On Feminist Theology (Column 40)
Our American cousins tell of a man who ascended to heaven to meet the Master of the Universe. When he returned to earth, his friends asked him: "What is He like? What did He say to you?". The emissary opened his report by saying:[1] "first of all, she is black…".
What is all this about? A few weeks ago I heard on the radio an interview with Efrat Gerber Aran following her article in the Shabbat supplement of Makor Rishon, titled "Daring to Call Him Mother." This article joins a genre of several essays that try to propose a feminist theology according to which the Holy One, blessed be He, is female rather than male ("to call Him Mother"—that is, the Holy One). It seems to me that the pioneer in our circles on this matter is Tamar Ross, who has dealt with feminist theology in several of her writings, one or two of which I once read long ago (though I do not remember details, only the general impression, which I will describe below).
Needless to say, here too we are trailing far behind our aforementioned cousins, who beat our timid Jewish enlightenment to the punch—though in this case only by a few decades. I must admit that there are quite a few things that are well worth learning from them, but it seems to me that feminist theology, and perhaps theology in general, is not one of them.
From this, you can probably guess what I think about feminist theology, but I am convinced that some of you may draw conclusions that are far too hasty about what is coming in this column. So let me say right now that this column was not written in order to oppose feminist theology, if only because one cannot oppose a sentence that asserts nothing. Someone who makes the claim X is in effect telling us that, in his view, X is true. Someone who opposes it is in effect saying that, in his view, X is false. But if X says nothing, then it can be neither true nor false. My purpose here is to try to show precisely that: that this theology says nothing at all. And from this it follows that opposition to feminist theology (or to masculine theology) suffers from exactly the same lack of importance and meaning as it itself does. If I were to understate matters, I would say that this is a non-issue. More precisely, one should say that it is nonsense.
The question of feminist theology is tied at the navel to several fundamental defects of theology in general. That is why I thought it would be interesting to touch on it in a somewhat broader context as well.
The Meaning of the Claim that the Holy One (=the Holy One, blessed be She) Is (?) Female
If we focus on physical characteristics, I assume that none of the theologians in question is trying to claim that the Holy One has female sexual organs, or a more highly developed left cerebral hemisphere, or goes about with head covered while leaving less than a handbreadth of hair exposed (according to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein). On the other hand, when it comes to non-physical characteristics, it is very hard to determine which of them are essential to a woman. Warmth? Emotionality (emotional intelligence)? Acceptance? Tolerance? Even if it were correct to say of any one of these that it is a distinctly feminine trait (which I very much doubt), it would still be hard to deny that one could say that the Holy One is warm, emotionally intelligent, tolerant, and/or accepting, even if we were to leave the masculine mode of reference to Him intact. So it is quite clear that the claim that the Holy One is a woman does not mean that He has some such mental characteristics. If so, then we are really dealing here with mere gibberish. Why say that He is a woman instead of simply saying that He is accepting or tolerant?!
On Positivism, Facts, and Faith
Let me try to formulate this a bit more precisely. It is customary to define a scientific theory as one that can be subjected to empirical testing. The more lenient will say (following Karl Popper) that a theory is scientific if one can try to refute it. Thus, for example, the claim that every fairy has three wings is not scientific, since I see no experiment that could put it to a test of refutation. The same is true of the more basic claim that "fairies exist."
Our logical-positivist cousins go further and argue that a claim that is not accompanied by some indication of a way to verify it (through empirical confirmation or refutation)—for example, any of the above claims about fairies, and likewise all claims of metaphysics—is meaningless (nonsense). In their view, the content of a claim is its empirical content (what it says about the world, or about what we could observe in the world). Hence they think that metaphysics is an empty field, and everything said in it is nonsense.
In my personal opinion, they went too far. For example, there is no way to verify the claim "There is a God," and nevertheless I think it has meaning (indeed, I think not only that it has meaning, but that it is even a true factual claim). Moreover, even if I were an atheist, I would agree that it has meaning, except that I would think it a false factual claim. Its meaning depends on one’s approach, of course. In the four notebooks here on the site, I argued that every argument for the existence of God presupposes a different kind of God. But according to all those arguments, the claim that He exists has meaning: either there is some entity that created the world (the cosmological argument in the second notebook and the physico-theological one in the third), or there is an entity that gives force to the laws of morality (the moral argument in the fourth notebook), or there exists a perfect being (than which nothing greater/more perfect can be conceived—the ontological argument in the first notebook), and so on.
Another example is the claim "Murder is forbidden," like any other ethical claim. Here too it is true that there is no empirical way to verify it (see the fourth notebook on the site), and extreme positivists claim of it as well that it has no real meaning (apart from a descriptive meaning regarding what certain human beings think—or really feel). Nevertheless, it seems to me that it has a clear meaning (not descriptive but normative; see the fourth notebook). And again, even if one does not accept it, one can still acknowledge that it says something—that is, that it has meaning.
What is its meaning? One could say that its meaning is some feeling that exists within me, but that is too weak a demand (that is the descriptive meaning mentioned above). Its meaning is expressed mainly through its implications. If the claim "Murder is forbidden" is true, then whoever murdered is a bad person and should be punished.[2] I myself would refrain from doing something if it were an immoral act. By contrast, the claim "There is a God" has a somewhat different character. In the deistic context it has no implications (deism is belief in a philosophical God, without religious or other commandments), and therefore it has meaning only as a statement of fact: there is such-and-such an entity (that created the world, etc.). Perhaps this cannot be known, and certainly it cannot be subjected to empirical verification, and yet it still says something. In the theistic context (belief in a commanding God) this is even clearer, because there it has implications of obligation to the commandments and obligation to carry out His will. What about the claim concerning the existence of fairies? There, there are no implications, but one can still argue that the claim that such beings exist has meaning.
