum for a miracle within three weeks.

Also, in my opinion it is important to note another basic point that is blurred in the article. There is a difference between God’s knowledge and His intervention. Even if we say that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene in every detail that happens in the world, that does not mean He does not know about it. No detail is hidden from God’s eyes; it is just that He does not always intervene in practice (certainly not when intervention requires a miracle), because He Himself wants the world to run according to the laws of nature that He Himself established. But providence (here in the sense of knowledge) over the world always exists, and for the Holy One, who is infinite, there is no difference between what happens in His world on the level of the cosmos as a whole and what happens on the bio-molecular level, just as there is no difference for Him in knowledge between what happens to the people of Israel as a whole and what happens to a single private individual. He knows it all, but as stated, He will not usually intervene in an exceptional way. (Of course, there would still be practical consequences regarding reward and saving a person in a non-miraculous way.)

B. I became aware of the exchange between you and my friend, the exchange from which you quoted the sentence in the article:
“As someone wrote to me not long ago, surely prayer, which is so meaningful for us, cannot be nothing more than useless mumbling.” I asked him: why “surely not”? Because it is hard for us to change our conception?”

So in your opinion prayer really is useless mumbling??

I do not understand why you accept the mitzvah of the red heifer, mixtures, the prohibition of eating pork, and more, even though they are not understandable to your reason (I hope at least that you do accept them, and I think you wrote as much in one of the notebooks). But regarding the verse in Psalms (which was also spoken in prophecy, or at least through divine inspiration): “The Lord is near to all who call upon Him, to all who call upon Him in truth,” and many other verses in Tanakh that say that “he who trusts in the Lord, kindness shall surround him,” and that all who take refuge in Him will not be ashamed—you suddenly become hesitant. To me this distinction is puzzling.
Your submission before the commandments of the Torah because they were given from a divine prophetic source demands of you submission and humility before every norm we received from similar sources such as prophecy and divine inspiration, written in the books of Tanakh. The understanding that there are things beyond cold rationality, the assumption that I do not know everything, that my tools for knowledge are limited, that I see one projection of the world, one dimension of the universe, while an entire dimension is missing from me—the understanding that, plainly speaking, we try to obtain information about that dimension from the Torah and the prophets—ought to guide every person, even the wisest, in approaching matters like these. So yes, one must think and use reason, but in this case reason itself tells us that we do not fully understand what goes on up there, and we have a tradition in this matter that understands it a bit better than we do. Especially when there is no direct frontal contradiction between them and reason, as you yourself wrote in the standard answers: perhaps the prayer will be accepted only later, perhaps for the next generation, or perhaps it is not good at all that it be accepted. I am very puzzled by the ease with which you decide that these answers are not correct, when confronting a world you do not understand at all. (By the way, you wrote in the fifth notebook a nice sentence, that regarding prophecy we are like blind people.)
As the wisest of men already said: “I said, I will be wise—but it was far from me.” It is permissible to accept that there are things we do not fully understand, and that our information about them comes from metaphysical sources. That does not detract from our dignity.

Forgive me if in the heat of my words I did not write with proper respect for you,
A good and blessed week.

Well, something like this is already written in Maimonides’ Guide. But interestingly, it is also found in Nachmanides’ commentary on Job (chapter 36).

In my humble opinion—the first assumption can be equally wrong or right (to take the example to the extreme: is the Holocaust evil?), the second is certainly wrong (unless the first or third are wrong. Cf. the Holocaust).
The question about both of them is: what is the definition of good? (At one end: what feels pleasant to me. At the other end: what happens in reality. At the third end: there is no such thing.)

The third assumption (and really the second as well) obviously assumes that we know who God is—an assumption that in my eyes is unfounded. Most of us, for most of our lives, are idol worshippers (not formally). The definition of God in my own mind could in principle accept the third assumption, but one may assume that her conception of God (and also that of the article’s author) is different.

– In my opinion, the discomfort aroused by the film does not come from the heroine’s theological worldview, but rather from:
A. Her psychological state: it is clear that her actions stem from despair, and this step is one step before mental collapse (likely even if it succeeds). On the other hand (to psychologists’ horror)—sometimes דווקא such an extreme and dangerous step can free a person from his fixed perception of himself, and therefore in my view it can sometimes be positive (rarely).
B. The human issue: it no longer matters who the groom will be, what the nature of the relationship with that person will be, etc…. What matters is: to get married.
What you might call: “looking at the vessel—and not at what is inside it.”

I did not understand the first remark. I defined good in two senses: performing a mitzvah or a good deed, and personal good for me. What is unclear here? As I wrote above, perhaps sometimes I am mistaken about this, but a reasonable assumption is that not always.

By contrast, I also do not understand the second assumption. Why does this depend on the definition of God? The question is what and how He acts. That is a factual question, not a definitional one.

As for the third point, here I disagree. In my opinion she is not acting out of despair but out of a worldview. But that is of course a matter of interpretation. And perhaps both things are true; still, even if a person is desperate, if he does something, that testifies to his worldview.

Hello Yosef.
Everything is fine, and there is no need to apologize. Passion is wonderful, and when the matters touch us, the words grow heated. After I finished reading, I did not understand at all what the apology was for. Everything is written perfectly fine, and not even with all that much heat. 🙂

A. What you are doing here is an ad hoc evasion of falsification. You set up the assumption that the Holy One, blessed be He, runs the world only in situations where it cannot be discerned. Because if one can suspect that He intervened, that is already considered more or less a miracle, and then He does not intervene. In other words, your assumption systematically evades falsification and in effect does not really claim anything. It is hard to argue with such a thesis, so you can surely understand why it seems suspicious to me on its face.
By the same token I could say that there is a demon with two tails and three horns constantly walking beside me, and when people ask why he is not seen I say that he always hides whenever anyone looks. It really resembles Russell’s celestial teapot.

“Do not rely on a miracle” does not mean that God does not intervene, but that He intervenes without performing miracles (or at least not always). What people pay less attention to is that there is no intervention that is not miraculous. Every intervention is a deviation from what should have happened according to the laws of nature, and as such it is a miracle. If you say that a miracle is only what is seen as a miracle, I would say two things here: 1. the above evasion of falsification. 2. Prayer about the past is forbidden in halakhah (“May it be Your will that these not be members of my household”). This is an intervention that nobody can know about (because I become aware of reality only after the intervention, if there was one), and nevertheless it is forbidden. Consider this very carefully.

And in general, if in your opinion I have said nothing new, then excellent (see the well-known introduction to Mesillat Yesharim). Then we agree. Although I must say that both your reaction and the reactions of others here show that this is not exactly so.

Where did you see in my words any confusion between intervention and knowledge? I am quite prepared to accept that He knows, and I did not write otherwise. My only claim is that He does not intervene.

B. Please acquaint yourself with the continuation of the exchange, in which he himself remarks that according to my view prayer is mumbling, and I explain that he did not read my words correctly. My claim is that requests to God apparently have no great significance (except perhaps asking that He depart from His custom and intervene after all—which according to my view is usually probably not answered). There are additional parts of prayer (praise, thanksgiving, etc., which also require explanation, but for them one can find one).

Even though, in light of my clarifications now, the comparison to the red heifer and mixtures is no longer relevant, I must note that your words contain a common mistake and it is important to sharpen the point.
For some reason people do not distinguish between what is written in the Torah, whose source is God, and the interpretation of the Sages (I mean even Torah laws, and certainly rabbinic laws), which is exposed to mistakes and error. Almost all the Torah laws in our hands are created from the Sages’ interpretation of verses, not from the verses themselves. I accept that if something came from God, then it is probably not mistaken (for He knows everything). But I do not accept that if something came from the interpretation of human beings, even if it concerns a Torah law, it is therefore necessarily not mistaken. On the contrary: Chazal, being human, certainly erred more than once. To be sure, the Talmud has authority in the area of halakhah, and therefore even if they erred, halakhically we accepted upon ourselves to keep it. But in errors of thought and fact, there is no authority.
From here you will understand the difference between the commandment of prayer (even according to Maimonides, that it is from the Torah) and mixtures and the red heifer.

Personally, I am not inclined to think that halakhah is based on Kabbalistic principles. There is no hint of this in the Talmud. Usually the Kabbalistic explanations come after the halakhic ruling and do not underlie it. As is known, the Ari used to rule like Maimonides, even though Maimonides certainly did not formulate halakhah on the basis of Kabbalistic thinking. In general, my trust in Kabbalah is limited (although, contrary to your assumption, I actually am knowledgeable in it; I studied it for several years). I think it is mainly a collection of spiritual intuitions, some valuable and some less so. I do not see it as a Torah transmitted from Sinai and passed down through tradition.
Since this is so, I relate to the words of Chazal as conclusions of human beings using their thought, and as such I do not see myself obligated to assume that they were always right. As for authority, my remarks on that are above.

