Q&A: The Motive for the Moral and Religious Life
The Motive for the Moral and Religious Life
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask two questions regarding the reasons behind actions and the reason for fulfilling obligations(?) that are incumbent upon us, such as serving God or morality.
A. We assume that when a person acts, he does so because of some reason or purposive rationale (motivation, in the vernacular). And of course the question arises: what is the range of reasons for which a person may act? This has practical implications regarding serving God for its own sake, obeying the categorical imperative of morality, and so on. But it seems simple to say that serving for its own sake is not really possible.
Because whatever reason a person acts for, he does so because of some inner and subjective reason of his own that served as the motive for performing the act, such as one self-serving interest or desire or another. But it does not seem possible to act for a reason external to oneself, because then the question arises: why would a person act if not in order to satisfy his own desires?
B. Likewise, I wanted to ask: even if we accept that there can be an external motive, what is still the motive for observing morality? Even if we are convinced of the existence of morality as an idea external to us, what gives it the authority that would persuade us to subject ourselves to it? By way of analogy: imagine that the Ten Commandments were engraved on Mars, or that you found an old book with instructions for how to behave. In all these cases, it does not seem reasonable to treat the written laws seriously just like that, because what is missing is the validating factor for that object.
And therefore, if you argue that God is the one who validated the laws of morality, then the question arises with regard to Him as well: why should I do God’s will?
And at this stage it splits in two:
I) If you argue that the reason to do God’s will is simply “just because” — then although we do have to arrive at some stopping point to avoid an infinite regress, there is still something uncomfortable about this view because it seems somewhat arbitrary. For example, why shouldn’t we become convinced that we ought to perform the duties written on Mars, or those written in the book we found, and do them simply “just because”?
II) And if you argue that the reason to do God’s will is because of some other moral motive, such as gratitude, then the question arises regarding that motive in a double sense. First, you contradict your earlier statement that morality comes from God. And even if you argue that gratitude is a reason that is self-grounding, then one could already have claimed under the first horn — I — that obedience to God is self-grounding. But then our question there returns.
The conclusion seems to be that serving God for its own sake is impossible; rather, it must be for some internal reason of ours, like the World to Come.
But on the other hand, we feel that moral commands such as “Love your neighbor as yourself” really are correct! Despite all the conceptual analysis stated here.
And therefore, since the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted us to uphold the values of justice and religion, He therefore increased their reward in the world to come, as it is said: “The Lord desired, for the sake of His righteousness…”
Answer
A. You began by saying that a person acts either because of a cause or for the sake of a purpose. And you ended by saying that a person acts only because of causes. See column 120 (and a bit also 122).
B. You ended with the feeling that this really is how one ought to act. So what is the question to begin with? There you have it: you understand that this is how one ought to act. You ask: why? There is no “why” (see section A). Values do not have causes. You can see for yourself that contemplating the idea of the good produces results that move a person to action, unlike contemplating other things. This is what I have several times called “ethical facts.” That is the nature of these facts, and so there is no point in asking why. That is the fact. It is like asking why the force of gravity is specifically like this. The fact is that it is like this.
Regarding gratitude, I understand that you are familiar with my distinction between ontic gratitude and ethical gratitude:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%91%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A8-%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%98%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%92%D7%99%D7%94
Discussion on Answer
A. Indeed, that is my claim.
B. If I understand that there is an obligation to fulfill their commands, I will fulfill them. Usually I would not feel that way. That is exactly the difference between an arbitrary “just because” and an axiomatic “just because” (where it is self-evidently correct and therefore needs no justification). If someone were to meet you and tell you that in Euclidean space two parallel lines intersect, would you accept what he says? You have no proof that he is wrong (otherwise it wouldn’t be an axiom). You would not accept it because it isn’t true. Why? Just because — not arbitrary, but axiomatic, meaning self-evident and not requiring explanation.
If someone says that this is a response to a desire, that is not a justification but a psychological explanation. Therefore the difficulty still remains, and he hasn’t really answered much. I have an inclination to speak slander. Is that a justification for doing so? It is only a psychological explanation of why I in fact do it. And it makes no difference at all if my conclusion is that God indeed implanted this in me. It still isn’t a justification. The question is why to do it.
A. Thanks.
B.1. How would you understand that there is an obligation to fulfill the commands of a group of lunatics? Norms are not measured in relation to facts/labors… Rather, it would seem that this is measured relative to your own inner subjective state (like a list of the desires you prioritize — including your desire to eat chocolate and peanuts and to go on a diet).
2. Clearly, the distinction between an axiomatic “just because” and an arbitrary “just because” is rather arbitrary to a person from the outside.
3. On the contrary, if someone says this is a response to a desire, the claim is very understandable. Precisely because a psychological explanation of an action that follows from inner desires is completely rational, since we know very well that from his standpoint fulfilling desires as motivation is a very good explanation for the actions we do. For example, the desire to eat sweets explains why we buy them in the supermarket.
