Q&A: Territorial
Territorial
Question
Hi, I read in your book (the trilogy on Jewish law) that there you gave an explanation for Rashi’s view that one may not save oneself at the expense of another person’s money, and you wrote that the value of “do not steal” is greater than the value of life—but simply, it is not in your hands; that is, it is not in your territory to decide. Rather, your fellow must decide whether to act morally and allow you to take from him or not. And if that really is the understanding, then is there in every law between one person and another a rule of “be killed rather than transgress”? Seemingly, that is not what emerges from the Talmud in Sanhedrin, because the Talmud explains that it is forbidden for me to kill my fellow in order to save myself because perhaps his blood is more precious in the eyes of the Holy One, blessed be He, than my blood, and therefore I may not save myself. If so, we clearly see that the reason is that the value of my fellow’s life is more important than my own life, and not because I am entering his territory. And another point: according to what the Rabbi says, regarding the question whether I am permitted to kill a gentile in order to save myself—where many later authorities say that one may, since the reason of “perhaps that man’s blood is redder” does not apply between a gentile and a Jew—according to the Rabbi’s reasoning, that it is entering his territory, surely the matter would be forbidden.
Answer
First, there is a series of responsa in Binyan Tzion (by the author of Arukh LaNer) that indeed expands this to all matters between one person and another. In my article I explained that this does not apply to every interpersonal matter, but rather to every matter that concerns the other person’s rights (civil/monetary law):
בין הטריטוריה שלי לטריטוריה של הזולת על חובות וזכויות בהלכה ומשמעותן
Your proof from Sanhedrin is very interesting. I hadn’t thought of that. I think it is hard to bring a proof from there, because it is quite clear that this is a metaphorical expression. It is not that there is an actual doubt whether his blood is redder than mine; rather, they are saying metaphorically that we do not make calculations of blood. And indeed, in Kesef Mishneh, chapter 5 of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, halakhah 5, he wrote explicitly that this reasoning is not the real reasoning (although his necessity there is not compelling, as I explained in my article on the separation of Siamese twins).
In any case, the proof from Sanhedrin is difficult for Rashi himself, regardless of my reasoning. For there we see that everything is determined by the value of the thing under discussion, and it is obvious that money is worth less than life. So from Rashi himself it follows that the expression in Sanhedrin is metaphorical.
And perhaps what we learn from there is that even if the other person volunteers, I am still forbidden to kill him (that of course does not follow from territorial considerations, since he agrees that I may enter his territory; he made the decision). For that comes the principle of “who says,” to tell you that you are forbidden to do this also under the laws of murder, and not only because of territorial considerations.
And from this I would say even more. It may be that even without the practical difference I mentioned (if the other person agrees), the Talmud in Sanhedrin comes to teach the very novelty that there is an additional prohibition of murder here beyond territorial considerations, even if there is no practical difference.
And again I will say that the comment is really a good one. I still need to think about it.