Miketz (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help Mida Tova — Eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Miketz, 5765

A. How Do We Know That an Edah (Congregation) Is Ten?

“And Jacob did not send Benjamin, Joseph’s brother… and the sons of Israel came to buy grain among those who came. From where do we know that the number is ten? Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Issi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Here it says ‘congregation,’ and elsewhere it says, ‘How long shall I bear with this evil congregation?’ (Numbers 14:27). Just as the congregation mentioned there is ten, so too the congregation mentioned here is ten. Rabbi Simon said: Here it says ‘within,’ and elsewhere it says ‘within’; just as the ‘within’ stated there is ten, so too the ‘within’ stated here is ten. Rabbi Yose said: If one learns from the phrase ‘among those who came,’ it could mean any number at all. Rather, here it says ‘the children of Israel,’ and elsewhere it says ‘the children of Israel’; just as here it is ten, so too there it is ten. Rabbi Simon said in the name of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Rabbi Judah the Patriarch: A minor may be counted as an adjunct to make up ten…”

— Midrash Rabbah, Theodore-Albeck edition, 91:3

“Shmuel taught: The sanctification of the new moon is performed only before ten. Rabbi Ba and Rabbi Yasa said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Here it says ‘congregation,’ and elsewhere it says, ‘How long shall I bear with this evil congregation?’ Just as the congregation stated there is ten, so too here it is ten. Rabbi Simon said: Here it says ‘within,’ and elsewhere it says, ‘The sons of Israel came to buy grain among those who came.’ Just as the ‘within’ stated there is ten, so too here it is ten. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Bun said to him: If you learn from ‘among,’ they are many. Rather, here it says ‘the children of Israel,’ and elsewhere it says ‘the children of Israel’; just as there it is ten, so too here it is ten. And for appraising land: nine and a priest…”

— Jerusalem Talmud, Megillah 4:4; Sanhedrin 1:4

The Law of Ten and Its Sources

There are many halakhic (legal) contexts in which a gathering of ten people is required, or at least significant: the composition of courts for certain purposes, such as sanctifying the new moon and appraising land; a minyan (prayer quorum) for matters of sanctity; Grace after Meals; the public liturgical recitation connected with the Shema; the definition of a public setting for the laws of sanctification of the divine name; and more.

The expositions cited above present derivations that teach the need for ten people in different contexts. The two passages quoted here overlap to a considerable extent, but there are parallel sources in which there are disagreements and contradictions. For that reason, Maharzu, in his commentary to the midrash, writes: “And the confusion is great!” See also Torah Sheleimah, here, sec. 31.

This gives us a relatively simple opportunity to try to trace the way the exposition itself took shape among the Sages. Before doing so, however, we should introduce an important principle that touches on the hermeneutical rule of gezerah shavah and, more generally, on the hermeneutical principles as a whole.

Gezerah Shavah

Gezerah shavah (verbal analogy).¹ The Talmud states that although a person may formulate a qal va-homer (an a fortiori inference) on his own, one may not formulate a gezerah shavah on one’s own. The usual explanation is that a gezerah shavah is always a Sinaitic tradition; see, for example, Rashi on Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 66a, and on Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 11b, s.v. “we do not derive.” However, later authorities already noted that according to Maimonides’ view in the second principle of Sefer Ha-Mitzvot (see on the page for Parashat Hayyei Sarah), since the legal status of laws derived through the thirteen hermeneutical principles is that of rabbinic law, gezerah shavah derivations were apparently not themselves given at Sinai either. When it is said that one may not derive a gezerah shavah on one’s own, the meaning is that only the Great Court may derive by means of a gezerah shavah; see Kinat Soferim on the second principle.

