Response to Rabbi Moshe Ratt's Post on the Trilogy (Column 262)
With God's help
Yesterday they sent me a post that Rabbi Moshe Ratt wrote about my trilogy. Because of time pressure and the burdens involved in producing and distributing the trilogy, I could not sit down and write something orderly until now. Now (in the dead of night) I have found the time to do so.
The post
Rabbi Miki Abraham has now published his new trilogy, and it is fitting to say a few words about it. I am referring to early parts of it that I read and not to the final version, which, as I have heard, contains some nonessential changes.
The first book in the trilogy, "The First Existent," deals with philosophical proofs for the existence of God. It in fact includes the "Five Notebooks" that he published years ago on his website, each of which presents a different proof: the ontological proof, the cosmological proof, the physico-theological proof, a discussion of philosophical and theological arguments, and the transition from deism to theism – from a philosophical God to religious commitment. All in all, this is a good work of philosophy, which may not persuade unbelievers, but will give believers tools to explain (to others and to themselves) the rationality of their faith, and to fend off foolish atheist arguments.
The third book, "Walking Among Those Who Stand," deals with the nature of Jewish law, its structure and meaning, how it works, and when changes can be made within it. I have not read all of it, but from a general impression it seems to be properly written (…) and may interest those occupied by the subject.
The second book, "No One Rules the Spirit," deals with creating a "thin theology," and it is the most problematic of the three. Miki does not see himself as bound by tradition or Jewish thought (whose very existence he denies), but only by what can be philosophically or scientifically proven. Oddly, the man who wrote four hefty volumes on the validity of intuition here denies the basic intuitions of most of humanity, claiming that God has "abandoned the earth," does not intervene in what happens in reality, and lets the world proceed solely according to nature. Consequently, prayers do not help in any way, and they have no meaning beyond the obligation imposed by Jewish law (similar to Leibowitz). Although in an earlier book he himself cited studies pointing to the effects of prayer, and referred to the wondrous events of the founding of the State as miracles or the hand of providence, he has retracted his words and now claims that everything is nothing but nature and statistics. It is important to emphasize that he offers no evidence or reasoning for his view beyond "that is how it seems to me" and "I do not see providence." Some of the arguments he presents are truly embarrassing, such as noting that no religious scientist takes divine intervention into account when conducting an experiment – and from this deriving proof that even religious people do not really believe in providence… I will not elaborate, because I have already written a long post on the subject, and there is still much more that could be written at greater length. I will note that Miki originally intended to include in the book a correspondence I had with him around this issue, but from what I have heard he ultimately omitted it.
Unlike Miki, my approach is not to create a "thin theology" that suits the constricted worldview of narrow-minded people, but the opposite: to try to broaden those horizons, to break out of that confinement, and to show that one can and should believe in far more than is included within the circle of light cast by science and logic. This was originally also the approach expressed by his earlier books, so it is unclear why he retreated from it in the direction of reductive analysis. Apparently, whoever gazes too long into the abyss, the abyss gazes back into him.
Like the Guide of the Perplexed, this book may perhaps reach those deeply immersed in unbelief, and show them that even within the framework of their views and assumptions one can be a believing Jew, or at least an observant one. But on the other hand, it will confuse and lead into unbelief those whose faith is purer, who from the outset do not suffer from such narrow thinking – and this is not a concern but a fact. Many have already fallen under its influence and taken off the kippah (skullcap) entirely or partially. It is appropriate to take this into account before reading or distributing his books.
My responses:
Let me begin by saying that when this post was passed along to me, some claimed it was disrespectful and unsubstantive. I saw nothing of the sort here. The post is entirely reasoned and substantive, but in my opinion also entirely mistaken. It suffers from quite a few inaccuracies, both in its presentation of my positions and in the arguments themselves.
Full disclosure: Rabbi Moshe is my former student, and as far as I know the relationship between us is excellent. I am very glad when my students criticize me and stand by their views. If I may say so, I even hope I had some part in that. From my point of view that is a great success, and it is another reason why I oppose all the complaints that seek to silence criticism by treating every sharp critique as though it were disrespectful and unsubstantive. Readers of the site surely know that I am entirely in favor of sharpness and even cynicism (which he did not employ), so long as it is substantive; that is, so long as it is only a writing style used to present arguments that are themselves substantive.
Rabbi Moshe's criticism focuses on the second book. From here on I will go through his words sentence by sentence (!), without skipping anything, and show that not a single one of them holds water and that every last one is riddled with flaws. This is not a sporadic mistake that can be forgiven, but a very problematic tendentiousness on the part of the writer. I know Rabbi Moshe as a very intelligent person, and therefore it is hard for me to accept so many mistakes and misinterpretations as happening just like that. There is bias here (of course not intentional), caused by preconceptions and an agenda that my remarks challenge. The views are of course entirely legitimate (even though in my opinion utterly mistaken), but when discussing someone else's arguments it is important to try to overcome that. So let us begin.
The assumption Rabbi Moshe places in my mouth right at the outset, and that serves as his point of departure for the discussion, is the following:
Miki does not see himself as bound by tradition or Jewish thought (whose existence he denies), but only by what can be philosophically or scientifically proven.
Wrong. In fact, two errors:
- I am certainly bound by tradition. The question is what tradition says, and what is nothing but an invention masquerading as tradition. Rabbi Moshe himself describes my position as saying that there is no tradition here, and from that you can understand that I am indeed bound by it insofar as it exists. I am not bound to a non-tradition presented as tradition. For me, tradition is what came down from Sinai and was transmitted to us by human beings. Anything created by human beings can of course be called 'tradition,' but I do not see how one can grant it absolute authority like the word of God given at Sinai. Such a thing stands open to rational criticism, if only because it was created by human reason. The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted. ("the same mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted").
- I certainly do not accept only philosophy and science as exclusive tools for dealing with problems, and certainly not with questions of thought. Tradition is a legitimate tool in my eyes, so long as it exists.
If Rabbi Moshe misses my starting point so deeply, it is no wonder that everything that follows suffers from flaws and mistakes.
Here is the next one:
Oddly, the man who wrote four hefty volumes on the validity of intuition here denies the basic intuitions of most of humanity, claiming that God has "abandoned the earth," does not intervene in what happens in reality, and lets the world proceed solely according to nature. Consequently, prayers do not help in any way, and they have no meaning beyond the obligation imposed by Jewish law (similar to Leibowitz).
Rabbi Moshe identifies intuition here with what most people feel or think. No mistake could be greater than that. Intuition is my intuition, not that of most people. I have written several columns explaining that I fully accept the ad populum criterion of truth, except that for me it works in reverse: what most people think is usually wrong unless proven otherwise. For example, if it turns out that most people do not believe in God, would Rabbi Moshe then say there is no God? If most people think time is absolute, is relativity therefore mistaken? This seems downright bizarre to me.
