Q&A: Kant and Kierkegaard
Kant and Kierkegaard
Question
Good evening!
1- Apparently Kant contradicts his own doctrine. On the one hand, he argues that an ethical act does not stem from its outcome (teleology), but because of its good essence (deontology). On the other hand, he argues that one must intend, in acting, for the sake of the good. Isn’t that a contradiction? After all, if it is good in and of itself, why is there any need to intend it?
2- It is commonly argued that Kant contradicted himself: on the one hand he refuted the proofs for God, and on the other hand he argued that in order to ground the demand of ethics we need God (something like the moral proof). I would like to argue that there is no contradiction at all: Kant only refuted the proofs for the existence of the religious God that arise from the classical proofs, since the source of those proofs is the phenomenon. But the moral proof arises from the noumenon. That is, through ethics one encounters the noumenon. What does the Rabbi think?
3- I do not understand how Kant refutes the proofs for the existence of God by arguing that the phenomenon reveals nothing about the noumenon. After all, insofar as we are in principle incapable of escaping the phenomenon, then precisely the logic that exists within the phenomenon should determine our belief, shouldn’t it?
4- Regarding Kant’s very claim that there is no access to the noumenon, this is difficult for me, because presumably the noumenon influences the phenomenon; if so, how does the phenomenon always manage to make us see everything in a categorical way?
5- Kierkegaard argued against Kant (and against everyone who came before him) that the ethical demands nothing; rather, a person has a causeless choice whether to choose the aesthetic or the ethical. And I do not understand how there can be a situation in which a person has no demand to choose the ethical side, for insofar as it is proper, it is binding. (True, Nietzsche went further and argued that there is no ethical command at all, but rather that a person creates his own values. But I have difficulty understanding Kierkegaard, who seemingly did believe in the ethical command, and only argued that one must respond to the command in order for there to be a reason to fulfill it.)
Thank you very much!
Answer
- You are mixing levels of discussion. The judgment of the act is not determined by its outcome, but by the intention. But the intention must be to do good, that is, to aim at a good outcome. If a person intended a good outcome, then the act is good regardless of what the outcome actually turned out to be in the end.
- I didn’t understand.
- That is not his refutation.
- I didn’t understand.
- I didn’t understand. Maybe I do not know Kierkegaard well enough, but I do not understand what it means to say that the ethical demands nothing (and I also don’t know whether Kierkegaard said such a thing).
Discussion on Answer
Every proof has its own refutation. I don’t recall any refutation connected to the distinction between noumena and phenomena.
The Rabbi writes that for an act to count as good it needs a good intention, and it doesn’t matter what the action is. And I don’t understand what it means to intend a good act. What is the “good” that one should intend?
If you do not understand what the concept of “good” is, I do not know how to explain it. It seems self-evident to me to any reasonable person.
I did not write that it doesn’t matter what the action is, but rather that it doesn’t matter what the outcome is (that was actually achieved).
Yes, but in order to say that one must intend a good act, one has to define what it is. Is it pleasure, like Epicurus, or happiness, like Aristotle? Is the good act what reason says, like Kant, or love, like Fromm, or attaining God, like Maimonides?
There is no need at all to define something that is self-evident. Good is good. That’s all. The fact that there are all kinds of windbags making absurd claims (which, by the way, do not necessarily contradict one another) does not obligate me to define anything. Especially since I already wrote in column 372 that a person should be judged according to his own approach.
Good evening!
I have a few more questions: 1- Why, according to Kant, is there any point in being rational-moral? According to Aristotle, a person is not fulfilled without them, but that is a teleological claim that apparently Kant did not accept.
2- Why, according to Kant, is there any point in intending for the sake of the good?
And in another formulation: I understand that there are three stages: good intention, good outcome, and the act itself being good in an ontological sense. That is, for example, helping an elderly person is an act that is good in its essence, and here one can intend it for its own sake, and it is also possible that the outcome will be bad, such as if it turns out that the help only caused harm. What did Kant mean?
Thank you very much!
- I don’t know how to answer regarding the grounding of values.
- Same as above. That is the meaning of doing good. You are asking why one should be moral? Because that is the meaning of morality.
- I explained. Kant requires an intention toward a good outcome (that is, something I would want to be a general law), but not necessarily that a good outcome will actually occur.
3- So what is it then?