Why Be Religious? (Column 395)
Dedicated to Racheli Rotner (although we are not acquainted)
A few days ago a post (see also here) by Racheli Rotner came my way that deals with the question of why be religious, or why observe the commandments. I like reading and listening to her, despite the provocativeness—and perhaps precisely because of it. I have a soft spot for free and honest people who don’t defer to convention, especially if they are religious (otherwise it’s not much of a feat).
She wrote a beautiful post, and from the flood of responses she received (which she herself marvels at and is surprised by) it is clear that she touched a raw nerve or a sensitive chord in many people. The feelings she describes honestly apparently reside in many of us. It seems to me that such feelings in me and in others led me to write the trilogy, and in fact to the long years of inquiry that culminated in writing it. My religious worldview came, among other things, to give religious people the freedom I find in her.
I will allow myself to analyze her words, and I hope this will serve Racheli Rotner and perhaps even help her understand herself (truly, not as a joke). I will try here to explain my answer to her questions, and to suggest that these are probably her own answers as well, only she does not manage to formulate them to herself.
Rotner’s Post
First, here are her words in full:
| What Connects Me to God Today?
I am religious. I pray Shacharit every day (though abbreviated), I wear only skirts (though shortened), I say blessings before and after eating, I wait six hours between meat and dairy. I keep Shabbat, kashrut, and family purity completely, in a religious—not traditional—format. Why? Lately I’ve been trying to decipher honestly with myself the reason for my loyalty to religion. After all, I’m not a person of inertia. I’ve made enough unconventional choices in my life to know I don’t walk in the furrow just because there is a furrow there. And yet, when it comes to the religious furrow, I still walk in it stubbornly. Why? I’m no longer sure I know. I go over the ingredient list of religious life, to look for which of them I actually connect to: The mythological narrative no longer speaks to me. I like the stories of the Bible less and less—as a literary text, as a historical text, and as a moral text. I also don’t have the intellectual curiosity to dive into the Jewish bookshelf, or the cultural urge to correspond with it, as others have (even secular people). I no longer identify politically with religious interests. I find it harder and harder to justify religious morality. When there are open and accepting places in religion, it’s almost always despite the religion, not because of it. A thousand liberal rabbis embracing gay people won’t change the fact that the Bible says they are an abomination. When liberal religious people say “my Judaism is to accept the different and to spread love in the world,” it feels New-Agey to me—not what was intended in the original text. I always feel that we’re all repressing the fact that this is a harsher and more cruel religion than the one we’ve invented for ourselves in the modern era. And I don’t have social and communal tendencies, so I also can’t be one of those religious people who no longer really connect to religious practice but stay there for the people, for the social life, for the family gatherings on holidays. I’m anyway most of the time in my room at the computer, and I hate holidays. Nor do I have a love for particular mitzvot or customs, maybe except for the part where the constraints of Shabbat allow me to read books patiently and with pleasure without wandering to the smartphone every two paragraphs. Some say that whether God exists or not, the commandments are a delight in themselves that connect you to some spiritual frequency, like meditation. To immerse in the mikveh, to pray, to light candles. I simply don’t feel that frequency, I’m not tuned to it at all; I do it on autopilot because that’s what you’re supposed to do. It connects for me to compulsive rituals that are embedded in me anyway. So what’s left when you strip all of that away—the elements that usually every religious person has at least one of them. If I don’t have any of them, why am I still there? Meaning, here. Meaning, perhaps it’s already there? The reason is complicated and a bit tautological. I may not believe in religion but I do believe in God. That is, I have to believe in God. That is, I’m afraid not to believe in God. I must have here an intelligent planning force, an organizing force, with an orderly narrative, that wraps the universe from the outside, otherwise I’ll go crazy. And if such a force exists, it presumably operates reciprocally, like everything else. There has to be a contract between me and Him that will anchor and justify the act of wrapping and His presence in the world, ground it in daily reality; otherwise He will fly off to His celestial literatures. So the commandments are a fairly logical contract: He will keep the world, I will wash my hands in the morning; the contract holds and His presence in the universe is maintained. Not in the sense of “He will punish me if I turn on a light on Shabbat,” but the practice preserves the connection between me and the cosmos, because we both remember each other, our hands hold. And yes, there is a bit of OCD here, which is a disorder I really have. The mysticism of day-to-day actions. The illusion of protection. And since I anyway accepted upon myself the Orthodox yoke of commandments, this is the contract I’m continuing with; these are the actions that are “important.” Is that enough? Most of the time yes. The need for God is stronger than any heretical thought, moral discomfort, or difficulty in performing this or that ritual. But sometimes no. Especially when in your life there are also secular people who are affected by your lifestyle, and then you need to have the mandate to shape the status quo. How important are certain things to you, and why. And what will you pass on to the next generation that you suddenly brought into the world? A religious truth? A set of values? Or just a neurotic disorder? Because perhaps I really have nothing to pass on; perhaps all of this is just my personal psychological story. And on the other hand—how will I dare give my child a world without God? Doesn’t he also deserve an organizing force that wraps the universe? I don’t know how to continue from here. |
She herself concludes in wonder and says that she does not understand herself, and therefore I hope it won’t be considered paternalism if I allow myself to offer her an explanation of herself from which she might also draw conclusions.
A First Look at Her Words
I’ll begin with a sentence Chayuta Deutsch wrote to me regarding this post:
She speaks about a “need for God”; I thought you would dismiss it with the well-known line from the genre: “Let her go to a psychologist, take medication, and leave us in peace.”
As the editor of the trilogy, it seems she knows me well. Indeed, Rotner’s search for the need these things meet for her and the benefit she derives from them should have elicited from me a response in that spirit. It turns out that others also understand her words that way and respond accordingly. See, for example, the response of Rabbi Moshe Rat (I was told this is a response to her post):
I completely agree with his words in themselves, but not that this is a relevant response to Rotner’s words. Now I will try to explain why, perhaps surprisingly, I read her words entirely differently—and in fact the very opposite.
So Why, Indeed, Serve the Lord?
In my trilogy I argue that true faith is not supposed to give us anything, and in any case the benefit from it, even if it existed, cannot and should not be the reason for religious obligation. The reason is supposed to be the faith itself, the commitment to God’s command and our conception of divinity. My claim is that God is such a being that one is obligated to fulfill His commandments by virtue of His being God. There is and should be no other reason that establishes religious obligation.
Maimonides stands on this in his famous words at the beginning of chapter 10 of Laws of Repentance (see also in column 22):
a. A person should not say, “I will perform the commandments of the Torah and engage in its wisdom so that I may receive all the blessings written therein, or so that I may merit life in the World to Come; and I will separate from the transgressions that the Torah warned about so that I may be saved from the curses written in the Torah, or so that I may not be cut off from life in the World to Come.” One should not serve the Lord in this manner; one who serves in this way serves out of fear, and this is not the level of the prophets nor the level of the sages. They serve the Lord in this way only the common folk, women, and minors, whom one trains to serve out of fear until their knowledge increases and they serve out of love.
b. One who serves out of love engages in Torah and commandments and walks in the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, and not out of fear of evil, and not in order to inherit the good; rather, he does the truth because it is the truth, and in the end the good will come because of it. This level is exceedingly great, and not every sage merits it; it is the level of Abraham our father, whom the Holy One, blessed be He, called His beloved, for he served only out of love. And it is the level that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded us through Moses, as it is said, “And you shall love the Lord your God.” And when a person loves the Lord with the proper love, he will immediately perform all the commandments out of love.
Serving for its own sake is the observance of the commandments and a religious commitment that is unconditional and not dependent on anything external to it. True, this arouses in many the sense that we are dealing with irrational behavior—or, alternatively, elicits meaningless and vacuous responses such as: faith is above reason; a leap into the realm of the absurd; the “vacated space”; R. Nahman; New Age; Rabbi Shagar; etc., etc. But all of these are based on a logical error.
Every value decision that is based on some explanation—its explanation will contain a value or values (the value of human life, helping others, honoring parents, love of neighbor, patriotism, and so on). When we seek an explanation for the value itself, we cannot find one. Ask yourselves: Why is there value in human life? The only answer is: Because human life has value. Why is it important to help others? Because it is important to help others. Values serve us to explain decisions and derived conclusions, but they themselves constitute the axioms of ethics. They themselves have no—and cannot have—an explanation external to them. If they had an explanation, they would be means and not ends—in other words, not values. As with every logical system, it is impossible to base all its claims on arguments and proofs, for these themselves are based on axioms, and axioms, by their very nature, cannot be proven. Therefore, when I explain to someone why it is forbidden to do X and I hang it on the value Y, one cannot ask me why to adopt the value Y. By virtue of being a value, it obligates. This necessarily leads to an infinite regress. One can, of course, dispute my value—and it is certainly possible that I am mistaken; here I only wish to claim that the fact that I have no explanation for it is not a flaw in my doctrine. On the contrary—there is and cannot be anyone who does not “suffer” from this.
