Vayera (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve, Parashat Vayera, 5765

A. Between Woman and Rain

Resh Lakish said: What is the meaning of the verse, “And He will shut up the heavens”? When the heavens are restrained from bringing down dew and rain, it is like a woman who labors and does not give birth.

This is what Resh Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara: the term “shutting up” is used with regard to rain, and it is used with regard to a woman. It is used with regard to a woman, as it is said: “For the Lord had completely closed up every womb.” And it is used with regard to rain, as it is written: “And He will shut up the heavens.”

The term “birth” is used with regard to a woman, and it is used with regard to rain. It is used with regard to a woman, as it is written: “And she conceived and gave birth to a son.” And it is used with regard to rain, as it is written: “And it gives birth and causes growth.”

The term “visitation” is used with regard to a woman, and it is used with regard to rain. It is used with regard to a woman, as it is written: “And the Lord visited Sarah.” And it is used with regard to rain, as it is written: “You visited the earth and watered it; You greatly enrich it; the channel of God is full of water.” What is meant by “the channel of God is full of water”? It was taught: there is a kind of dome in the firmament from which the rains go forth.

— Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 8a-b

The Difficulty in the Structure of the Midrash

In the midrash (rabbinic exposition) cited here, Resh Lakish and bar Kappara compare biblical formulations used with regard to a woman and with regard to rain. The overall structure is unclear. There are three comparisons here, yet neither their purpose nor their conclusion is obvious. Is this merely an interesting linguistic correlation? Is there some rule, in the context of legal exegesis, or some characteristic, in the context of aggadic exegesis, that exists in woman or in rain and teaches us something about the other side of the equation?

On closer inspection, it seems that the conclusion of the midrash is formulated in the opening sentence. The conclusion drawn from all these comparisons is that when the heavens are restrained from giving rain, this is like a woman who labors and does not give birth. If so, some feature is indeed being learned from the context of woman to the context of rain. The three expositions that follow are meant to ground that conclusion.

What is this feature that is being learned from woman to rain? Is it only a technical comparison: rain comes forth from the heavens as a fetus comes forth from a woman, as the end of the third exposition might suggest? Why would biblical verses be needed for so simple a claim? It is still unclear why the conclusion of the midrash refers specifically to the negative aspect — the withholding of rain and the prevention of birth — rather than to the positive aspect of rainfall and birth itself.

Comparing the First Midrash to the Other Two

It should be noted that the three expositions differ from one another in several correlated respects.

First, the first exposition deals with stoppage, the negative aspect, whereas the two later ones deal with birth and visitation.

The order of appearance of woman and rain also changes from one exposition to another, in a way that matches the previous distinction. In the first exposition, which deals with stoppage, rain appears first. In the next two expositions, which deal with birth and visitation, the woman appears first. Is this significant? To be sure, when the scriptural sources themselves are spelled out, the order is identical in all three cases: first the woman, and only afterward the rain. It should be added that if this were merely a random anthology of sayings by different speakers, these points would carry little weight. But when we are dealing with a cluster of expositions in one context — and perhaps even by the same speaker, as will be discussed below — there is reason to take such differences seriously.

Another difference, again dividing the expositions into the same two groups, concerns the source texts. In the first exposition, both verses come from the Torah. In the latter two, one of the verses comes from the Prophets and Writings, specifically Isaiah and Psalms.

The Conclusion of the Midrash: The Birth Pangs of Rain

So far we have only listed the data. To understand the purpose of the midrash, let us look more closely at its language. The key word in the opening, conclusive sentence is that the woman “labors” and does not give birth. Rashi explains ad loc.:

“Labors” means like the birth pangs of a woman in labor. The heavens do the same; it is hard on the world, and it comes because of sin.

Rashi explains that the point of the midrash is to show that the withholding of rain is preceded by “birth pangs,” exactly as with a woman who gives birth. Apparently these birth pangs are the suffering that the withholding of rain causes the world. But Rashi’s wording leaves it unclear whether what is hard on the world is the withholding of rain itself, or whether, before the actual withholding, there are sufferings like birth pangs before birth. The first interpretation is trivial, whereas Rashi’s plain wording leans somewhat toward the second.