In fact, later on you are right that this is indeed a psychological explanation, but it is worth noting that it makes no sense to ask for a justification for desires, because by its very nature justification relates to a state of affairs external to us, but anything external to us gives us no reason for it to generate within us a desire to act toward it. Therefore all desires originate in psychological motivation.
So then what — a person who does not have this axiomatic understanding that if God says something one must do it [who is He exactly? why should I care?] really has no reason to fulfill it? And does God punish someone for not listening to this insight?
Kobi,
1. Not a subjective state, but my understanding (which is cognition of reality). I don’t understand what is unclear here.
2. I am not a person from the outside.
3. A psychological explanation is completely rational; it is just self-interested. It is not value-based and not connected to obligation and norm.
I don’t understand what is unclear here. This sounds to me like just a discussion that keeps repeating itself.
Eliezer,
God does not punish someone who is coerced. And He presumably knows who was coerced and who ignored the insights he had.
1. I didn’t understand the point. After all, cognition is measured relative to the normative situation outside, but if the norms outside cannot say anything, then there is no frame of reference by which to measure, and everything is psychological.
2. So in practice you are claiming that you have an intuition that this is right, and morality motivates you to act (or vice versa) without needing a prior reason. Because this is an evident stopping point to the regress.
3. I assume this is connected to the continuation of the discussion, for example point 1: whether values external to us, like altruism, really can exist for us.
Okay, thanks.
Indeed, recognition of the norms is what yields the values. The norms outside can definitely tell us something, and those are the value-insights we have. When I see this bunch of lunatics, it is clear to me (and to you as well) that there is nothing to them, and therefore I will not obey them.
Okay, thanks. It feels to me that anything I ask will just bring us back to the discussion we already had, and I can already guess in advance the answers you’ll give…
But let me ask what I’m trying to express from another angle.
Doesn’t the concept sound strange to you — that commands external to us, for example within a validated idea, would have the ability to generate norms and not just facts?
Not only does it not seem strange to me, it is a simple fact of life exactly like there being a chair next to me. In my opinion, every reasonable person understands it this way (although perhaps he does not conceptualize it explicitly to himself). This is the only basis that can give validity to moral principles, and therefore anyone who sees moral principles as valid principles is in effect relying on such a picture. It may be worthwhile for you to read articles (by David Enoch and others) on moral realism. By the way, one of his articles is called “Why I Am an Ethical Objectivist (and Why You Are, Too).” He too, like me, assumes (and shows) that all of us are like this, even those who do not admit it.
Obviously everyone understands the idea that murdering someone for no reason is bad, etc. etc. But the clear difference is that he does not understand how strange, abstract, and some even bizarre the hidden assumptions entailed by his belief are. Once he sees how strange the assumptions are, it is possible and reasonable for him to give up those beliefs in order to have a more plausible and rational worldview.
P.S. Do you have an article in Hebrew to point me to?
He can of course give up the recognition of morality, and then of course he is exempt from that assumption.
Only the fourth booklet, part 3.
Are you sure there isn’t any more good material in Hebrew on these topics?
Seems to me we need to get translators to start translating philosophy books if so…
A. If I understand correctly, you are claiming that I am simply begging the question, and according to your approach an act really can be for the sake of a purpose external to us. And that itself is what I feel, and we do see that people do this. And that’s it.
It’s as though there is no way to add anything to the discussion: either you hold that an altruistic act is possible or you don’t. (Every discussion has assumptions behind it, but here the assumptions are themselves directly the conclusion.)
B. If so, then I have a question for you. Suppose you met two delusional people in the street who gave you a book with five commands that you have to perform every morning — like tying the skins of dead carcasses to your body, jumping 8 times on your right foot and 6 times on your left, giving a third of all your money to so-and-so, etc.
Presumably, you would not see yourself as obligated to fulfill what they say. Why not? According to your view, after all, the reason to listen to morality is “just because,” something that cannot be reduced to anything prior. But if so, what makes this different from the religion of those lunatics?
It cries out that this is an arbitrary “just because.”
P.S. I found that one of the reasons written by Rabbi Moshe Rat on this topic is that God implanted within us the desire to fulfill His commandments, and if so then this is just an inner desire and it’s not so difficult.
And moreover, I, the humble one, thought to argue that from this itself we get proof of the existence of God. Because if you ask a person on the street: “If you had a revelation from God and He told you to put on tefillin, would you do it?”
He would probably answer, “Of course.” But since apparently it follows from the Rabbi’s words here that there is no difference between our case and the request of the religion-of-the-lunatics (where of course he would reject their request), it follows that there is planted within him an inner drive to do the will of God. And if so, based on the anthropological evidence, the most reasonable interpretation is to say that God implanted this desire in him from the outset.