I once compared this to moral obligation. Think of someone who comes to you and says: I understand that murder is immoral, and still it’s not clear to me why not murder. Why be moral? One who asks such a question is confused: either he does not understand what the statement “X is immoral” means, or he does not really think that murder is immoral. If he thinks so and understands the meaning, there is no room for the question of why not murder. It is a direct corollary of the statement that murder is immoral.
So too regarding the obligation to God’s command. It has—and needs—no explanation external to it. Certainly not a utilitarian explanation, but not even a value-based explanation. It is a basic value, and upon it one can build explanations for other things. One who says to me: I understand that the Lord is God and that He commanded to do X, and still I ask myself why and whether to do X—I tell him he is confused: either he does not really believe that the Lord is God, or he does not understand the meaning of the statement that the Lord is God. But if he believes and also understands, then there is no room for the question of why to fulfill His commandments. In fact, this is the meaning of the concept “God”: the entity whose command we are obligated to do (by the very fact that He commanded). In light of this principle, I have often explained Maimonides’ puzzling words in Laws of Idolatry 3:6 (“acceptance of divinity”). Therefore, the term “elohim” in Scripture also describes judges (see Sanhedrin 3 and elsewhere), for a judge is a person whose commands we are obligated to obey by virtue of his being a judge. That is precisely “elohim.” Thus Maimonides, at the end of Laws of Kings ch. 8, writes that one who performs commandments because of reasoned judgment (because it makes sense to him) is not pious but perhaps wise. There is no act of commandment here, for a commandment must be done by virtue of the authority of the Commander and nothing else (“acceptance of divinity”).
My favorite example of this is the famous mountaineer George Mallory. When asked why he climbs Everest, he answered: Because it’s there. This is a wonderful illustration of faith and religious commitment. A person has fundamental values for which he has no explanation, and he also does not need one (and cannot find one)—precisely because these are his most basic values. Axioms have no proofs and no explanations. They are true just because. One who does not experience this attitude toward mountaineering (like me) will not understand Mallory, and no explanation will help him. It will appear wholly irrational. The same goes for one who does not experience faith. He, too, cannot understand this answer for religious commitment.[1] Therefore the example from morality is, in my view, so good and powerful—because there we all experience it. As for religious commitment, apparently not every person experiences this.[2] But religious people usually do, and in my view this is indeed the deep reason for their commitment.
Two Kinds of “Just Because”
It is important to sharpen and clarify that I am not saying values are arbitrary (as Leibowitz claimed; see my article here). My claim is that values do not require an explanation, for they are self-evident. An explanation of claim X is to ground it on claim Y that is more intelligible than it. But the most intelligible claim cannot be grounded on a more intelligible claim, and therefore we will have no explanation for it. Moreover, we necessarily must have such claims (axioms); otherwise we fall into an infinite regress.
Hence there is no possibility of proposing an explanation for a value in terms of something more clear and intelligible than it. It is the most clear and most self-evident. Therefore every ethical chain of explanation begins from values, and by definition they cannot have an explanation. My claim is that the obligation to God’s command is a value in the deepest sense of the word. It is the most fundamental value, and by means of it one can explain other decisions and values. But precisely because of that, it itself is not explainable and does not need an explanation. Yet none of this means that values or faith are arbitrary. Quite the opposite. They are the parents of every rational argument by being the axioms on which it rests.
One of the axioms of Euclidean geometry is that two parallel lines do not meet. By virtue of its being an axiom, we have no proof for it. We also cannot say that it is the result of observation (who walked with those lines to infinity to ensure they don’t meet?). It is true because it is self-evident to us. When I am asked why this is true, I will say: “Just because.” But my intent is not that it is arbitrary; rather, that it is self-evident and requires no explanation. On the contrary—geometric theorems are explained on the basis of the axioms. By means of them we can explain or prove other things, but they themselves require no explanation.
Anyone can see that we are not dealing with an irrational approach. On the contrary, a rational argument is always based on foundational assumptions, and therefore a rational explanation always begins from an essential “just because.” The statement “I believe in X” or “I am obligated to Y—just because” is a thoroughly rational statement. There is nothing problematic in such an explanation. On the contrary, it only means that we are at the root point of my beliefs and values—what is most clear and most intelligible to me.
In my above article I showed that Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who used the term “arbitrariness” very much to describe his relation to values, intended “just because” in the sense I described here—and not “just because” in the arbitrary sense. His terminology—that values are “arbitrary”—was not successful and thus confused many, including himself. Values indeed are not rationalizable and not justifiable—but that certainly does not mean they are arbitrary. In my assessment, Leibowitz himself did not grasp that there are two kinds of “just because,” and therefore tended to relate to fundamental truths as if they were arbitrary (he identified non-justifiability with arbitrariness). But I claim—paternalistically, clearly—that he did not decipher himself correctly. I also have an explanation for my paternalism: his positivist thinking, according to which what cannot be explained and proven is arbitrary, necessarily led him to the mistaken terminology and to this confusion. Now I will argue that something similar happens to many people, who do not fully understand their own outlook.
On Attempts at Rationalization and on Unconscious Understanding
Many people wonder why to observe the commandments. They seek an explanation—and naturally do not quite find one. Sometimes they cling to the usual clichés, such as that if we serve God He will deliver us from all sorts of things, or that our lives will be better; it will give us satisfaction and meaning, and so on. I don’t believe any of that (except for satisfaction and meaning, with which I completely agree; but in my view that is not a reason to serve the Lord), and in my estimation others, deep in their hearts, also do not truly believe it. They find themselves compelled to say this because of the very distress Rotner describes. If we have no such explanations—why do we at all observe and have to observe the commandments?! This is a rationalization that comes afterward, a kind of cognitive dissonance (a person’s psychological tendency to justify his path and to seek consistency in his positions).
The fundamental reason for this confusion is that the “explanation” I suggested above does not occur to people at all. When people look for an explanation for their religious commitment, they do not think of the option that there is—and needs to be—no explanation. The “just because” explanation is not an option, for as is well known, “just because” is “not a reason.” But alas, contrary to what we are constantly told, “just because” is actually the ultimate reason. This is not an arbitrary “just because,” just because I feel like it. Nor is it the claim “I observe because that’s how I was raised” (a foolish and even appalling statement, in my eyes; any pagan or ISIS member also does what he was raised to do). It is an essential “just because.” It is the most basic truth and therefore does not require an external explanation—therefore there is and can be no such explanation.
This is the reason people invent explanations like acting out of gratitude (see my article here), or that faith and religious commitment are tools for a good life; the commandments make us better and more moral people; or any other benefit, physical or spiritual. I do not believe any of that, and in my view factually it is not really true and does not really work. But again, people are forced to cling to those slogans; otherwise, they will have no good explanation for their way of life.
What I want to argue is that there is such an explanation: I am obligated—just because! It is a fundamental value for me and it requires no explanation. My claim is that because people are unaware of this option, they concoct all sorts of other explanations for themselves that do not really hold water. We know such phenomena from neuroscience. I discussed this in my book The Sciences of Freedom, but see here for a simple description of a similar phenomenon in people with split brains (I recommend ignoring the foolish conclusions drawn there from these phenomena. After all, this is the Hofesh site, and one should not expect too much):
In an elegantly simple experiment conducted by a group of researchers led by Michael Gazzaniga at Dartmouth College, they showed images to the left and right hemispheres of a split-brain patient, and then asked each hemisphere to choose an image that would go with the one shown at first. To the right hemisphere they showed (through the left half of the visual field) a house covered with snow. Quite logically, the hemisphere chose a picture of a snow shovel. To the left hemisphere they showed (through the right half of the visual field) a chicken’s foot, and it chose a chicken’s head—again, quite logically. Afterwards, the researchers verbally asked the patient to explain his choices. The left hemisphere was the only one that could express itself, but remember—it did not know why its right-hemisphere mate chose the shovel, since the information about the snow-covered house did not pass through the damaged corpus callosum. The patient’s answer was nothing less surprising than illuminating: “Oh, that’s simple. The chicken’s foot goes with the chicken (which was true), and you need a shovel to clean the chicken coop (a plausible but wrong answer).” In other words, the left hemisphere acted as an interpreter of the person’s worldview and simply made up a story to fit the available information!
A person supplies himself with explanations to rationalize his choices. When he has no reasonable explanation at hand, he invents something else. Cognitive dissonance exists in split-brain patients, and certainly in a person with a whole brain. This is what happens to many of us at the intellectual level: the blindness we have regarding part of the picture (essential “just because” explanations) causes us to complete it in strange ways that seem relatively sensible to us. Anything is preferable to remaining with an inconsistent and illogical picture.
This is the source of the explanations about the wondrous benefit that observing commandments has for our lives and about our becoming better people. No fact will move us from these baseless conclusions; otherwise, we are left without a justification for our way of life. Our entire lives are presented as an empty vessel. No wonder cognitive dissonance works overtime here!