Many have already noted that, at least according to Rashi and those who follow him, which is the overwhelming majority of the medieval authorities, it is very difficult to understand several phenomena found in the Talmud: the fact that there are disagreements about gezerah shavah derivations, see Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 88a; the praise bestowed on one who found the source of a given law in a gezerah shavah, see Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 7a; and, as was also noted by Nahmanides in his glosses to the second principle and elsewhere, if everything was in fact transmitted from Sinai, it is very difficult to understand why gezerah shavah is called one of the “principles by which the Torah is expounded,” since it leaves no room at all for rabbinic exposition.

For this reason, many medieval authorities wrote that the point is not that the gezerah shavah was given from Sinai exactly as we have it; see, for example, Halikhot Olam, gate 4, and others. Sometimes a certain law was transmitted to Moses, together with the information that it is derived by a gezerah shavah, but without stating from where or in what precise form. Sometimes the source was transmitted, but not the law. Sometimes the hermeneutical principle was transmitted, but not the exact word, and so on.

Methodological Implications for the Study of the Hermeneutical Principles

How can we identify, within a given exposition, what was transmitted to the exegetes by tradition and what they added on their own? The structure of an exposition consists of three components: the biblical sources, the hermeneutical principle, and the law derived from them. With respect to each of these, we must decide whether it belongs to the part given by tradition or to the part added by the exegete.²

When we have a cluster of expositions on the same subject, that itself can help us. For example, if we see that all the exegetes use the same biblical sources, yet derive the same law by means of different hermeneutical principles, as in the sources cited on the page for Parashat Lekh Lekha and in many other places, that indicates that they received the tradition that this law emerges from those sources, but did not receive the specific hermeneutical principle through which this was to be done. The same is true if there is similarity in the structure of the exposition but disagreement about the sources, and so forth.³

There is also room here to consider the identity of the hermeneutical principle under discussion. As we have seen, gezerah shavah is unique in that one may not derive it independently. By contrast, a qal va-homer may be formulated independently, although it too may be received by tradition. Regarding the other principles, the medieval authorities disagree; see on the page for Parashat Lekh Lekha, note 2. Thus, precisely with regard to gezerah shavah, the approaches proposed here seem especially relevant. At least for this principle, it is clear that there is always some component that was received by tradition. With the other principles, this depends on the context and on the views of the medieval authorities.

This picture somewhat qualifies the usual dichotomies in the standard division between creative midrash and confirmatory midrash; see on the page for Parashat Hayyei Sarah. There are very many midrashim that contain a creative component, but also contain components that were given by tradition. If the law is given by tradition, the midrash is confirmatory. If the law is not given, the midrash is creative, even though at times it creates with the aid of other data that were received by tradition, namely the sources and/or the hermeneutical principle. The creativity of creative midrash is not free, but guided.

These rules are fairly simple, but they are extremely important for the work of scholars of the principles by which the Torah is expounded when they try to reconstruct rabbinic expositions. As we have seen, they also remove a good deal of the vagueness surrounding research questions such as whether midrashim are creative or merely confirmatory.

Applying This to the Set of Expositions Here

From the cluster of expositions cited above, it seems that the law requiring ten people is itself given, since no one disputes it. If so, these midrashim are probably confirmatory.⁴ In addition, we see that all the exegetes use gezerah shavah, from which it is reasonable to infer that the Sages received a tradition that the source of this law is some sort of gezerah shavah. The question that remains open is the precise source of the gezerah shavah, and that is where the disagreements begin.

Let us now see how the Sages approached the search for such a source. First, they look for a place in the Torah where there is a group of ten people, from which a source for this law can be sought. There are two relevant contexts:

1. The spies, where there were twelve emissaries, from whom Joshua and Caleb separated, leaving ten sinners.
2. Joseph’s brothers who went down to Egypt. There too there were twelve brothers, of whom Joseph was already in Egypt and Benjamin remained with his father.