I will only add here a note about imprecise wording. I clarified to Rabbi Moshe more than once in the past that I do not claim that "prayers do not help in any way," as he writes. Rather, that is usually not the case, and therefore I would not build on it. I have no way of knowing that the Holy One, blessed be He, never intervenes. But it is certainly clear that if He does so at all, it happens in very hidden places that nobody notices and whose existence nobody assumes (in actual behavior, not in declarations). I proved this with clear and unequivocal proofs, and I do not see how one can argue about it. But these are really minor quibbles compared to the other flaws in this post.
Here is the next sentence:
Although in an earlier book he himself cited studies pointing to the effects of prayer, and referred to the wondrous events of the founding of the State as miracles or the hand of providence, he has retracted his words and now claims that everything is nothing but nature and statistics.
In the appendix to my book God Plays Dice (which, incidentally, reached print at Yediot Sfarim with the help of Rabbi Moshe and his father, Rabbi Avi Ratt), I brought studies that point to the effects of prayer, and in a footnote there I referred to devastating methodological critiques of them (incidentally, these were Christian prayers). Those examples served me there to show the lack of integrity among medical researchers in their treatment of such studies, and not to show that prayers are effective. I wrote this there explicitly, and it seems strange to me that Rabbi Moshe ignores it.
I did not refer to the founding of the State as a miracle or the hand of providence, though I cannot rule that out. What I wrote is that I cannot rule out the opposite (that these were natural events). For me, what they prove is the uniqueness of the Jewish people and its culture (the Torah), and not necessarily the hand of God in history.
Here is the next sentence:
It is important to emphasize that he offers no evidence or reasoning for his view beyond "that is how it seems to me" and "I do not see providence."
I do not know which version Rabbi Moshe read (he writes that he read some early version), but in the printed version he will find many arguments and reasons. But even in this very sentence there are arguments, and for some reason he chooses to ignore them. Is the fact that I do not see not an argument? Since when are observation or understanding not arguments? If seeing something is an argument for its existence, then not seeing it is an argument (not a conclusive one, of course) in favor of its nonexistence. Not to mention that Rabbi Moshe is guilty of the very same flaw, for he offers no substantive argument in favor of his position (not in our past conversations either), apart from the fact that many think otherwise. Does such a thing count as an argument for him?! Or is he exempt from bringing arguments, with that obligation placed only on me? I explained the biblical verses very well (at least in my own estimation), so there is no proof from them either. So in the absence of evidence either way (and, as stated, there is evidence, but I am arguing on his assumption that there is none), is it not right to refrain from accepting claims about the existence of what I do not see?
Let us continue:
Some of the arguments he presents are truly embarrassing, such as noting the fact that no religious scientist takes divine intervention into account when conducting an experiment – and from this deriving proof that even religious people do not really believe in providence… I will not elaborate, because I have already written a long post on the subject, and there is still more to write at greater length. I will note that Miki originally intended to include in the book a correspondence he had with me on this issue, but from what I have heard he ultimately omitted it.
It is a pity that Rabbi Moshe chose not to elaborate. I would have been very glad to hear how he explains the disregard of religious researchers for the most significant factor in our healing: prayer and divine providence. Why do they not neutralize this effect in their studies by means of controls, double-blinding, and choosing a proper and balanced sample for the control group? More generally, how can one rely on research that does not eliminate such an important parameter? (Needless to say, none of the studies do this.) Perhaps Rabbi Moshe did not elaborate because of the embarrassment my remarks caused him, and I will not judge him for that. Incidentally, this proof from the approach of religious researchers, and the fact that the results work despite our not having neutralized the effects of prayer and righteousness, are themselves arguments (the very ones that, according to him, I do not have).
Let us go on:
Unlike Miki, my approach is not to create a "thin theology" that suits the constricted worldview of narrow-minded people, but the opposite: to try to broaden those horizons, to break out of that confinement, and to show that one can and should believe in far more than is included within the circle of light cast by science and logic. This was originally also the approach expressed by his earlier books, so it is unclear why he retreated from it in the direction of reductive analysis. Apparently, whoever gazes too long into the abyss, the abyss gazes back into him.
And this is Rabbi Moshe's approach, which is supposedly based on arguments? Not to yield to an approach that fits science, but to choose to depart from it without evidence, simply because that is how it seems to me, or because there are people who think so (ad hominem).
And finally to his concluding sentences (which I have already discussed with him at length in the past):
Like the Guide of the Perplexed, this book may perhaps reach those deeply immersed in unbelief, and show them that even within the framework of their views and assumptions one can be a believing Jew, or at least an observant one. But on the other hand, it will confuse and lead into unbelief those whose faith is purer, who from the outset do not suffer from such narrow thinking – and this is not a concern but a fact. Many have already fallen under its influence and taken off the kippah entirely or partially. It is appropriate to take this into account before reading or distributing his books.
Regarding this, I will simply bring here an email exchange between us from yesterday following my reading of his post:
Hello, Rabbi Moshe.
I hope you are well.
I read the post, and it contains quite a few inaccuracies. At the moment I am in the frenzy of organizing and do not have time to respond in detail. I will attach just two messages out of several such ones. These two arrived today:
I grew up religious, and I left religion after being exposed to philosophy, believing that religion is irrational and untrue. When I came to Miki's books, of course I did not become religious again immediately, but after one book and another book, and after gaining a stable rational foundation, the main change for which I am grateful to Rabbi Miki is that faith suddenly became an option on a par with atheism, and not the unbearable foolishness it had seemed before. Without him I would not be religious today (in retrospect I understood that he underwent a similar move of leaving religion and returning)
Since we're already in that mode..
I grew up secular, and I began taking an interest in the religious world for emotional reasons – "it seemed to me like a better way of life" – and I met good religious people. Still, I was in a state where it all seemed illogical and strange to me, and following Rabbi Miki's books and website I reached the conclusion that there really is logic in Judaism and I do not need to lie to myself in order to be religious
It is important to understand that these two messages happened to reach me by chance yesterday, and that is why I sent them. They join many other similar messages from the past. So the situation is more complicated (to put it mildly) than Rabbi Moshe described.
He answered me:
It is heartening to see that there are also people who were strengthened by your influence, but you yourself admitted that there are quite a few who moved away because of it, and I personally know several such people. Therefore I wrote in the post that, like the Guide of the Perplexed, such an approach helps those who are in the depths of unbelief, but harms people of simple faith. It is certainly possible to show the logic and rationality in Judaism without trimming it down to an anorexic version of itself (as I, for example, try to do. And I have not yet heard of anyone who moved away from faith because of me).
And I replied to him:
I do not know about quite a few, but I do know that there were some. At the same time, there are those who came closer (I know of quite a few such people. I sent you only the two whose messages happened to reach me today). Moreover, in my estimation, based on my acquaintance with the people (or some of them), there is an asymmetry between the two types: those who moved away had earlier seeds of that tendency, and my remarks may perhaps have crystallized them, but there is a fair chance that it would have happened even without that. But those who came closer, or did not abandon, probably would not have done so without my words.