According to that second reading, the conclusion of the midrash is that the withholding of rain is hard on the world in an additional way, beyond the mere lack of water. That is why it is precisely like a woman who labors and does not give birth. She suffers the birth pangs, and in addition she suffers the fact that in the end she is not granted a child. The novelty of the midrash is that the withholding of rain contains an additional dimension of suffering, parallel to the birth pangs of a woman.

Against this background we may perhaps understand Rabbeinu Hananel’s remark ad loc., where he cites Resh Lakish in the following form: “Stoppage, birth, and visitation were stated regarding a woman, and corresponding to them in the firmament and in the earth.” Rabbeinu Hananel is probably hinting to the last two expositions — another distinction between them and the first — in which that which is “visited” is the earth rather than the heavens. The birth pangs affect the heavens, which give birth to the rain, whereas the lack of visitation is the earth’s suffering. Unlike the case of a woman, in the context of rain there is a split between the recipients of the two kinds of suffering mentioned above.¹

What Are the Birth Pangs of Rain?

Still, what exactly is this additional suffering? What is involved in the withholding of rain beyond the lack of water? To answer this, we should consider the context of the discussion in Taanit. The passage appears within the framework of a discussion of prayers in times of distress. Rashi there writes: “That is, for all of them one asks for mercy.” If so, in the context of rain, the “birth pangs” may be the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not answer our prayers. As is well known, there are three keys that remain in God’s own hand and are not entrusted to an agent; among them are childbirth and rain, as stated in Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 2a. Throughout tractate Taanit one can see that rainfall, beyond supplying water, also serves as an indication of the quality of our relationship with God.²

In sum, the withholding of rain involves two problems:

1. A lack of water.
2. A weakening of the relationship with God.

And indeed we find in the Rif’s commentary in Ein Yaakov ad loc. the following:

Just as a woman’s visitation precedes birth, for birth comes from visitation, so too from the visitation with which the Lord visits the earth — to see their good deeds, their prayer, and their repentance — He brings down rain.

The Logical Structure of the Expositions

This is the conclusion. To understand what follows, and to address the difficulties raised above, let us now examine the logical structure of these expositions. At first glance, all of them seem to be instances of gezerah shavah (verbal analogy). We learn from the shared words in Scripture that rain possesses what a woman possesses.³ But there is a problem with that assumption, for it is an accepted principle — see, for example, Yavin Shemu’ah, Principle 102 — that one does not derive Torah law from the Prophets and Writings, even when the relevant terms are considered “free” for such an analogy.⁴ Yet, as we saw above, the verses in the last two expositions are from those later biblical books.

Apparently, then, at least the last two expositions are not gezerah shavah in the formal hermeneutical sense. And indeed, when one examines them, it seems very plausible that even without interpretive tools given at Sinai we could have arrived at the ideas they express. The conclusion that compares birth pangs to divine non-response is not entirely obvious. But the basic comparison between woman and rain is not especially sophisticated, and certainly does not require grounding by means of a formal verbal rule.

That is, even gezerah shavah is not always an opaque inferential device, a kind of formal code, as discussed on the pages for Parashat Bereshit and Parashat Lekh-Lekha. As we saw there with kal va-homer (a fortiori reasoning), gezerah shavah too can contain elements of universal interpretive reasoning. It may be necessary to distinguish in this regard between legal exegesis and the thirty-two hermeneutical rules of aggadic exegesis, but this is not the place to pursue that question.

A Hypothesis About a Structural Indicator Distinguishing Two Types of Gezerah Shavah

We can now point to a structural indicator in the language of these expositions that may support the distinction we have proposed. As noted, the woman is the source context and the rain is the target context. In the first exposition, the order in which the two sides are presented is the reverse of the order of inference. In computer science such a structure is called LIFO — last in, first out. By contrast, in the last two expositions, which deal with birth and visitation, the structure is FIFO — first in, first out.