But there are those who are more honest. They are unwilling to adopt these concoctions—but then they abandon their religious commitment or simply continue with it out of inertia. Both are making the same mistake: indeed, all those explanations are incorrect, but that does not mean religious commitment is irrational and not mandated.
Back to Racheli Rotner
Racheli Rotner is one of those honest people, but she conducts herself differently from those two ways: she doesn’t buy the penny-worth explanations, but she also doesn’t abandon. Despite all the questions, she finds herself committed and observant. True, she does not understand why she herself does this—but that does not stop her from continuing. She has no answer, but she does not abandon. My claim is that she has no answer because she is not looking in the right place. She seeks an answer in the planes of benefit and the goals of religious commitment, but, as noted, such an answer does not exist and cannot exist. Therefore she rightly concludes that those answers do not persuade her and cannot explain her conduct.
In my estimation, the correct explanation for her behavior is that she is obligated: “just because.” She understands that this is the truth and that a divine command must be fulfilled. Period. But such an answer does not arise in her mind as the answer of a rational person (you need to get used to philosophical-Wittgensteinian thinking to adopt it), and therefore she searches for answers in those realms—utilitarian and “spiritual”—and of course does not find them. I claim she does not decipher herself correctly, and it seems to me that not a few religious people are in a similar state (hence the flood of responses to her post).
This claim of mine concerns many who continue to observe and be committed without having answers. I claim that they are in fact observing because of this reason.[3] Moreover, many of those who concoct other answers—ones that do not persuade me and, in my view, not even themselves—deep down probably understand that faith and religious commitment are a basic value that requires no explanation. They serve the Lord “just because,” because He commanded. This is the inner truth for them—but they themselves do not know how to formulate it to themselves and to diagnose that this is their deep motive (because it is a fairly sophisticated diagnosis, even though it looks simple on its face). Therefore they try to rationalize it—that is, to ground that commitment on a more basic rationale (which for some reason will not need a rationale—otherwise we are in an infinite regress), just like the completion the brain makes about the tractor shovel needed to clean the chicken coop. No wonder they live with embarrassment or some internal conflict. They have no explanation or answer, but they continue. The reason is that deep in their hearts they understand that no answer is needed. They know, even if not consciously, that when God commands, we are obligated to fulfill. But they do not manage to understand that and therefore fall into odd rationalizations of various kinds.
By the way, even in the moral context, people who begin to ask why be moral usually concoct ridiculous answers of various kinds. There, too, it stems from the same intellectual helplessness (that there is no answer). As I explained, the truth is that there is—and can be—no answer in terms of more basic values (values that explain why to be obligated to moral values). This is also the meaning of Kant’s categorical imperative. The imperative is categorical because it is not conditioned on more basic values. Kant does not bother to explain why to be moral, because the imperative is categorical. He only tries to define the content of the imperative (“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”), but does not touch its validity—that is, the reason it is binding; why obey it. Yet even in the moral context, most people do not consider this option because it seems irrational. Therefore they look for another explanation (they rationalize), and when they do not find a plausible explanation, they turn to the realms of the tractors.
My paternalistic claim is that the behavior of these people attests to what they themselves think in the depths of their souls, much more than what they themselves say. What they say are excuses formulated after the fact and out of lack of choice—but deep down they act for the right reason. They conduct themselves morally because there is an obligation to be moral, and they conduct themselves out of religious commitment because there is an obligation to obey the divine command. The explanation for the moral obligation, like that for the religious obligation, is: “Just because!” I claim this is an excellent and super-rational explanation. In fact, it is the only possible rational explanation. I suspect that after you examine it you will discover that it nests within you, only you did not know how to formulate it to yourselves. I also suggest that Racheli Rotner examine this option.
This is why I disagree with the claims against Racheli Rotner. I indeed do not think a utilitarian search for an explanation can ground religious commitment. On the contrary—religious commitment, like moral commitment, is only commitment that is not done for benefit. But this is an argument against those who supply explanations and those who abandon commitment due to the lack of explanations. Those who, even in the absence of a utilitarian explanation, continue on the path—and for that earn torrents of scorn—are the only rational ones. Their conduct tells us and them, as well as Racheli, that deep inside she acts for non-utilitarian reasons, and those are the right reasons. I have criticism of her search and of the kinds of explanations she proposes and rejects—but the fact that she continues nonetheless says she acts correctly and for the right reasons, only she apparently does not understand herself (because she is not aware of the option of the “just because” explanation).
[1] See on this in the article by Yaakov Yeshua Ross, “Why Observe the Commandments,” in the collection Religion and Morality (edited by Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman). Among other things, he discusses there a similar answer Wittgenstein gave to this question.
[2] I write “apparently,” since it is possible that all human beings experience this, only they suppress it because it feels like irrational conduct. See more on this below.
[3] The claim that this is “a commandment learned by rote,” i.e., mere habit, does not persuade me at all. Some observe halakhah seriously and meticulously even when no one is watching. The “by rote” is a rebuke from “mashgichim” (in the Yeshiva sense) who do not understand this state.
Discussion
Notice what a hack (and unserious person) Michi is.
Racheli Rotner wrote:
“Even a thousand liberal rabbis who hug gays won’t change the fact that the Bible says they are an abomination.”
And Michi wrote:
“I have a weakness for free and honest people who don’t defer to conventions.”
Does anyone know a Bible in which it says that homosexuals are an abomination?
It explicitly says that only ***lying with a male*** is an abomination.
If someone has a homosexual inclination, and does not sin by lying with a male, he is not abominable.
Indeed, what an amazing line by Ms. Rotner, and what a very critical and serious reading by the “philosopher” Michi.
Oh Michi, Michi.
So don’t be surprised afterward that not 99% don’t take you seriously . . .
“And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might.
And these words, which I command you this day, shall be upon your heart.
And you shall teach them diligently to your children, and speak of them when you sit in your house, and when you walk on the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise.”
RMA’s explanation of the particulars of the commandment to love God: “And you shall teach them diligently to your children” — that is, teach them that almost nothing at all can be learned from the Torah.
Something here doesn’t add up.
In my opinion she is looking for utilitarian reasons only because she is not convinced that this is a divine command. In the absence of proof (or a high probability) that this is a divine command, all that remains for her is to look for utilitarian reasons…
It seems to me that the whole utilitarian discourse the rabbi described arose only because of the assumption that there is no decision as to whether the path of Torah and commandments is indeed a divine command. And therefore the claim of “just because” loses its meaning.
Your “just because” reminds me of Tevye’s “Tradition!” in Fiddler on the Roof. Ostensibly from a much simpler and less intellectual place, but in fact with the same meaning.
With all due respect, but what is the nature of this artificial separation between homosexuals and lying with a male? And even if it is practically true, what does it actually give? I’ve seen this claim repeated again and again on various organizational pages — bottom line, what does it give?
It means that if a gay man remains single his whole life (like an agunah woman) and also hides his inclinations very, very well, then society won’t crush and humiliate him into the ground
A wonderful article. Simply wonderful (although I think it is not of the same kind as Rotner’s argument, but the point here is brilliant and astonishingly fundamental). I bookmarked it, for good life and for peace.
Thank you for this after all the…..
[By the way, interestingly, and perhaps not consciously, the conception here (I still need to delve into the Kantian/Wittgensteinian sources to understand this well) resonates wonderfully (and I’m not sure whether R. Michael would be flattered by this) with the Baal Shem Tov conception of mitzvot from the root “companionship/joining,” and with the deeply Hasidic concept of “accepting the yoke” (which over the years has been covered by heaps upon heaps of garlic cloves from pidyon haben and key-shaped challahs). Many thanks]
Hello Sh. Eliezer
First of all, what is abominable is the act (perhaps I didn’t make that clear enough in what I wrote). And already at the declarative level that has very great significance. You are invited to look at a video by a rabbi, and not at the words of a hack like Michi:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AUXQ46pv2FQ
And in practice, if only the act is abominable, and not the person himself, I assume that has many moral as well as halakhic implications.
Besides that, what do you think about the fact that Michi writes about a woman that she is “honest,” when in fact from the article itself it is evident that she is not honest at all?
What does that say about Michi?
Doesn’t it mean he is biased?
Have you tried to look at his words critically?
In that column the rabbi related to Racheli’s post as if the question were whether a divine command to keep commandments causes me to keep them.
In my opinion what she meant was that she does not have absolute confidence that this is a divine command, and therefore without benefit she has no reason to keep them.
I would be glad for a response
Hello Muallem,
You are saying things that are not true.
Like 99% of religious people, I have no problem hugging a homosexual (religious or not) as a person.
The problem is with the abominable act itself, not with the inclination that exists in him.
Again, 99% of religious people have no problem with homosexuals as human beings. The problem is with the act itself.
It’s a shame that you are being incited by unfit (and unreliable) people like Michi, who wants to create the feeling that religious people hate homosexuals.
Besides that, what do you think about the fact that Michi writes about a woman that she is “honest,” when in fact from the article itself it is evident that she is not honest at all?
What does that say about Michi?
Doesn’t it mean he is biased?
