Toldot (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

---

With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Friday eve of Parashat Toledot, 5765

A. The interpretive methods of the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva

Mishnah: Meat of a kosher domesticated animal cooked in the milk of a kosher domesticated animal is forbidden to cook, and forbidden to derive benefit from… Rabbi Akiva says: Wild animals and birds are not prohibited by Torah law, as it is said, “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” three times — excluding a wild animal, a bird, and a non-kosher domesticated animal.

Gemara: From where are these matters derived [that the prohibition applies to every kosher domesticated animal]? Rabbi Eleazar said: The verse states, “Judah sent the kid of the goats.” Here it says “kid of the goats”; from here, wherever Scripture says simply “kid,” even the young of a cow or a ewe are included. But why not derive from it the opposite — that everywhere “kid” means specifically a goat-kid? Another verse is written: “and the skins of the kids of the goats.” Here it says “kids of the goats”; from here, wherever Scripture says simply “kid,” even the young of a cow or a ewe are included. But why not derive from it? These are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach a general rule.

This is satisfactory according to the one who says that they do not teach. But according to the one who says that they do teach, what can be said? Two exclusions are written: “goats” and “the goats.”

(Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 113a-b)

The prohibition of meat cooked in milk

The discussion in the first part of the Mishnah concerns the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and it rules that this prohibition was not stated only with respect to a kid, but also with respect to any kosher domesticated animal. In the latter part of the Mishnah, Rabbi Akiva rules that there is no Torah prohibition regarding wild animals, birds, or non-kosher domesticated animals. On the present page we will use this exposition as a point of departure for a brief look at the fundamental disagreement between the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael with respect to methods of interpretation in general. God willing, the discussion will continue next week as well.

The basis of the Gemara’s question: why is a derivation needed?

The cited Gemara discusses the source for the expansion in the first part of the Mishnah from “kid” to every kosher domesticated animal. But before examining the Gemara itself, we must understand why any source is needed here at all. Against this background, it is interesting to look at the Mishnah in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 54b, which states:

An ox and any other domesticated animal are alike with respect to falling into a pit, the injunction at Mount Sinai, double payment, returning lost property, unloading, muzzling, mixed species, and Shabbat. And wild animals and birds are likewise included. If so, why does Scripture say “ox” or “donkey”? Rather, Scripture speaks of what is usual.

At first glance, the Mishnah in Bava Kamma makes it clear that when the Torah mentions a particular animal, we automatically extend the law’s application to all other animals. The Torah merely gives an example, but not an exclusive one, in the way people ordinarily speak. This is the principle expressed by the phrase “Scripture speaks of what is usual.”

According to this principle, it would seem that in the Hullin sugya (Talmudic discussion) as well, we should have extended the prohibition of meat cooked in milk to every kosher domesticated animal without any need for a special derivation. Indeed, the exclusion of wild animals and birds, which are not prohibited by Torah law, really does require a special derivation, since without such a derivation we would have assumed that Scripture is merely speaking of what is usual and that the prohibition applies to all animals.

But if so, it is unclear why the Gemara in Hullin opens by searching for a source for the halakhic expansion from the “kid” of the first clause to all other kosher domesticated animals, when the Mishnah in Bava Kamma seems to say that Scripture speaks of what is usual. By contrast, Rabbi Akiva’s exclusion in the continuation fits very well with what emerges from the Mishnah in Bava Kamma.

The school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva

It is well known that the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael disagreed about both the understanding and the application of the hermeneutical rules.¹ Many have linked this to a fundamental dispute about the language of the Torah — that is, to the question whether “the Torah speaks in human language,” or not.² According to Rabbi Akiva, the Torah’s language is precise, and therefore he expounds every letter and every ornamental crown atop a letter. By contrast, Rabbi Ishmael holds that “the Torah speaks in human language,” and therefore we need not always expound letters and words that appear to us programmatically “superfluous.” The Torah speaks in the manner of ordinary human speech.