It should be noted that rabbinic literature contains comparisons of both these types. For example, on the previous page, for Parashat Lekh-Lekha, two such examples were brought. In the second exposition there, a gezerah shavah appears, and its formulation is of the LIFO type. In the third exposition, whose exact nature was not made explicit — although it too looked like a gezerah shavah — the formulation was of the FIFO type.

In light of our remarks above, one might suggest that the same division applies here. The first exposition is a formal gezerah shavah, and therefore its structure is LIFO. We saw that the next two are not true gezerah shavah, and therefore their structure is FIFO. Such a structure indicates a comparison grounded in ordinary reasoning, with biblical language brought merely as support — a quasi-gezerah shavah. A possible explanation for the connection between these different structures and the nature of the exposition will be discussed below in Part B. For now, we can return to the difficulties raised above.

It seems that the root of the difference between the expositions lies in their different functions. We saw above that the purpose of the comparison is to teach that the withholding of rain contains an additional problematic dimension. We also noted Resh Lakish’s focus on the negative aspect, the withholding of rain, rather than on rainfall itself. Perhaps the explanation is that in the positive case — rainfall and the birth of a child — there are indeed two positive outcomes: the event itself and divine responsiveness. But that is a straightforward comparison, because in both contexts the structure is really the same, and therefore this is not a true gezerah shavah. By contrast, in the negative context, childbirth contains a third problem that at first glance does not exist in the case of rain: birth pangs. These are not essentially similar to divine hiddenness or non-response, but rather constitute an additional problem beyond the prevention of the result itself. Therefore a formal gezerah shavah is required here.⁵

The first derivation deals with the withholding of rain. It is therefore constructed as a full formal gezerah shavah, made from the woman in labor to rain — hence the LIFO structure, and hence the fact that the verses are from the Torah. By contrast, the latter two expositions deal with rainfall itself. They are not formal gezerah shavah — hence the FIFO structure, and hence the presence of verses from the Prophets and Writings — but rather a general comparison between the woman in labor and rain. These comparisons are brought only as support, perhaps even as association rather than a full source, for Resh Lakish’s conclusion. Indeed, from the wording of the passage one might infer that these latter expositions come from another exegete, not from Resh Lakish himself.

B. LIFO and FIFO Structures: Two Types of Gezerah Shavah

The Logic of the Structural Distinction

As we saw above, rabbinic literature contains comparisons in two formulations, which we called LIFO and FIFO. A LIFO structure is formulated as follows: X is said in context B, and X is said in context A; just as A is Y, so too B is Y. A FIFO structure is formulated as follows: X is said in context A, and X is said in context B; just as A is Y, so too B is Y.⁶

Our claim in Part A was that the LIFO structure expresses a formal gezerah shavah, whereas the FIFO structure can also express support for a comparison grounded in ordinary reasoning, that is, a mere textual support. This is not meant as a universal rule. It is only a proposed local interpretation of the midrash before us, not necessarily a general principle. Still, if a rationale can be found behind it, then perhaps it can be applied in other places as well. Let us therefore try to identify a possible logic underlying this difference in formulation.

If the change in structure is not accidental, it may express two related points:

1. The essential point is that a LIFO structure begins with the target context, not the source context. This suggests that there is some difficulty or lack of knowledge in that context, and we propose to resolve it by comparison to another context, the source. On this view, the sentence is divided into two parts: X is said in context B, but its nature is unclear. To that we answer: X is also said in context A, and therefore we learn from there to here. In other words, the LIFO formulation is split unevenly, as it were into a quarter and three quarters. By contrast, a FIFO structure is one long sentence. It begins, as one would naturally expect, with the source context and ends with the target. This suggests that there is no particular difficulty lurking in the background of the target context.
2. The change in order hints at whether the direction of the inference matters. A LIFO structure is a directional inference from source to target. This is gezerah shavah: through an identical term, it transfers a law or a feature from context A to context B. A FIFO structure, by contrast, is a non-directional, bilateral comparison, somewhat like a direct linkage. In our examples — the second and third expositions above — the derivation runs from A to B, but one could just as well learn other things in the reverse direction. In summary: in our example above, stoppage is learned by gezerah shavah from woman to rain, and therefore the structure is LIFO. Visitation and birth are meant only to liken the two contexts to one another, and therefore the structure is FIFO.