Have you tried to look at his words critically?
If the reason to fulfill commandments or keep moral directives is an essential ‘just because,’ it follows that one who does not understand the truth in that [like us regarding the mountain climber] has no reason to fulfill the commandments and morality.
Whether it’s hatred or not doesn’t interest me. Everyone is welcome to hate in their heart whomever they want as much as they want. What interests me are actions visible outwardly. Religious people (and “conservatives,” usually ignoramuses, around the whole world) deny LGBT people respectful treatment and a variety of civil and social rights, in the name of some fabricated hallucination about an abominable act. In my opinion your nose-picking (I have no other idea where you mine your nonsense from; if it doesn’t come from there then say so) is a-b-o-m-i-n-a-b-l-e; please stop picking your nose urgently and then I will warmly accept you into the group called human beings.
Why should I care whether Michi is biased or not? Are you serious? In another two hundred years, God willing, rabbis will twist themselves into all sorts of bizarre excuses to explain their historic acts of evil toward LGBT people just as today they twist themselves to explain slavery.
Ehud,
Regarding Racheli Rotner and her honesty. One of two things: either she does not know the distinction in the Torah (or in the Bible?) between the person and the act, or she does. If she doesn’t know it then she is simply ignorant about this matter and not “dishonest,” as you say.
But I get the impression that she is an intelligent woman and in fact does know this distinction (that is of course only my guess), but from that it does not follow that she is necessarily lying. My guess is that she misspoke and meant to say something like: attributing abomination to male same-sex intercourse is itself immoral. If she answered you in those terms (that she got confused), would you retract what you said?
I don’t understand the question. When I think it’s right, then it’s an essential “just because.” And when I choose arbitrarily, it’s an arbitrary “just because.”
It is certainly possible that with Tevye too that was the root. Since many people perceive tradition as something arbitrary (because that’s how we were educated). But this interpretation is certainly possible, and in my view even more plausible. And if so, we even have an anthem for adherents of the “just because” doctrine (Traditiin!): (:
Many thanks. I try to accept the truth from whoever says it, even if he is a Hasid.
You don’t need absolute certainty. We have no absolute certainty about anything, and still we adopt positions and conduct ourselves accordingly.
Indeed. But there are many people who understand this very well, and yet when they try to conceptualize that understanding for themselves they fail (as I explained in the column). They continue on without knowing how to explain to themselves why, as with Rotner.
It’s like someone who does not understand why the axiom of geometry is true will not adopt it. But of course he would be mistaken. The same applies to faith and religious commitment.
According to your latest words, this is a psychological criterion. When in practice I think something is “right,” then it is such, and when it is considered “not right,” then it is not.
In other words: according to your answer, the logical or theoretical structure of the “just because” carries no weight at all.
What logical structure could there be to “just because”? Is there a logical structure to the axioms of geometry? I understand that it is true, and therefore in my opinion it is true.
Hello Doron,
The point is not Rotner (who is actually known mainly for negative headlines, and more than one of them), but rather Michi, who emphasizes twice that Rotner is honest, when amusingly, a reading of the article shows that you certainly can’t define her as honest.
You yourself distinguished between two kinds of “just because.” And not only did you distinguish them, you took the trouble to explain the usefulness of that distinction. Indeed, you hung an entire column on that distinction.
Now when I ask you on what basis you distinguish between the two kinds (that is, how you justify the distinction), according to your own method you have two options, as you described above: 1. the distinction between the two kinds of “just because” is itself arbitrary; 2. the distinction is not arbitrary (although it is not justified).
In light of this I ask again the simple question: which of the two kinds that you yourself described is relevant for grounding your distinction?
As for the analogy to geometry, I suspect it is not relevant, but even if it is, that is a marginal matter for our discussion.
Ehud, I know your comments very well and I didn’t suspect for a moment that she was your target. Still, I showed you that what you said about her does not seem plausible, and in any case that also reflects on your claims against Michi.
1. Do you think it is within a person’s range of choice to experience religious obligation, or is it not under his control?
2. Isn’t an axiom proven from our observations so far? That is, true, we haven’t followed the lines to infinity to check that they don’t meet, but as far as we have followed them, they haven’t met. That is not the case with religious obligation.
2
1. In principle it is definitely within the range of choice. Maybe not for everyone, but I suspect it is. A person needs to make an effort in order to experience it; it’s not something one is necessarily born with. Religious education is of course very helpful.
2. The principle of induction too is an axiom (and David Hume did indeed cast doubt on it).
It seems to me that since we’re already dealing with psychology, the issue of consciousness is important here.
If a person chooses to live with an ultra-Orthodox or very hardal consciousness according to which the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Torah are first and foremost a factually true reality in 100 percent certainty, without any question or doubt, just as the sun rises in the morning—and secondly to determine that all the moral norms that conflict even slightly with the Torah or halakhah are automatically trash, and perhaps even more than that, that extra-halakhic or extra-religious moral intuitions are automatically trash—then life is easier
on this plane. You serve the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Torah simply because that is the truth. Morality and the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, may in fact be the same thing. Because what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded and what Jewish tradition defines as truth and right are probably also the things that are truly moral and good. Consequently all those examples she mentioned (the attitude to LGBT people, the value of tolerance and equality among human beings, and all the enlightenment) are actually invalid things, which perhaps also come from the sitra achra. And maybe all the people who espouse such morality are actually rotten and corrupted deep down. Like the hooves of a pig that come to say: “I am pure!”
And inner meaning? If the Holy One, blessed be He, unquestionably exists and the Torah is unquestionably true, there are no questions and no answers. So the meaning a person can find is in classic answers in which this world is a corridor before the World to Come.
What she is talking about here is the paradox created in people educated in a modern religious educational system—they try to instill in us a Judaism that also comes with tolerance for LGBT people, a Judaism that also comes with love of gentiles, as though all that were part of the Torah, of the Torah itself. Enlightened? She isn’t buying the nonsense about the people of Israel as the equivalent of the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit. She also isn’t buying the nonsense about the righteous woman who is the queen of the home and reveals new and unique facets in the Torah—and also not the nonsense of respect for the gentile, respect for the homosexual, respect for the deviant, the weak, the exceptional, the sick, the miserable. (To use the golden words of Yigal Knaan—the credit for opening my eyes goes to him. In a provocative way he is one of the people who takes care to shatter for us the illusion that Torah and enlightenment are two gloves that go together.) And then she finds herself in a bind: I am a feminist, I am tolerant, I love people, and none of this fits for her, or it even contradicts, her faith in God and in His son that He commanded. But she still believes in Him in some way, and is simply trying to tell herself why. Why does she believe in God, but behave according to values that are supposedly opposite?
And her answer is different, in a kitschy and revolting way, but very authentic. She hasn’t read your trilogy, nor apparently Leibowitz’s words about serving God for its own sake, and she doesn’t know the concepts of two parallel value systems. So her answer is: God is the source of morality. Without God, then in fact all morality is invalid and meaningless; there is no meaning at all to human experiences, to childbirth, or any value to human life. And therefore:
We also need to give God a place, to keep some concluded contract with Him, even though we are slackers who most of the time do not obey Him and do not act according to what He precisely commanded, so we will give Him the minimum possible and hope that it will be enough and somehow okay. A kind of folk traditionalism-plus, only in a version that is not at peace with itself, but tormented over the sins that have become routine
To be honest, I wish I had her level of self-honesty. In matters of God. And in all areas of life
What is “obligation” at all? Is it a kind of emotion? Like all sorts of urges and desires we have?
Is that mountain climber’s commitment to climbing Everest equivalent to religious commitment?
No. I didn’t make a comparison; I showed the logic.
The “just because” here is not “this is how I keep commandments simply because I feel like it,” but rather “this is how I believe in God” (because she really does believe), and therefore I keep commandments. It is not arbitrariness of the will but arbitrariness of belief, and with that I very much agree.
You can see it as the reverse of coercion in beliefs spoken of by the Radbaz. She is not compelled not to believe, but compelled to believe. Her claim is the opposite of the secular claim according to which religion is a temptation that a mature person overcomes (that is basically the assumption Persico presents in his new book). There is no temptation here. She is a mature, autonomous, believing person. That’s it. She believes and therefore keeps commandments.
(This also answers Doron’s question about the difference between the various kinds of “just because”)
Muallem,
In recent days I watched a video by vegans (it’s being circulated now again on YouTube).
According to the film’s intent, anyone who is not vegan is morally inferior.
In my opinion the day is near when certain societies in the world will begin imposing sanctions on meat-eaters,
and afterward will also anchor that in law.
Would I have a problem with that?
No!
I have no problem with it, not in the declarative sense, that vegans think I am less moral than they are.
And in a society where they won’t allow me to eat meat, I simply won’t live, or I will live and accept its laws without whining, because I understand that this is that society’s style.
Now regarding homosexuality—
Here this is a Jewish state. In a Jewish state there are naturally conservative values. One of these values is that lying with a male is an abominable act. Likewise, in a Jewish-believing-conservative state, homosexual families will not be allowed.