But quite apart from that, in my view one must speak the truth (and in my opinion this is the truth). And even if there are those who are driven away, this is a phenomenon to regret, but not to change anything because of it. Those who need these answers owe nothing to those who move away. I do not have to sacrifice one person in order to save another. This is a very problematic Haredi outlook in my eyes. Who is to say that this man's blood is redder than that man's blood??! ("Who says this man's blood is redder than that man's?")
One can argue about the substance of my remarks on their merits, but it seems to me that these considerations have no place whatsoever in the discussion.
I should note that I have written more than once about these hesitations, and that my conclusion is that this excessive caution causes us to lose good and precious people who do not receive an adequate answer (in the spirit of "The humility of Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas destroyed…" – "the humility of Rabbi Zechariah ben Avkulas destroyed …"). I therefore ultimately decided to bring these matters into the public sphere and put them on the table (see also in the previous column). I added that if there is harm in speaking the truth and harm in not speaking it, then this is a dilemma between two paths that both involve harm. In such a situation, in my opinion there is no reason to choose specifically the option of falsehood (even if there is room for a "holy lie," that is, lying in order to prevent harm). As for myself, I oppose holy lies even on the principled level (see Column 21), but this is a tactical consideration that, in my estimation, ought to be accepted even by supporters of holy lies.
Discussion
To my mind, it is clear that Moshe Rat is not a believing person. His articles for years have shown a line of thought that one usually sees in teenagers only before they go off the religious path. The faith and tradition of his father’s house are not good enough for him, so he is trying with all his might to invent a new Judaism that does not exist, so that all the contradictions in his life can be reconciled with the idea that in fact “everything depends on the conception in his head.”
Fortunately, such a person was seized by these ideas only when he was already a teacher and a family man, otherwise I fear he would not have remained a believing person.
More power to Rabbi Michi and to everyone willing to stand up against empty ideas that could distance other believers from the tradition of their father’s house.
I am against ad hominem comments. It is better to focus on the arguments and not on conjectures about motivations and psychological depths.
A response to the response:
https://www.facebook.com/moshe.ratt/posts/10218859174083367
I have to say, I read the response to the response (Moshe’s, from an hour ago) – and I could not find any substantive argument there – except for hiding behind the “Jewish bookshelf,” which long ago became a room crammed with books to the point that you can’t breathe, let alone talk.
Thank you very much for the discussion.
Again, there are quite a few inaccuracies here, and really just a repetition of his previous arguments. It is hard to fit a full response here, so I will only comment on a few main points: as stated, everything I write here has already been written, because not much is new here.
Rabbi Moshe asks what, in my opinion, came down from Sinai. My answer is similar to Maimonides’: not much. The Written Torah (as a starting point, unless there is something regarding which there is good evidence that it did not), the hermeneutical principles of exposition (middot ha-derash, in a very flexible sense that I explain in the second book of the Talmudic Logic series), laws given to Moses at Sinai that the Gemara explicitly says are such (and here too the Rishonim note in several places that this is not meant literally, but that requires evidence case by case). That is all. Indeed, everything else has the presumption of being a later development.
.
And even if what remains is nothing, as Rabbi Moshe puts into my mouth, I still do not see in his words an answer to my claim that for human creations, logic is an important tool (the same mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted).
His claim that prevalence is a measure of the acceptability of intuition was answered in my original remarks. Nothing new has been added here. I do not see in the argument, “many do not think like you,” any substantive and relevant claim. It is just a way of shutting people up.
I explained my opinion about the studies, and I see no point in repeating myself again and again. Invalid studies are not supposed to change anything.
As for “we have not seen” not being evidence – that is true if you have another source that calls your evidence into question. But that is not the case here. We have again returned to the argument that “many do not think like you.”
As for the arguments he says he brings from the Bible, I already responded to that. To Hazal as well I already responded (human logic stands up to the logical scrutiny of human beings). I do not see what is new here.
I did not speak about what accords with science, but about why one should look for apologetics at all. Why assume that an apologetic is needed? Were Hazal prophets? How would they know scientific and other things except through scientific knowledge? The Talmud is full of cases where they learned from experience and from consulting experts.
As stated, if something came from a clear tradition, I too would look for apologetics in the face of science. But when there is no second side, I do not see why one should look for apologetics that “fit” science.
In the final analysis, all of Rabbi Moshe’s words are based on the fact that various people think differently from me. Everything else is apologetics that science is not the whole picture (entirely true), and that there are apologetics in the face of scientific findings (also true). I just do not see why to use apologetics, or what other sources besides science exist here. If they show me such sources – I will gladly concede.
Congratulations (?) on the publication of the trilogy.
I can identify with Rabbi Moshe’s remarks, though perhaps with a bit of explanation. After extensive reading in your thought, I too would say that the two more well-developed areas (and even within them I do not agree with everything, though I have received a great deal from them) are the area of grounding faith philosophically, and the second area is the discussion of the authority of the sages, etc. The only area in which I experienced significant resistance is the one Rabbi Moshe is addressing.
The question of providence is, in my view, identical to the question of foreknowledge and free choice. I do not understand why one should split hairs over it so much. It is true that the Rishonim disputed the matter, as is explicit in Yehuda Halevi and in Maimonides, but what is the problem with explaining it this way? Is there any essential difference between the question of how it is possible that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows what I will do and I still have free choice, and the question of how it is possible that the Holy One, blessed be He, decrees what I will do and I still have free choice? I have no understanding either of His knowledge or of His decree. The discussions in this area are the most alienating of all; it is a world of chaos, in which there is no clarification and in which we will never be able to achieve clarification.
Rabbi Michi… Maimonides is even more extreme than you. You saved 2 and 4 fell? Maimonides says let 10,000 fall and save one…
Guide for the Perplexed…
“The upshot is that I am the sort of person who, when the matter presses him and the path becomes narrow for him, and he finds no device for teaching the truth that has been demonstrated to him except by giving satisfaction
to one virtuous person and not giving satisfaction to ten thousand ignoramuses, I choose to say it for that one person by himself, and I pay no attention to the blame of that great multitude; and I would rather save that one virtuous person from what he has sunk into and guide him out of his perplexity until he is made complete and healed.”