To be sure, this dispute is usually discussed with respect to doubled expressions; at first glance, it does not seem to be a wholly general principle. But various scholars and commentators have already pointed out that these two approaches characterize the overall interpretive methods of the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva. For example, the Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 8:10, implies that the matter applies even to the exposition of the letter vav; see Korban Ha-Edah and Penei Moshe there. The same appears from Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 1:12, and Guide of the Perplexed I:26, I:33, and I:46, where he uses the expression “the Torah speaks in human language” in broader contexts as well. See also the entry “The Torah speaks in human language” in Encyclopaedia Talmudit, around note 68.

It should be noted that this central dispute concerning interpretive method is not clearly decided either in the Talmud or among the halakhic authorities. The baraita listing the thirteen interpretive principles is attributed to Rabbi Ishmael, but in halakha (Jewish law) quite a few of Rabbi Akiva’s interpretations are accepted as well, including in the very sugya in Shevuot mentioned above. Heschel, in his above-mentioned book, explains that over the generations a synthesis gradually emerged between these two schools, and that is indeed how things appear. This sugya still requires further clarification.³

Dividing the sugyot: the relation between “Scripture speaks of what is usual” and “the Torah speaks in human language”

Against the background of this dispute, it is important to note that the latter part of the Mishnah in Hullin explicitly cites Rabbi Akiva, and the halakha follows him there with respect to wild animals and birds. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the entire Mishnah there follows his general approach. A proof for this from the Gemara’s line of argument will be brought below. As stated, Rabbi Akiva maintains that the Torah’s language is precise, and therefore if Scripture says specifically “kid,” it presumably means only a kid. We are thus compelled to search for an explicit source for extending the law to other animals.

By contrast, the wording of the latter part of the Mishnah in Bava Kamma suggests that it follows the approach of Rabbi Ishmael. It formulates the principle “Scripture speaks of what is usual,” meaning that the Torah’s examples are not exclusive, and that the Torah’s language is not always precise, but rather like ordinary human speech. In light of the broader claim made above — namely, that the expression “the Torah speaks in human language” is not limited to doubled formulations — it seems reasonable to assume that the phrase “Scripture speaks of what is usual” in the Mishnah in Bava Kamma likewise reflects a principled interpretive approach of Rabbi Ishmael.

This also emerges from various considerations in the Gemara there. First, the Gemara employs derivations of “general and particular,” which belong to the interpretive method of the school of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, expounds by “inclusions and exclusions,” not by “general and particular”; see Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a, and parallels. In addition, Rabbi Ishmael himself is explicitly mentioned there as the source of one of the derivations. If so, there is apparently nothing surprising in the fact that the Mishnah there interprets the Torah in human language, so that when Scripture says “ox,” it means any animal.

The relation between the sugyot, and the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael

In the previous section we suggested attributing the Mishnah in Bava Kamma to the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the Mishnah in Hullin to the school of Rabbi Akiva. But a closer examination of the sugya in Bava Kamma raises several difficulties.

The Gemara there brings a special derivation for each of the legal rulings in the Mishnah. If the Mishnah’s assumption really is that Scripture speaks of what is usual, it is not clear why these derivations are needed. More than that: the Mishnah seems explicitly to say that the Torah uses the term “ox” only because “it speaks of what is usual.” This suggests that even according to Rabbi Ishmael, the extension from one animal to all other animals is not automatic; a source must still be provided. How can that be reconciled with the Mishnah’s implication that the extension is based on the principle that Scripture speaks of what is usual?

It seems that the rule in the latter part — “Scripture speaks of what is usual” — is formulated only as a conclusion drawn from the various derivations, not as an a priori methodological principle. Only after all the derivations presented there in the sugya do we reach the conclusion that in all the contexts listed there, Scripture gave merely an example and did not intend exclusivity. But one should not conclude from this that it is an absolute and a priori rule — that this is always the Torah’s way. In other words: this is not an a priori assumption of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, but rather an a posteriori summary of what emerges from the various derivations.

According to this, Rabbi Ishmael too does not simply interpret Scripture as using examples casually unless he has derivations that force him to do so. He too assumes that the Torah’s language is precise. If so, it is no longer clear what the difference is between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva.

The disagreement between them can be understood in two ways, depending on how one understands the relation between the two rules under discussion here: “the Torah speaks in human language” and “Scripture speaks of what is usual.” We shall now spell them out.