However, in order to examine whether a claim like "fairies exist" indeed has meaning, we must pour some content into that statement—that is, try to explain or characterize what a fairy is. One minimal characterization could be: a transparent winged creature that is not made of matter, has no mass, and is not empirically observable. Why, after we have supplied content, does this claim have meaning? Because now it says something. If it were somehow to become clear to us that there are indeed non-material winged creatures, we could say that the claim "fairies exist" is true. I do not mean to say that fairies really do exist, and still less to say that we have some way of ascertaining or denying this. I mean only to sketch the framework within which one can speak about the meaning of the claim "fairies exist." At that point one can adopt it or reject it, or even remain without a position on it. But before we supplied it with meaning, one could neither adopt it nor oppose it, nor even remain without a position on it. To use an example from a previous column, I cannot say that I have no position on the question "What is the difference between a rabbit?" If something says nothing—or if I do not understand what it says—I cannot have a position regarding it, nor can I say that I have no position regarding it. I simply do not understand what it means.
Back to the Meaning of Feminist Theology
Now we are a bit better equipped, and we can return to asking whether the claim "God is a woman" has any meaning. It is of course not open to empirical verification, but in that respect it is no different from claims about fairies and about God in general. Does it have implications? I very much doubt it. I cannot see even a single implication of this assertion—that is, a single claim that someone who believes God is male would have to deny, and someone who believes He is female would have to adopt. But it is still possible that this claim has meaning, like the claim that fairies exist or that God exists in the deistic context. Yet as we saw above, claims of this kind say nothing so long as we have not offered some characterization of that God or those fairies. God is a being with power who created the world, and a fairy is a non-material massless creature that cannot be observed. These are rather amorphous definitions, and yet, to the best of my judgment, they suffice to give content to those claims. One need not be a logical positivist to demand this kind of content as a condition for a claim to have meaning. All we are asking is that the claim make some claim.
Well then, does the claim "God is a woman" in fact assert anything? I must say that if there is such a thing, I fail to discern it. As noted, it is unlikely that there is a claim here about physical characteristics, but neither is there one about psychic or mental characteristics. Put differently, I would ask it this way: what would have to happen for me to conclude that this claim is true or false? And I do not mean specifically empirical observation. Give me some difference that it makes, even if only a theoretical one: what ought to be true or untrue in masculine/feminine theology? If Elijah were to appear to me and I could ask him anything, what should I ask him in order to reach a positive or negative conclusion on this matter? I am willing to settle for Popper’s minimal and lenient criterion: what would have to be said to me in order for me to conclude that Tamar Ross or Efrat Gerber Aran were wrong? I cannot think of anything like that. If, in my generosity, I were to refer them and suggest that they speak with Elijah, who had appeared to me, what would they need to ask him in order to reach their conclusion? What is very impressive to me is that they managed to reach this conclusion (that God is a woman) even without asking Elijah. Whereas I, poor little me, a worm and not a man (a worm and not a man), am too boorish to understand how one could reach this conclusion (or its opposite) even after a free conversation with Elijah.
It is important to understand that my claims are directed both at those who advocate a masculine theology (paternalistic, condescending, and exclusionary), and at those who advocate—more precisely, those women who advocate—a feminist theology (enlightened, progressive, and compassionate). Both groups are engaged in nonsense. At the same time, those who oppose either of these theologies also share that label, in my view.
A Broader Point about Theological Claims in General
It turns out that many claims in theology have this character. In theological literature (and also in philosophical literature), pens are broken and rivers of ink are spilled (which requires massive forest-cutting, and contributes its share to the jittery upheavals of the climate in our generation) in clarifying issues of nonsense. People investigate so-and-so’s approach to the question of the Other and other-orientedness, when only a few of them bother at all to clarify the meaning of the discussion. My impression is that this is a distinctive characteristic of continental philosophy (French-German, as opposed to analytic philosophy, which is mainly Anglo-American). All sorts of Frenchmen discuss deep issues that say nothing at all, but they themselves are immersed so deeply in these important discussions that they do not notice it. And when this is accidentally discovered by one of them, they immediately move into the realms of postmodernism, wordplay, and verbal amusements, where you manipulate sentences and arrive at other sentences without any need for any of them to make any claim at all. After all, if every frog is as deep as a cloud, and the depth of a cloud is triangular, then it is obvious that there is something triangular about a frog. True, there is another approach that maintains that the triangular dimension in the frog is hyperbolic, and this explains why a world war rages between the approaches. Alan Sokal’s amusing article demonstrates this well.
It seems to me that if you were to pick up a sample volume of a philosophical journal or some articles in Jewish thought, you would see that a considerable portion of the articles furiously churn water at one another, bringing quotations and sources for every approach, while the waters stand as a wall to them on their right and on their left. Just as an example, consider the discussion of the relation between God and the world—that is, the question of pantheism, or in kabbalistic language, the question of tzimtzum (divine contraction). The pantheists hold that God is identical with the world (what is that? what is the content of such a claim?). The panentheists, by contrast, think that He contains the world (the world is within Him). Others think that He surrounds or fills; some hold that the tzimtzum is literal and others think it is not. What all of these have in common is that these are not claims, neither true nor false. This is nonsense at its best. In the articles I have seen, not an ounce of effort is devoted to defining what is at issue, what the content of the claims is, and the like. There is a careful classification of the different approaches, citation of sources for each, and the drawing of a map of positions and opinions.
Perhaps I am giving these fields too sweeping a bad name, and I assume that there are some who have indeed tried to clarify the meaning of these claims, but among the works I encountered there were hardly any such works. They were very systematic and heavily grounded in sources, and yet my feeling is that they said nothing. In any case, the fact that such discussions are possible at all, even if they are not a representative sample, is a very bad sign for these fields.