With God’s help, 20 Kislev 5780
The “trilogy” of DMA is the complete opposite of Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed. For Maimonides, Judaism begins with faith. Faith, in his view, is the “Foundations of the Torah.” Maimonides was the first to define clearly the Thirteen Principles of Faith: God’s unity, Torah from Heaven and its eternity, providence and reward, and anticipation of redemption; and he says, “It is dearer to me to explain one of the principles of faith than anything else I teach.” What has DMA left of Maimonides’ principles? God’s unity; the belief that something was given at Sinai, though it is unclear what; God’s policy may change; providence and reward – existed in the past; and redemption and the World to Come – who knows…
According to DMA, all of Judaism is nothing but the observance of commandments. In matters of beliefs and opinions, no one has authority, including the sacred writings and Hazal, and even observance of the commandments is subject to “morality,” in determining which every individual is autonomous. Even in determining halakhah, where Maimonides was strict about “not forming separate factions” even in different courts, and he labored to create a halakhic codex so that there would be a uniform halakhah – for DMA there is no “do not form factions.” On the contrary, a basic principle is “halakhic autonomy,” for each person to rule for himself.
What DMA proposes here is a kind of “existential Judaism,” except that he did not go as far as “until Shiloh comes,” who is willing to accept even commandments without a commander. DMA insists that there must be a commander for there to be “the effective designation of a commandment,” but after throwing out the Commander, the Commander is asked to “leave our lives” – He was “the philosopher’s God, You shall not support, nor long for” 🙂
The roots of the method are already found in Mendelssohn, who argued that Judaism commands only practical commandments and not beliefs and opinions *), the complete opposite of the sacred writings, in which faith and the quest for closeness to God occupy a central place. The God of the sacred writings watches over His creatures and desires their prayers and calls on them to love Him and fear Him, as Maimonides describes the intensity of the emotion of love and fear of God. Not for nothing did Maimonides establish prayer as a Torah commandment to turn to God every day with praise, petition, and thanksgiving!
Regards, Shatz
Mendelssohn, unlike DMA, also went on at length to ground and explain divine providence, the persistence of the soul, and the existence of a “World to Come”…
Indeed the questions are similar, and my answer to both is similar. There is only one mistake with you (admittedly a common one): the fact that there is one unresolved question does not help with another unresolved question.
Well said indeed. Words like arrows.
What an amazing quotation. Thank you.
Rat’s entire mistaken post was worth it only so that this amazing quotation from Maimonides would appear here.
Michi, what really is the explanation of these words of Maimonides? Isn’t it more logical to be on the side of the 1000 rather than the 1?
Even if the entire structure of the “trilogy” does not hold water as part of Jewish thought – it may still have “therapeutic value” if it succeeds in keeping someone observant of the commandments. Incorrect beliefs and opinions can be corrected through proper explanation, but someone who has already become accustomed to casting off the yoke of the commandments will find it difficult to change his habits and return to a life of halakhic commitment. Thus preserving halakhic commitment, even if the wholeness of faith has been shaken, serves as a kind of “first aid” that prevents extreme estrangement; and that, after all, is DMA’s role: to provide “first aid” 🙂
Regards, Shatz
In spoken Abrahamian, they call this: “theology in the person,” even if not “in the object” 🙂
Line 2
… incorrect beliefs and opinions can…
Incidentally, if we are already being precise about Maimonides’ words, then one has to qualify it only on condition that “he finds no device…” That implies that if it is possible to convey these things by means of a device (the third or fifth type of contradiction), then according to Maimonides that is preferable.
But if the rabbi creates intentional contradictions, it is not certain that people will notice them, and if they do notice them, it is not certain they will reach the author’s correct conclusion 😉
In our case, inaction is preferable.
There is also a middle way: not to imagine wildly, with blind faith even in the egg of the bar yokhani that drowned cities, etc., but also not to say that Judaism has nothing to do with practical life and that “God has forsaken the land.” Rabbi Michi’s rationality appealed to me greatly, but his arguments, however logical and sweet they are, can be dealt with without too much difficulty.
This whole invention that providence has changed is an invention that common sense does not accept, and it reminds me of Rabbi Moshe Rat’s arguments. I believe that the people of Israel did in fact receive some signals from Heaven even after prophecy ceased. That does not obligate us regarding everything they said, but to claim that they made such a grave mistake about prayer is itself a grave mistake.
I do not understand. What is the rabbi’s answer to the question of foreknowledge and free choice?
Now I saw.
I have read Moshe Rot’s views many times.
The problem, in my humble opinion, with many of his articles is that he takes certain views from mysticism, Kabbalah, and Hasidism – things in which he finds meaning and which he uses to shape his worldview – but on the other hand he chooses only the things that seem to him significant and relevant, and on the other hand ignores (or rejects?) things from that same body of thought that he does not find meaningful. In my humble opinion that is a selective choice that cannot lead to any serious idea or thought that aspires…
Even though Moshe Rot is God-fearing and observant of the commandments, his thought reminds me many times of the heaps of garbage of Ohad Ezrahi from the “School for Love and Kabbalah” –
a Torah scholar who, after becoming disappointed with Rabbi Ginsburgh’s Hasidic ideas, decided to try to reconstruct the method of Shabbetai Tzvi and claim that “biblical” and “historical” Judaism espoused a multiplicity of gods, mass orgies, and sex worship.
I am not comparing the methods and not claiming they have the same agenda, but when people try to draw from certain ideas only the aspects that will give us a feeling of satisfaction and meaning, they very often arrive at bizarre regions like these.
With God’s help, 21 Kislev 5780
To Rational(ly speaking) – greetings,
And what is wrong with constructing an eclectic outlook in which a person takes from every school of thought whatever seems more acceptable to him, or what he connects to more, or what seems to him more like the “middle road” around which there is broad consensus? Is that not what our sages said: “Who is wise? One who learns from every person.”
Regards, Shatz
By the way, “Rat” with a patach (“counselor” in German), not “Rot” (“red” in German); and your mnemonic is: “and salvation is through many counselors” 🙂
If it were a thousand against one, then obviously the thousand are preferable. But it is one + the truth versus a thousand, and here the truth and the one are preferable to the thousand. Something like the story of the Kotzker, that against the truth there is no majority.
And nevertheless,
I very much liked the graceful wording of this message (which is utterly mistaken). Really. More power to you.
That there is no foreknowledge.
I would be happy for a more detailed explanation; I saw the matter in summary form in the article on free will.
What needs more detail? There is no foreknowledge, and therefore there is no question. You can search the site. This has come up here in the past as well. There I also explained why there is no escaping the contradiction (Newcomb’s paradox) and why this does not contradict the omnipotence of the Holy One, blessed be He.
But it is an established ruling that “he cast him out in the end”…
It is obvious that there are those who are strengthened and those who are weakened. In my opinion, the first book can strengthen, whereas the second book can do the opposite. In any case, the second book means that even if tens to hundreds of thousands of Haredim could find in the first book (and perhaps also the third) great interest, it will be shunned because of the second book. Woe to the wicked and woe to his neighbor. The truth is important, of course, but in this form it simply will not reach its rightful owners, not even partially.
Forgive me for not understanding Maimonides as you do, but I was left with the impression that Maimonides says he will instruct the perplexed sage even in the face of ten thousand fools who condemn him and for whom it is not fitting. The message, then, is that one need not take it to heart if his words are not accepted by the masses. But they are not harmed. Whereas here the issue was that some people become casualties by hearing the truth. Maimonides was not speaking of mass spiritual murder. What connection is there?
