I am surprised by your answer.

I expected an answer saying that this is “grain the Torah did not recognize” or “that Jewish law does not recognize this grain.”

Certainly, according to the “simple reading” of dry halakhic study, there is no basis at all for leniency, and certainly one should be stringent.

At first glance, the leniency that developed in Europe in earlier times is very puzzling, and from close familiarity with American and Western European Jewry over the last 100 years, the vast, vast majority of the religious and Haredi public in the U.S. practiced complete leniency, and so too with many products sold today on shelves in Israel. As Arukh HaShulchan wrote regarding the unclear leniencies on the subject of the eruv: “It is as though a heavenly voice came forth and ruled in accordance with this view.” And this remained so until a certain renaissance in awareness regarding new grain over the last 20 years, in terms of “carefulness” and “stringency” on this matter.

However, the simple explanation is that most of the problem with new grain abroad nowadays stems from winter grain. We are dealing with different grain varieties that grow in Northern Europe and America, with a different annual/seasonal cycle. Not the grain cycle that ends around the time of Nisan/the bringing of the offering, which is what the Torah speaks about and which is relevant to Middle Eastern climate/geography.

In my humble opinion, the Torah was not speaking about this grain. Therefore one may be lenient on that basis; personally, once this reasoning occurred to me, I decided to be lenient after years of being stringent on the matter.

I would be glad to hear your opinion.

Hello Natan. We probably agree that the accepted leniency has no simple explanation. Your suggestion seems very interesting, but as far as I recall, this is not the explanation given by the halakhic decisors who discuss the leniency, so their words still require further analysis.
Regarding your suggestion, perhaps there is room for it (I have not checked the reality regarding the new varieties and their cycles). The question is whether a different cycle, even if it really is different, is sufficient reason to permit it. Fine, you are basically invoking the reason for the verse here, but even that I do not find in your words. Why do you assume that the cycle is important regarding the prohibition of new grain? Why is a different cycle considered different grain for this purpose? Which changes in grain define it as a new kind of grain about which the Torah did not speak? This requires appeal to the reason for the prohibition of new grain (and again, even assuming we invoke the reason for the verse here).
Are you assuming a particular reason for the prohibition from which one can see that the cycle is an essential characteristic? Could you elaborate?
To put it differently: if people had not practiced leniency, would you still have ruled on your own initiative, based on reasoning alone, that it is permitted?
Or perhaps you mean that because of the change in cycle there is simply no place at all to speak of this year’s grain or another year’s grain?

Thank you for your response.

Regarding the cycle—it seems obvious to me that the enactments of the Sages in determining Jewish law were tailored to (and could only be tailored to) the only reality they knew: one cycle of one grain crop per year, sown at the end of summer/beginning of fall and harvested in the spring. Period.

A geographic/climatic/varietal cycle of spring sowing and harvest beginning in the summer certainly did not exist and was not possible/does not exist even today in our geographic region. And it certainly was not known to the Sages in that period. All the more so, a double cycle of grain (one harvested in the spring and one harvested in the fall) certainly does not exist and is not mentioned anywhere. I know of “harvest,” not “harvests.”

In terms of the reason for the verse, you use the term the “prohibition” of new grain—but that already assumes that what matters here is the prohibition and not the commandment to bring the offering from which the prohibition is derived. Maybe that is semantics, but if the reason plays a role here, it seems to me that in the second framing the reason for the verse is clearer (though one can also make my argument in a completely technical-halakhic way without any reason at all). In my humble opinion, it is hard to separate the cycles in nature from the reasons and details of most of these commandments: thanksgiving/recognition/remembrance before the Holy One, blessed be He, for the new harvest, from the time of removal to animal tithing, harvest time, and so on. “The Feast of Harvest, of the first fruits of your labor… and the Feast of Ingathering at the end of the year, when you gather in…” The halakhic determination here is not arbitrary; it is directly tied to reality and to the reason. But it addressed the only reality it knew in order to fulfill “and you shall bring the sheaf of the first fruits of your harvest…” The time is the days of Nisan; Jewish law did not recognize another reality or another variety to which it should relate. (Moreover, regarding the original timing of the waving of the omer and the festival of Shavuot, the well-known view in the Kuzari is that there was no fixed time and it depended on the harvest/grain itself, until they fixed/enacted a precise time—and Nachmanides’ astonishment at his words is known. Rabbi Samet has a nice and interesting article on this discussion in one of his books on the weekly portion and his explanation of “for your acceptance”… “and on the morrow of the Sabbath”—though then one could go even further and ask cynically whether in a situation of two harvests there would be a need for two omers… ).