These distinctions may help explain why the two structures correspond, respectively, to formal gezerah shavah and to comparison grounded in reason. A formal gezerah shavah is meant to solve a certain puzzle.⁷ We have one context that is unexplained and another that is explicit. Through gezerah shavah, we learn a law or a specific feature from the explicit context to the obscure one. But this does not necessarily imply an essential comparison between them. By contrast, in an ordinary analogical comparison, we find a substantive similarity between the two sides, and therefore their standing within the comparison is equal.

Relation to the Comparison Between Gezerah Shavah and Kal Va-homer

On the page for Parashat Lekh-Lekha, we saw a similar distinction between gezerah shavah, which is a formal act and therefore does not necessarily reflect a substantive similarity between the two contexts being compared, and kal va-homer, which is a content-based rule rather than a textual one, and therefore presupposes a substantive comparison. The gezerah shavah of the last two expositions resembles the third type of kal va-homer that we saw on the page for Parashat Noah. In the background there is ordinary reasoning, to the point that it is hard to suppose that what is involved here is a specifically hermeneutical inference rather than ordinary interpretation.⁸ The difference that nevertheless remains between these two forms of inference is that the third type of kal va-homer is built on a hierarchy between the two contexts, whereas in the quasi-gezerah shavah the character of the reasoning is analogical rather than hierarchical.

Implication: Is Gezerah Shavah Symmetrical?

We find a dispute among the medieval authorities over the question whether the existence of a gezerah shavah from A to B necessarily entails the possibility of a gezerah shavah from B to A. The dispute concerns the interpretation of the rule that “a gezerah shavah is not partial”; see Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 22b. Some understood this to imply the symmetry of gezerah shavah — for example, Rashbam on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 120b — whereas others held that it does not imply symmetry — for example, Rashi on Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 22b.⁹ According to Rashbam, gezerah shavah reveals a substantive resemblance between the contexts, and is therefore necessarily symmetrical. According to Rashi, by contrast, it is a formal rule intended only to transfer specific laws from an explicit context to an obscure one, without necessarily indicating any substantive resemblance between them. Therefore it is not necessarily symmetrical.

C. Reasoning and Formal Rule: What Is a Scriptural Decree?

Two Types of Hermeneutical Rules

On the page for Parashat Noah, we discussed different kinds of kal va-homer. We saw there that there is one specifically hermeneutical type, and in addition two other types, one of which is a deduction that cannot be refuted. It is therefore fairly clear that it is not part of the system of hermeneutical rules. Our claim there was that no Sinaitic authorization is required in order to use ordinary logic. The status of the third type remained uncertain. Here a similar phenomenon arises with respect to gezerah shavah. There is a specifically hermeneutical gezerah shavah, which is a formal rule and part of the system of exegesis. And there are comparisons that express ordinary analogy, which we make in other contexts as well. It is reasonable to assume that such inferences are not part of the formal system, and that in their case the exposition is at most a textual support.

If so, we must distinguish between rules that are a special innovation, a scriptural decree, and pseudo-rules that express ordinary interpretive reasoning in language that only appears to be formally hermeneutical.

Why Logical Rules Are Included in the System of Rules

But this reopens the problem raised on the page for Parashat Bereshit. There we discussed what may be called midrashic Platonism, which sees the hermeneutical rules as a system of analogical inferential paths rather than as particularistic and unique interpretive techniques — an arbitrary code — applicable only to interpreting the Torah. If ordinary forms of inference are not included within the system of rules, then it would seem that what is included are only particularistic inferences. If so, it becomes unclear how the system of rules can have universal significance with regard to the world or to thought in general.

The solution to this problem is similar to what we saw in Part B of the page for Parashat Lekh-Lekha. More generally, as we noted there, it is important to understand that gezerah shavah expresses a logical similarity. The textual comparison on which gezerah shavah rests is only a textual hint that draws our attention to that substantive similarity.

What Is a Scriptural Decree?