On the first point—you were indeed right. You also wrote it in the article. In any case, these are specific definitions of good (one can disagree with them). But according to your view (if I understood correctly), good = pleasure: “personal good”—is what feels pleasant to me? “Performing a mitzvah or a good deed”—is what feels pleasant to another/to God? (Or is there another kind of good in them?) In any case, according to your view—there really is a probability that we are not always mistaken about this.

On the second point—it certainly depends on the definition of God. What and how does who act?
If for the sake of argument—you think God is Reuven, and I think God is Shimon—we can argue for a very long time about what God does and how, but presumably Reuven and Shimon do different things and in different ways, and therefore each of us is right according to his own definition but wrong according to the other’s definition.
For example here: from your words it seems that your God is more transcendent to the world, while in my eyes He is more immanent. Both can be found in the tradition, but some incline to this side and some to that side. And from this (among other things) our conception of providence will also emerge. If we were to define God in exactly the same way—it is conceivable (though not absolutely necessary) that if neither of us were lying—we would also agree on what and how He acts.

In any case, the three assumptions cannot all stand together in the face of the question of evil in the world. In my opinion, the key is examining the definitions of “good,” and “God” (who “forms light and creates evil”), and also the definition of the “I” in relation to them.

Regarding the third point—of course one can interpret it differently (though in my opinion it is relatively clear).
It is true that this testifies to a worldview, but my claim is that it is not what causes the feeling of discomfort (at least for me), but rather the despair and lack of humanity.

The fact that our belief in prayer does not meet the principle of falsifiability—that is true; God does not either.
I would even strengthen the point that it does not meet it, for blessing rests neither on something measured nor on something weighed, etc., and blessing rests only on something hidden from the eye, and even the prophet’s miracle with the oil had to take place in private.
So yes, it is hard to believe there will be proofs, for even in things that came closest to intervention in nature, the Sages took pains to say: “Ten things were created on the eve of the Sabbath at twilight—the mouth of the donkey, the mouth of the well, etc.”

My wonder, and that of many others, is why you suddenly try to put prayer to the test of whether it is proven. After all, this whole layer is unproven, beginning with God Himself and ending with the effect of the red heifer.
Yes, I believe there is providence; I believe providence is much rarer than Breslovers and the like present it; I believe there is a close connection to the level of the person under providence; and I see no way to doubt this. It is not on the same plane as simple facts.
True, it sounds evasive, but that is how Chazal determined it even before they needed apologetics, so it seems that this was entirely their view.

I agree that Chazal generally just thought and on that basis inferred their positions, but not so regarding the prophets; and in matters like these one is expected to turn to Tanakh and bring proofs from there, or at least to say: I do not know.

I will perhaps try to explain a bit more why this sounds implausible to me.
In order to raise difficulties about prayer and providence in general, one first has to assume that I know:
A. What is good for a person, what is the optimal act that ought to happen in order to maximize his good.
B. How righteous the person is, and accordingly what he deserves.
Both things are hidden from our eyes.
1. In one of your notebooks, you said that it is clear that the purpose of our creation is not morality or something similar that is intra-worldly, but something external. If I continue along that same line of thought, I think it is clear that we cannot determine what the optimal act is, since by definition we are assuming there is a set of goals external to us of which we have no idea, a set of goals that defines the maximization of our good.
2. I hope we agree that knowing how righteous a person is and what reward he deserves for his mitzvot or his prayers are two parameters unknown to us.
But you probably say: true, we do not know the details, but we can know trends and the like—for example, compare the greatest sages of the generation to the most absolute atheists, on the assumption that our error cannot be too great.
So first of all, I would be glad if there were a test that examined extreme populations, and not just ordinary religious people, whose level I am not at all sure of—certainly when all the studies I have seen were conducted on Christians, which does not excite me as a Jew.
But in any case, the saying “With the righteous, the Holy One is exacting to a hair’s breadth” greatly complicates the test.

I join Yosef’s request for forgiveness,
and would be glad for an answer especially to the question of why you saw fit to put something so vague to an empirical test.
Thank you,

As I wrote, facts do not depend on definitions. See (I did not understand whether you are male or female, so forgive me for writing in the masculine): according to your suggestion, God can be defined as immanent or transcendent, and in the tradition there are those who incline this way and those who incline that way. And I ask: what is the truth? Why should I care about definitions? Is He this or that? In other words: does He run the world or not? And to this you answer me that this is a matter of definitions?!

The three assumptions cannot stand in the face of the question of evil, and that is exactly my claim in the article. Therefore I said that one must give up one of them. I did not understand what you are answering to this. And here again you returned to making it depend on definitions. What do definitions have to do with all this? Instead of making arguments, you keep repeating that everything depends on definitions (when in truth nothing depends on them. Facts never depend on definitions).

Male.
The objective truth, in my eyes as it appears today, is that there is no answer—or that He is both and can contain logical contradictions. The truth is that this can be so just as it can be otherwise; if you remain consistent with your arguments, you can see the electron as matter or as energy, and so too God (at least in this context) you can see according to your definition (and that is why I argued earlier that most of us are idol worshippers), and apparently the full picture we will not see right now (“My face shall not be seen”). My own answer is that He “runs” the world (I would not use that term, but let it be) and is present in the world, but logically—I understand that one can argue otherwise, and if one can argue otherwise all the way through—then there will be no proof. And here—my preference is to cling to providence and to a relationship with God, even if other people can argue (correctly from their standpoint) that it has no meaning.

Again, in my opinion this very much depends on definitions. I will answer according to my definitions and my conception:
My own answer is that I do not want to give up either providence and relationship with God, or trust in my ability to see the “good” and pleasantness (as you wrote, there is a probability this will be correct).
On the second claim, I am willing to give up—“God” (whom I do not know exactly what He is, but) is not “good” (as I define it) and does not “want” that I have “good” and that I do “good.” The Lord God is truth (and like Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed: “and in the necessary there is no good and evil at all”). He is what happens.
That is how things stand according to my understanding and my definitions.

I lost you. But if you are speaking about logical contradictions, then in any event our discussion ends here.
All the best.

It’s not obvious that getting married is good. Maybe as atonement for sins she needs to remain single, at least at this stage? Or get married only when she is more mature and ready for it? Or maybe the groom destined for her is not ready yet? It is ridiculous to think that what we think is good for us necessarily matches the divine plan.

Hello Moshe.
I will write here again things that have all already been written above:
1. I explained that I do not mean to claim that this necessarily matches the divine plan, but you are claiming that it necessarily does not match, and that is completely unreasonable. Common sense can err, but to say that common sense is always wrong and crooked sense is always right is a rather revolutionary claim.
2. I explained that the theory in your formulation systematically escapes falsification, because when it does not work you will always say that it does not match the divine plan, and thus you cannot even subject it to statistical falsification.
3. Continuing from that, I wrote that in my eyes this resembles the claim that beside me at every moment walks a demon with three wings and two tails riding a Merkava Mark 8 tank (a literary embellishment now added so as not to leave the paper blank), except that whenever you look at him he disappears, and whenever you listen he makes no sound.
4. I also wrote that if I saw a reason to assume this, perhaps I would try to squeeze myself into it. But in my opinion there is no reason at all to do so. I simply do not think it is true, and common sense indicates as much. So why force ourselves into convoluted excuses at all?
5. And if I remember correctly, in a previous exchange between us we already reached agreement that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not run things, and at most intervenes from time to time. So what is the dispute about? Do you think He determines everything? Especially in light of what has already been written here (and I already discussed it in the article “A Good Measure”) in the name of Maimonides’ letter, that “from God, a woman to a man” is not correct because matchmaking is a mitzvah-act. So that certainly is not in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is for anyone looking for an anchor in the Rishonim for his principles of thought (unlike me).

Good morning,

You claim that my words are similar to Russell’s celestial teapot or to the ugly dwarf argument that you brought, but in my opinion there is no similarity at all. There is a clear difference between claims that come against a reasonable and logical background, and claims that have no basis whatsoever. To claim that there is a teapot floating around the world is a claim for which we have never found even the slightest basis, and therefore there is no obligation at all to relate to it or discuss it; the burden of proof is on the one making the claim. Likewise with the ugly dwarf.
By contrast, the claims regarding the benefit of prayer come, of course, against the background of our belief in the Torah and the Prophets who claim this and even tell us of many cases in which prayer was answered, and therefore among us it is presumed true. Whoever wants to come and refute it bears the burden of proof.
For some reason, it sometimes seems in your articles that you forget that we come from a religious background, that we are at the stage after accepting Tanakh as true, and are no longer at the stage of a beginning atheist.