What exactly does DMA stand for?
I am not convinced that you are right. It seems from his words that he is willing to sacrifice the weak (those made weak) for the sake of the sage. Otherwise, what is the dilemma? The others will not understand, and nothing has happened. Is that a reason not to write a book?
With God’s help, 21 Kislev 5780
Yerucham is indeed correct. Maimonides is willing to absorb criticism and condemnation from the many, social damage to the writer that he is prepared to accept in order to benefit the few. We have not heard in his words anything regarding the question of concern for spiritual harm to the many versus benefit to the few.
On the duty of caution in saying things liable to cause the listeners to err in matters of faith, Maimonides addressed this in his commentary to the Mishnah in Avot, “Sages, be careful with your words,” concerning Tzadok and Boethus, the disciples of Antigonus of Sokho, who mistakenly inferred from his statement “Do not be like servants who serve the master in order to receive a reward” that there is no reward and punishment.
One may hope that the trilogy author’s indifference to the effect of his words on listeners will lead many of them to err in understanding his words and mistakenly arrive at the correct conclusion that the Holy One, blessed be He, does indeed watch over His creatures with individual providence :).
Regards, Shatz
On the contrary, Yerucham. Precisely because of that he wrote “where he finds no device,” in order to prevent as much as possible a spiritual catastrophe for the masses. And this is the caution Maimonides mentioned in Pirkei Avot, “Sages, be careful with your words.” From this you learn that if he finds no indirect way to conceal the matter, he is not responsible for the masses. They will go on cursing (= “I shall pay no attention to the blame of that great multitude”), and Maimonides will say what he has to say.
I get the impression that the perplexed sage is the confused believer, and the fools are the heretics. (Although our Rabbi Dr. Michi always emphasizes that heresy is not stupidity, and “The fool says in his heart: There is no God” means a scoundrel, but not a fool. Still, Maimonides refers to those from whom truth is absent, and therefore they are fools.) Indeed, there is an issue that the truth should not become odious to the people (apparently because then it will be even harder for them to draw near to the truth), and therefore he will find a device to heal him without the disgrace. In the absence of a device, he will heal him even though the fools will condemn him. But this does not mean that he causes excellent, perplexed sages to turn into fools.
Still, there is here a problem of authoritarianism when relying on Maimonides, and I think Rabbi Michi’s approach is to stand his ground by force of reasoning and not by force of conservative sources. Or non-conservative ones. The rabbi is trying to preserve objectivitivitis (objectivity…).
Yerucham, a question. Why, according to your view, are they cursing if no spiritual harm at all is caused to them?
Because they are fools who do not hold by Maimonides’ truth. And just as people come out against Rabbi Michi. And as is the nature of the world, one person opposes and condemns the one who disagrees with him. (Maimonides says it is not fitting for them. Fitting, my brother. It does not sit well with them. And then they come out against that person whose speech they did not like. It does not lead them to abandon the source of life and deny the foundation.)
But where are the curses you mention? Do you mean condemnation?
With God’s help, 22 Kislev 5780
To Yerucham and Arik – greetings,
They fought Maimonides from every direction.
On the one hand, members of the camp loyal to tradition argued against him because he used Greek philosophy to explain the Torah’s outlook (and for this reason he writes in the Eight Chapters that he did not mention the names of gentile philosophers for fear that this would interfere with the acceptance of his words), and because he explains the sacred writings and the words of Hazal not according to their simple sense but allegorically (as explained in his introduction to Perek Chelek).
On the other hand, those devoted to Aristotelian philosophy opposed him, since Maimonides rejected several of its foundations, determining that the world was created and not eternal, and establishing as part of the principles of religion that God takes an interest in human actions, commands him Torah and commandments, and exercises individual providence over human beings (as explained in Guide for the Perplexed III:17, contrary to Aristotle’s view that divine providence applies only to species and not to individuals, and contrary to Epicurus’ view that God neither takes interest in nor intervenes at all in what happens to His creatures).
Any attempt to create harmony between Torah and tradition and the dominant scientific worldview may bring upon the would-be harmonizer opposition from both directions: from those who will claim he is not sufficiently “Torah-based,” and from those who will claim he is not sufficiently “scientific.”
Regards, Shatz
On the polar difference between Maimonides’ positions and those of DMA – I discussed this above in my comment “The complete opposite of ‘Guide for the Perplexed.’”
Even in the field of halakhah, Maimonides “invited” struggles against him from every direction. On the one hand, he fought the Karaites and their influence and struggled with all his might to establish the Talmudic tradition; on the other hand, there were those who criticized him from the opposite direction. Both because formulating a halakhic codex in clear Hebrew might lead to a reduction in the study of the Talmud in its original form, and because of interpretations and rulings that were not according to the tradition of the Geonim of Babylonia (and over this Rabbi Samuel ben Ali argued with him sharply).
An additional front came from the community of the Land of Israel in Fustat. Since Maimonides held that even two courts in one city violate “do not form factions,” he did not like their separate halakhic existence, because thus “the Torah appears as two Torahs,” something liable to “play into the hands of the Karaites,” who undermine the tradition of the Oral Torah.
In short: it is impossible to pave a path for the nation that will please everyone. Even Mordecai the Jew was acceptable only to “most of his brethren,” not to all of them.
Regards, Shatz
Yerucham, yes, I mean condemnation. (True, that is a somewhat softened word.) Without realizing it, you made your words partial. How do you know that the things Maimonides had in mind do not cause the destruction of faith? Why, the book under discussion is the Guide, which indeed was accused of abandoning the source of life and denying the foundation, as you put it… (For things that are not “fitting,” as you put it, Rabbenu Yonah would not have burned the book.)
Philosophical truth versus necessary truth, a consequence of denying reward and punishment… he writes that we do not know the purpose of Torah study… (What, not? I thought it was in order that through study we attain the World to Come… naive me.) Those are only two points in the Guide; should we continue? Hmm, take one more:
“And the ultimate perfection contains neither actions nor moral qualities, but only opinions.” If you understand the connotation in which this was said, then Rabbi Michi is small potatoes. This is what is called (in Moroccan) the ultimate destruction of faith.
Rabbi Sh. Tz. Lewinger,
I explained what the problem is that can arise.
I do not know Moshe Rot’s thought or views well enough.
Certain articles of his left me with the impression of the beginning of a line of thinking like that of people such as Michael Laitman, for example, who turn Kabbalah into a sweet children’s game, or, thousands of distinctions aside, talented Torah scholars like Yoav Sorek who for some reason feel a need to claim that according to Rav Kook’s teaching there is no need at all to keep halakhah, or their counterparts on the left – who try to prove that democracy and human dignity are the central message of Judaism.
