Q&A: Jewish Holiday
Jewish Holiday
Question
In honor of the Rabbi, hello,
A. In the laws of a Jewish holiday, section 495:1, it says: “However, if one did not do it before the holiday, and it is needed for the holiday, it is permitted to do it with an unusual manner of performance” (Ran), end quote.
And see the Biur Halakha there, where he explains that this is not the view of the Ran, since according to his approach no unusual manner is needed; and the Vilna Gaon wrote similarly.
This is difficult, because see Ran on page 6b in the Rif pagination, s.v. “And there is room to examine,” where he writes explicitly that an unusual manner is required, and this requires further study.
B. The Rabbi wrote in one of the recent columns that in the case of a rabbinic decree whose reason is not stated explicitly, one can assign a reason.
And the Rabbi brought the example of a woman’s testimony, etc. Seemingly, one could bring support for the Rabbi’s words from the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 3 of Beitzah, which states: “One may not trap fish from the ponds on a holiday,” etc. The medieval authorities discuss whether this law is Torah-level or rabbinic,
and Ran wrote (there) that this is a rabbinic law, and the reason is that there is a concern that it appears as though one is acting for weekday needs. So this is an example of assigning a reason without any hint from the Mishnah that this is the reason; rather, it must be as the Rabbi said.
Thank you
Answer
I didn’t understand. Where did I write that when no reason is given, one may supply one? I wrote that when a reason is given, then there are views that the decree can be voided when the reason no longer applies. And I certainly did not bring a woman’s testimony as an example, since that is not a decree but a Torah-level law (derived from an exposition). But you are right that the medieval authorities do give reasons for decrees. However, they do not use them to cancel the decrees, but to define them (what the parameters of the obligation are).
Discussion on Answer
So that is an exposition and not a decree. And correct — I claimed that in the case of an exposition one can estimate its reason and change the conclusion.
I didn’t understand — is this a valid proof for the Rabbi’s point or not?
Yes. But here they are not making a change as a result of the reason, so this is just interpretation, and there are plenty of those.
You can make a change based on how Nachmanides defined it, and consequently when that definition does not apply it is permitted — for example, if it is not for many days, then seemingly harvesting would be permitted. Nachmanides himself would apparently agree to this, and all of this is only on the basis of Nachmanides’ interpretation of the Mishnah.
So this is proof that a change is made as a result of a reason that is not written.
That one can — that is obvious. My claim was that usually one does not do so (just as we do not generally expound the reason of the verse). So this is not proof of my point.
The Rabbi wrote that regarding a woman’s testimony, since it is an exposition, one can explain on what basis the exposition was said — that women were not learned, but today they are valid. And I will add that according to the view that this is a Torah-level law (Nachmanides), based on the Jerusalem Talmud, where it is an exposition, he too, like the Ran, explained that same reason of weekday needs even though nothing at all is mentioned in the exposition.