Second, I did not understand how you explained away the verses I brought from Psalms about how the Holy One, blessed be He, hears the voice of those who call to Him in truth. You claim that prayer does not help, and I claim that there is an explicit verse that it does. Does this verse too require some special rabbinic interpretation that you would dispute? I think not. The plain meaning of this verse and many others indicates that there is indeed benefit to requests made to the Holy One, blessed be He, when they are made with a full heart. And all the more so when they are communal prayers. And this has no necessary contradiction to reason.

And as I wondered above, this is dealing with God’s ways with His creatures—things whose essence even Moses our teacher, the greatest of the prophets, did not fully grasp, and he asked God: “Please make known to me Your ways.” So you, with a partial and limited view of the world, presume to understand them and draw such significant conclusions about them? Have you understood all the other systems existing in the world that God created, that you now want to understand the nature of God’s governance of His world?
In these matters, in my opinion and in the opinion of all the sages of Israel, we have only what we received by tradition, which is more trustworthy to us than any such speculation.

Again, I hope I wrote with proper respect.
A good and blessed day.

The rabbi wrote in response to Moshe that it is not reasonable that common sense should always err.
Why is the claim that in every case what needs to happen happens and that is the right thing at the moment connected to the claim that common sense always errs? In most cases, the woman gets married at the proper time, without entering a frustrating period of singleness (as an example, of course), and common sense is correct in all those cases that things are proceeding “properly.” Moreover, the assumption that there is common sense in matters too complex (it doesn’t seem to me that one can assume there is common sense regarding a weather forecast at the level of the exact temperature three weeks from now) is not clear enough to me.

Hello Moshe.
The claim that women get married on time is one you can always make, but that itself is exactly what the dispute is about. Who says they get married on time? I claim that they get married when things work out according to the laws of nature and their choices. So let us look at a case where there will be practical difference between us.
What I am claiming is that if we conduct an experiment with a thousand women who set a date and reserve a hall and guests for three weeks from now, both my assumption and yours will be that almost none of them will get married. The meaning of that is that this is not a case in which we did not understand the good, but a consistent error.

As for the weather, I didn’t understand what it has to do with the matter. Of course that is complicated and cannot be predicted. But that it is good to get married on time when there is a hall and guests is perfectly simple, and therefore it is clear to me that, aside from exceptional cases, this is a reasonable assessment.
After all, if you do not believe in your own assessment of the good, how will you fulfill your Creator’s commandments and do good? You have no idea what good is.
This really seems to me like a bizarre discussion.

See a general response to everyone at the end.

I am writing here a general response and ending the discussion here with all the commenters, asking forgiveness. The arguments keep repeating themselves over and over, and what I answered I am asked again, and sometimes I answered one person and am asked the same thing by another. People are not relating to what I write and keep repeating the same thing over and over and over again. My strength is spent.
You can read my response here and the entire thread above, and these are my answers. If that works for you—fine, and if not—we will remain in disagreement.

This is the essence of my position.
1. Looking around me, the hand of God is not evident. All of us (including all of you, in my estimation) live with the clear sense (the accepted scientific outlook) that nature operates according to its fixed laws. What determines what will happen is the laws of nature and human choices (for those among you who are not determinists). That is all. God’s involvement, even if it exists, is very, very exceptional (and hidden in such a way that no one in the world can say he has noticed it. And those who say that simply are statistically mistaken. They can assume it, but not claim that they actually saw it).

2. Likewise, no response to prayers is evident—neither financial nor medical nor in anything else. When people talk about this, there is nothing here but the law of small numbers. Of course each individual can assume there was intervention, but no one can bring even the slightest indication of it. We have not gotten beyond fantasies.
In no statistical measure do I discern a difference between those who pray and those who do not. Moreover, none of you balks at studies done on medicines and surgeries on the bodies of gentiles or secular people, even though they do not pray, and that completely changes the picture. I have never heard of a God-fearing medical researcher who insists that his patients not pray, or that the rate of those who pray in the sample group and in the control group be equal, in order to validate his findings. So don’t sell me the nonsense that you really believe in anything you’re saying.
Just to clear away all sorts of baseless talk, it is important to understand something many people get confused about: there is no divine intervention within the framework of the laws of nature. There is no such creature. Intervention is always a deviation from the laws of nature. Whoever thinks miracles are constantly happening around him—please stand up. Whoever thinks a miracle occurs after every prayer—please sit down. And after sitting down, let him believe me about the demon that accompanies me on all my ways and disappears when one looks at it.

3. The sources from Scripture and prophecy are indeed binding for me also on the factual level, but the gates of interpretation have not been locked. If “an eye for an eye” can mean monetary compensation, then “I will give your rains in their season” or “the Lord answers all who call upon Him” can mean in a period when God reveals Himself with prophets and miracles, and not in our own day. Or alternatively, “He can answer all who call upon Him,” but He chooses to answer very few of them (with no statistical weight whatever). In this way, the sources above are nicely explained.
As for Chazal, they knew about the world and God’s conduct no more than you and I do (except for what came by tradition). I have no indication that their conception is the result of a tradition from Sinai, and even if it is, perhaps that was only for their time and not for ours. A tradition that determines that God’s conduct does not change even over the course of history (until our own day) seems even less reasonable to me. Since factually the view that He runs everything and answers all who call upon Him seems to me (and to you as well) plainly incorrect, I decide not to accept this conception of theirs, at least for our times.

4. The fact that all the sages throughout the generations thought otherwise, even if true (and I strongly doubt it), is not very important. They have no authority in matters of fact, only at most in matters of halakhah. Therefore this can at most lead me to think again. So I thought again, and this is still my conclusion. That is all.

All the other claims I saw here are beside the point and do not address the arguments I keep making again and again. Such as that I forget we are religious, when the argument here is precisely about what it means to be religious (and again, I have no problem with the tone. I have a problem with the silly content and the disregard for what I keep repeating again and again), and so on and so forth.
That is all for now. I will elaborate more in my book.

Hello Rabbi.
1. Where did I say that common sense always errs? I said that we do not understand the divine plan, which is a rather simple and accepted claim already from the time of Tanakh, without anyone disputing it.
2. Faith is not a scientific theory and does not need to meet the test of falsifiability. As long as it contains no logical contradiction, there is nothing irrational in adopting it even if it is not falsifiable. That is the whole idea of faith, as opposed to knowledge.
3. If belief in such a demon were one of the principles of Judaism passed down in tradition from Sinai and agreed upon by the Written and Oral Torah and all the great sages of Israel, then indeed I would believe in it. Even so, this is not similar at all. Belief in such a demon is highly unintuitive, whereas the belief that God hears prayers and can answer them is very intuitive.
4. The reason is as I wrote in the previous section: it is a very basic and essential part of Judaism. If even the prophets attacked those who claimed “The Lord has forsaken the land,” it is not clear why you choose to place yourself in that slot. Also, there is nothing in this that contradicts common sense, unless one sets up a straw man according to which God must answer every prayer in a way visible and apparent to us. No one claims that. The claim is that prayers can help, not that they always help.
5. I do not recall agreeing to such a thing. Everything that happens is done by God, whether it is done by way of orderly and predictable regularity, like the laws of nature, or by way of individualized providence and small or large miracles here and there.

Of course I have the good that seems good to me at the time, and by that I conduct my steps. I simply believe that through the narrow slit by which I see, there is not enough to discern with certainty what is good and what is not, when hindsight reveals to me what needed to happen. Could it have been otherwise? Probably yes, if I had acted differently. In the given reality, I believe that this is the best thing that could happen, and therefore it happened.

‘A fundamental principle of the Torah of Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, and of all who follow it, is that man has absolute capacity—that is, that by his nature, his choice, and his will he does all that it is possible for a human being to do… And it is likewise among the fundamentals of the Torah of Moses our teacher that no injustice can in any way come from Him, exalted be He, and that all the sufferings that befall human beings and all the good things they attain, whether individual or community, are all according to what they deserve, by a just judgment in which there is no injustice at all… This is what He, exalted be He, said: “for all His ways are justice” (Deuteronomy 32:4), but we do not know by what criterion they deserve…

And we believe that all human states are according to what each and every person deserves, and He is exalted above doing injustice—He punishes only whoever among us deserves punishment. This is what the Torah of Moses our teacher says explicitly: that everything is according to what each and every person deserves…

Divine providence follows the divine overflow, and according to the species to which that intellectual overflow adheres until it becomes rational and all that is fitting for a rational being is revealed to him—so does divine providence accompany him and evaluate all his actions by way of reward and punishment. If the sinking of the ship with its passengers, as mentioned [in Aristotle’s opinion], and the falling of the roof upon those in the house are entirely by chance—then the entry of these people onto the ship and the sitting of the others in the house is not by chance, in our opinion, but according to the divine will in accordance with what is fitting by His judgments, whose principles our minds do not attain to know.