At the next stage, the Sages of the midrash apparently went to those passages and looked for key words from which this number could be learned for other contexts. Presumably, such words had to be words that denote a quantity of people and refer to a group numbering ten. Let us now examine those passages:

1. In the passage of the spies, the word “congregation” appears: “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation?” (Numbers 14:27; and see Rashi there, who explains that this word refers to the spies and not to the people of Israel as a whole).⁵
2. In the passage of Joseph’s brothers, the words “children of Israel” appear. From here one can infer that this expression denotes ten people, or more.⁶

Now the Sages move on to constructing the expositions themselves. Let us try to see how the derivation actually works.

Considerations in Constructing the Expositions: Two Types of Gezerah Shavah

The passages above contain three basic derivations:

1. The word “congregation”: “Separate yourselves from within this congregation” (Numbers 16), and “How long shall I bear with this evil congregation?” (Numbers 14). In light of what we said above, it is clear that the source is the spies, and from there one learns to Korah’s congregation.⁷
2. The word “within”: “And I shall be sanctified within the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22), “Separate yourselves from within this congregation” (Numbers 16), and “The sons of Israel came to buy grain among those who came” (Genesis 42). Here there are two contexts that can serve as a source, and from them one learns the law of sanctification of the divine name, or of matters of sanctity.
3. The words “children of Israel”: “The sons of Israel came to buy grain among those who came” (Genesis 42), and “And I shall be sanctified within the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22). The source from our parashah teaches regarding sanctification of the divine name, or matters of sanctity.

On the page for Parashat Lekh Lekha we distinguished between two kinds of gezerah shavah, and it seems that both appear here. Derivations 1 and 3 are cases of gillui milta (clarification of meaning). We learn from them the meaning of a word, namely “congregation” or “children of Israel,” whose meaning here is ten people.⁸ By contrast, derivation 2 does not seem to be a case of gillui milta, since the word “within” does not express quantity at all. If so, this is a regular gezerah shavah, meaning that the appearance of the word “within” creates a verbal similarity that hints at a substantive similarity between the contexts. Later, in part 2, we will propose a substantive explanation of this gezerah shavah.

The Course of the Midrash in Genesis Rabbah

Both of the passages cited above contain midrashim that seek a source for the rule of ten. In the Vilna edition the text reads: “From where do we know that a congregation is ten?” That is, the discussion in Midrash Rabbah concerns the concept of “congregation,” which appears in the contexts of Korah’s congregation and the spies, but not in the passage dealing with sanctification of the divine name.

1. At the beginning of the midrash, derivation 1, described above, is cited in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.
2. At the second stage comes Rabbi Simon’s derivation from the word “within,” namely derivation 2. This word appears in all three contexts. It is clear that the source is our parashah, since in the passage of the spies it does not appear at all.⁹

The appearance of the word “within” in the two contexts teaches the meaning of the word “congregation,” which is what our midrash is seeking. As stated, the literal meaning of the quantitative term is learned here by means of a formal gezerah shavah.

Rabbi Simon’s purpose is not entirely clear. Is this a halakhic midrash about sanctification of the divine name, or an aggadic midrash about the Korah episode? Yet from comparison with the previous derivation, it seems that the goal is to learn about the Korah episode. More than that: if the goal is indeed to understand the word “congregation,” as we saw above, then it is proven that the goal is to explain the Korah episode, since that term does not appear at all in the passage of sanctification of the divine name.

If so, the derivation proceeds from Joseph’s brothers, who were ten among a larger number, “those who came,” to the Korah episode, where “the congregation” is the ten who remain.¹⁰ But according to this, the derivation is not clear. In the Korah episode the issue is separating from ten people, whereas in our parashah the issue is ten people situated within a larger number. On the face of it, this gezerah shavah is entirely formal, since there is no real comparison here between Joseph’s brothers and Korah’s congregation.¹¹

3. At the third stage, Rabbi Yose comes and rejects the derivation from the word “within.” His claim is that Rabbi Simon’s derivation yields that a “congregation” contains at least ten, not exactly ten. That is, Rabbi Simon’s source gives us only a lower bound, a minimum measure, rather than an absolute determination of the quantity denoted by “congregation.”¹²

4. The alternative he himself proposes is derivation 3, namely a simple clarification of meaning based on the phrase “children of Israel,” who were ten, applied to the other places in which there were, or had to be, ten.