So I understand that the world is changing, but that is not relevant to Jewish-believing-conservative society.
And therefore, I would be glad if you would understand this, internalize it, and live here happily and peacefully in the Jewish-believing conservative society.
Any loathsome apologetics in the style of the hack Michi are doomed to failure, and will only increase the pain even more.
The truth is simple and there isn’t too much room for compromises and flexibility:
Lying with a male—an abomination.
No abomination parades.
No rights for daddy-and-daddy or mommy-and-mommy families.
Lots of love, Ehud.
I already wrote that I do not see stupidity as grounds for deletion, and therefore Ehud’s messages remain here on the site. That is also not grounds for personal and non-substantive responses. Therefore this message was deleted. M.A.
Hello Rabbi. Truly a very special article; it really gave me nachat ruach in the fullest sense of the term.
My question is admittedly a bit tangential to the article, but it follows from it:
It turns out that we have several kinds of just-because in life: just-because morality, just-because faith in God, and so on. 1. Doesn’t that mean we believe in multiple divinities? 2. And what really happens when two just-becauses meet? Which prevails? After all, they are not dependent on one another..?
“Here I only want to argue that the fact that I have no explanation for it is not a flaw in my doctrine”
Of course you would want to argue that, since it is clear and known to every sensible person that this is a major flaw when a method is based on mere whims.
And in general, is that claim too based on a value, or does the need to justify values (which after all merely satisfy psychological needs) sanctify all means?
A side note — it doesn’t seem to me that Leibowitz himself used the term “arbitrariness” even once. Only various Leibowitz scholars used it by mistake.
Distinguishing in what sense? In terms of meaning, there is an enormous difference — whether the “just because” is meaningful or arbitrary.
In terms of understanding whether it is the first kind or the second, that is a matter of worldview. The claim here is that people think their “just because” is arbitrary, when in truth it is meaningful.
And yet, someone who arrives at the conclusion that these are not the commandments God commanded, or: if there is a God, these certainly are not His commandments. These religious commandments are moral thoughts of people with relatively little knowledge compared to us. Kant’s categorical imperative sounds far more reasonable as God’s commandments than the commands and anecdotes that Racheli Rotner is careful about, despite the romantic and nostalgic aspect in maintaining a long-standing tradition.
1. Not every “just because” presupposes God at its base. But when there is an entity in the background, they all have to be the Holy One, blessed be He. That is also the result of Ockham’s razor. I explained this in The First Being.
2. There is no difference between two “just becauses” and a clash between two values within the same “just because” (like a moral conflict, that is, a conflict between two moral values).
You are assuming several assumptions here with none of which I agree. For some reason you decided that the commandments are the moral values of people with little knowledge. If you assume these are not commandments of the Holy One, blessed be He, then of course there is no point in the discussion. You assume the categorical imperative is more reasonable as God’s commandments, and on that too I disagree. On the contrary, it is much less reasonable. I explained in The First Being that it is not plausible that the Holy One, blessed be He, created us for the sake of morality, because morality is about creating a proper society. But it makes no sense to create a society so that it will be a proper society. Don’t create one, and there will be no need.
A disgusting comment. Ehud expressed a super-legitimate position, especially on a religious site. I’m surprised they didn’t delete Muallem’s comment.
That’s not an argument at all, because His will was that we should be the ones to create the proper society
In short, “I feel like it.” Keep up this line of thought and maybe you’ll get to Max Stirner.
Hello Michi
One note for now regarding an axiom — I quote from Wikipedia
“An axiom, truth, or basic assumption [1] (in archaic spelling: acsioma) is an assumption treated as true and self-evident. The word ‘axiom’ originates in Ancient Greek (αξιωμα), and means ‘a self-evident principle,’ which requires no proof.
In mathematics and logic, an axiom is a basic assumption (or ‘starting point’) in a certain logical system, treated as true. A common mistake is that axioms are ‘intuitive and basic truths that are self-evident,’ but axioms need not be phrased that way, only to supply a basic assumption that one does not try to challenge (since it is a stipulation). The combination of several axioms is called an axiomatic system. The system of axioms of a mathematical theory forms the basis for proving the theorems included in that theory.”
Hello again, Michi—
I wanted to suggest a different explanation for what she said—
Maybe you believe/estimate 70%–30% in favor of commandments etc.
and she believes/estimates 70%–30% in favor of secularity — but still doesn’t abandon them for the reason she gave — because personally it is hard for her to accept such a chaotic world, even though she may recognize that it is like that. And therefore she prefers to be in a sort of socially agreed-upon and utilitarian lie, even though she has not investigated to the end… and maybe she prefers not to investigate to the end.
She herself asks — what will she pass on to her children? etc.
And maybe she is not so philosophical — but is influenced by her secular surroundings and sees justice in their approach?
You can simply ask her…
I am not worthy
I’m trying nevertheless to accept your distinction between two kinds of axioms: arbitrary ones and those that are “intuitively true.”
The second kind receives validity from the entire structure built on it and functioning (for now) in the world — and therefore the axioms receive reinforcement.
In my opinion information can indeed flow from the world to us perfectly (see the channel coding theorem)
and therefore the intuitively true axioms are actually true because the whole structure above them works sufficiently well in reality.
And another note concerning the trilogy, part one, p. 496, s.v. “In summary, I suggest to you, Hillel, that when you encounter an argument or report of a revelation parallel to that transmitted in the Jewish tradition, examine them according to the criteria proposed here, one after another: 1. What exactly are the details and is there precision in their description vis-à-vis the sources? 2. How many people were present at the original event, etc. 3. What was the continuity of the report …”
That feels to me like shooting the arrow and then marking the target afterward.
By the same token one could say that all those seeking utilitarian justifications for serving God don’t really believe the commandments are from God either
And true to your sacred way
The opposite, the opposite.
Precisely from RMA’s approach one can leap over Stirner — because in fact even the “I” and the biggest ego (in its own conception, of course; in the conception of others it lacks all value and existence, and all the more so institutional entities — whose foundation is falsehood (absolutely according to Stirner, and relatively according to almost every other philosophical approach)) is:
A. The handiwork of the Commander (of course, and RMA forgot to mention this in the article, because all acceptance of the commandments, and the “just because” proposed as the reason, is under the assumption that one accepts/that it is established that the First Being is also the giver of the personal and detailed Torah at Mount Sinai and the Oral Torah. And indeed there was no need to mention this in an article that was a “response” to a person assumed to be religious and believing in God — something impossible from the outset according to Stirner, and therefore this approach of RMA can never lead to ethical egoism, because it lacks the duality inherent in every religious person between materiality and spirituality).
B. The Commander is the root truth, and His commandments are truth like Him, and therefore the “I” of the creature, in fulfilling the commandments because “just because,” does not realize itself at all. On the contrary, its “I” presents it with a different picture (say, one that underlies Stirner’s theses), and it “forces” it, or more precisely (at least at the moment of the commandment) “transforms” it, into the “I” of the Commander. Therefore this conception in its purity can never lead a person to anarchism/egoism. For the claim “just because” no longer comes from himself, but from something external to him (according to his conception of himself), which, unlike the anarchist conception, is immeasurably more absolute and objective than the subject (the person’s “I”) itself. And on that the rest of Torah is built, in practice.
And the rest, go and learn.
This ugly, crafty, propagandistic dichotomy between a person’s acts and the person arouses in me endless nausea (“I love you as a person, I hate your acts as a homosexual”) — all in the service of religious prettification. What am I if not my deeds? It is impossible to love me detached from what I do, because it is one and the same
And it seems to me that precisely for an intelligent girl like Racheli Rotner, the Jewish bookshelf could help. And even in order ultimately to arrive at Rabbi Michi’s idea in his answer. It’s worth giving the bookshelf a chance too.
A question for Rabbi Michi and for anyone interested who holds the conception presented here. What is the definition of morality? What falls under this umbrella of things that require no justification? Suppose someone opens and closes doors all day with the justification that that’s what should be done—does he too get an exemption from justification because this is his moral choice?
I don’t understand
What intellectual wretchedness!
The comparison between a mathematical/geometrical/logical axiomatic system and a moral axiomatic system is nonsense. You do not have to believe in Euclid’s axioms. But try to design a building on the basis of alternative axioms. Does it stand? Great, go live there, young couple. You do not have to believe in the axioms of Diophantus and his colleagues, but try to design a car or an airplane on the basis of alternative axioms. Does the car drive? Does the plane fly? Great. Safe travels (the keys are inside).
But to say that murder is forbidden “just because” is wretchedness upon wretchedness, and an even more wretched commandment is one whose source of authority is “just because” (and the pilpul of “commanded laws” under the law of “just because” is pitiful indeed, real Purim-Torah). Does your imagining something make it so? Can one really place the monetary and capital laws of the Torah on “just because”? Is there any greater foolishness than that?