…There appear explicit verses that providence extends to all particulars of human beings and that all their deeds are taken into account: “He who fashions their hearts alike, who considers all their deeds” (Psalms 33:15); and it is said: “whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the children of men, to give every one according to his ways” (Jeremiah 32:19); likewise it is said: “His eyes are upon the ways of a man, and He sees all his steps” (Job 34:21). The Torah explicitly writes of providence over the particulars of man and the reckoning of their deeds. It says: “And on the day when I visit, I will visit their sin upon them” (Exodus 32:34). And it says: “Whoever has sinned against Me, him will I blot out of My book” (ibid. 32:33), and it says: “And I will destroy that soul” (Leviticus 23:30), and it says: “And I will set My face against that soul” (ibid. 20:6), and many such [verses]. All the stories of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are conclusive proof of individual providence….

Understand my opinion completely. For I do not believe that anything is hidden from Him, exalted be He, nor do I ascribe impotence to Him. Rather I believe that providence follows the intellect and is attached to it, for providence comes from One who is intellectual and whose intellect is perfect with a perfection after which there is no perfection. And whoever is touched by something of that overflow—according to the measure of the intellect that reaches him, so is the measure of what reaches him from providence. This is the opinion that seems to me suited to reason and to the language of the Torah.

In the earlier opinions [which either extend providence to animals as well or deny providence to human beings. S.Z.L.], by contrast, there is either excess or deficiency. Either an excess that causes complete confusion, denial of reason, and blatant contradiction of what is perceived by the senses; or a great deficiency that entails corrupt beliefs about God, the destruction of the order of human existence, and the erasure of all man’s moral and intellectual virtues. I refer to the one who denies providence over the particulars of human beings and equates them with the other species of animals.’

All the best. In any case—thank you for helping me understand your position and my own more clearly. I’d be happy to answer if something specific is unclear.
By the way, your response only reinforces my position regarding the conception of God: a God who does not provide oversight in the world and who is unable to contain logical contradictions—is not my God (and more sharply—according to my definitions He is a spiritual idol, which by the way very much resembles the philosopher’s God in the Kuzari), which does not prevent Him from being your God. Who has the truth? “And the truth will be absent” (“flocks, flocks”).
Again thank you, and all the best.

The truth is not absent at all, nor does it become flocks. A common mistake is to think that if there are two opinions, that means there is no truth. That is simply a mistake. The truth is that it only means one is right and the other is wrong.
And as for our matter, if you think God is exempt from logic, or that you are looking for a God who is not subject to it, you are simply dealing in nonsense, if only because you cannot believe in such a God (for you are subject to logic).
All the best.

I did not claim that every two opinions are undecidable. Usually there is, as you say—one is wrong and one is right. But there are things about which every intellect looks from a different angle and therefore sees a different picture and reaches a different conclusion, like a tall building that looks like a flat circle from a bird’s-eye view, or like the electron example I brought earlier. In my opinion—that is the case in this discussion. My conclusion is not that there is no truth, but that God is truth, and Him we are unable to grasp with our intellects.
If we are speaking about facts—my belief in such a God is itself a fact. And likewise my denial of other gods. And indeed—I seek such a God—and sometimes find Him.

No intellect looks at a logical contradiction from any angle. He may imagine that he is looking at it from some angle, but he is mistaken.

In chapter 18 Maimonides explains that there is a difference in the degree of providence according to the degree of a person’s perfection and attachment to God, as it says: “He will keep the feet of His pious ones, but the wicked shall be silent in darkness, for not by strength shall a man prevail” (I Samuel 2:9). He says that the fact that some human beings are protected from harms while others are struck by harms is not according to their physical powers and natural preparedness, as it says “for not by strength shall a man prevail,” but rather according to perfection and deficiency—that is, their nearness to God or distance from Him. Therefore those close to Him are best protected: “He will keep the feet of His pious ones,” and those far from Him are exposed to what strikes them by chance, and there is nothing to protect them from what may happen suddenly, like one who walks in darkness…’

In chapter 19 Maimonides brings the prophets’ grappling with the question of “why do the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer”: ‘The prophets noted that the proofs the ignorant bring for God’s not knowing our deeds are that they see wicked people living lives of comfort and ease, and that this leads the excellent person to think there is no benefit in his turning to do good and in the suffering he endures because of the opposition of others. The prophet noted that he thought deeply about the matter until it became clear to him that one must look at the ends of things, not at their beginnings…’, and in the test of time, “falsehood does not endure; truth does endure.”

In chapter 24 Maimonides explains the matter of trial, that its purpose is “that it be an example that they should imitate and follow,” and he illustrates this with the trial of the binding of Isaac, which teaches the many the obligation of self-surrender to God’s will and the degree of certainty in prophecy.

Hello Rabbi,
The ideas in the article on the film “Through the Wall” were very interesting and gave much food for thought.
I want to argue that the example you brought from the film can be explained even without the three approaches you presented and rejected, and therefore there is also no need to reject one of the three assumptions we brought in order to understand why the film’s conclusion is not at all compelling.
The rabbi proposed throwing out the third assumption, the assumption that says that everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He. The rabbi gave an example—“When Reuven decides to murder Shimon, the blame lies with Reuven and not with the Holy One, blessed be He, since Reuven is the one who did it. And of course from this it also follows that it is not true that Shimon died because of his sins or because he finished his role in the world.” If I want to accept this statement, what do I do with statements such as “Merit is brought about through the meritorious, and liability through the guilty”? And do I need to stop believing in reward and punishment? Is everything chance in this world? In the Ten Commandments it says, “I the Lord your God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generations of those who hate Me,” but from the example it seems that there is no individual providence or ancestral merit.
Accordingly, I propose a simpler solution for refuting the equation that emerges from the film. All three assumptions are true and correct, while the film’s conclusion ignores part of those assumptions. In his preliminary pilpul the rabbi proposed “that the date should also enter the conclusion. After all, if she has already reserved a hall and spent money, then clearly it is good for her to get married on that date, no? There is no reason to assume that another date would be preferable.” How can we know what is truly good for us? Who knows what would have happened on that wedding date? Perhaps a terrorist would have entered and killed ten guests? Perhaps the ceiling would have collapsed and there would have been a major disaster? Even then is there no reason to assume another date would have been preferable? So yes, the Holy One, blessed be He, wants what is good for me, and therefore He does not want the wedding to be on that date. And who said that getting married is good? Perhaps from that marriage there would emerge a pedophile who would molest dozens of children? Or perhaps the husband who comes along would be crazy and make his wife miserable all her life?
Therefore I suggest that indeed the Holy One, blessed be He, wants only to do us good (assumption A), and that getting married is good (assumption B), and that everything is in His hands (assumption C), but we simply do not know what is truly good for us. Are we simply not supposed to make heavenly calculations? And therefore all our effort does not change the fact that “sometimes Dad can also say no.”

Not for nothing did I end the discussion in this thread, for exactly the reason I wrote: the same questions keep recurring there again and again, and I have already answered each of them several times. Perhaps you do not accept my answers, but there is no point in repeating the same things over and over. The wording of your remarks clearly shows that you did not read what was written. Perhaps I am naïve and exaggerating, but I expect someone writing a comment on the post to read what was said before, at least in the same thread.
All the best.

Hello Rabbi.
I understood that no further responses on comments on this topic will be accepted, and I wanted to clarify something.
I assume that the rabbi believes that on the large scale there is providence (for how else can one explain the purpose of the Torah, Judaism, and the people without assuming this), as well as freedom of human choice. If that is the case, I cannot understand how there is no contradiction between the combination of these beliefs and holding the view that there is no individual providence. If in the end reality must arrive at a certain place (and alongside that there is determinism and “the Lord shall be King,” etc.) and on the other hand a person has the ability to influence and change things in reality, is it not necessary that changes occur in reality according to human actions? And if changes do occur according to your actions, what practical difference is there between saying that this is providence and claiming that this is how nature is built (that through prayer, for example, something in reality changes for the better—sometimes not as you wanted, but always for the better)?
If the rabbi is already saturated with questions on this issue, or if the matter is simple and I just failed to notice, there is no need to answer.
Thank you

It is definitely possible that there is direction of the world on large scales. According to the law of large numbers, there can be full freedom for each individual and the big picture will still move in the desired direction. Just as each toss of a die is random, and yet on large scales the distribution will be 1/6 for each face. On this matter see also Maimonides, Laws of Repentance 6:5, where he writes this explicitly (and thereby the Raavad’s objection there is resolved).
Beyond that, I am not sure there really is direction even on the large scales. Even if in the end the Messiah will come, that can be a process that is done at that time. It does not necessarily have to be done through a long process throughout all of history.