Using Metaphors to Soothe Stomachaches
It is hard to deny that such statements have therapeutic value. I am sure that Efrat Gerber Aran and Tamar Ross derive a great deal of satisfaction when they call him (or her) Mother. It probably calms them greatly, causes them to love him (actually, her), and to observe his commandments (actually, her commandments) with devotion. Likewise, the Hasidim are very enthusiastic about the profound claim that There is none besides Him (there is none besides Him) and everything is divinity—that is, that the tzimtzum is not literal. Others distinguish between surrounding and filling, and feel infinite depth in one approach or another. All of these are blessed therapeutic phenomena.
But there is a great distance between soothing stomachaches or emotional healing and loading a statement with a claim. For example, if it helps or calms someone to say three times a day the sentence "Every fairy has three wings," then he should certainly say it. But for us, as listeners, that statement carries no information whatsoever. It is a mantra recited for therapeutic purposes, not a claim with informational value. Therefore, even if I myself felt a therapeutic need to recite this mantra, I would not write an academic article or any other kind of article about it (unless perhaps in a medical or psychological journal). To the best of my understanding, theology and philosophy are supposed to deal with claims, that is, with sentences that say something, true or false, about the world. Therapy is the business of psychology or psychiatry and medicine, which are of course entirely different disciplines. Those who engage in such statements would do well to bear this in mind. I invite the enthusiastic thinkers of feminist theology to send their learned articles to medical and psychological journals, if only as reports of interesting case studies. The community ought to take notice that there are men or women who experience healing and illumination when they mutter sentences like "calling her Mother" and the like. This is indeed a fascinating clinical phenomenon, and certainly worthy of analysis and discussion. But that analysis and discussion properly belong in medical and clinical realms, not in the realms of theology and philosophy. For some reason that is not clear to me, many of these articles are sent to venues devoted to theology and philosophy, whereas their proper place is, as noted, in other realms.
Just to dispel any discomfort, I do not mean to say that whoever says such things is ill. Absolutely not. Each of us is calmed or gratified by one means or another. One likes watching basketball games, another watches television, a third studies Ketzot HaChoshen, and a fourth goes traveling, or eats a good piece of cake. So there are also those who bring peace to their souls by developing a feminist theology or discussing a non-literal tzimtzum. All of these are phenomena that appear among perfectly healthy people; I am only arguing that the discussion of them should take place in venues devoted to therapy and psychology and the structure of the human psyche, not in venues devoted to theology and philosophy.[3]
Slander, Rape, and Seduction
They tell of Rabbi Isser Zalman Meltzer (head of the Slutsk Yeshiva, and later of Etz Chaim Yeshiva in Jerusalem, and head of Agudat Israel’s Council of Torah Sages, author of Even HaEzel) that he once said that Rabbi Chaim of Brisk, Rabbi Shimon Shkop (head of the Grodno Yeshiva, author of Sha’arei Yosher), and Rabbi Meir Simcha (author of Meshekh Chokhmah and Or Sameach) correspond to the categories of rapist, seducer, and slanderer who brings a bad name (I do not remember who was who, though I have my own suspicions). Regarding feminist theology, I would like to argue that it is all three: both rapist and seducer and slanderer. It rapes theology though theology did it no wrong, seduces those drawn to feminist views and innovative theological conceptions, and arouses in them the feeling that this is theology and that these are factual claims, without any basis whatsoever—but above all it slanders philosophy and theology.
Many people have the sense that philosophy is nonsense. The positivists ostensibly should have argued this, were it not that positivism itself is a philosophical doctrine (there you have a contradiction within the positivist doctrine). Philosophical questions and disputes are eternal, and it is impossible to make progress in them. One cannot decide a dispute between philosophers, for after all it is argument against argument, and neither is exposed to the test of empirical verification. This one says one thing and that one thinks another, but in the worst case it is merely word games and pseudo-disputes. Scientists are very prone to this attitude, and that is usually their undoing when they come to deal with the philosophical meaning of their findings.[4]
As for me, I completely disagree with that feeling. In my opinion, philosophy advances a great deal, and quite a few questions do get decided. Sometimes the arguments are nothing more than pointing to different aspects of the matter, and there is no real disagreement there at all. There are indeed also disagreements that have not been settled, and that do not seem likely to be settled, but these are a tiny minority in my view. And even there, one can raise intelligent arguments (provided that the arguments have meaning in the minimal sense I presented above) this way and that, and each person can form a position for himself in accordance with his assumptions and his common sense. What gives philosophy a bad name is discussions of the sort exemplified by feminist theology. These are word games that say nothing, apart from promoting one agenda or another, or providing catharsis for one frustration or another (therapeutic effects). In closing I will say that, truth be told, my anger at the vanities of feminist theology does not stem from my allegedly paternalistic-chauvinistic-condescending approach (it is not such, if only because I do not think that the Holy One is a man), but mainly because discussions like these give philosophy a bad name.
[1] My thanks to Tzipora Chesler, the greatest of them all, for this story.
[2] Of course, the implications are not the meaning itself, but rather an implication that serves as an indication of the existence of meaning. But I will not enter into such petty niceties here.
[3] Anyone who infers from my remarks that existentialist thought also belongs on those stages and not in philosophy will indeed be correct (at least with regard to most of it).
[4] I once attended a philosophy conference at Bar-Ilan, and an elderly American physicist lectured there. In the audience sat Itamar Pitowsky (of blessed memory), a philosopher of science (who had also studied physics and mathematics) from the Hebrew University. At the end of the lecture he told the lecturer that philosophy too is a profession. The lecturer, like many other physicists, thought that his scientific knowledge entitled him to make philosophical claims, and did so with great authority, which only sharpened the absurdity of what he was saying.