First possibility: the two rules are different in character

The principle “the Torah speaks in human language,” which guides the method of Rabbi Ishmael’s school, is indeed an a priori principle, and on this the school of Rabbi Akiva disagrees. But the principle that appears in the Mishnah in Bava Kamma — “Scripture speaks of what is usual” — is an a posteriori principle, that is, a result of the derivations, as we explained above. Rabbi Akiva himself could agree with it as well. If there are derivations of inclusion, then even according to Rabbi Akiva one may conclude that in that particular case Scripture is “speaking of what is usual.”

But this picture is not so simple. First, we saw that the derivations in the Bava Kamma sugya indicate that the Mishnah there is interpreted in Rabbi Ishmael’s manner, through “general and particular.” What would Rabbi Akiva say about that? If he too agrees with the a posteriori rule that “Scripture speaks of what is usual,” how did he himself arrive at it? Does he have other derivations, different from those of Rabbi Ishmael’s school, that happen by coincidence to lead to the same conclusion — that here Scripture is “speaking of what is usual”? Beyond that, it is hard to assume that the formulation “Scripture speaks of what is usual” has no principled significance, or no connection to the principle “the Torah speaks in human language.” In the Mishnah in Bava Kamma, this principle appears as an independent rationale, not as a mere result.

Second possibility: the two rules are similar in character

Both of these principles — “Scripture speaks of what is usual” and “the Torah speaks in human language” — express a fundamental rule. Even according to Rabbi Ishmael’s school, however, that rule is not applicable under all circumstances and in every case. The difference between the two schools in this context turns on the following question: after all the derivations have been made, must we return and ask ourselves why the Torah nevertheless chose to say specifically “ox,” or not?

As we saw, according to Rabbi Ishmael, the sugya offers several derivations, and taken together they yield the conclusion that in the contexts under discussion the word “ox” is not exclusive; rather, Scripture is speaking of what is usual. According to Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, the word “ox” must be interpreted specifically, and therefore he is not willing — despite all the derivations — to accept the claim that the Torah wrote an imprecise word. Rabbi Akiva asks himself: if the Torah means all animals, as the derivations indicate, why did it not write that explicitly, and why did it instead choose the specific term “ox”? That question is grounded in the method of Rabbi Akiva’s school, according to which the Torah does not merely use ordinary human language.

For this reason, the school of Rabbi Akiva would not accept the move made by the sugya in Bava Kamma, and that move is made only according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael. This also explains why, in the Mishnah in Hullin, Rabbi Akiva excludes wild animals, birds, and non-kosher domesticated animals: if the Torah chose the word “kid,” then it means precisely a kid — in addition to the extension derived from it by the interpretive consideration brought in the Gemara, which will be discussed below. In contrast to the first possibility, this means that the Bava Kamma sugya really does fit only the method of Rabbi Ishmael’s school, not that of Rabbi Akiva.

By contrast, in the case of the Hullin sugya, where the Torah says “kid,” even according to Rabbi Ishmael an interpretive consideration is required to show that the kid is only an example of a broader class rather than an exclusive case. Once such a consideration is found, Rabbi Ishmael is willing to see “kid” as an example for the whole class of animals. The derivation thus serves as proof that here Scripture speaks of what is usual. Presumably, Rabbi Akiva’s exclusion later in the Mishnah, with respect to wild animals and birds, would not exist according to Rabbi Ishmael.⁴

To sum up: according to Rabbi Akiva, even if there seem to be derivations supporting such a reading, there is no possibility of interpreting Scripture as merely speaking of what is usual. Every word in the Torah is necessarily precise. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the word “ox” can indeed serve merely as an example for a broader class, though derivations are still needed to show that Scripture is speaking of what is usual. See also Tosafot to Sotah, cited above.

“General and particular” versus “inclusions and exclusions”

Let us now briefly consider the statement of the Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a:

Rabbi Ishmael, who served Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah, who expounded the entire Torah by the method of general and particular, likewise expounds by general and particular. Rabbi Akiva, who served Nahum of Gimzo, who expounded the entire Torah by inclusion and exclusion, likewise expounds by inclusion and exclusion.