I have no problem when people take the peel and throw away the apple; my problem is when they conceal or even soften a certain body of thought, and in radical cases like the ones I described above, completely distort that body of thought.
And quite simply, from articles by Moshe Rot that I read, he talks about kabbalistic concepts like transmigration of souls or Gehenna as though we were dealing here with some message whose purpose is to grant a person some meaning or wonderful and complex thought,
and that is not how things are, and those are not the messages of that mysticism or esoteric teaching in the source.
And using them in such a way is not at all serious in my opinion.
With God’s help, 22 Kislev 5780
To Rational(ly speaking) – greetings,
I do not know the thought of R. Moshe Rat (with a patach), but I do not see a problem in drawing “some meaning or wonderful and complex thought” from a concept whose roots are planted in the depths of esoteric mysteries.
After all, when we read in the Torah, “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying,” do we have a full and deep grasp of God’s greatness, of Moses’ stature, and of what divine speech is? And yet we read and understand that there is here a divine message conveyed to us through Moses, and we implement the command in practice, without understanding all the secrets and depths hidden within it.
Similarly, I do not see a problem if a certain educator or preacher advocates the value of the trait of being a “giver” while making use of kabbalistic sources. A problem may begin when he does not appear merely in the role of an educator seeking sources to explain the importance of that value, but rather appears in the role of a “teacher of Kabbalah,” in which case one has to examine how authoritative he really is.
Regards, Shatz
I should note approvingly that you have begun to break your remarks into paragraphs, which makes them easier to absorb, aside from the fact that there are of course exalted aspects here of “black fire on white fire” 🙂
And
The matter of “human dignity” really is a central value in Judaism, as Hillel said that “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow” is the essence of the Torah on one foot, and as Ben Azzai said that “This is the book of the generations of man… in the image of God He made him” is a “great principle in the Torah.”
“Democracy” too includes important Torah values, such as commitment to majority decisions, “follow the majority,” together with the importance of the individual, since every person is “an entire world.” A person’s freedom is so important that one who does not want to go free is punished by having his ear pierced, because “they are My servants and not servants to servants.”
The value of democracy also imposes on us an unshakable commitment to the Torah, which was accepted unanimously by the entire people of Israel at Sinai, and repeated in the people’s acceptance in the days of Ahasuerus. I saw in a book of homilies by one of the scholars of Hungary that therefore the people’s consent was needed, and the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He, as King of the universe was not enough, because the law of the kingdom is valid only when it applies equally to everyone; and since the 613 commandments impose obligation only on the people of Israel, the authority of the “King of the universe” is not enough without the people’s consent.
From this arises a puzzlement regarding our leftist brethren: how do they support a Palestinian state when its rulers trample all the values of democracy and human rights? It requires great study 🙂
Regards, Shatz
Sh. Tz. Lewinger, greetings,
As usual, you do not understand or do not want to understand my words and you turn to very distant regions, and what does the Israeli left have to do with what I said here? (Perhaps you got confused when I wrote “left” – I did not mean the political left at all. There are people rather radical, such as Menachem Froman, who were very right-wing in their halakhic outlook but connected to the political left, or people like Yoav Sorek, who politically belong very much to the right side of the map, but in terms of their attitude to halakhah almost touch even the right side of the Conservative map.)
Indeed, as your words implied, you were aiming at my views concerning people like Michael Laitman (for whom “giver” and “receiver” are the entire essence of Kabbalah).
But also in the words of people who try to take kabbalistic concepts whose purpose is (and I am not making this into a criticism at all) to arouse awe and fear and truly convey a message of constant struggle, and to make of them a kind of more “interesting” version for the reader – that is a bit problematic.
In Kabbalah the severity of the prohibition of wasting seed is emphasized many times; it is claimed there that this is literally something that destroys and ruins upper worlds and even corrupts and brings calamities entirely in our world as well. (And in the article brought from the scholar Tomer Persico, a fairly radical Rebbe is even cited saying that calamities upon the people of Israel came only, or mainly, because of this.) And when people try to take such things and present them as “interesting,” as things that come to give meaning and a new perspective on life, that seems to me, with all due respect, problematic.
If these things are true for anyone who believes and accepts them, whether literally or not literally, the first thing a person holding such beliefs would do is avoid that severe prohibition and see it as perhaps one of the gravest battles of his life; certainly not publish on the internet an article explaining how this gives us a “new” and “interesting” perspective on life, and with exaggerated language, that entire upper and lower worlds are destroyed because of my sins, and I am busy finding time to write an article about it on the internet?! And then also say that the purpose of the idea is to cause a person to engage in what lies beyond this world. (I know neither Moshe Rot’s personality, nor his character traits, nor his general views, and I am referring only to the response brought
by him to Michi’s article.)
As for your responses about the value of human dignity and democracy – once again it seems, Shatz, that you do not want to get to the depth of my meaning (or do not agree with it). First of all, the terms democracy and human dignity are modern concepts. Neither Hazal nor the Rishonim nor the Aharonim knew these concepts, and therefore it is rather difficult to determine exactly what each of them would have thought of these matters.
Second – and this is exactly my problem with homilies of your sort – it is very clear that there are values (or concepts of basic decency) such as the prohibitions of murder and theft, honoring parents and elders, and many other good traits (and in the sense that “had the Torah not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat,” and the like, and the thirteen attributes) that were accepted also in the eyes of the sages (and were even considered desirable and obligatory, and connected by many to some commandment or roots of commandments such as imitating the Holy One, blessed be He) –
but the problem (or distortion), also in approaches like yours from the right (which try to say that if today we uphold democracy, whether as a value desirable ab initio or as something that post factum we must live with, we should fool ourselves into thinking that Rashi, Nahmanides, and Maimonides saw a democratic state as something legitimate), and even more so among your rivals from the religious left (who for years, and with little success, have tried to prove that such values are Torah commandments and that one who violates them is in the eyes of the ancients worse than one who desecrates the Sabbath) –
at most, one can say that the value of the democratic state today would have been tolerable or not entirely rejected by them, and similarly regarding values of “human dignity.” For, in a simple example, the modern value of democracy says that all citizens as individuals are completely equal before the law (and I write “as individuals” intentionally so that you do not mix in questions of left and right and the question of a state of all its citizens versus an ethnic state), whereas in the world of our sages, of blessed memory – from the most basic halakhic standpoint – the law in the state (or under rule) in a Jewish legal system is explicitly not completely equal before all citizens. The simplest example is that if a resident alien, a nice gentile loyal to Jewish rule, murders a Jew, he is liable to death, whereas in the opposite case the murderer is not liable to death. (And there is a full hierarchy in capital law between a full Jew and a righteous convert, between them and a Canaanite slave, and between them and a resident alien; and similarly in monetary law and bodily injury, and similarly in laws of appointment to positions of authority, a hierarchy between an Israelite by birth and a convert.) And the same is true in matters of freedom of speech. Would it have entered the halakhic world of our sages to grant legitimacy to the public expression of positions of heresy and apikorsut? Of public quarrels and attacks by the simple ignoramus against a Torah scholar? Of state funding for the publication of heretical books? Likewise in the matter of the modern value of human dignity and freedom – human dignity as a sacred value is explicitly not something necessary and obligatory according to Judaism, for the Torah and halakhah see nothing wrong in the enslavement of other nations by the people of Israel according to the discretion of the government and the king when needed. One can of course argue – and there is nothing unseemly in this – that periods of time must also be examined and that even according to the sages one should act differently in every age. But even an ab initio rejection of all slavery, absolute equality before the law, and certainly respect for every person whatever his views and tolerance – these are explicitly not values one can claim are sacred according to the “spirit of Judaism.” At most one can say that such values may be seen as positive values there is no problem in adopting in part because they accord with reason. But to claim that they are an inseparable part of historical Judaism – that is a severe distortion and falsification.