Of course, anyone can make claims, and he may even be right. I presume I am not under suspicion of demanding formal education in philosophy as a condition for engaging in the field. But I certainly do recommend philosophical knowledge and skill, even if they were not acquired within a formal academic framework. Scientific knowledge does not always advance you in this respect. Sometimes it even gets in the way, because you live under the illusion that you know everything that needs to be known about the field under discussion. That is what leads to much of the nonsense that comes out of the mouths of scientists who are very talented in their own domain. Moreover, the scientific aura neutralizes the ability of listeners to criticize the nonsense they are saying, and then even they themselves do not understand how great the folly is.
Discussion
Shalom to Rabbi Michael,
A few small questions and comments.
1. Beyond your disparaging Sartre and Derrida, does Emmanuel Levinas also fall for you into the category of those who delight in bombast?
2. Regarding pantheism and its opposite, why is it nonsense? I didn’t understand.
3. And regarding feminist theology, in my view its importance is mainly on the practical side (not only the psychological-therapeutic one). Since the woman’s place is secondary (I hope that’s not nonsense) in various halakhic issues—for example, divorce/chained wives—then all the movements of religious feminism are creating a process of recognizing this side of things. The meaning is that halakhah will change. True, this is not a direct consequence of saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, is female, but it is part of a historical process (am I allowed to write that on your blog?) that I think Rav Kook called “the spirit of art belonging to history” (not the feminist process, but every “ideational” process that splashes out in a number of directions—in art, religion, and more).
In short, the fedalhushiyot (I hope you know the term) touch on matters of saving life. Buchris, Slomiansky, divorce and chained wives (I read about one case in which you were involved as a halakhic authority), and a woman’s dignity in the privacy of the home. So in the name of the movement of ideas in Israel, is it not proper to tolerate placebo articles in places that are not themselves pretentious? Really!
I dedicate the following song to you; perhaps you’ll find precious pearls in it. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo2Y83MwEzM
That is exactly what I was referring to when I spoke about therapeutic value (constructing a theology in order to prevent consequences or attain gains, rather than because the claim is true). Even the reference to Him as male is not because He is male, but because the generic grammatical form is masculine. That is all.
The first part is acceptable. The second part is the heart of their claim. Generic language is itself a way of constructing reality. That is a claim that is hard to deny. Referring to the Creator as male, despite His being no more male than any other metaphor, causes people to behave in one way or another. You can’t dismiss this reality with the argument that it is merely generic language; they want to change it, because it produces gains and, in their view, at their expense.
Hello Shlomi.
I hope you didn’t take it personally. To each his own taste.
1. Everything is included, Levinas as well. I wouldn’t say this comes from comprehensive knowledge, since as a result of this opinion of mine I didn’t trouble myself to equip myself with comprehensive knowledge about these fellows (and I am of course very doubtful whether such knowledge even exists).
2. Pantheism is simply atheism that calls its world “God” (yes, I know the pilpulim about there being something in the whole beyond the details that compose it. That is empty verbiage. Nonsense, in the vernacular). Therefore I do not see what there is to discuss in this silliness.
3. Contrary to the reservation at the beginning of your remarks in this section, what you go on to describe is exactly what I called therapeutic value. Although I identify with most of the goals you mentioned, I strongly oppose presenting a theoretical doctrine that says nothing at all (or even one that does say something but is simply false), just because it brings some benefit. Pragmatism is downright repulsive and infantile in my eyes (mere empty words). A theoretical doctrine is examined by what it says and judged only in terms of truth or falsehood (not in terms of utility). I gave the example of the benefit of muttering the mantra that fairies have three wings. Of course, if you want to justify this silliness in terms of saving life—who am I to stand in your way. Except that in my opinion the use of such nonsense only sharpens and intensifies the problems. If a woman comes to me with a value-based demand for equality or in protest against deprivation and abuse—then it is certainly important and right to consider it. But if she does so on the basis of feminist theology—I would throw her down all the stairs as a consummate babbler. Such theology only reinforces the chauvinistic perception that women are babblers and foolish, and that is a shame.
Thanks for the song. It is indeed nice, and the message is not entirely unambiguous.
I really disagree. On the contrary, referring to Him as male at most reflects chauvinism; it does not create it. And therefore referring to Him as female at most reflects aspirations, but does not change other aspirations (see my reply here to Shlomi). In this case language constructs no reality at all. These are feminist-postmodernist prattlings (the kind that hang everything on language and politically correct speech that allegedly constructs reality), and they are baseless.
Why? I actually think there is indeed a normative claim in Gerber’s article. The claim is that there is nothing wrong (nothing contrary to God’s will) with a woman imagining the Creator as a woman when she relates to Him/Her. She infers this from the fact that there are prophets who related to Him/Her that way. If Elijah were to tell us that there is something wrong with this and that the male image must be preserved at all costs, then the claim would indeed have been refuted. No?
That is roughly like saying that the claim “there is a demon” has an implication, namely that one may say that there is a demon (or that the claim “there is a demon” is true). It works the other way around: if there really is a demon, then the claim is true. But a claim’s being true cannot itself constitute its own meaning.
My question was what it means to say “God is a woman,” and you cannot answer that by saying it has implications, namely that one can say the sentence “God is a woman.” In other words: when I say this very sentence itself, what will its meaning be?
This reminds me of a question I once had about the view of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean that lesser sancta are the property of their owner. After all, the Torah determines what must be done with them, and that is very similar to any other sacrifice (most holy offerings). I do not see any greater connection between the owner and lesser sancta than between him and the most holy offerings.
