Q&A: Halakhic Pluralism in Practice
Halakhic Pluralism in Practice
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I read your article regarding halakhic pluralism, and the following question came up: what is the practical difference in Jewish law between the different approaches?
I’ll try to explain:
If in the end a competent halakhic decisor (who does not “err in an explicit Mishnah”) studies the topic thoroughly, examines all the relevant sources, takes into account the complexities of the reality in which he lives and the halakhic tradition before him, and rules one way or the other—what practical difference does it make whether we say there is one halakhic truth or many?
In the end, each person will do what seems right in his own eyes, and no one is more or less correct. (As you noted: “In the study hall of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they ate poultry with milk.”)
Thank you very much, and more power to you for all the important work you do.
Answer
A practical difference, for example, that I’ve mentioned more than once is the passage in Eruvin 13, where they did not rule like Rabbi Meir because his colleagues could not fully grasp the depth of his reasoning. Suppose you have a dispute with a very great sage, and it is clear to you that he is far greater than you. If there is no halakhic truth, then I would still follow my own view. But if there is halakhic truth, then there is room to worry that he is right even though I was not convinced, and to act according to his ruling.
However, I argue that even if the truth is with him, I should still act according to my own approach, because autonomy has value. But this too has a practical difference, as emerges from the Ritva on Sukkah 10b. See, for example, here: https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2597%25D7%2599%25D7%25A8%25D7%2594-%25D7%259E%25D7%259C-%25D7%2594%25D7%25A1%25D7%2595%25D7%2591%25D7%259C%25D7%25A0%25D7%2595%25D7%25AA/&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwiCjsSI8cuQAxW4T6QEHcE-J28QFnoECAoQAg&usg=AOvVaw285MrGrSTY8bGG-l2mP6IQ
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t understand the proof from Eruvin.
After all, we do not follow Rabbi Meir because we do not understand his words, even though he is a sage, perhaps even greater than us.
That is, if I do not understand the opinion of the rabbi who is greater than me, I will do what I myself understand.
If there is truth, then maybe I should nullify my own view.
As for what you wrote at the end:
What does “the greatest decisor” mean?
Who decides who is the greatest?
Me?
Then we are back to the same problem. Even if there is “truth” about who is the greatest, I have no access to that truth, and it is meaningless.
There too I will decide according to the ruling that seems most reasonable to me.
You understand the proof perfectly well. You do not understand the claim. The reason I would not act like him is because of the value of autonomy. There is value in acting according to my own conclusion and my own approach. And that outweighs the value of truth, if I am competent in these matters. Search here on the site for autonomy.
As for who should form an impression of who is the greatest, or consult someone.
The main practical difference is regarding someone who is not competent in these matters. If there is no halakhic truth, he should choose whatever halakhic decisor he wants. But if there is halakhic truth, he should choose the greatest decisor.