Here is a “large numbers” study proving that religious people live longer than secular people.
As a religious person, I also attribute this to prayer and fear of God, which prolong life.
Of course you will claim that it stems from other things,
and in fact this already enters into interpretation arising from a prior worldview.
In any case, you have no clear proof that prayer is of no use,
because in any event we have found a noticeable difference between secular and religious people.

Here is the link to the study:

http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/012/897.html

This study is in addition to the other differences we see with our own eyes,
that the religious family is more stable, that they are more successful in educating their children,
and again, even in these cases it is obvious to me that you will claim this is only because of material reasons,
but that already enters into interpretation of the facts.
In my view and in the view of many others, these successes are more than would be expected from the effort they make,
and therefore, in the bottom line, there is no proof for your claim that we do not see differences.

You are trying to see the differences in some dramatic and major thing that goes beyond nature,
but nowhere is it written that everyone who prays, God will perform for him a miracle outside the ordinary.
Whoever reflects sees God’s governance in the world hidden behind nature.

At the margins I will add that we do not pray only in order to receive benefits from the Holy One, blessed be He,
but also, and perhaps mainly, in order to draw close to God and feel our dependence on Him and serve Him.
So for me the discussion is not whether to pray or not, but only about the practical results of prayer.

Hello Yosef.
First, that is not a link to a study but to an article about it. There is an important difference between the two; note this well.

As for the matter itself, quite a few such studies have been published long ago, and this is ancient history, except that they are also true of other religions. This phenomenon is true of Christianity as well (even more so than among us). Now you have to decide whether the Holy One, blessed be He, answers the prayers of idolatrous Christians, or whether faith causes this on the psychological level. Elimination is an important scientific consideration that prevents a lot of begging the question. Whoever wants to avoid scientific thinking naturally does not bother using it. Your thesis can be tested more scientifically (let them do an experiment on people who believe but do not pray, and people who pray Christian prayer, or in another wording, or in any other form). Let us wait for the results and then talk.

This is not a question of drama but of laws of nature or not laws of nature. There is no such creature as intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, within nature. Every involvement is a deviation from the laws, visible or hidden. I have already raised here several arguments for why the existence of such involvement is plainly highly unlikely, and why you yourself probably do not really believe in it. But I do not have the strength to repeat them again and again.

Prayer whose purpose is not request is not part of this dispute.

With God’s help, 13 Kislev 5777

To RMDA—greetings,

Maimonides already taught us in Guide of the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17, that his belief in providence does not rest on proof, but on the testimony of the Torah and the prophets that “all His ways are justice,” and on the implausibility that the Perfect One should act unjustly.

Regarding your claim that every divine intervention is an annulment of nature:

First of all, an exception is not the annulment of the system of the laws of nature. The Holy One, blessed be He, is the One who established the laws of nature according to which creation is conducted, and He is the One who placed above them the laws of justice, and He has the ability to bend the laws of nature according to the demands of the laws of justice. (See on this in Ramchal’s Derekh Hashem, part two.)

Second, in most cases there is no need at all to change the laws of nature in order to do God’s will, since even according to nature there is room for several scenarios. And as Maimonides wrote (ibid.), even if the sinking of the ship in the storm or the collapse of the house happens according to nature, the person’s being in that place or not is dictated by providence.

It is enough that a bee sting the person, or that he discover he forgot something at home, and so on among natural scenarios, in order that he not board the ship and be saved from the natural disaster. Thus the Creator generally conducts His world without the need to deviate from the laws of nature.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

It is no wonder that even the prayer of those who associate the Name of Heaven with idolatry should be answered, for King David said through divine inspiration: “The Lord is near to all who call upon Him, to all who call upon Him in truth.”

. Therefore there is room that the Lord may hear the prayer of travelers on the road even though their request is bad for the world, because their prayer comes from the heart. Therefore the High Priest had to pray that the prayer of travelers on the road not be heard. And therefore even the prayer of accidental killers who yearn for the death of the High Priest can be answered, because their prayer is said with a full heart; therefore the mothers of the High Priests would provide for the killers so that they would not pray for the death of their sons.

Greater than this is worthy prayer emerging from worthy people, about which it is said, “He will fulfill the desire of those who fear Him; He also will hear their cry and save them.” And even here there are situations where “Dad says no.” Who is greater than Moses, who pleaded 515 prayers to enter the Land of Israel, and the Lord commanded him: “Enough for you; do not continue to speak to Me any more of this matter,” and as the Midrash of the Sages says: “Enough for you”—much more than this is stored up for you, abundant goodness hidden for you.

The faith and prayer of the people of Israel, who clung to their God through all the exiles and all the trials, has proved itself. Not only did the seventy wolves fail to destroy the poor sheep, but it succeeded in bequeathing to humanity the essentials of its faith and values, and began to return after thousands of years to its land, when the wolf of wolves, Stalin, turned for a short time into a “Zionist” and brought about the nations’ approval for the return to Zion.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

I came to write a comment, but I saw that Rabbi S.Z.L. had written everything I wanted…

Especially regarding what he wrote, that God’s intervention is within the framework of the laws of nature.
None of us, nor any of the Rishonim, is speaking about prayer that brings about intervention
that creates a deviation from the laws of nature—what in our language is called a miracle.
Our entire claim is only that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes in what happens in the world within the framework of the laws of nature,
and in that, prayer can help—depending of course on the level of the person.
There one must look carefully in order to see the hand of God.
This can be heard from many people who have experienced it in the small matters during their lives.
In my eyes this can also be a lost object found after prayer, or better-than-expected success on a test, and the like—
small things that are of no interest to anyone to conduct a large-numbers study on,
and there the Holy One, blessed be He, runs His world in concealment and hears those who call to Him—all within “nature.”
And even according to your own view,
at the very least there is no proof whatsoever that it does not help in cases like these.
(Have you yourself conducted a large-numbers study on that??!)

Hello S.Z.L. and Yosef.
1. It seems to me that providence only intensifies the difficulty. You see injustice in the world (“the righteous suffers”). So if there is no providence, there are no complaints about injustice, but if there is providence then the difficulty only intensifies.
2. Regarding intervention as a deviation from the laws of nature, I have already explained this here more than once and will repeat it again. It is a simple claim, and I do not see any way to argue about it without denying simple facts. The laws of nature determine that something will happen, and God intervenes and causes something else to happen. If so—every intervention is a miracle. Sometimes it can be hidden, but every intervention is a miracle. You can reject this only if you assume that the laws of nature are not deterministic (that is, they do not determine uniquely what will happen). But such a claim does not fit anything known to us today and contradicts the most basic assumptions and findings of science. It has no basis (except in quantum theory, which exists only on very small scales and “smears out” on large scales).
“Intervention within nature” is the kind of thing people say when they do not know what they are talking about. It is simply an oxymoron resulting from ignorance (or disagreement with the known laws of physics. On what basis?) or lack of thought.
I see no point in getting into this again. In the theological trilogy I will explain it in detail (God willing?).

With God’s help, 14 Kislev 5777

Regarding the question of “the righteous suffers”—I addressed it in my comments “Of the Ways of Providence (continued)” and “The Obligation of Optimism and the Obligation of Caution.” God’s will that man have choice requires the concealment of providence, for if everyone received his reward or punishment “on the spot,” choice would be taken away. Likewise the possibility of repentance would be removed, and therefore often the recompense is evident only in the long term, where only “truth endures.”

Regarding the laws of nature, I already noted in my previous comment “‘All His Ways Are Justice’” that the Legislator of the laws of nature, the Master of the universe, is not prevented from “bending” the laws of nature before the laws of justice. But there are many situations in which the Leader uses natural scenarios in order to carry out providence.

Like the story you told about a family stuck on the road, and the One who causes all causes arranged that an acquaintance of theirs, who knew the road like the back of his hand, would suddenly lose his way and pass exactly by them, and his wife would notice them despite the darkness and the speed of the drive. A rare conjunction of circumstances that is hard to see as mere chance, yet with no deviation at all from the laws of nature.

And like what happened to me 14 years ago, on the eve of 14 Kislev 5763, when I was supposed to arrive at the hitchhiking post for Kochav HaShachar at 5:30 PM, and therefore I phoned my “boss,” Prof. Meir Benayahu z”l, to inform him that I would not be able to bring him the galley proofs of his article today but only tomorrow. He, unlike his usual way, insisted forcefully that I finish the “project” that very day, and in no way postpone it to the next day. Thus I did not arrive at the hitchhiking post at 5:30 and did not join as a hitchhiker in the car of my neighbor Mrs. Eti Galia hy”d, who was murdered later in her trip on the way to the settlement….