Now, many answer that one can betroth a woman with them, but that is a valueless answer. The fact that one can betroth a woman with them is a consequence of the claim that they are the owner’s property. I am asking what it means/signifies that they are the owner’s property. In what sense are they his property?
By the way, if you look carefully you will readily see that this answer is much better and more meaningful than the one you proposed for my question, but this is not the place to elaborate.
Although this is somewhat at the margins of the article, I’d be happy to hear your interpretation of the aforementioned remark of R. Isser Zalman.
Hello Rabbi Michi. Isn’t the traditional division of influencer/giver as male and receiver as female meaningful in this context? That is, a male God is a God who creates the world and sustains it and brings content into it, whereas a female God—I’m not sure what that means in this context. But in any case, this is a claim with meaning, not an empty one (if one accepts this definition of male and female, then saying that God is male is ostensibly something that is part of the believer’s basic experience of existence: all the content within us, and outside us, we receive from God).
With all due respect, that is really not what I argued.
I did not write that the implication is that one may say that God is a woman. My claim is that the article does not deal with God Himself at all, but with the image a person adopts when addressing Him. To imagine God in one way or another is a real mental act, not meaningless verbiage. I can imagine Him as a stern king or as an old man full of mercy, as a warrior hero, etc.
Therefore the question is whether imagining God as a woman when addressing Him or praying is a legitimate act or not. What is the nonsense in that?
(Of course, I am not discussing the question whether it is desirable to imagine God in any form at all.)
More power to you. Excellent article.
Not because of the feminist aspect, but because it helped me define for myself my reservations about many intellectual discussions.
Hello Rabbi Michi,
In my humble opinion, your words in this column only strengthen Efrat Gerber-Aren’s point. You argue that there is no meaning whatsoever to relating to God as a mother, just as there is no meaning whatsoever to relating to God as a father. That is in fact her claim as well—there is no real meaning to relating to God as a father, and therefore one can also relate to Him as a mother.
And it is not a mental act but an image devoid of any factual content. If you are asking how to imagine Him, there is no right or wrong answer to that. Do whatever you want. That is what I called therapy.
It is philosophical nonsense because it asserts nothing. If it’s convenient for you—on my account, imagine Him as an electric pole. This is not judged in terms of true or false, but in terms of convenience, agenda, or personality structure.
And one can also relate to Him as an electric pole. Enjoy.
To Natan (for some reason I’m unable to insert a reply to your message),
I can guess that the Avi Ezri is seductive (it sounds plausible and fitting), R. Chaim is slanderous (because what he says sounds right, but on further examination it does not hold up; common sense forces the sources), and R. Shimon is violent coercion (he tries to tailor all the sugyot to his principle. R. Chaim does not even trouble himself to check his principles against all the sugyot, and indeed his words usually do not really fit them). There is more to elaborate on here, but this is not the place.
No. If her intention is to say that God does not influence but is influenced, let her say that (and then we can also argue or agree, because that would actually assert something). Moreover, as a feminist she will surely agree that there are also influenced men and influencing women.
Beyond that, contrary to what you say, this claim does not say anything at all. I asked that someone show me what claim would contradict her claim. What is supposed to happen for us to decide whether she is right or not? That God should suddenly stop influencing? What does that even mean? Do you not see the absurdity of this whole matter?
If I measure your post by those same standards:
What practical implication does your post have?
It seems that the whole post is therapeutic only.
Hello Hillel. I liked that (take a like).
But the liking is only on the therapeutic plane. On the substance of the matter you are mistaken. Speaking about therapeutic value is not itself therapeutic. If I were arguing in favor of masculine theology, you would be right. That is why I was careful to clarify that this is not my claim. When I speak about the lack of meaning of something, that is a meaningful statement.
By the same token, a logical contradiction is meaningless, and therefore ostensibly any discussion of it (including the statement that it is a contradiction) is meaningless, since it deals with a concept empty of content. But that is not correct, because pointing out a contradiction in what someone says is itself a meaningful statement. The same applies not only to contradictions but also to a vacuum of content.
What I am claiming is that feminist theology has no implication (practical or otherwise, aside from psychology and therapy). Therefore, if you show me any implication (non-therapeutic) whatsoever of feminist theology, my words will be found mistaken.
Mark this well.
It seems to me that you are simply assuming that the image a person adopts has no meaning, and therefore an article discussing whether a certain image is legitimate or not must be nonsense and is sent directly to the therapy department. Just as an atheist would say that a discussion of the proper way to recite the morning blessings is meaningless and would say, “Do whatever you want,” “Whatever is convenient for you.” But if one assumes that there is a “permitted” image and a “forbidden” image in the worship of God—that is, that God wants us to adopt a certain image and reject another image from our minds when we address Him or pray—then the discussion is certainly relevant. For example, Maimonides devoted great effort to purifying us from corporeal images, which means that an image can be incorrect (or at least undesirable).
(If you think the discussion has been exhausted—if indeed you think there is a discussion here—I’ll stop digging.)
I am assuming nothing. I said something completely simple, and you keep repeating the very same point again and again in different words. There is no meaning at all to discussing permitted and forbidden images as long as those images have no content. An image can be permitted or forbidden if I understand what it says. Otherwise it is a game of words.
Therefore I repeat my question: what is supposed to obtain so that we will know whether the claim/image is true or false? What does this image say?
The discussion of whether the Holy One, blessed be He, is in the category of male or female has an enormous practical implication:
If the Holy One, blessed be He, is in the category of a man, there is no problem excluding Him from the public sphere and denying Him any intervention in the management of the world. By contrast, if He is in the category of a woman, then excluding the Holy One, blessed be He, from the public sphere of managing the world is the grave transgression of “the exclusion of women,” whose severity is beyond measure!