If they had not ruled leniently, would I have ruled that way for myself? Good question. It is easier to make such a decision when there is a medieval authority—or two—who permit it, and all the more so when the broad masses have accepted leniency upon themselves (and it does not matter right now whether its basis was error or practical necessity, since in any case one could argue that this creates some kind of halakhic legitimacy).

In any case, certainly if there were a reality (and that is how I estimate it was in Europe at a certain stage) in which Jewish law created a real difficulty in the ability to eat a most basic food (and drink) product—I would hope that the halakhic decisor would find a reason like the one I am proposing (in your terminology, a first-order ruling that contains novelty and is fitted to reality, rather than searching for isolated opinions, doubts, and somehow forcing a leniency under great pressure and without a logical reason).

As I wrote, this is certainly a possible consideration, and I had not thought of it. But it seems to me that ordinarily I would not permit on that basis, and since the accepted leniencies seem to me baseless—and certainly this is not their basis—it would still be hard for me to permit on this ground. All the more so because I do not see any special difficulty abroad beyond what exists in Israel, so the difficulty does not require adopting such an innovative leniency.

Thank you.

One final note.

As for the reality behind what you wrote—”that you do not see any special difficulty abroad beyond what exists in Israel”—here I will have to disagree with you, although “special difficulty” is completely subjective.

About 30–40 years ago in the U.S., anyone who was stringent about new grain was engaging in real self-sacrifice. I grew up on “war stories” from my parents, who were stringent on this and had to freeze challahs and stockpile flour for periods of months so that there would be “old” challah in the house for Sabbath. If in every “very large” city there was maybe one bakery that was careful about old grain, the situation was considered good. The one who almost singlehandedly brought the issue to public awareness was Rabbi Aharon Soloveichik of Chicago, who was almost alone in advancing the matter in the U.S. Rabbi Moshe permitted it, and on that basis the OU completely permits new grain.

Today the situation is much more reasonable, but it is still very difficult for someone who does not cut corners. That is, someone who is stringent about old grain (and even among them, most view it and act regarding it as a nice stringency and not necessarily as a prohibition) is prevented for half the year from eating in most kosher bakeries in some cities and in almost all of them in other cities (and any baked product without certification that has a presumption of kashrut for a person with sound halakhic judgment, aside from the issue of new/old grain), most pizza shops and the like, the overwhelming majority of kosher restaurants. Of course, without precise knowledge, then beers, snacks, and the like that are not from “religious” companies and that are not careful to write “Yoshon” are impossible.

To eat a Sabbath meal or at a kiddush or celebration at the home of someone who is not careful about it (the majority of the public in most communities)… so challahs/bread/crackers are a problem (I would sometimes bring my own), but also the soup because of the powders, the cholent because of the barley, the chicken because of the coating, and so on and so on. Today one can track every product by code number… and the problematic nature extends from breakfast cereals to tuna salad, crackers, soup powders, sauces, meats/hot dogs, granolas and cereals… wheat, barley, oats and their derivatives, sometimes with only water sugar and salt listed as ingredients…. In the end you can write an entire fellowship’s worth on whether the “steam” of new barley in beer is Torah-level or rabbinic, and whether if one embarrasses his fellow one should not eat it with the aid of the doubt about that “steam” and the Bach and Maharil, together with the fact that you do not like the food at all and it is nullified in the majority and does not impart flavor—does that permit it or not. At least it is also a way to learn Torah.

In Israel too many products are sold that contain new grain from abroad. Recently the rabbinate (which you love so much) has tried to write either that there is no concern of new grain, or if there is a concern… and that too is relatively new. (About 15–20 years ago I remember a store in Jerusalem belonging to a friend that did not get “mehadrin” or Badatz certification because there was non-Jewish milk, but the fact that the food was “new grain” did not bother them at all and appeared nowhere as a warning.) And some (or all) of the Badatz certifications nowadays, I understand, are very strict and do not grant certification if they know it is new grain; but even so, they do not give certification to many products from abroad at all. Yet there are still many products on which nothing is written and that do contain new grain, and without knowing to think and check, it is everywhere in certain seasons even in Israel. So anyone who is not aware, familiar, knowledgeable, and searching, and does not eat only from such-and-such Badatz certifications, eats new grain from abroad in Israel too—that is a fact.

I still do not see the problem. You understand that if they had left the prohibition in place, they would have found a solution. They would supervise agriculture and bakeries and make sure there was no problem of new grain. The fact that it is hard to find grain that is not new is only because they do not take care of it. After all, there is no principled problem there in ensuring that there will be old grain. I do not see what the difference is between the U.S. and Israel, aside from the fact that there they got used to giving up, permitting, and not coping. If it becomes difficult to supervise meat, would we permit eating pork? So increase supervision, and that is that. With all due respect, this is not hardship Judaism.