Not for nothing do we thank God “for Your miracles that are with us every day” and pray that His mercies and kindnesses never leave us forever and ever.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

The gates of excuses and escape from falsification have not been locked. And I already pointed this out. I already remarked that beside me all the time walks a demon with three yellow wings and four red horns. You may ask: how is it that no one sees him? Simple: every time someone looks at him he becomes entirely transparent (“If the plague has turned all white”), and then returns.

As I explained, there is no intervention through the ways of nature, and there is no point repeating this over and over. It is simply a misunderstanding.

I assume your neighbor’s relatives also thank the Holy One, blessed be He, for His miracles and abundant kindness and His intervention in the laws of nature. Or is it that her being killed is nature and your being saved is a miracle? Or perhaps the opposite? Your being saved is nature and her being killed is the miracle (the intervention)? This is exactly the sort of fallacious argument of the law of small numbers.

Well, this is already starting to become a dialogue of the deaf..

You keep returning to the demon argument,
and claim that everything must be open to falsification (as though we were dealing here with plotting witnesses),
and I (and perhaps S.Z.L. as well) do not understand why, when you have no proof either way,
you simply do not accept what Tanakh says in order to decide the matter.
True, there is no proven proof for our approach, but neither do you have a crushing contradiction,
so let the third verse come and decide between them!

Would you not agree that this is at the very least a dispute dependent on worldviews,
in such a way that there is no decisive proof for either side?
Indeed, whoever wants can interpret the matter either way, and there is no necessary proof (which in my opinion, too, is God’s will).
(We, of course, prefer the side of Tanakh and tradition, and it seems to me that you do not.)

Indeed, I have the odd tendency to repeat correct arguments that receive no answer. Everyone has his eccentricities.
I have excellent evidence this way, and none that way. The law of gravity too has no evidence other than that it works. And if it works, that means that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene but the world runs with fixed regularity (whereas according to your view the law of gravity is voluntary). I have already explained several times that according to your view you cannot rely on any medical experiment, because no experimenter takes into account the parameter of prayer and fear of Heaven when checking the effectiveness of a treatment/drug and the like. I also explained that I rely on Tanakh just as you do, but I allow myself to interpret it according to common sense (as the Ran wrote in Sukkah: one should not deny what is perceived by the senses). Therefore do not recruit Tanakh to your side, because that is begging the question.
In summary, for some reason I prefer what I have evidence for, while offering a possible explanation for the biblical sources. By contrast, you propose to interpret them literally even for our time (against common sense and experience) and to give up the laws of nature. A puzzling preference—but health to you.
But I have really repeated this here many times already, and I think we have exhausted it.

With God’s help, 14 Kislev 5777

Is the wondrous existence of the people of Israel as a sheep among seventy wolves, as the Torah promised—“And yet for all that, when they are in the land of their enemies, I will not reject them nor loathe them to destroy them”—not proven evidence of the truth of the Torah?

Is the return of the people of Israel to its land, the renewal of its national revival, and the beginning of the ingathering of its exiles from the four corners of the earth, as the Torah promised—“If your outcasts be at the ends of heaven, from there the Lord your God will gather you, and from there He will take you. And the Lord your God will bring you to the land that your fathers possessed, and you shall possess it, and He will do you good and multiply you more than your fathers”—not proven evidence of the truth of the Torah?

As for the creature with three yellow wings and four red horns disturbing RMDA’s peace of mind—I recommend that he set before his eyes the merit of the three Patriarchs and four Matriarchs, who believed in God even amid great concealment of the divine face, and as Maimonides wrote in Guide of the Perplexed, Part III, chapter 17, that all the stories of the Patriarchs teach individual providence.

And may the merit of the Patriarchs and Matriarchs protect Torah scholars from all harmful forces, which according to Maimonides are the doubts in faith “that stand against us like the ridge before the rushes,” and may it strengthen all “the knees of the rabbis that knock together,”

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

Regarding the claim you repeat again and again, that the existence of laws of nature contradicts providence, I have already answered in detail in my comment “‘All His Ways Are Justice,’” from the second paragraph onward, and there is no need to repeat the matter.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

Hello Rabbi Levinger,

The discussion here does not revolve around whether there is general providence over the people of Israel.
On this I think and hope that RMDA also agrees that there is,
and your proofs above indeed prove in my opinion that such providence exists.

The discussion is specifically about individual providence,
and from it also follows the question regarding the response to each individual person’s personal prayer,
as part of that providence.

As for the matter itself, the arguments are indeed repeating, but I truly did not understand R. Michi’s claims on this issue
(I am doubtful whether I am the one blessed with a small mind, or whether the problem lies in the body of the claim or in its proofs),
why according to his view it is impossible to say that individual providence is within the framework of the laws of nature,
and that its intervention actualizes one of the possible scenarios and not another.
(And of course all this does not contradict the laws of nature such as gravity, which stand as they are by God’s will.)

I personally believe that this is how God governs the world, as also emerges from the plain sense of Tanakh and Chazal,
and as you explained so well.

In any case, it indeed seems we have exhausted the matter; the discussion is not advancing.
Let each person go with his own understanding,
as long as he is honest with himself.

Thanks to R. Michi for the effort and the quick responses.
And thanks to you as well, of course.

I expected that the mistaken assumption would דווקא be assumption 2—that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants what is good for me.
One can argue that the Holy One wants some general good that does not necessarily align with the good of each individual person (who will be compensated in the World to Come). In such a conception, the general good is indeed in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, perhaps through prior planning or perhaps through intervention in reality—it is hard to say.
Is this point of view also possible?

Personally I enjoyed the film just as I enjoy films written from a Christian or atheist point of view—a film like that can be interesting both philosophically and dramatically, even without my fully identifying with it.

And to Yosef he said—

That providence applies to every individual is explicit in the Ten Commandments: “visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generations of those who hate Me, and showing kindness to the thousandth generation of those who love Me and keep My commandments”; “for the Lord will not hold guiltless one who takes His name in vain”; “Honor your father and your mother, that your days may be prolonged…”.

And so the Lord says to Moses: “Whoever has sinned against Me, him will I blot out of My book,” and many times the Torah warns: “that soul shall surely be cut off; his iniquity is upon him,” “and I will set My face against that man,” and the like. Abigail blesses David: “for the Lord will certainly make my lord a sure house… and the soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life…” (I Samuel 25:28–29). The prophet Jeremiah calls to his God: “great in counsel and mighty in deed, whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the children of men, to give every one according to his ways and according to the fruit of his deeds” (32:19).

From these and many similar sources Maimonides (Guide of the Perplexed III, 17) derived the Torah’s belief that providence is over every single detail of the human species (and only regarding animals is providence over the species as a whole and not its individuals). Maimonides also says that reason and justice require that the Creator of the world not withhold from any rational being what is due to him for his proper choice. In this Maimonides rejected the view of Epicurus that everything is by chance, and the view of Aristotle, that both among humans and among animals providence is only over the species.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

And one who holds that the laws of nature do not permit their Creator any intervention will, according to his view, necessarily have to adopt the opinion of Epicurus. Against their view, King David said: “He who planted the ear, shall He not hear? He who formed the eye, shall He not see? He who disciplines nations, shall He not rebuke—the One who teaches man knowledge…” (Psalms 94).

Hello Yosef, I have already explained the matter, and you again return as though it had not been written.
You again assume that the laws of nature allow several options and providence chooses one of them. But it is not so. The laws of nature are completely deterministic (unless you have a different physics from what physicists know). Given a certain set of circumstances X, the laws of nature determine that Y will happen. There is no other possibility according to the laws of nature.
Therefore, if Y indeed happens, then it happened because of the laws of nature and not because of the Holy One, blessed be He. And if Z happens—then it is a miracle (because what happened is what should not have happened according to the laws of nature).
Hence: there is no intervention that is not a miracle. QED.
I do not know how to explain this in a clearer or simpler way.

That is of course possible, but plainly highly unlikely.
I do not know why the general good always requires that the good for me not occur. After all, I am claiming that in most cases, when we reserve a hall in advance, no wedding will take place, despite the fact that that is what is good for me. In your opinion is there a law that what is good for the world is always bad for me? That is an interesting law, and since it is true for one person (there is nothing special about me), it turns out that what is good for the world as a whole is always bad for each and every one of the particulars in it. That is a really interesting law indeed.
Enjoying the film, of course, does not depend on agreeing with its content. I too enjoyed the film and did not agree with the heroine’s position (I do not know what the director’s position is).

What I meant was that the general good does not necessarily align with the private good, but sometimes it coincides with it and sometimes it conflicts with it. When I claimed that assumption 2 is mistaken, I did not mean that the opposite is exactly true (-1), but that it is not generally correct (0).