Regards, Samson Latz
Well, I don’t really know what to say. To me it is completely clear that the image changes the way a person relates to God. If I imagine God as an irritable grocery-store owner, my appeals to Him will be different than if I relate to Him as a merciful king or as a spaghetti monster.
You can say that this is unimportant, but as a matter of fact there are different experiences here of turning to God. The experience of a woman who imagines God as a mother is different from the experience of a woman who imagines God as a father; one cannot dispute that.
Now the question is whether every experience of turning to God is desirable. Whatever the answer, there is indeed real content here.
And regarding the question of when an image would prove improper (I don’t understand why you insist on true/false—at the outset I wrote that this is a normative claim and not a factual one, the ought and not the is), one can simply raise possibilities. Perhaps an overly corporeal image is invalid, or perhaps the image of an animal is invalid. That is, a person who imagines God as a giant yellow duck is doing something improper.
In short, I do not understand why you think this discussion is less meaningful than any other discussion dealing with norms of turning to God, such as intentions in prayer or the manner of reciting blessings, about which one also cannot say true/false.
Our master Latz, you made me very happy. 🙂
With God’s help, 8 Kislev 5777
And to the matter itself.
It is clear that as for the very essence of the Creator, may He be blessed, “No thought can grasp Him at all” — but regarding the ways He conducts His world, “the attributes by which the world is governed,” we are commanded to try to understand as much as possible, both because of the commandment of Torah study and so that we may walk in His ways and cleave to His attributes, for “in the image of God He made man.”
The plain sense of the verses in the book of Genesis implies that the “image of God” or “likeness of God” emerges from the combination of male and female, and as Rashi says, from the letter yod in ish (“man”) and the letter heh in ishah (“woman”), the divine name arises. He guides His world through a combination of the father’s attribute—“who teaches him Torah” and sets laws and boundaries—together with the mother’s attribute, “who persuades him with words” (in the words of Rabbi in the Mekhilta on “Honor your father and your mother”), and implants in him the desire to walk in the path of the good and the upright.
Rav Kook of blessed memory already explained in the essay “The Generation” that our generation, which has already borne God’s judgments in the course of history, is more fit for serving out of love, for “they willingly accepted His kingship upon themselves.”
“The God of the philosophers,” cynical and alienated, is not enough for us. We need the maternal caress: “As one whom his mother comforts, so I will comfort you; and you shall be comforted in Jerusalem” (Isaiah 66:13).
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
Even in the Torah, the discussion of the love of God and rejoicing in Him is unique to the book of Deuteronomy, written on the threshold of the Land.
.
Two side remarks.
1. The halakhic decisors wrote (for some reason in the laws of Yom Kippur) that practices whose point is to resemble angels, such as standing in prayer with “straight feet” (Tur 619:6 and Magen Avraham there, sec. 10) or wearing white garments (Tur 610:4 and Magen Avraham sec. 5), do not apply to women, who cannot resemble the ministering angels, since the ministering angels are all males, as explained in Yalkut Mishlei. Is the question of the angels’ sex meaningless? If not—what meaning does it have?
2. It is simply nice to bring the following quote from Hobbes from 1651:
“And one other infirmity of speech there is, which may be numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before, in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity.
This is incident to none but those that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the schoolmen; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other, esteemed idiots.
But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a schoolman into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point … into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin…
What is the meaning of these words: ‘The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work’? They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of the first book of Suarez… When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend they to make others so?…
Those hours wherein they are not guided by their clear thoughts to the pursuit of their lusts, but are debating about such things, and writing them, are but intercalary fits of madness.”
With God’s help, 8 Kislev 5777
To Nadav—greetings,
In the responsa Gur Aryeh Yehudah (sec. 82; cited in the responsa Yayin HaTov by R. Yitzhak Nissim, part 1, Orach Chayim, end of sec. 33), he asks according to the Magen Avraham’s view that women need not wear white on Yom Kippur because they are not similar to angels—why then do women on Yom Kippur say “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and ever” aloud? See there for his answer.
In my humble opinion, there is a difference between saying “Blessed be the name…” aloud, which is because on Yom Kippur we resemble angels in our qualities, for they have no jealousy, no rivalry, and no evil inclination—and this kind of resemblance applies to women and men equally.
By contrast, regarding the appearance in which angels are revealed to prophets in prophetic vision—such as straight feet and white garments—here one can say that women cannot be said to resemble the appearance in which angels are revealed.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
Nadav, hello.
S. Tz. L. already answered you well. This is about resembling the manifestation of angels, who appear before us as human beings (at least that is what Hazal and Scripture tell us. I, in my sins, have not yet encountered an angel, neither in the form of a man nor of a woman, nor even in the form of an electric pole). But the Holy One, blessed be He, does not appear before us in human form or in any other form whatsoever. Therefore with regard to Him there is no meaning to talk of man or woman.
I will add that personally I would also ignore the words of the halakhic decisors you cited. If Efrat Gerber and Tamar Ross wanted to argue against those rulings, I would join them (which is why I wrote that I am not writing in order to side with masculine theology, but rather to side with the claim that both of these theologies are empty of content).
The quote from Hobbes is wonderful.
A particularly amusing process is happening here. He speaks against the metaphysicians and their empty discourse. His criticism anticipates positivism, which in the twentieth century led to postmodernism (see in my books Two Carts and Truth and the Unstable). But postmodernism is a transformation of positivism that does to it exactly what it criticized in others. The most clearly logical critics returned to speaking nonsense and grinding words. This teaches you that people apparently cannot do without nonsense, just as the Russians cannot do without a tsar (see Stalin and Putin).
