Q&A: Objective Morality
Objective Morality
Question
Has the Rabbi read Crime and Punishment? If not, I recommend it.
Part of the question is phrased as a statement, but that is just in order to present the position properly.
The Rabbi says that whoever thinks objective morality is valid believes in God.
The question is whether there is any valid objective morality at all. Why do we need the ought? The is is enough for me. The moral intuition does not seem to me any more metaphysical than the intuition to pull one’s hand away from a boiling pot (the intuition that pain should be avoided). In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov raises rational and utilitarian ethical arguments to justify murder (in an Ubermensch style), and later in the plot those arguments are not refuted; rather, the human pain that follows the act breaks Raskolnikov’s soul and body. I’ll explain the message as I understood it through an example: you can think there is no validity to avoiding pain, and stop avoiding painful things for completely rational reasons. But as a human being, that practice will fail (no matter how justified you may be, you will still stop dipping your hand into boiling water), and this applies entirely to morality as well. An ordinary person who starts stealing will break down psychologically. We are built to behave according to certain norms—which perhaps contributed to the survival of our ancient ancestor—similar to avoiding pain. And suddenly the answers of ethical relativists no longer sound so absurd to me. I have no argument with someone who holds a moral system different from mine; I simply try to impose mine on him, because it is imposed on me.
When I say that theft is bad, I am expressing my instinct that theft is bad, just as pain is bad (at least my pain). I do not see a problem with our assigning a different weight to a moral statement than to the statement “I don’t like tomatoes”; it is simply a more basic and universal instinct. Evil is not an objective property of theft, but a human experience of rejecting the act. And even if we go one step further and say that morality has validity like logic, it is still simply an is that is imposed on me without forcing a validating command.
Morality is simply a reality imposed on me, perhaps even like mathematics. Does anyone obligate me that 2+2=4? Is there some command like that? It is imposed on me; so too morality. Is the Rabbi claiming that God can also be inferred from the validity of mathematics?
Trying to deny the validity of logic will lead me into contradiction, and trying to deny the validity of morality will fail practically. Mathematics is imposed logically, and morality is imposed psychologically-existentially.
Maybe the question can be summed up as: perhaps a moral statement can be understood as a descriptive statement. A natural phenomenon. Like fire burns?
Answer
I’ve read it. If you are arguing that there is no moral obligation, I disagree with you. What exactly do you want to discuss? Either you understand that there is one, or you don’t.
In several places I have distinguished between the content of morality, which is like logic, and the very existence of moral obligation. See columns 456–457.
Regarding morality and utility, see the discussions on the categorical imperative, especially column 122.