The Bible itself (in countless places) emphasizes that the basis for the Holy One, blessed be He, demanding observance of the commandments is the covenant, not “just because.” That is, a mutual commitment of the Holy One, blessed be He, who chose us from all the nations and brought us out from slavery to freedom so that we would keep His commandments and His teachings. The Holy One, blessed be He, emphasizes: “Yet for all that, when they are in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, nor will I loathe them, to destroy them utterly and to break My covenant with them; for I am the Lord their God” (Leviticus 26:44). That is, exile is not a breach of the covenant between the Holy One, blessed be He, and the people of Israel, since it is only a punishment for their breach of the covenant on their part, and therefore they are still obligated in the commandments, as the prophet Isaiah also says: “Thus says the Lord: Where is the bill of your mother’s divorce, with which I sent her away? Or to which of My creditors have I sold you? Behold, for your iniquities you were sold, and for your transgressions your mother was sent away” (Isaiah 50:1), and so too in countless other places in the Bible and in the words of Hazal. Even the seven Noahide commandments are based on the covenant between the Holy One, blessed be He, and humanity after the Flood as explained in Genesis (chapter 9).
Michi was pushed into this heartrending wretchedness after he expelled the Holy One, blessed be He, from the world and denied His involvement in it on the basis of his “observations” (what arrogance; and R. Moshe Rat has already struck him on the crown of his head on this matter). That is, Michi nullifies the covenant between the Holy One, blessed be He, and humanity in general, and the people of Israel in particular (for even the return to Zion is for him a process that somehow rolled along, without the involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He). In the absence of mutual commitment, Michi is forced to create ex nihilo a one-sided commitment of “just because.”
The tradition convinces me דווקא because it is evident that the Torah was a living Torah for people in every generation. From the Mishnah, the Talmud, the Rishonim and the Aharonim, you can see people who connected to Torah and God in a natural and deep way, not an artificial and superficial one. That is a tradition that convinces me. The Gemara describes people who inspire trust in me.
If we want to continue the tradition onward, we absolutely must connect to the Torah. It cannot be that our entire inner world is absorbed from secular and liberal culture while the commandments are only something one does like a person possessed by a demon. “To connect” means that the Torah will be part of life, and for each person this is expressed differently.
Racheli describes a situation in which she does not connect to anything, and that is not healthy either for her Judaism or for the continuation of the tradition of the people of Israel.
If that is your answer, I would like to examine with you, very carefully, whether your claim is consistent.
Let’s set things in order again for the sake of clarity of the discussion:
According to your approach, we have 2 kinds of “just because” (both lack reasons, but only one of them is arbitrary).
In addition, you claim that the criterion distinguishing between the two kinds is itself based on type 2 (“just because” that is not arbitrary).
Here, apparently, a difficulty arises in your position: if the criterion for distinguishing between the “just becauses” is of type 2, then at most it can only be presented but not grounded (that is, justified).
But as far as I can tell, your column violates this very principle, since it nevertheless tries to bring reasons for what you argued. In other words: you are trying to justify what you argued cannot be justified.
Why is one obligated to keep covenants? In the end you’ll get to “just because.”
A nice post. Just a small comment: isn’t the very fact that something (- Torah and the commandments) is “true,” but beyond that has no meaning whatsoever, difficult?
That is: if I keep the commandments because this is the truth, but aside from that (- aside from the fact itself that I am doing the true act) it has no meaning for my life (- I do not inherit the World to Come because of it, do not become more moral, do not connect to God, do not bring redemption to the world, etc. etc.; simply nothing happens) — isn’t that a defect in this truth itself? Is the truth of keeping Torah and commandments like the truth of the fact that in Africa there are two million species of ants (fine, that is the truth and I am prepared to acknowledge it, but why should that interest me? What does it have to do with me)? Isn’t it true that the very fact that Torah and commandments are divine truth (assuming they really are) means that they must have a concrete effect on my life and not be just some trivial thing one keeps, period?
I hope I phrased my question clearly.
That is exactly what I wrote. Just one note about the second passage: the mistake is to relate to an axiom only in that way, because that is only one of the two kinds of axioms (= the two kinds of “just because”). But of course that is one of the two kinds.
That is strange psychology from my perspective. A person lying to himself. I prefer my explanation, but of course I’m not a psychologist and I don’t know her either. In any case, she is not the subject. What I wanted to say is that there is such a human state, and it is worth being aware of it. It is certainly possible that the state you describe also exists among people.
This continues your previous comment (from Wikipedia), which I also didn’t understand. You don’t accept my distinction? But you wrote exactly the same thing.
Not for me. If the criteria are reasonable, then I do not understand how you claim that the fit was tailored in advance. Or perhaps, in your opinion, the criteria are not reasonable — then explain why.
Correct. That is the simple possibility. What I tried to suggest here is an additional possibility to explain it.
This message is not placed correctly. But as for your point, it absolutely is possible. That is true both factually and in terms of the sources (“let sins cease” [rather than sinners]). And I too have elaborated in several places that love is directed not toward deeds but toward the person (the deeds are the medium through which you encounter the person).
I explained: just as one is “obligated” to believe in Euclid’s axioms. Try alternatives and see whether it works. The Holy One, blessed be He, was not obligated to create the world, nor obligated to sustain it, nor obligated to bring you out of Egypt, etc. All this was on the basis of a covenant, and whoever breaches the covenant will bear the consequences. Your choice.
If that is what a person truly thinks, then that is what he will do. I will of course look at it as nonsense, because within myself I do not find an understanding that this is how one should act. My criterion is personal and not universal: if you are convinced that this is right, then from your perspective that is what is right to do. That does not mean everyone will agree with you.
So in your opinion there is no obligation at all to keep commandments, and everything is just a matter of reward and punishment (in the World to Come; because there is no reward for commandments in this world, as one can plainly see). Did I understand correctly?
No one said one is obligated to believe in Euclid’s axioms. They said that the correctness of the axioms cannot be justified (that is, they cannot be derived from something prior to them). Did you check and see that parallel lines *never* meet? That cannot be checked. About this you said one need not believe in anything and everything is measured only empirically. But mathematics is not an empirical science, and people are convinced by proofs even without measuring all the triangles that can exist in Euclidean space and seeing that in all of them there are exactly 180 degrees.
Mordechai, may he live long. You remind me of Mark Twain, who once received a letter containing a single word: “Idiot.” He immediately replied with a letter of his own: “I have already seen letters in which the writer forgot to sign his name, but this is the first time I have seen a letter containing only a signature without the content.”
You bring a collection of ridiculous arguments and say them with confidence as if you pulled some terrible joker out of a hat. So I’ll answer you in kind: try to build a society on the basis of different moral laws. Try to build the service of God on the basis of different halakhic laws. This is only to show what nonsense you have spewed here. But on the actual issue, all these arguments are of course irrelevant. All of these are consequentialist justifications. I am talking about intrinsic validity. In morality and in halakhah and in geometry, the fact that something works is not a justification for its correctness. You’re a bit confused, apparently; we are not talking here about science.
As for the “just because” and the covenant, others have already answered you well enough.
If for a change you try to weigh things on the scales of logic instead of the scales of obsession, I am sure the results will improve. And the rest, go and learn.
Maybe you’re right that this is what is needed. The question is what you propose for someone who does not connect. That is the main issue here.
Doron, this is unnecessary hairsplitting. When we talk about words, we use words. We have no other tool. When we talk about logic, we use logic. We have no other tool. When we talk about the way insights are adopted, we adopt insights. We have no other tool.
This column did not try to prove anything, but to describe and clarify feelings people have inside. There is no obstacle at all to doing that even for ungrounded things. I have explained several times that this is precisely the main business of rhetoric: examining foundational assumptions (the “just because”).
And also this:
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%9E%D7%94_%D7%A9%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%91_%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8_%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%A1
A completely understandable question. A few notes on incorrect assumptions in your words:
1. The very fact that something is true is the most basic explanation of all. Even when act X serves goal Y, you can ask why goal Y is needed. In the end you will always get to “just because.” So there is no escaping it, and it should not bother you either.
2. I did not say that you do not inherit the World to Come, but rather that the World to Come should not be the reason why you observe. In that I only repeated the Rambam’s clear words at the beginning of chapter 10 of Hilkhot Teshuvah.
3. I did not say the commandments have no reason. On the contrary, in my estimation they do. But I do not know it, and therefore it cannot motivate me to perform them. Beyond that, if I do them for the sake of the reason, that is service not for its own sake. Just as morality brings good results, but I do not practice it for the results but out of respect for the categorical imperative. By the way, in article 122 I showed that one who does it for the results will not attain them. It may be that in the religious context too it works this way: only one who observes for its own sake (= not for the results) merits the full results.
4. The effect of the commandments does not have to be on my life. Maybe it is on the world, on the Holy One, blessed be He, or on anything else.
5. Even if you are right that they must have an effect, the factual question is whether such an effect indeed exists and whether you feel it. Racheli Rotner claims she does not feel it. What should she do in your opinion? Abandon it?