From analysis of that sugya and its parallels,⁵ it emerges that Rabbi Akiva analyzes the verses from the general to the particular, in a process of specification, whereas Rabbi Ishmael analyzes them from the particulars to the general, in a process of generalization. Heschel presents a broad intellectual-mystical background within which Rabbi Akiva’s teaching is to be understood. Rabbi Akiva lives primarily in abstractions and spiritual heights, and from there descends and becomes articulated in the details of prosaic reality. He deals in generalities, and these are his building blocks and argumentative units. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, is a man of the concrete, realistic world, who begins “below” and climbs upward, forming generalizations out of particulars. His tools are the concrete particulars, not abstract generalities.

It is important to note that the main difference between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael does not lie in the scope of the rule produced at the end of the process of generalization. The core difference lies in the inferential method. One may say that Rabbi Akiva uses complete classes all the way through, and only the result of the process is applied to the particulars that belong to the class that remains at the end. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, ascends from particulars and creates from them a general class to which the rule applies. From here it is easy to see that quite often specifically the school of Rabbi Ishmael will arrive at a broader field of application than that yielded by Rabbi Akiva’s interpretive method.

A brief reflection shows that these two methods are well reflected in our sugyot as well. Rabbi Ishmael begins from a small and innocent kid — bought for two zuz — and apparently reaches from it a broad class that includes all domesticated animals, wild animals, and birds. Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, begins from that same kid, but for some reason includes from it all kosher animals. He then asks himself why the Torah chose a particular term, “kid,” since it does not merely speak in ordinary human fashion. Rabbi Akiva concludes from this that wild animals and birds must be excluded from that class. In the end, the kid expresses collective properties of the class of kosher domesticated animals. It is specifically according to Rabbi Ishmael, who extends the kid so broadly, that the kid retains substantive meaning. In Rabbi Akiva’s method, it seems only a tool for classifying groups. Anyone familiar with the sugya in Shevuot will recognize here the forms of thought characteristic of “general and particular” and “inclusions and exclusions.”

Up to this point we have dealt only with the background to the Hullin sugya — that is, with what lies behind the gap between the end of the Mishnah and the beginning of the Gemara. We now turn to examine in greater detail the interpretive and midrashic move made in the cited Hullin sugya, and through it to illustrate the complex relation that exists between peshat (plain sense) and derash (rabbinic interpretation), as well as the great importance that awareness of this relation can have for the learner.

B. The relation between peshat and derash in the course of the Hullin sugya

The basic argument in the Hullin sugya

The conclusion from the first part is that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael both agree that the term “kid,” taken by itself, means specifically a goat-kid and not other animals. The Gemara’s point of departure in Hullin is therefore understandable: it seeks a source for the Mishnah’s extension from “kid” to every kosher domesticated animal.

The Gemara opens by proposing a source from Judah’s “kid of the goats.” The argument rests on the fact that if the Torah says “kid of the goats,” this proves that the plain term “kid,” without any addition, includes even the young of a cow or a ewe. We should note that this consideration appears to be an interpretive argument on the level of peshat, not necessarily a derash.

Why does this consideration not lead to the conclusion that the prohibition includes all animals, but only kosher domesticated animals? It seems that the Gemara is already assuming at this point Rabbi Akiva’s derivation that appears later in the Mishnah. In truth, the word “kid” by itself includes all animals, but there are additional exclusions that limit this derivation to kosher domesticated animals alone. That is why, according to Rabbi Akiva, a special derivation is needed to exclude birds and wild animals. This provides further confirmation for our conclusion in the first part, that the entire Mishnah in Hullin follows Rabbi Akiva’s method.⁶

An objection based on a gezerah shavah

The Gemara now objects: why should we not learn from the occurrence of “kid of the goats” in the Judah passage that everywhere in the Torah the word “kid,” even when it appears by itself, should be interpreted specifically as a goat-kid? Rashi explains that the proposed derivation is a gezerah shavah (verbal analogy). In what follows, we will return to the importance of this point.