But this raises a problem. That derivation does not teach anything about the Korah episode, since the phrase “children of Israel” is not mentioned there at all. It seems that derivation 3 is a halakhic exposition, which teaches the number required for matters of sanctity, where Scripture says, “And I shall be sanctified within the children of Israel.” But, as we saw, the aim of the entire midrash is to clarify the number denoted by “congregation.” If so, it is unclear how Rabbi Yose’s derivation answers that question.

It therefore appears that Rabbi Yose proposes only a revision of the first stage. We learn from our parashah to the passage of sanctification of the divine name that “children of Israel” means ten. This is a simple clarification of meaning, and therefore Rabbi Yose prefers to begin from there. Afterward, we must continue and learn from the passage of sanctification of the divine name to the Korah episode, since that is the purpose of the midrash. To do so, we must ask what appears in both of those passages. Clearly, the result is the word “within.” Thus Rabbi Yose performs a double derivation: the first part is a clarification of meaning, and the continuation proceeds by gezerah shavah.¹³

The Course of the Jerusalem Talmud

In the Jerusalem Talmud there is a very similar movement, but the goal of the derivation is not to explain the word “congregation.” Rather, it is to clarify how many are required for matters of sanctity, in this case the sanctification of the new moon. This is a halakhic midrash.

Accordingly, derivation 1, which deals with the word “congregation,” seems at first glance not to be directly relevant. We probably need to understand the Jerusalem Talmud as we understood Rabbi Yose in Midrash Rabbah: after we learn, through a clarification of meaning, that “congregation” means ten, we continue by gezerah shavah from the spies passage to the law of matters of sanctity.¹⁴ Here too, the second derivation is a regular gezerah shavah, and Rabbi Yose therefore challenges it.¹⁵ Finally, derivation 3 learns directly from “children of Israel” to matters of sanctity, and here there is no need for any further step.¹⁶

B. The Substantive Layer of the Exposition: The Meaning of a Collective

Formalism and Content

Until this point we have dealt with the process by which the exposition took shape. For that purpose, we considered the relative status of the three formal elements of the exposition: the biblical sources, the law, and the hermeneutical principle. Yet, as we have seen more than once, every exposition also contains content-specific dimensions that are woven into its schematic-formal structure, and together they create its complete form. In this part we will examine them briefly.

Community as a Collective Entity

As is well known, in several halakhic contexts the concept of the community appears. Many have already noted that a community is not merely a collection of individuals, but a new entity composed of their combination: the collective.¹⁷ This is why, in order to create a community from that collection of individuals, halakha requires some process of combination, or at least a combining situation, such as a shared purpose, a shared location, and the like.

On the question whether the collective constitutes a separate entity, different from the individuals who compose it, various thinkers disagree. In halakha there is a fairly clear collectivist conception, although it is almost always accompanied by an individual aspect as well. The halakhic conception implies that each person is composed of both of these aspects together. For example, Maimonides, in the laws of repentance, states that every person is judged on Rosh Hashanah, and at the same time the city, the state, and the entire world are also judged. That is, each of us stands trial separately in each of these respects, and the judgment of the state is not a mere sum of the judgments of the individuals, but an independent judgment.

The philosopher John Searle, in his book Mind, Brain, and Science, gives an example that illustrates the collectivist perspective. The property of liquidity characterizes a cluster of molecules, but not a single molecule. We may therefore ask: does the liquid itself have ontological status, that is, does it count as an entity, or do only the molecules that compose it exist? In Searle’s terms, we may ask: what is the being that is characterized by liquidity? Of course, it is the liquid itself.¹⁸ The liquid also truly exists, as does the single molecule, which has two aspects: an individual one and a collective one. Molecules, like human beings.