Correct, the correctness of the axioms cannot be justified, and therefore there is no “obligation” to believe in them. Nevertheless, the fact that no contradiction has been found in them and the fact that what is built on their basis “works” (in whatever sense), strengthens belief in them; and the same is true of mathematics, which is not an empirical science, but what is built on its basis “works” (also empirically), etc. This is not a proof that the axioms are true — and who claimed it was?
You can argue that if you do not accept the axiom that murder is forbidden, society will not endure (and there is much room to doubt that, and several nice models of “jungle economy” have already been published, but that is not the place to elaborate). If that is true, you have proved that there is a utilitarian value to the axiom that murder is forbidden; you still have not proved any moral axiom here, and the reduction to “just because” is pathetic. (Like the “justification” that otherwise there will be an infinite regress. So what? Maybe that itself is proof that there is no morality?)
Mordechai, Mordechai, I gave you a golden piece of advice for free (logic instead of obsession). Use it. Isn’t it a shame?!
First you repeat my words exactly as if there were some claim of yours here, then complain about my pathetic reductions, and finally put a question mark (metaphorical) at the end. At the very least, you should have learned the rules of punctuation (metaphorical) a few years ago. So here’s another lesson: when you completely agree with someone, you put a period at the end, not a question mark, and online you can also add an approval emoji or applause for agreement and enthusiasm.
What you are saying here is this:
The axioms are not proven on the basis of the fact that they work (who said otherwise?!), but they do work. And nevertheless, we also assume they are true. Why? “Just because.”
Morality too is not proven on the basis of the fact that it works. But it works (if we ignore the infantile example of the jungle). But we also believe that it is true. Why? “Just because.”
Ah, so now the difference between axioms and values is clear. Q.E.D.
I sent the column along with my first response to a friend and asked him to measure how long it would take until you lashed out at me… You met my expectations…
And what shall I answer? Should I descend to your level and say that your response is like a letter with only the sender’s name? Or that it is like an empty letter? Maybe that is true, but what use is there in that?
Indeed, consequentialist arguments are not essential arguments. I came only to claim that “just because” is not an argument at all! At most it is an expression of a strong intuitive feeling. Nothing more. To base the whole Torah and the commandments on intuitive feeling is nothing but intellectual wretchedness.
The “just because” in geometry and mathematics is not equivalent to the “just because” in ethics, and it is certainly possible to build a society on the basis of other moral axioms (I noted in my reply to “Tekhelet” that the economic literature has published several beautiful models of “jungle economy” that showed the existence of a “moral” equilibrium even without any moral axioms, and the rest, go and learn).
“The fact that something works is not a justification for correctness” — yes indeed, that’s exactly what I said. So where am I confused? The one who is confused is you. When there is no justification for correctness, we are left only with a hypothesis or belief. But this is not arbitrary belief of “just because”; rather, it is belief that receives reinforcement from various supports (including the fact that it “works”). See the holy book “True and Not Stable” [a play on “True and Certain”], which is not free of errors but nevertheless contains some correct things.
As for cheap psychologism (“obsession,” etc.), I also have a great deal to answer there, but I will refrain from that for now.
The more you rage, the more reinforcement I receive for my position. That too is not a proof, only reinforcement…
If you didn’t understand, I did not repeat your words but attacked them. We do not “determine” that the axioms are correct; rather, we assume them. Do I need to explain to you the difference between a working assumption and a factual determination? Intuition has its proper place. But to base the whole Torah and the commandments on intuitive “just because” is intellectual wretchedness, and I explained above what I think pushed you toward it.
If I wanted to descend to your level, I would quote Krylov (in Reichman’s marvelous translation): “The fool proclaims in all simplicity — whatever he does not understand is nothing but nonsense.” Before you decide that the jungle is an “infantile example,” how about reading some of those models and understanding them? Want references?
What you identified in the column in others has materialized in you: a lack of understanding of what you yourself are saying.
Contrary to what you wrote in your last response, your column does not try only to “describe and clarify” but also purports to provide an explanation (that is, a justification) for why it is right to cling to certain truths (“just becauses”) even though they are ungrounded.
Racheli, for example, if she were to read your column and be persuaded, could find a justification—which until now, according to your view, she was unable to attain—for the conduct of hers that you like so much.
So far this is, in my opinion, a more accurate description than yours of the basic idea behind this column.
Now comes my criticism (I am admittedly repeating myself, but apparently I didn’t explain well before or you simply didn’t understand):
This basic idea clashes with the sweeping rule you formulated, according to which no justifications can be given for that same basic idea…
I would further note that your appeal to tautologies (talk about words and logic is also done by means of words and logic…) does not serve you but exactly the opposite. If words and logic have such decisive weight (I of course agree), one cannot evade them, as you tried to do in your last response. The problem here is not that you claimed something ungrounded (which could still count as rational), but that you went further and made a self-contradictory claim, as I showed above.
Mordechai, your obsession brings you to speak like a dog returning to its vomit (if you say the same nonsense over and over and maneuver from side to side, do you think something more intelligent has been said here?!). I have already seen people here who are not the sharpest pencils. But you—a talented Jew that you are—this is truly pitiful and heartrending. Words fail me, so I’ll stop here.
Michi needed three thick volumes to lay out his (flawed) doctrine, and from me, who makes no philosophical pretensions whatsoever, you expect a comprehensive answer in a talkback?
And nevertheless, briefly. As creatures of the Holy One, blessed be He, we are guests in His world, and therefore He has the right to impose on us whatever His wisdom has decreed. After the Flood the obligation was strengthened by a covenant with humanity (symbolized by the rainbow) that includes the Holy One’s commitment not to destroy the world (apparently meaning not to destroy it before its time, which is unknown to me), in exchange for humanity’s commitment to the seven Noahide commandments. At Mount Sinai the people of Israel were chosen in another covenant with the Holy One, blessed be He (strengthened in the plains of Moab, and “they accepted it again” in the days of Ahasuerus, Shabbat 88a), in which the people of Israel took the Torah upon themselves in exchange for being chosen. The obligation to keep commandments rests on reward and punishment (the Torah and the prophets emphasize this explicitly), where the punishment is for “they broke My covenant,” but it also has an additional level.
The additional level is faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, as “a God of faithfulness and without iniquity,” which entails that the commandments have a reason and their observance is “truth.” Why? I do not know, but it is really not “just because,” unless by “just because” you mean “thus His wisdom, blessed be He, decreed.” That is a completely different “just because” from a person’s obligation to the yoke of Torah and commandments (and in the days of the Sanhedrin also capital law) merely because “that is how” Michi feels in his intuition. We do not know the reasons for the commandments, and according to the Rambam (at the end of Hilkhot Me’ilah and elsewhere) it is proper to seek them, but not to make observance conditional on knowing them, since “Can you find the essence of God through searching?”
This is far from concise and certainly does not answer all the questions and difficulties, and it is doubtful whether anyone has a comprehensive and satisfactory answer. It is entirely possible that I am mistaken. Even so, my proposal is a far more respectable basis for your intellect than a “just because” that is nothing but Michi’s personal, subjective intuition. And the rest, go and learn.
I haven’t yet read the thick volumes, so help me for the time being understand what is written in your talkback:
A. “As creatures of the Holy One, blessed be He, we are guests in His world, and therefore He has the right to impose on us whatever His wisdom has decreed.” There is a component from our side as to why it is our duty as guests to obey the host’s commands, and a component from His side as to why He is entitled to command and impose. I am not dealing with the component from His side but with the one from ours. Why are guests obligated to obey the host’s commands? If we have finally arrived at a basic principle that is self-justifying, that is what is called here “just because.”
B. If reward and punishment are an additional level above the basic level, *and even without them there would still be an obligation to keep commandments*, then I have no complaints. That is also what I think on the matter. Whether the reward and punishment are in the World to Come or also in this world through some ultra-sophisticated hidden system, I do not know and it matters less to me.
C. The level that the commandments have a reason and that observing them is truth seems entirely correct to me, but I do not at all agree that this is a level in the obligation of the commandments. I would keep God’s commandments even if they had no reason at all. But I definitely join the assumption that they probably have a higher, hidden spiritual reason.
According to what you wrote, that the whole matter of religious duty is because one is obligated in it, then if so a gentile who is outside and has no obligation at all—why would he enter into an obligation that is not his if there is no truth in it other than the fact that Jews are obligated? In other words, what is a righteous convert for you?
Please be ashamed of this column urgently
You turned worshippers of God into idiots
With God’s help, 11 Tammuz 5780
This post fits the portion of Chukat, where one encounters a commandment that is a “statute,” not understood, and accepts it because the Creator so decreed. But it is very hard to build a living Judaism all of which is built on “just because,” and therefore the wise son asks, “What mean the testimonies, and the statutes, and the judgments, which the Lord our God has commanded you?” He tries to understand even the “statutes,” out of the understanding that in them too is hidden wondrous divine wisdom, which we have not yet merited to understand.