First, we must understand why the Gemara, in its objection, proposes ignoring the plain-sense consideration raised earlier — which taught that “kid” in Scripture denotes kosher domesticated animals generally — and prefers the proposed derivation here, from which it emerges that “kid” means specifically a goat-kid. It may be that Rashi intended to explain this when he added that the derivation here is a derash of gezerah shavah. The Gemara’s objection is based on the fact that the present consideration belongs to a formal interpretive rule, gezerah shavah, which learns from the explicit context to the unclear ones, and is therefore preferable to a plain-sense consideration. If so, an extremely important principle emerges: even though the plain-sense consideration remains valid and points toward a broad interpretation, the derash displaces it and turns the picture upside down. This is what we find in all cases where derash runs contrary to peshat — “an eye for an eye” meaning monetary compensation, and so forth. Derash takes precedence over peshat, at least on the halakhic plane.⁷

Global considerations as a method for evaluating midrash

In the first part we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva’s school, even if we have midrashic or other evidence that the Torah intends a generalization rather than the specific example that appears in the text — here, “kid” — we must still return and ask: why, then, did the Torah choose to write it in such an ambiguous way?⁸ Why did the Torah not write directly “a kosher domesticated animal”?

To try to understand this, let us examine the problem from a global perspective. There were three possibilities open to the Torah’s author, if the law were indeed as the questioner assumes:

1. To write “kid” in both places. As we saw above, in that case we would interpret both as referring only to a goat-kid — even according to Rabbi Ishmael, and certainly according to Rabbi Akiva.
2. To write “kid of the goats” in both places. Then of course both places would clearly refer only to a goat-kid.
3. To write the verses as they in fact stand. According to the questioner, even then both would be interpreted as referring only to a goat-kid, by force of the gezerah shavah.

Surprisingly, all three possibilities would yield the same conclusion: that both places refer only to a goat-kid. To choose among these equivalent possibilities, one must notice that the third is “wasteful,” since it contains an unnecessary word. From this it would follow that if that formulation were chosen, we would specifically infer that the text does not refer only to a goat-kid, since the choice of a “wasteful” formulation indicates that the Torah wishes to include something. The second possibility is certainly not “economical.” The first appears the most “economical” of all. If so, according to the questioner it is not clear why the Torah chose formulation 3 rather than formulation 1. That itself is an objection to his assumption.

We are thus compelled to conclude that the author of the Torah had additional considerations in choosing the formulation, beyond “economy” considerations on the plane of derash — for example, plain-sense considerations of reasonable wording. We have already noted that the Hullin sugya is apparently interpreted according to Rabbi Akiva’s method, and at first glance he does not accept the rule that “Scripture speaks of what is usual”; that is, he does not accept that plain-sense stylistic considerations neutralize the plane of derash.

If so, Rabbi Akiva does indeed expound every surplus element and does not accept the rule that “the Torah speaks in human language” or that “Scripture speaks of what is usual.” Yet even according to his approach, the question of which formulation the Torah’s author chose, and what it means, ought to receive two answers, each of which by itself provides a full explanation of the text: a plain-sense explanation and a midrashic explanation.

Peshat and derash

Here again Rashi’s remark is crucial: the derivation is by way of gezerah shavah, not by plain-sense interpretation. Considerations of “economy” when comparing alternatives are relevant only when we compare two plain-sense alternatives, or two midrashic alternatives. It is quite clear that the interpretation according to which the wording is explained in a way superior to all other alternatives is itself a criterion for identifying the peshat — and that is exactly how the first consideration in the sugya, the plain-sense one, operates. But the third possibility rests on considerations of derash, and therefore the claim that it is less “economical” than the first possibility, which belongs to peshat, cannot serve as a criterion for rejecting it. The Torah chose the third possibility, though it is not economical, because of other considerations.

The second occurrence of “kid of the goats”: the relation between peshat and derash

The Gemara resolves the objection by pointing to an additional verse in which the Torah again specifies “kid of the goats.” The point of the answer is that if the questioner were right, and every “kid” in the Torah had to be interpreted specifically, then the added word in the second occurrence of “kid of the goats” would be redundant. Even without it, we would know that the verse referred specifically to a goat-kid. Therefore the word “kid” when it appears by itself must be interpreted as an example.