Just to note from Midrash Rabbah:
Rabbi Simon in the name of Rabbi Eliezer opened: “And the Lord, the God of hosts, the Lord is His remembrance” (Hosea 12:6)—for He does His will among His creatures. Another interpretation: “God of hosts”—for He does His will among His angels. When He wishes, He makes them sitting, as it is said, “And the angel of the Lord came and sat under the terebinth” (Judges 6:11); and at times He makes them standing, as it is said, “Seraphim stood above Him” (Isaiah 6:2), and it is written, “And I will give you those who walk among these who stand” (Zechariah 3:7); and at times He makes them in the likeness of women, as it is said, “And behold, two women came forth, and the wind was in their wings…” (Midrash Rabbah, Beshalach 25:2)
With God’s help, 13 Kislev 5779
And Maimonides likewise wrote (Guide of the Perplexed, part 1, chapter 49):
“The angels also are not corporeal, but are intellects separate from matter,… In Bereshit Rabbah (21:9) they said: ‘The flaming sword that turned every way’—from ‘His ministers a flaming fire.’ ‘That turned every way’—for they change: at times men, at times women, at times winds, at times angels.
By this saying they stated explicitly that they have no matter and no fixed corporeal form outside the mind; rather, all this is in prophetic vision and in accordance with the operation of the imaginative faculty, as the meaning of the true nature of prophecy will be explained.
Their statement, ‘at times women’—for prophets too sometimes see angels in prophetic vision in the form of women—hints at Zechariah’s statement, peace be upon him: ‘And behold, two women came forth, and the wind was in their wings…’ (Zechariah 5:9).”
By contrast, in Vayikra Rabbah (31:5):
“Rabbi Yehoshua of Sikhnin said in the name of Rabbi Acha: ‘A wise man scales the city of the mighty’ (Proverbs 21:22)—it is written gvarim (‘men’), for they are all males and have no female among them; ‘wise’—this is Moses, as it is said: ‘And Moses went up to God.’”
And Radak, in his commentary to Zechariah (5:9), wrote:
“And the great sage Rabbi Moses son of Maimon, of blessed memory, interpreted: ‘two women’—angels; he saw them in the likeness of women, just as he also saw them in the likeness of horses (in chapter 6), because the power of prophecy had weakened in his time.”
According to Radak’s explanation, one may say that there is no disagreement between the midrashim. At the time of the giving of the Torah, revelation by means of the angels was powerful, and therefore they appeared to the prophets as men; whereas in the Second Temple period, when “the power of prophecy had weakened,” the revelation of the angels too was “softer,” and at times they appeared to the prophets as women.
Indeed, in the Second Temple era God’s manifestation in the world was less powerful. If the prophets wondered, “Foreigners are crowing in His sanctuary—where are His mighty acts? Where are His awesome deeds?” then the Men of the Great Assembly taught that precisely the patience of the Omnipotent is His might. And astonishingly, it was precisely this patient governance that brought about the collapse of idolatry.
The Men of the Great Assembly, through their instruction, “Raise up many disciples,” and through their enactments to gather in miniature sanctuaries in every place and to engage in Torah and prayer every day and especially on the Sabbath, established a religious framework that was a wonder in the eyes of the nations, who saw before them “a nation of philosophers.”
Many mocked and hated them, but many were drawn as if by magic to the synagogues and listened to the Torah reading; many of them converted, and many at least became “God-fearers,” attached themselves to the people of Israel, and kept some of the commandments. The Jewish influence was so strong that it was said there was no house in Rome without people becoming Judaizers, and because of this Hadrian decreed against circumcision.
The trend of mass Judaization was halted, both because of the decree against circumcision, and because of the cruel suppression of the Bar Kokhba revolt, and because of Christianity, which offered “Judaism” without the yoke of commandments. But the ideas of monotheism, belief in God’s revelation to the prophets of Israel, and the weekly day of rest on which people gather for prayer became enduring possessions of humanity.
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
Hello,
From the anecdotal cases in which I have heard claims of a similar kind, there was never any intention to say something meaningful about God.
In all these cases, sometimes more explicitly and sometimes less so, whoever claims (usually a woman) that one should relate to the Holy One, blessed be He, as a woman seeks to change the social relationship between men and women, on the basis of a view that language has a role in shaping social-gender patterns. That is to say: since there is no content to referring to God as “He” or “She,” the choice to use “He” teaches us something about social assumptions regarding the status of men as compared to women (who can be perfect, strong, the provider, the merciful one, the judge, etc.). The attempt to refer to God as a woman or mother is directed at the speakers and listeners, not at God Himself.
From what I read in Gerber-Aren’s article, she goes in a somewhat different direction, but in a basically similar way in that there is no intention to say anything meaningful regarding the Holy One, blessed be He. As I understand it, her words deal with the possibility for women to connect to God in prayer and in general, though she does not refrain from noting that her words are also directed toward women’s status as equals among equals:
“By means of the feminine-maternal image of God, perhaps we too, as women and mothers, may draw one more step closer to holiness and feel at home within it, equal among equals, for we were all created in the image of God, and He has neither body nor bodily form, only a wide-ranging system of images in which there is room for all of us.”
What is said in the post regarding nonsense-claims has value in itself, but it seems to me that a straw man has been attacked here.
Dvir.
Indeed, a straw man has been attacked here, except that it was the feminists who created it. If they want to use some image—health to them. Why write articles about it? Why are arguments required? Let them just do whatever they feel like, and that’s it. Clearly they think their words amount to some kind of claim, and as I explained, that is a mistake. They are claiming nothing. After all, I explained in my remarks that if these things have value on the therapeutic plane (which is exactly what you claim their intention is), then their place is in psychological journals and not in theological and philosophical forums.
By the way, with regard to any nonsense claim one can say that it is aimed at therapeutic value. So according to your argument, my words too have no value (contrary to the reservation at the end of your message).