Clearly one cannot descend to the depth of the wisdom of the Giver of the Torah except through deep study of the “Jewish bookshelf,” to learn “from books and from sages,” and the more one clears away the burden of the shallow, cynical, jumpy world of the “bohemia,” the more room is freed in heart and mind to receive the “living waters” of Torah.
With blessing, Ami’oz Yaron Schnitzler
I didn’t understand the question. A gentile who wants to serve God and be close to Him can come and convert. I am not saying there is no spiritual benefit from the commandments. What I said is that we do not know what it is, and that the benefit is not a sufficient reason for the obligation to keep the commandments.
I noted at the beginning of my previous response that I make no philosophical pretensions, and even if I did, the subject certainly cannot be encompassed in a few short lines in a talkback. What moved me to respond was the intellectual wretchedness Michi displayed here, he who certainly does have pretensions as a philosopher. (By the way, contrary to his penny-cheap psychologism, I suffer from no “obsession” toward him, certainly not personally; but if psychologism is in order, I can offer here a psychologistic analysis of him himself that would not add to his honor, but I will refrain from that both because I am not personally hostile to him, and because this is his platform, and because I despise all psychologism, including the kind that supposedly serves me.) At the end of the response I noted that I doubt whether a comprehensive and satisfactory answer exists. Your question is an opportunity to explain why.
As is known, the Rambam in the Guide of the Perplexed argued that the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to the laws of logic, and that this does not in any way diminish His omnipotence. Various philosophers and rabbis (such as Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, of blessed memory) went even further and argued for the existence of an independent and autonomous morality to which even the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposedly subject. Whereas regarding the Holy One’s subjection to logic I feel a certain perplexity and have no clear doctrine on the matter, and this is not the place to elaborate, regarding subjection to morality it is clear to me that the claim is nonsense. First, it is obvious that regarding the Holy One, blessed be He, one cannot claim that He too is subject to a “just because” morality. In my humble opinion it makes no sense at all to speak of morality as having independent existence vis-à-vis the Holy One, blessed be He; just as He and His wisdom are one, so too He and His morality are one, for it is none other than He and His will, and the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to His will to the same degree that He is subject to Himself. All the pilpul and attempts to produce an independent and autonomous morality are, in my eyes, mere empty talk.
Since morality is nothing but the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, there is no independent morality that one must observe because of some inner intuitive feeling of “just because,” and Kant’s categorical imperative is an empty form without content (and wiser men than I have already preceded me in saying this), unless you say that the Holy One, blessed be He, embedded His will in our “operating system.” That may be, but it is not “just because.” The will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is the law of nature. But His wisdom decreed that man be given free choice to deviate from it to a certain degree. A person can drink poison and die, yet he can defy the Lord and not feel the consequences immediately, so that free choice may have meaning. (It makes no sense to speak of free choice when a gun is held to your temple.) But free choice was not given to us so that we should do whatever comes into our minds, but so that we could choose to enter into a covenant with the Holy One, blessed be He, and thereby merit to draw close to Him, etc.
You need not return and challenge me. I know I have not sealed all the breaches, and as I have already noted at least twice, these matters are broader and deeper than what I can offer here (or in general), and it is doubtful whether a comprehensive and exhaustive answer even exists; perhaps there is still some force to the “great protest against the Torah,” and it requires further study.
In any case, it is better to remain with a question needing study than to offer pathetic answers that came into the world only out of the aspiration to remove from it the Holy One, blessed be He, His covenant, and His providence (and without full disclosure).
In any case, I will summarize my position (in its essential part I learned it from the words of the author of the column, though in other places).
I believe in reward and punishment and in providence (oh, was there a Holocaust and a tsunami, and sometimes the way of the wicked prospers? No one dies from difficulties, and perhaps when I merit prophecy they will explain everything to me), and in the covenant of the people of Israel with the Holy One, blessed be He, and also that Torah study and observance of commandments repairs the soul and brings cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He.
And yet all these are, for me, additional levels, and the foundation of keeping commandments is the recognition that I am under an obligation to obey with submission the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. And that basic recognition cannot be based on anything.
In the end, when one descends the slope of justifications, one arrives either at personal pleasure (and why do I want pleasure? Just because) or at a basic value (and why uphold it? Just because. This is not the irritating “just because” of the kind my daughter uses to explain why she doesn’t want to go to sleep, but a “just because” that indicates we have reached the foundation stone of values and justifications).
By the way, she herself tries to rationalize her belief in God as the organizing factor of reality. It isn’t clear to me how much she herself believes that. It would be better if she simply acknowledged that she believes, and that’s that.
On the psychological plane, it seems that what troubles her is the price other people pay for her belief. It would have been good if she also rejoiced in her belief, as it is said: “Because you did not serve the Lord your God with joyfulness and with gladness of heart.”
A not very deep comment like the rest of the discussions in the other comments — I think the rabbi meant George Mallory. Thomas Malory wrote/edited “Le Morte d’Arthur,” the collection of stories about King Arthur’s Knights of the Round Table
Now I understand, you are saying that the meaningful axioms that are intuitively true are a subset of axioms in general. It seems that Wikipedia accepts this, but in a weak way, because otherwise it would sharpen it. English Wikipedia on the subject says that in the mathematical realm this is disputed. And in the philosophical realm, axioms indeed are self-evident truths.
In any case, it seems to me that lines fit this definition. The parallel axiom is that through a point outside a line there passes one and only one parallel line, and perhaps there are alternative axioms.
In any case, we have digressed.
And another idea — to make the blog in the form of a Talmud page, and all the notes and polemics would be around it — but some would say that this is cheapening it — so maybe with some modification.
Gemara
Complex systems (like an ethical or religious system) do not have to be hierarchical — in which case axioms are needed — but can be networked. A networked system gets validity (or at least some degree of credibility) from the connections between its parts and their consistency. In such a system there is no room for “just because.” A node in the graph that is “just because” is an isolated island, which usually can simply be deleted.
Indeed. I made a mistake.
See various formulations here: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%90%D7%A7%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%AA_%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D
But it really doesn’t matter. No one has seen another parallel passing through that same point either, but “I haven’t seen” is not proof.
That is Quine’s claim regarding concept formation, and in principle I accept your comment. But it does not change the matter in principle. One can still ask why you accept the whole network. Internal consistency is not a justification for external validity. There are many consistent systems, some of which contradict each other. The adoption of this particular consistent system is justified by “just because.”
I can agree with the end of your words, but in a slightly different formulation — this is not the irritating “just because” of the sort Michi uses (“just because my intuition decreed it, and it obligates all who enter the world, even those who have a different intuition because whoever has a different intuition is captive to delusions, etc.”); it is “just because” in the sense of “thus His wisdom, blessed be He, decreed,” which we cannot understand and contain in its fullness, and probably not even in part of it.
Such a “just because” empties Kant’s categorical imperative of content. I really do not care whether the act I do would become a universal law. The Holy One, blessed be He, has the right to establish differential laws as He wishes, because thus His wisdom, blessed be He, decreed. He is obligated (if at all) only to what His wisdom decreed. And that is all.
What anchors a network — so that it does not just float in space — is the connections it has with nodes outside it. A scientific theory is a network, and what anchors it is a connection to reality — the results of experiments (admittedly they too are theory-laden, but not only that).
What can anchor Judaism? Various suggestions have been made, starting with a feeling of “holiness” in the style of Rudolf Otto, through Kant, and up to tradition (to the point of certainty?) as the author of the Kuzari suggests.
With God’s help, 12 Tammuz 5780
At any rate, Mordechai and Esther did not see “thus shall it be done” as “just because,” but required a long and detailed explanation of “what they saw regarding ‘thus shall it be done,’ and what had happened to them.” And then, when the Jews and their descendants were aware of the greatness of God’s kindnesses in saving them from the hand of an enemy and avenger — then “the Jews undertook” willingly what they had already accepted under the “coercion of the mountain held over them like a barrel.”
The “just because” is not “just because,” but stems from a consciousness that the yoke of commandments placed upon Israel comes from “thus shall it be done for the man whom the king — the King of the universe — delights to honor,” and the burden of His commandments is meant to elevate and refine the souls of those who perform them, to be a “kingdom of priests and a holy nation,” the vanguard force that proclaims to humanity the faith of the Torah and its values.
When a person feels that God’s commandments prepare him and his people to proudly bear their divine mission — he can also accept this or that detail that he does not understand, understanding that the created being cannot descend to the full depth of the wisdom of his Creator.
A person can and is even commanded (through the commandment of Torah study) to understand as deeply as possible, but just as we do not fully understand the laws of creation, and every new discovery arouses new questions in us — so it is with the wisdom of the divine Torah: we strive to understand more and more, yet remain with a realm of “I said, I will become wise, but it was far from me.”
With blessing, see there
That anchor is the “just because.” You won’t be able to escape it.
I read it and didn’t understand one point: according to your view, what is the distinguishing criterion between the two kinds of “just because”? Or would you say there is no such criterion (and that itself is another “just because,” a third one)?