Q&A: Relating to the Rationales of Jewish Law
Relating to the Rationales of Jewish Law
Question
Hello, honorable Rabbi!
From time to time, in various places, you say that Jewish law should be approached according to its overt rationales as they appear in the Talmud, and that you do not accept claims about hidden rationales. Based on that, you suggest being lenient or stringent in a given matter, all according to the rationale of the commandment.
But even setting hidden matters aside, sometimes a given law is assigned one rationale in the Babylonian Talmud and a different one in the Jerusalem Talmud (for example, the shofar on the Sabbath). Sometimes the Talmud reveals the rationale of the commandment, while research suggests a different rationale that seems much more plausible (for example, the Havdalah candle).
If truth is our guiding light, how can one so confidently “tamper” with Jewish law leniently (or even nullify it) in the name of halakhic truth, while not examining the halakhic topic from the perspective of scholarly research as much as we are able? Perhaps the true rationale of the commandment is still fully in force?
Answer
Hello, Yonatan.
One can never be certain about anything. Does that prevent us from using reasoning? Punishments are not derived by logical inference, and some explained that this is because of concern for a possible refutation of the inference (an explanation that seems very problematic to me). But everyone agrees that the prohibition itself is indeed derived by logical inference. There is no interpretation in the world that is certain, and yet Jewish law is full of conclusions based on interpretive considerations. To fear error is crippling and unnecessary. In very rare cases the Talmud says, “Just because we make an analogy, shall we act on it?” But generally, people certainly do act on the basis of reasoning.
It is clear that if there is an enactment whose overt rationale does not fit its parameters, that is certainly worth examining, or at least raises concern for hidden rationales. But usually that is not the case, and there is no reason to assume that it always is. If there are different rationales in the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud, that only means that the Talmudic sages themselves were also uncertain what the rationale was, and allowed themselves to interpret. In any case, of course we need to take both the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud into account.
And finally, as I have written several times in the past, not changing is not necessarily the default option. Sometimes not changing carries much heavier costs than changing. So it is not always true that the side advocating change has the weaker hand. From this it follows that even if there is concern for hidden rationales, there is no less concern that there are no hidden rationales and that it is right to make a change. At that point, we must do what seems more correct in our eyes, while of course also taking into account the costs of change and of not changing.