If a religious court rules that the ring is his, then is it his even from the person’s own perspective? Meaning, if he knows the truth—that really it isn’t his, only the court ruled that it is—then is his wife betrothed to him?

If he lied and knows the truth, then it seems the ruling is ineffective.

Seemingly this is a sharp dilemma that skewers legal theory. Can you explain why it doesn’t help? (When there is only a “majority” and not certainty, then seemingly there is legal theory—one does not follow the majority in monetary law in order to take from the current holder, even though the current holder also admits and knows that there is a majority against him.)

[By the way, regarding “matters of the heart are not legally significant”—which is also a principle that may stem from legal theory—as I recall there is a dispute among later authorities as to whether, if he knows for certain that in his heart he had firmly intended such-and-such, then for him those inner intentions do count.]

I didn’t understand what is being skewered here or why. The fact that someone misled the religious court means the ruling was mistaken.
And it has nothing at all to do with the law of majority, because even if he admits there is a majority, he still does not know what the truth itself is. Here the discussion is about someone who knows the truth and lied. These are not remotely comparable.

Legal theory seemingly says that “the legal effect of ownership” is not determined mechanically by the methods of acquisition, but depends on the state of knowledge prevailing in the world and on the rules of decision. So how does the knowledge of one individual change that state?
(A court ruling does not create the legal effect. If both are Torah scholars and all of Torah is clear to them and agreed upon by them, and in their claims there is no dispute over the facts, then there is no reason for them to go to court in monetary matters. Isn’t that so?)

You don’t have to get to a case where he lied; it is enough that after the ruling he remembered or found out that the truth was the opposite.

Indeed, even if he didn’t lie but only later learned that the truth was the opposite, the ruling is void. It was given in error. How is that different from a transaction made in error? The thesis of legal theory says that Jewish law does not uproot the legal norms that preceded it, but is built on top of them. Legal theory itself (and Jewish law as well) says that truth is what determines matters where it is known. If it is not known, then the court ruling determines the legal status. I don’t understand the problem here.

I thought legal theory says that the truth is not important, only public knowledge and the rules of decision. If truth matters where it is known, then why specifically the knowledge of the owner? Or is anyone who knows in the same position? Is this like doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel?

I didn’t understand the comparison to a mistaken transaction. When all the data are known and there was a mistake in the transaction, then public knowledge and the rules of decision say that ownership remains as it was before the transaction. But in a case where only one person knows, you are saying that ownership is an objective matter that stirs in secret and operates according to the methods of acquisition, without legal theory. Where am I going wrong?

I didn’t understand. What does this have to do with legal theory? Do you mean the principle of R. Shimon Shkop? He definitely does not say that. He says that the prohibition of “do not steal” is founded on the pre-halakhic laws of ownership (social law).

For example, in the case of an ox that gored a cow and its fetus was found at its side, and it is unknown whether it gave birth before the goring (in which case the damager is exempt for the fetus) or whether it gave birth because of the goring (in which case the damager is liable for the fetus): according to Jewish law, because of doubt, “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract from another,” and the damager does not pay for the fetus. Then the question is why the damager should not have to be stringent and pay because of the prohibition of theft (say the injured party is certain, etc., and according to Jewish law in such a case certainty is not preferred).
And the answer, as far as I know (not much), is that ownership and monetary obligations are determined not by the factual truth but by the rules of decision (legal theory), and it determines that “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract from another,” thereby conclusively assigning ownership to the current holder. And the prohibition of theft (both legal and halakhic) depends on that determination of ownership and not on the factual truth, and therefore the holder has no reason at all to be stringent and pay. But you are saying that the hidden factual truth does matter (for someone who knows it). But honestly I don’t know the topic well enough and I’m probably just rambling.

This has nothing to do with the question of factual truth and legal truth and the gap between them. The claim is that what determines things is legal theory and not Jewish law; rather, Jewish law is built on top of legal theory. The factual truth may align with Jewish law, with the law, or with neither of them.
And if legal theory says that “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract from another,” then there is no concern about the halakhic prohibition of theft (which in this case is the one that matches the facts, but that is not essential).

Okay. That’s a new understanding for me.

So does it basically split according to what each person knows? If someone knows that in truth the money with which so-and-so betrothed his wife was not his, then can he now go and betroth a married woman, and the betrothal will take effect? Are you not distinguishing at all between monetary law and prohibitions?

In principle, if the truth is that the money is not his, then there is no betrothal for anyone. Maybe not everyone knows this, and they are allowed to assume that this is not the case. It may be that when there is no legal knowledge available to the public, the court’s determination acquires binding force by virtue of legal theory or the court’s power to declare property ownerless, and then the money becomes his. I don’t know.