That sort of consideration underlies the rule that “two verses that come as one do not teach.” When we have two sources teaching one principle, one of them becomes redundant. The writing of the second source teaches that the principle in question is relevant only in the two contexts in which it appears, and should not be extended further. This is an “economy” consideration; and, as we saw above, the fact that it operates here teaches us that the comparison is between two alternatives that lie on the same plane, not between peshat and derash.

We saw above that the inference drawing from the added word a broad interpretation of “kid” without any modifier is not derash but plain-sense interpretation. On the other hand, we saw in Rashi that the projection from each of these two “verses” to the whole Torah is a derash of gezerah shavah. We must therefore ask about the nature of the two alternatives being compared here: writing “kid of the goats” once, and writing it twice. The consideration rests on the claim that if there were only one such “verse,” we would perform a gezerah shavah to the rest of the Torah, and therefore we would know even in the second place that the verse meant a goat-kid. Thus, on the plane of derash, the second occurrence is redundant. This is a consideration that compares two possibilities, both on the plane of derash, and so “economy” is entirely a legitimate criterion for choosing between them.

A gezerah shavah from two verses

The Gemara then asks: according to the view that two verses can indeed teach a general rule, why should we not learn from these two occurrences that everywhere “kid” means specifically a goat-kid? In light of the foregoing, that position is not easy to understand. We have seen that considerations of “economy” lead us to conclude that one cannot derive one principle from two sources. Perhaps, according to that view, no such consideration exists, because that position does not accept global “economy” considerations of the sort discussed above. The reason for this may be the principle that “the Torah speaks in human language.” Admittedly, such an explanation would introduce Rabbi Ishmael’s method into the middle of the Hullin sugya, which otherwise appears to follow Rabbi Akiva specifically. Above we assumed that the questioner in the sugya also followed Rabbi Akiva’s method, and perhaps we must in fact reject that assumption. It may be that this statement was said only according to the view that two verses do teach; but as a matter of halakha the accepted rule is that they do not teach, and the conclusion is that the entire sugya follows Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemara’s answer

The Gemara explains that there are two exclusions by means of a superfluous letter heh — twice “the goats” — and these teach us not to perform a gezerah shavah. Therefore the word “kid” when it appears by itself is always interpreted in the broader sense. This consideration seems problematic, because the letter heh is required for the plain-sense wording. Does the interpreter expect the Torah to write “kid of goats” without the definite article, when that would be poor wording on the level of peshat?

Two possibilities may be suggested here for understanding the matter, and it appears that Ritva and Tosafot may disagree about them in this sugya:

1. In light of the principle we established above, and which becomes especially sharp here, each interpretive plane — both peshat and derash — must by itself offer a full explanation of the text. Peshat does not fill gaps in derash, and vice versa. The fact that there is a plain-sense explanation for the presence of the letter heh is no substitute for an additional explanation on the level of derash.
2. It may be that what we have here is some rule in the laws of gezerah shavah itself, and not an exclusion based on the redundancy of the letter heh. The rule would be that when a word appears in a narrowed or qualified form, we do not derive from it to other contexts. In our case, once the phrase “kid of the goats” appears, we can no longer perform a gezerah shavah and conclude that every “kid” in the Torah refers specifically to a goat-kid. Here again we need Rashi’s remark that we are dealing with a gezerah shavah and not with plain-sense interpretation.⁹

Summary

On this page we tried to present something of the difference between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva with respect to halakhic interpretation. In the first part we saw that according to Rabbi Akiva the Torah is precise, and therefore he tends to expound every ornamental stroke and every extra letter. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, is willing — at least when there is sufficient evidence for it — to accept situations in which the Torah speaks imprecisely, in ordinary human language.

In addition, we demonstrated how important it is to understand whether a given derivation belongs to peshat or to derash. We saw that this fact has consequences for understanding the movement of the sugya; and conversely, understanding the sugya also yields important implications for understanding how derash operates.

Over the course of both parts of this page, a picture emerged of peshat and derash as two parallel and autonomous planes of explanation. It should be noted that the question whether two parallel explanatory planes can exist for the same text involves a complex logical and hermeneutical problem, and it seems that Maimonides and Nahmanides disagreed about it in Nahmanides’ glosses to the second root of Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot. God willing, that topic will be discussed in the future.

Footnotes