Q&A: A Possible Solution to Hume’s Causality Problem
A Possible Solution to Hume’s Causality Problem
Question
Hello and blessings.
First, I distinguish between the principle of causality (that is, everything has a cause) and causality itself (that there is such a thing as a cause). My argument focuses on causality itself, without committing to the claim that everything has a cause.
David Hume argued that causality is a priori, and as I understand it, you agree with him as well. But here is a possible solution: we all sense causality from childhood, when we apply force to something and it moves. Of course, one could argue that this is only a sensation. But as is taught in philosophy of mind, sight too is only a sensation, and so is hearing. From this it follows that if one infers the existence of a chair from a sensation (seeing the chair), then one can likewise infer the existence of causality from a sensation (applying force to a chair and feeling that it moves as a result of my applying force).
This is not the same case as when I see someone else move a chair, because in that case I do not sense the causality itself, but only see a correlation.
And of course, another objection could be raised: perhaps it just so happens that whenever I feel that I applied force, the chair moves, so what we have here is correlation and not causality (even though I feel causality). To that I reply: perhaps it just so happens that whenever I feel that I see a chair, God inserts into me the idea of a chair (Berkeley’s approach), and then there is no actual existing chair here, only a chair as an idea that God places into my consciousness.
As you can see, I am trying to draw an analogy between the sensation of applying force (an actual physiological pressure) and the sensation of sight, such that just as I infer the existence of things from sight, so too I infer the existence of causality from the sensation of applying force. In this way, I may be able to turn the claim of causality into an a posteriori claim, just as the existence of things is an a posteriori claim.
I would be happy to hear your opinion of the argument.
Answer
You are conflating sensory cognition with intuition. When I see something, that is sensory cognition. When I sense a causal relation, that is not sensory cognition but intuition. To be sure, I have often written that intuition is also a kind of cognition (though not sensory).
Discussion on Answer
Hi Michi, maybe you missed it, and maybe you just have nothing to add to what I wrote. In case you missed it, I’m sending this message here so that you’ll see my previous comment.
I understand what you are saying, but I am trying to grant causality the status of sensory cognition. That is, the distinction between another person moving a chair and the fact that I am moving a table is that in the first case I infer causality through intuition, whereas in the second I infer causality through my senses. Is that distinction not relevant? Does the very fact that I feel that I am moving something and that it moves because (causally) I applied force to it not give the claim “there is some causality in the world” an a posteriori status? (Not the claim “everything has a cause,” nor even the claim “an event on which I do not exert force has a cause.” Those are, of course, a priori claims.)