As an addition, let us try to clarify an important point regarding the concepts of “innovation” and “scriptural decree.” It is commonly assumed that matters which can be understood independently do not require a special innovation of the Torah in order to teach them. From this, some infer that if a matter does require such an innovation, then it cannot be grasped by ordinary human reason. But that conclusion is incorrect.

As an example, consider the Meiri’s comments in the discussion of the stubborn and rebellious son in Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 69b-70a. The Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter states that the law of the stubborn and rebellious son does not apply to a daughter, only to a son. In the Gemara there, at the end of 69b, we read:

It was taught: Rabbi Shimon said, “According to reason, a daughter too ought to be fit to be treated as a stubborn and rebellious child, for opportunities for transgression are more readily available to her. But it is a scriptural decree: ‘a son’ — and not a daughter.”

That is, the Gemara determines that this is a novelty that runs against simple reasoning, a scriptural decree. The same appears in the parallel passage in the Jerusalem Talmud, also cited by the Meiri below. Several medieval authorities nevertheless make an effort to find a rationale for this law. For example, Sefer Ha-Hinnukh and Maimonides maintain that it is not the ordinary way of a daughter to be drawn after her appetites, and therefore the law of the stubborn and rebellious child does not apply to her. All this still falls within the general effort to seek reasons for the commandments, whose halakhic standing is limited. But the Meiri, at the beginning of that chapter, says something slightly different:

The Torah was particular only about one whose way is to be drawn after his appetites and to become immersed in them. This is true not of a daughter but of a son. For these matters, although they are scriptural decrees, all tend in this direction, even though at first glance some of the details may seem to point the other way.

The Meiri argues that saying the derivation “a son — and not a daughter” is a scriptural decree does not mean that it has no explanation. Rather, it means that although at first glance we would not necessarily have arrived at this conclusion, after reflection, and with the help of the verse itself, we can certainly understand this innovation with our own intellect. From the Meiri’s language, it seems that he understands the notion of scriptural decree in this way generally.

This approach sheds new light on the notion of scriptural decree, and in particular on formal gezerah shavah, and perhaps on the hermeneutical rules in general. As we saw in Parashat Lekh-Lekha, the rules were given at Sinai, and we always assumed that ordinary modes of thought do not require authorization or revelation in order to be used. Now, in light of the Meiri, there is no need to conclude from this that they are an arbitrary code. The fact that we would not have succeeded in reaching them on our own does not mean that, once disclosed, we cannot understand them and make use of them. The example of geometry, discussed on the page for Parashat Lekh-Lekha, proves the point.

Conclusion: Gezerah Shavah Is Not Merely a Formal Rule

Above, at the end of Part B, we saw the dispute between Rashi and Rashbam over the symmetry of gezerah shavah. At first glance, if gezerah shavah reveals a substantive similarity between the subjects under discussion, then it ought to be symmetrical. If Rashi, in the discussion in Keritot, does not accept the symmetry of gezerah shavah, then it would seem that he understands it as a formal scriptural decree in the usual sense — that is, as a particularistic rule, a kind of arbitrary code, whose function is only to reveal some law indirectly, and nothing more. Rashbam, by contrast, implies that once gezerah shavah has revealed the possibility of likening A to B, it is obvious that B is also like A. Similarity, of course, is a symmetrical relation.

However, even according to Rashi, gezerah shavah may not be entirely arbitrary. The asymmetry points to a relation, but it is a hierarchical relation rather than a simple analogy. A can be learned from B, but not necessarily vice versa. The indication of this is that Rashi too accepts the rule that gezerah shavah is not partial. According to him, that rule means that in the direction of the derivation — from A to B — one may learn everything relevant to the comparison between the two contexts. Only the reverse direction is not necessary according to Rashi. This proves that even for Rashi the inference is not arbitrary, for it can be applied to all the relevant laws that are explicit in context A and implicit in context B. It follows that in each specific gezerah shavah we must examine the reason for the asymmetry. Even according to Rashi, there is no claim here of a completely formalistic understanding of hermeneutical gezerah shavah.

Footnotes