And with this let us ask a simple question: within (Orthodox) Judaism there is a clear determination of who is inside and who is outside, what is fit to enter the study hall and what is not. A person who publishes a book on the laws of Shabbat in which he writes that he has reached the halakhic conclusion that on Shabbat it is permitted to smoke a cigarette is shown the door from the study hall, and rightly so. But a person who writes a book on the ideal mode of conduct in the world and explains to us that in his opinion it would be better if the world returned to a system in which there are “superior nations” ruling over “inferior nations,” and that the democratic form of government, which grants every person equality, is falsehood – he will probably be condemned by all the camps (in the Religious Zionist public because of the principle of using common sense, and in the Haredi public because of the matter of desecration of God’s name and fear of harm to the Jews), but no one, and rightly so, will be able to prevent him from joining a prayer quorum, from continuing to issue halakhic rulings, and from teaching halakhah in Israel. Judaism – like it or not – is first of all halakhah, and then historically also the thirteen principles and a literary canon (of books which one is commanded to believe in and accept their authority, like the Pentateuch, Gemara, Mishnah, halakhic literature, Rishonim and Aharonim, and later also the Zohar).
You do not agree with me normatively, but I maintain that this is the approach closest to reality.
And Shatz, the comparison between Michi and Mendelssohn is very mistaken in my opinion –
Indeed, perhaps there is a certain similarity at first glance.
At second glance, they seem to be complete opposites.
Mendelssohn was no small apologist, coming to claim as though historically in Judaism the Jewish community and the rabbis never commanded belief, and that consequently the Enlightenment value of tolerance is the very soul of Judaism – and also to claim, very ingenuously, that in fact in his approach of integration and personal friendship with gentiles in personal life, and the general integration of the Jews among them, there was nothing new. He even went so far as to claim that if Spinoza had kept the commandments he would have been accepted as a Jew fit for a minyan. (And in this, incidentally, his radical view that the purpose of the commandments is only the preservation of the Jewish community, and that even a complete atheist can be a valid member of the community and join a minyan, and who knows, perhaps according to his ingenuous approach even a Christian apostate in that period could have been a member of the community if he kept the commandments – this is completely different from Rabbi Michi, who emphasizes that the purpose of the commandments is the service of the Holy One, blessed be He, and nothing else. Your serious inaccuracy in comparing thinkers like Mendelssohn, for whom the Enlightenment was the main thing and Judaism and observance of the commandments were only a personal secondary clause at their side, is not serious.) Moreover, Michi is not an apologist. He would not claim that the spirit of Judaism toward other beliefs was tolerant from time immemorial; he would not claim that Judaism has an advantage in “enlightened” terms over other religions; in fact he scorns all kinds of such claims, since this is simply not what interests him and not what is primary for him.
Mendelssohn himself probably believed more or less in the same “principles” that Michi believes in – Torah from Heaven and the authority of Hazal (as well as the persistence of the soul and providence; Michi’s positions on this matter I do not know). As for resurrection of the dead, Israel’s chosenness, the coming of the Messiah, and the like – I do not think he mentioned them.
But his goals, and what was primary and secondary for him, are the complete opposite of Michi’s.
As long as you write this on a blog and people enter it, then the arguments of yours that do strengthen faith also strengthen them.
And their confusions that you are considered a heretic among them, they set aside.
But when you publish a book into the world, and today every article that comes out in a binding and printed letters enters the bookshelf together with the entire Jewish bookshelf, it is more confusing and closer to heresy.
And if you are concerned for some anonymous secular person rather than some anonymous religious person, then you have done your part when you posted a blog post one day; whoever looks for an answer that you can give him will find it.
In the meantime, of most of your books I can assure you that it is not secular people who will buy from you, only people from the religious side, and the way to the abyss is closer.
You are gravely mistaken. Those who will draw closer are usually in the religious world. People with doubts and questions who need these responses. Not everyone reads the blog, and secular people will not read the trilogy and probably will not even hear of it. This whole discussion is taking place inside the “shtibl.”
To Arik Buader, have a good week.
I did not find in your quotation a reference to the Guide, but rather a general statement. Rabbi Moshe is not speaking of the Guide leading people down to heresy. If Rabbenu Yonah burned the book (if what you say is true), it could be that Maimonides would have agreed with him. As for us, we have only our own reasoning.
Your mention of the destruction of faith by Maimonides, and its connection to our topic – allow me to phrase it in a condescending way – is absolutely mistaken. Maimonides established pure faith. “This is what is called (in Moroccan) the ultimate destruction of faith” – but this is not Jewish faith according to Maimonides. Here the matter under discussion is (if I understood correctly) people who, by cutting down theology, reached the point of making it disappear. It no longer has any part in their outlook or in their way of life. That is not Rabbenu Michi’s intention.
Rabbi Michi – how do secular people, whom in your view are wise and intelligent, relate to your books, your claims, your proofs? In your impression, would an intelligent secular person who encounters your thought take upon himself Torah and commandments? Could you give stories or cases?
It is hard to establish a sweeping rule. A change in way of life is a complex matter, and it does not happen through reading a book. I hope and believe that my words contribute to such processes. Of course I do not know details, but quite a few messages do arrive saying that. Two of them appear at the end of this column.
With God’s help, 26 Kislev 5780
To Yerucham – greetings,
The story that Rabbenu Yonah was involved in a complaint to the Inquisition that led to the burning of Maimonides’ books, and afterward repented of this – is first brought in the book Tagmulei HaNefesh by R. Hillel of Verona, who lived some sixty years after the event. Professor Yitzhak Baer already cast doubt on this story (in his book The History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 2, p. 319).
Professor E. E. Urbach brings (in his article “The Part Played by the Sages of France and Ashkenaz in the Controversy over the Books of Maimonides,” Tziyon 12 [1947], p. 149ff.) a letter of Rabbi Abraham Min HaHar (the teacher of Rabbenu Yonah) in which he denies the rumor that had spread that he had excommunicated “one who believes in the faith of Ibn Maimon.”