I understand. And to that I asked whether this is usually so (that the general good differs from the private good) or not. For if there are enough cases in which the general good coincides with the private good, then I would expect behavior like that of the heroine to be within the realm of the reasonable (even if not certain). She tries, and has a good chance of succeeding (even if not certain).
But it seems to me that we all think this is not so—that her behavior is strange and irrational. And from here it follows that in our opinion it is always (or almost always) not so. Now, according to your view this is explained by the general good diverging from and conflicting with the private good. From this it follows that always, or almost always, the general good contradicts the private good (which seems very strange to me). QED.

The relation between private good and general good is not fixed, just as the relation between private good and nature is not fixed. There are trivial cases in which the private good coincides with them—for example, the fact that the Earth is not destroyed—and there are cases in which they are in conflict—for example, a private person winning the lottery, where the odds are especially low, and therefore it is not likely that it will accord with nature or with the general good.
And so too regarding the heroine’s behavior: we think the behavior is unreasonable because her private good in this case—namely, finding a groom without preparation—is highly improbable in light of the laws of nature. Thus, since we do not accept the second assumption, it is clear to us that the Holy One, blessed be He, is more interested in the persistence of the laws of nature than in the heroine’s personal good.
Of course, the error in this assumption is related in a certain sense also to the error in the third assumption.

Rabbi already taught us (whose date of passing is attributed to today, 15 Kislev) that the fruitful tension between the general good and the private good is what brings about a straight and balanced path, a path that is on the one hand “a glory to the one who does it,” suited to the will of the person himself, and on the other hand “a glory to him from mankind,” good also for the rest of humanity.

Since the Lord is “good and upright,” He guides us—whether through His Torah, which is the order of the world, in which every detail and every tendency finds its proper place, or through His overt and hidden providence—toward the straight path that brings harmony between the private good and the general good.

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

With God’s help, 15 Kislev 5777

R. Abraham ben HaRambam expands on the trait of trust in his book HaMaspik LeOvdei Hashem (ed. R. Yosef Dori, Jerusalem 1973, pp. 75–106. I will bring here some of his words, and “Give to a wise man and he will become yet wiser”):

‘Trust in God, exalted and blessed be His name, is one of the sublime traits, indeed even one of the foundations of the Torah… The books of the prophets are full of it, and the verses of the Torah point to it. It is enough for us to mention His statement: “for man does not live by bread alone, but by everything that proceeds out of the mouth of the Lord does man live.” And His command, exalted be He, to refrain from sowing and reaping and to leave the produce of the land ownerless in the seventh year and in the Jubilee year, is founded on the principle of trust…

And the essence of trust is the strengthening of faith that the Lord, exalted be He, is the Creator and Sustainer, the One who gives life and causes death, who makes sick and heals, who enriches and impoverishes, and that all the particular and general occurrences of the world return to Him, and He forms them, decrees them, and brings them about—except for fear of Heaven, which is not in the hands of Heaven…

And the state of human beings regarding trust in God… is divided into three parts…
The first part… is the trust of the prophets and the close ones, and their disciples among the upright righteous, and it is the stripping away of all ordinary means and the tendency to rely on miracles that contradict the laws of nature… Such trust—trust in unheard-of miracles and in great divine kindnesses whose level is close to miraculous acts—is possible only by virtue of the holy spirit and God’s command… Whoever hangs his hopes solely on miracles without proper preparation, without revelation, without true divine awareness, and without heavenly assistance—desires what is not suited to him and sins through audacity that leads to desecration of the Name…

As for the third type, it is the trust incumbent on all those who keep the faith, namely that it should be firmly planted in a person’s belief that natural causes and ordinary means are entrusted to individual divine providence… In light of these things, the keeper of the faith must therefore, when he dedicates his strength to natural causes and ordinary things in order to derive benefit from them… place his trust in the Lord, exalted be He, and have his heart dependent on Him for obtaining the benefit he hopes for…

What is demanded of him is that a person be occupied with his livelihood through ordinary means, without excess and without overindulgence, and that inwardly he recognize the Torah’s principle concerning trust, and devote most of his time to Torah study and fulfillment of its commandments, as it is written in Pirkei Avot: “Beautiful is Torah study together with a worldly occupation, for the exertion of both causes sin to be forgotten…”

But the keepers of the faith who understand the Torah—these contemplate causes and meditate on them in the manner of… the enlightened and the sages of nature… They understand all that the men of science understand, and receive honor and esteem from them. And the Lord caused them through His Torah to understand that which is beyond the understanding of the sages and philosophers… And from the book of the Torah of the Lord, exalted be He, and the histories of His prophets and servants, they inferred that although things have natural causes linked one to another—yet He, exalted be He, is the agent who brings about those causes. And when He wills, they proceed according to their natural course, and when He wills, they deviate from their course and undergo change…’

And as a kind of summary:
The Creator of nature rules it and directs it. The believer’s duty is to act within nature and make a reasonable effort, without negligence and without excess, and not to divert his mind from the Cause of causes and the Bringer about of causes, who gives nature the “power to get wealth”; and alongside natural effort one must also make “spiritual effort” so that we may be worthy of His help!

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

As a father and as an educator—God sometimes chastens a person for his own good, like pain which is a warning signal to the body that there is a problem requiring treatment; or as atonement for sin—“And you shall know in your heart that as a man chastens his son, so the Lord your God chastens you… to do you good in your latter end” (Deuteronomy 8:5–16)

Paragraph 7, line 1:
…these contemplate causes and meditate on them…

To Ariel,
In other words: the business is run according to the laws of nature and not according to God (as you explained: He decides that natural conduct is preferable). And that is exactly what I have been saying. Except that I claim this is always so (or almost always). That is all.

With God’s help, 27 Kislev 5777

It seems that the statement of Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav (Sotah 2a): “Forty days before the formation of the embryo, a heavenly voice goes forth and says: the daughter of so-and-so to so-and-so…”, does not stand in contradiction to the statement of Resh Lakish (ibid.): “A woman is matched to a man only according to his deeds, as it says: ‘for the rod of wickedness shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous,’” from which it emerges that a person’s choice and merit are decisive—for one can simply say that the “heavenly voice” expresses designation and preparation: that this woman is suitable for this man as “bone of his bones and flesh of his flesh,” yet it still remains in man’s hand to choose whether to realize his destiny or, God forbid, get entangled.

The Gemara’s difficulty from Rav’s statement is with Rabbi Yohanan’s statement: “Matching them is as difficult as the splitting of the Red Sea,” for this does not fit with the heavenly voice declaring the designation and compatibility between the two. If there is designation and compatibility, then the match should not have to be “as difficult as the splitting of the Red Sea,” and therefore the Gemara must answer: “This is the first match; that is the second match.”

And Maharsha also notes (ibid., on Rashi s.v. eini) that there was no need to explain the difficulty as going back to the earlier statement, to “a woman is matched to a man only according to his deeds,” but rather to the immediately preceding statement, “matching them is as difficult as the splitting of the Red Sea.” He proves this from the parallel (Sanhedrin 22a), where the words of Resh Lakish are not brought at all, and the difficulty from Rav’s statement about the “heavenly voice” is on Rabbi Yohanan’s words: “Matching them is difficult as the splitting of the Red Sea.”

The matter of the “heavenly voice” is brought in Moed Katan 18b in a different form in the name of Shmuel. On Shmuel’s statement: “It is permitted to betroth a woman on the intermediate days of the festival lest another precede him,” the Gemara asks: “Did Shmuel say ‘lest another precede him,’ but Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: ‘Every day a heavenly voice goes forth and says: the daughter of so-and-so to so-and-so…’?” And they answer: “Rather, lest another precede him through prayer.”

From Shmuel’s words it seems that the declaration of the heavenly voice is made not before the formation of the embryo but “every day,” and in that case it is reasonable that the merit and choice on which one is judged day by day are operative (and even another person’s prayer can change the judgment).

May it be His will that all the sons and daughters of Israel merit, with God’s help and salvation, to find the match fitting for them, and may the Divine Presence dwell between them!

With blessings, S.Z. Levinger

Regarding Resh Lakish’s words that a woman is matched to a man according to his deeds, it is worth noting that he was “experienced” in this, and merited his wife, the sister of Rabbi Yohanan, as a result of his agreeing to repent.

Who put you in charge of knowing what accords with the divine plan and what does not? Do you have information from behind the curtain? This is not a television program, as far as I know.
And furthermore: from the day the Temple was destroyed, we do not heed a heavenly voice. Text Rabbi Yehoshua and have him get back on his feet and confirm it.