I don’t think this is about therapeutic value, but about an attempt to bring about social change through language. That is why articles are published. I assume the arguments are needed in order to create an Orthodox and non-revolutionary appearance for the linguistic change, and as a shield against possible objections. As for the publication venues—I would estimate that the authors are interested in publishing where their words will have the greatest impact.
Your words are important for cases in which the speakers of nonsense see themselves as engaging in theology and philosophy, such as the French thinkers you mentioned. But here the claims are not philosophical but social, and therefore they carry meaning.
I should note that I am writing on the basis of an impression, since I never actually troubled myself to ask. Perhaps I would discover that these claimants really do seek to do philosophy/theology.
Dvir.
There is a basic mistake in your remarks. Even if the articles are trying to bring about social change, let them publish their words in forums for social change. Theological forums deal with theology. Let them write an op-ed article about the importance of equality and femininity. In any case, what does all the ridiculous verbiage about “Goddess” have to do with that? Therefore, despite the wish to judge them favorably, it is clear that they think these articles contain theological claims. In that sense, this is nonsense in the strictest sense.
If some woman thought that believing in three-winged fairies or saying three times a day the words Kama Sutra would advance women’s equality or concern for the weak, would you consider it legitimate for her to write a theological article about three-winged fairies, or to publish in a theological journal a translation of the Kama Sutra? By her lights, that too would be an article that brings about social change.
In short, theological forums are meant to clarify ideas that deal with theology, not with women’s social advancement. Beyond that, even if nonsense claims as such succeed in advancing women, that does not make them true or make them claims that actually say something. In order to say that “Goddess” is a woman, one has to explain what is meant. It is not enough to say that this article will have important consequences.
It seems to me, in my humble opinion, that the fairies with three wings are the mates of the triangular-winged creatures and the square-horned creatures; and together, the two are good, to be like the angels of heaven, who have six wings, to cover face and feet and to fly like the eagles of heaven, as in Isaiah’s vision in Jerusalem.
May you be blessed doubly by the God of heaven, and may you see the good of Jerusalem in the lands of the living,
as prayed by S. Tz. Levinger
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I admittedly do not know the illustrious institution under whose auspices this is conducted, but the syllabus is very impressive. Very typical of institutions that teach liberal arts.
Apparently the Holy One, blessed be He, really is feminine,
He is always right.
With God’s help, 14 Tammuz 5778
In truth, feminism, in its radical form, sees femininity as weakness, and sees masculine assertiveness as the ideal to which women should aspire.
Not so, however, in the opinion of Rabbi Berekhiah (Yoma 70), who sees the trait of Torah scholars in the ability to combine feminine gentleness with masculine firmness, and therefore Torah scholars are called ishim (“men”), for they are like women (Rashi: humble and physically weak) and perform acts of valor like men. A combination of gentleness and firmness.
Likewise women of valor excel, on the one hand, in the trait of softness that leads them to educate their children in the manner of “persuading him with words,” in the way of “service out of love”; and on the other hand in firmness and standing by their convictions, which brought them to withstand trials in which the men failed, such as the sin of the Golden Calf and the spies.
The complete image of God includes both feminine and masculine traits together: strength and humility, truth and peace, and together they shall be established!
Regards, S. Tz. Levinger
In my opinion, historically this whole approach began in Christianity, where sex has meaning because Jesus was a man (though the very idea of the Trinity is itself meaningless..).
Then all sorts of New Age “trailblazers” began looking for the feminine dimension (and turned Mary Magdalene into a goddess, the feminine aspect of Jesus). And once this became feminist theology studied within modern religious studies, it also influenced women’s studies and feminist theology in Israel, even though when copied into the Jewish environment it of course lost all meaning.
Roni,
Historically, this approach began in the pagan religions, where sexuality is a foundational principle in every mythology. Christianity drew a great deal from there, of course (around the figure of Mary).
And to say that in the Jewish environment such theological discourse is meaningless shows a basic lack of familiarity with Kabbalah.
In my humble opinion, Sefer HaBahir was the first to give a feminine sexual meaning to the rabbinic concept of the Shekhinah, and from there it developed greatly in the Zohar and in Lurianic Kabbalah, with a strong erotic myth.
You are of course entitled to reject these ideas, but it is worth recognizing that today they are deeply rooted in Jewish thought.
I once had doubts about this, but I didn’t know you had written about it.
I think there really is a difference between the claims—for example, what is the difference between using the Tetragrammaton and using “Elohim”? Rather, as I understand it, people are talking about different modes of divine governance. The same goes for the difference between conceiving of God as a woman or as a man; between God as an influencer and a man of war,
and His being revealed at Mount Sinai as an elder full of mercy, as it says (Exodus 24:10), “And they saw the God of Israel.”
More than that, I do think that when we are accustomed to referring to God as a man, that raises different associations in us than if we refer to Him as a woman. I don’t remember much Tanakh, but I do not remember many verses of this sort being used about men: “Thus says the Lord: A voice is heard in Ramah, lamentation and bitter weeping; Rachel is weeping for her children; she refuses to be comforted for her children, because they are no more”…
A similar idea is that in the Prophets one can sometimes see the use of “the virgin of Israel,” or “Sing, O barren one who did not bear,” etc.
Thank you, Rabbi Michi. But it seems to me that the greatest motive of all for claiming “He is a woman” lies in the fact that until now He has been treated as a male figure (not to mention an influencer, etc.), so the implications of that image have belonged to the male world. (In the style of “Just as He is merciful, so you too be merciful.”) Therefore, as a form of affirmative action, He should be treated as a woman, if only to correct the power of the implications of treating Him as a quintessentially male figure. After all, He has not been treated as a genderless figure, but as a man.