A rumor about a ban by the rabbis of France against Maimonides’ views also reached the ears of Nahmanides (Rabbenu Yonah’s brother-in-law), and he appealed to them to refrain from this. In his letter Nahmanides speaks with great respect of Maimonides and his contribution to strengthening faith. In his commentary on the Torah, Nahmanides disputes Maimonides’ words in the Guide for the Perplexed, but relates to him with very great respect.
Urbach also mentions the great respect with which R. Moses of Coucy (a student of R. Yechiel of Paris) and the German Pietists relate to Maimonides, and this respectful attitude likewise does not accord with the rumors of a ban supposedly imposed on Maimonides’ books. Rabbi Moshe Hershler notes in the introduction to Aliyot Rabbenu Yonah on Bava Batra that Rabbenu Yonah mentions Maimonides’ words with great respect, and this too does not support the rumors of bans and persecutions.
There were some extreme Aristotelian philosophers in the Middle Ages (and, following them, some scholars in our generation) who try to read “conspiracy theories” into Maimonides’ words, according to which, despite the fact that he devoted whole chapters to grounding the creation of the world and providence, “under the table” he was actually an extreme Aristotelian who thought the opposite. Because of such philosophers who tried to invert Maimonides’ words, opposition arose to the study of philosophy, until Rashba forbade its study to anyone under the age of thirty.
Regards, Shatz
Hello Rabbi,
You detailed here what, in your opinion, came down from Sinai.
After reading the trilogy, I am having difficulty finding a clear and unequivocal specification regarding:
1) What are your criteria for deciding what came down from Sinai – here you list clearly what, but still not why precisely these?
*** In the trilogy you mention, among other things, that you assume that “belief in God and the creation of the world are clear foundations that were probably indeed received in the tradition from above,” and you did not mention that this time here. It adds somewhat to my confusion regarding your opinion on the subject.
2) What can you really learn from those things anyway (since, as you already noted in the trilogy, everything that passes through human interpretation is subject to doubt)?
Thank you, and have a good week!
The fact that something is subject to doubt and is not certain does not mean that it is not true. It only means that one has to think and make a decision about it. Belief in the Holy One, blessed be He, and in the giving of the Torah did not come down from Sinai; they are the Sinai revelation itself. So what exactly do you expect me to explain? I have no criteria, just as nobody else has. There is common sense, and each thing is judged on its own merits.
I do not expect you to explain; I am asking to learn from your words 🙂
At the end of the day, I would say that in something as critical as deciding what we truly received from the Holy One, blessed be He, I would expect at least some general modes of thought with which we can analyze each case on its own merits – for really, how can you analyze any particular thing at all and say whether it came from Sinai or not? What possible lines of thought would there be?
For example:
– The explanation you just gave me regarding belief in the Holy One, blessed be He (that it is the revelation itself) is an example of a fairly persuasive criterion.
– In the trilogy you brought Maimonides’ statement that something about which there was no dispute may be assumed to be from Sinai. That is another criterion (about which too there is disagreement, and I would be happy to hear your opinion about it – Rav Kook holds that matters that were disputed, like the resurrection of the dead, are so because they were transmitted in tradition only to select individuals – and why is his reasoning not preferable?).
– You say that verses are not necessarily from tradition, and that if something can be derived by reasoning, we should dismiss the possibility that it came from Sinai. Why?
Bottom line: I would be happy to hear the general ways of thinking in this area (which seems to me rather basic), and also regarding the second question, which I would be happy if you could answer – how is it relevant to us that something came from Sinai if we basically invalidate everything because it passes through human interpretation?
As I said, I have no criteria, and the criteria that you yourself brought prove that they are not worth much (such as something about which there was no dispute. This is indeed a fairly sharp criterion, but of course it does not stand the test of the facts – see Havot Ya'ir, sec. 192, and also not the test of logic).
I understand.
I would be happy with a few more questions, if that is all right with you:
1) The question from before – let us say that for some reason you decided that it is likely that some prophecy really is from Sinai. How much value does that have if in the end everything is subject to human interpretation? That is, it has no value even if we agree that it is from Sinai – it comes out that this entire discussion, in your view, should be valueless (correct me if I am mistaken).
My question, then, is why the Holy One, blessed be He, gave us any tradition at that revelation in the first place, if in any case it will not be possible to understand it in its plain sense? He presumably did give us certain things so that we would know His will, no?
2) On page 134 in A Man Has No Power over the Spirit, you explain that one may assume that Maimonides’ tenth principle is from Sinai, both because it is written in the verses and because it is plausible by reason. Why in this case did you decide to take those two factors into account in favor of the claim that it is from Sinai?
3) On page 126 in the book No Man Has Power over the Spirit, you speak about the fact that the fifth principle and onward in Maimonides’ principles are principles that affect practice, and therefore clarifying them has significance. You write that there are three categories into which the principles can be divided: a) meaningless and with no practical implication; b) those given from Sinai that have practical implications and are true; c) principles with meaning that were reached by reasoning (most of which have no practical laws).
But in the end you did not actually classify the principles into the three categories. Is there a post or article of yours from the past in which you practically divide each of the principles into one of the three categories? Or could you do so now?
1. Indeed, it has no real value, except for the halakhic parts of the Torah from which we derive the laws (in plain sense and exposition). I have written more than once that I see no possibility of learning anything from the Bible. Why did the Holy One write or give it? Excellent question, to which I have no answer (I suggested that in the past people did learn moral principles and the like from Scripture). Still, that does not change the fact that one cannot learn anything from the Bible.
2. When you find criteria in my words, you ask why I act according to them. When there are no criteria, you ask what the criteria are. Make up your mind. Incidentally, the fact that something is plausible by reason does not mean that it was given from Sinai, but that it is true. Note this carefully.
3. I have no such article. As best I recall, I commented on this briefly in the book itself. But regarding some of them I have no classification. The fact that there are three possible categories does not necessarily mean that I know how to say about every principle which category it belongs to.
2. Exactly. I initially asked what your criteria are because I did not find any explicit treatment of them, and in places where you did speak about it I found that you (as in the example I brought in the question) sometimes accept things received in verses/reasoning as evidence that they are from Sinai and sometimes not. Afterward you answered me that you examine each case on its own merits (thereby resolving the ambiguity surrounding the issue by saying that in your view it is ambiguous from the outset), and now I wanted to understand what your considerations were in a specific example, in order to learn your way of thinking on this matter.
I went back to page 134. I still understand from the plain sense of the words that you give 2 reasons from which one can accept the tenth principle as a tradition from Sinai: verses and reasoning (correct me if I did not understand properly).
I repeat my question – why did you find them relevant דווקא here?
Thank you.
Rabbi (R.) Michael David Abraham.
If only I could publish a “problematic” book like the Guide for the Perplexed.