True, since the Temple was destroyed, etc.; but nowadays, when an “academic savior” has arisen for Israel, the crown has returned to its former glory, as it is written: “And saviors shall ascend Mount Zion.” 🙂

With blessings, Shimshon L.Tz.

If so, I have no problem at all with the claim about the heavenly voice. I would only note that R. Avraham son of the Vilna Gaon, in his explanations of aggadot according to the plain sense, did not understand it this way. However, the Meiri and other Rishonim indeed explained this statement through various reinterpretations as well (first match and second match, and more).

With God’s help

Hello Rabbi Michi and S.Z.L.,

First to S.Z.L.,
It is obvious that all of a person’s deeds are supervised by God, and he will receive reward and punishment for every small detail no less than for every large one, and even a light conversation between a man and his wife is told back to him at the time of judgment. (On this I assume Michi also agrees, otherwise all the punishments in the Torah directed at the individual are unintelligible.)
However, the discussion here is about the question of to what extent this reward and punishment are expressed here in this world. That is, to what extent the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes here in the world to save a righteous person or punish a wicked one according to his deeds or his prayer even before he reaches the World to Come.

In practice I agree with you that such providence indeed exists, hidden within the ways of nature, and my words here are only meant to focus and sharpen the subject of our discussion.

And now to Rabbi Michi,
You keep returning to the issue of the physical laws of nature and their determinism. I am aware that in essence you are a man of science and a great physicist. But what can be done—our view of the world is not exhausted by that. The world is much more complex than the dimension of physics and the laws of nature, and the possibility of the formation of several scenarios in reality is not a product of the laws of physics, which indeed are fixed (and I will address that as well below). The various scenarios are the result of many other factors that are not deterministic, such as human choices and decisions.
S.Z.L. already gave you a good example above, where he spoke of a determined decision by his professor to submit a paper to him specifically by tomorrow, a thing that prevented him from getting into the car that fell into a terrorist ambush in which the driver was killed.
Neither physics nor the other laws of nature determined here whether he would or would not get into the car. Rather, it was a stubborn and perhaps even puzzling decision by a professor. To the same extent, the honorable professor could have waived this and postponed submission of the paper to another day, and it would presumably have ended differently. Here S.Z.L. and I claim that one can see the hand of God that saved him. Of course this perspective depends greatly on a preexisting worldview that stems from belief in the Torah, the prophets, and Chazal (although sometimes even people who are not believers repent because of such cases), and the denier will always be able to interpret it as mere chance. But at the very least this is not an interpretation that can be falsified as you claim.
The decision whether to launch a war against an enemy country or not, something that affects the fate of many people, is not determined by the laws of physics but by the changeable decision of one leader or another—a decision about which the verse says: “The heart of kings and rulers is in the hand of the Lord.”

There are of course many other possibilities for the formation of different scenarios, and I will list a few. You claim that the laws of physics are fixed, but what about medicine—is it fixed too?! Why does one person get a disease and another not?! Why does one person recover from his sickbed and another not (see Rosh Hashanah 18)? As a personal example I can say that no doctor knew how to explain to us why my late father was struck by a disease in which the body attacks itself, which ultimately led to death. Is there a clear deterministic answer to all these questions? In my opinion this is another place where the hand of providence enters.

The Gemara tells of Rav Huna, whose 400 barrels of wine turned sour, and when he examined his deeds he found that the reason was that he had not paid his worker his wages on time. After he repented, the vinegar reverted to wine, or else the price of vinegar rose to equal that of wine.
Do you have a clear answer as to why his barrels of wine turned sour?! Is there some fixed physical law that determines that barrels of wine must turn sour, and immediately after repentance improve their taste?
You, of course, unlike what is accepted and expected of a rabbi, do not accept the Gemara’s conception and the interpretation that followed it of this story, but I hope and believe that you do accept the facts that the Gemara reports and do not think the amoraim lied (for otherwise our whole discussion is completely pointless). And in my opinion, in facts like these one has to be almost blind not to see God’s providence.

As stated, these are a few examples among many. One can find many other factors for the different possibilities of the scenarios, and the believer knows to attribute this to God’s providence in the world, hidden away in the ways of nature (after all, we are in a period of concealment of the divine face, and God does not just perform an open miracle).

The only area in which I can understand the direction of your thought is physics, because it is indeed deterministic; but even there I have a certain reservation about your words. You state clearly that if some physical event happened then necessarily it had to happen. But sometimes there are physical events hanging by a hair’s breadth, where one cannot estimate at all what should have happened. For the sake of argument let us discuss a story, also from the Gemara (I hope you have not already given up because of too many stories..). The Gemara in Ta’anit tells of Rav Adda bar Ahavah, whom another amora brought into a rickety house about to collapse, and immediately when they finished removing the vessels from that house and went out, the house collapsed and fell down. And it emerges from the passage there that Rav Adda’s merit is what caused the house not to collapse on them.
According to your view, the laws of physics should have caused this house to fall at one clear and precise second, and no merit of any person, great as he may be, could help here. But from the Gemara it clearly emerges that this is not so. So either we explain that there were changing external factors, not fixed ones, that caused the building to collapse—such as a wind that came only after they left, or rain that suddenly began falling, and the like. Or we simply say that within the laws of physics, which are unknown to human beings, God acts as He sees fit and decides when yes and when no. I agree that the boundaries here are not sufficiently clear, and therefore we will not rely on this in practice (one does not rely on a miracle), but in general perhaps one can say that wherever people do not know that something ought to happen physically, it is indeed not necessary that it happen.
Perhaps this is also the Gemara’s intention in bringing the verse “The Lord protects the simple,” regarding permission to circumcise a baby on a day when there is a north wind, if I remember correctly—that is, even things that according to nature and reality should have caused harm, nevertheless, since people are not aware of this problem and there is no negligence on their part in entering danger (like Rav Adda, who did not know the house was unstable, and like in circumcision), God saves us from them.

“Blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord, and whose trust the Lord is.”
May we merit to reach those levels of faith and trust in God,
out of knowledge that everything that happens to us is supervised by God.

All the best!

Hello.
First, I am not a great physicist. Do not insult the great physicists for no fault of their own.
Second, on the matter itself, I tried again and again to clarify my conception, and apparently I am failing, because the same points keep recurring, points I have already clarified very well several times. I will try one last time, briefly, to describe my conception, and I suggest we end with this.

As I understand it, what happens in the world is the result of two factors: the laws of nature and human choices. That is all (meaning there is no involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, except perhaps in exceptional cases that are hard to discern. Perhaps there are such cases and I do not know of them, but the ongoing conduct appears to be by way of nature + human choices).
This is the scientific picture from my point of view (as a libertarian. Others remove choice too). I do not see any indication of the existence of an additional factor. When we test our physical knowledge, it is confirmed again and again. Things do not appear to depend on spiritual state, on commandments or sins, or on anything else. Acamol reduces fever, and that’s that. Even complex events that can be attributed to divine intervention only appear that way because of our ignorance. When we lack knowledge, one can always attribute it to God, but the fact is that as our knowledge advances, more and more things we did not know become known and familiar—without divine involvement. Therefore I assume that the rest of the gaps in our knowledge can also be filled with further scientific research. From this there emerges the scientific picture that this is about the laws of nature + choice, and that is all. There is no indication whatsoever of anything else, and therefore I see no reason to assume such a thing exists.
It must be understood that intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, means that there is an electron moving without a force acting on it and without a human will setting it in motion (against the laws of nature). There is no indication that such a thing happens or is possible, and therefore I see no reason to assume it.
I explained the verses of the Torah in a way that accords with this scientific picture. The words of Chazal, however, I do not think need to be reconciled with it, because they did not have the relevant knowledge, and therefore their words were said out of their understanding of the world and may be mistaken.

Of course one can raise various hypotheses, such as that the Holy One, blessed be He, hides from us every time we check Him, and therefore we never see Him or His involvement (like Russell’s celestial teapot). But that does not seem reasonable to me, and of course it is also unfalsifiable. The laws of nature, by contrast, repeatedly withstand attempts at falsification, and therefore I trust them.

I will conclude by saying that your prayer at the end seems to me self-contradictory. For if you pray to attain the knowledge that X, then you already know that X is true (otherwise why dictate to yourself what you should arrive at? Arrive wherever the truth takes you). So what are you praying for?
Therefore I prefer to end with a different prayer: may we merit to attain levels of knowing the truth, whatever it may be (if the Holy One, blessed be He, does indeed supervise and run everything—then may it be His will that we attain that knowledge, and if not—then may it be His will that we attain the knowledge that not).

Fine, we will remain in disagreement.
I have to note that you brought a smile to my lips with your dialectically clever ending..
I meant that we should merit to live these things, not only to know them.