Collective and Individual: Two Kinds of Relation

Sometimes the collective “swallows up” the individual within it. An interesting implication of this can be found in the halakhic contexts in which the concept of community appears. In most of these contexts, the question arises: what is the law of a community that contains one exceptional case?

Later in the midrash cited above there is a lengthy discussion of the status of a minor as an adjunct to ten; the beginning of that discussion was included in the quotation. That is, the midrash asks whether one minor together with nine adults also constitutes a community. In the Jerusalem Talmud, Megillah, cited above, there is a discussion of a court consisting of nine judges and a priest.¹⁹ Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 74b, discusses the definition of a public setting with respect to sanctification of the divine name and brings derivation 2 above. Immediately afterward it begins a discussion of the law of a public setting consisting of nine Jews and one gentile. It should be noted that the conclusion there is that this is not considered a public setting.

This is a puzzling phenomenon. If halakha really requires ten adults, how can we even entertain the possibility that fewer might suffice? When an olive-bulk is required in various halakhic contexts of eating, do we also wonder what the law would be with half, or even most, of an olive-bulk?[^^20]

It seems that the basis for this hesitation lies in the character of the halakhic requirement of ten. This is not a quantitative law, a demand for ten adults as such, but a qualitative demand for the existence of a community composed of ten individuals. In such a case, it is possible that a different kind of individual may join and be absorbed into the collective, without depriving it of the status of “community.” When the Sages encounter a law of ten, or of a “congregation,” they understand that what is being required is a community, and therefore they immediately ask whether perhaps even one exceptional individual can be counted together with the rest.

From here we may also try to explain why the conclusion of the Sanhedrin passage is that a gentile does not join to form a “public setting.” It appears that the concept of a public setting is not identical with the concept of community. For a situation to count as public, a minimum number of individuals is required, but there are no requirements of combination, unlike a prayer quorum and the like. The Torah requires that there be enough individual onlookers for the act to be defined as desecration or sanctification of the divine name in public. By contrast, in halakhic contexts in which a “congregation” is required, what is at stake is a community, not a mere number of individuals. In such contexts, the inclusion of a minor, or another exceptional case, may be effective as well, under certain conditions; the halakhic decisors disagree on this.

“God Stands in the Congregation of God”

What distinguishes a community from a mere collection of individuals? The act of combination expresses a divine manifestation. Therefore, in matters of sanctity as well, for God to appear in their midst there must be the combination of a community. If we describe the hierarchy of beings in creation, from the inanimate to the vegetative, the animate, and the speaking being, we end with society. The highest entity, the one closest to the Shekhinah (divine presence), is the community, and therefore it is precisely there that the Shekhinah appears. This is the intent of the Mishnah in Avot 3:6, that the Shekhinah does not dwell among fewer than ten. This is learned from the word “congregation” in the verse, “God stands in the congregation of God.” In our midrash as well, the verse is cited: “And I shall be sanctified within the children of Israel,” and the children of Israel are ten, as we shall see below.

Returning to the Expositions: Is the Gezerah Shavah from “Within” Formal?

These conceptions may depend on the expositions we saw above as the source for the law of ten. From the derivations that learn the law of ten from the word “within,” it is reasonable to understand that an entity within which one can be found, or from within which one can depart, is only a collective of ten. Therefore, what is learned from there is a collectivist requirement. But if the derivation is a mere clarification of meaning, then it is possible, though of course not necessary, that the requirement is only quantitative.

This direction sheds new light on the gezerah shavah from the word “within,” that is, derivation 2. It may not be a gezerah shavah based on purely formal similarity. According to what we have said here, it becomes possible to suggest that we learn this gezerah shavah from substantive reasoning: one can be “within” a group of people only if that group is a community. One cannot be “within” a mere collection of individuals, because there is no comprehensive whole here that encloses the individual, or the smaller quantity.²⁰

Admittedly, on this view it seems that one could not learn from the gezerah shavah based on the word “within” that ten are required for sanctification or desecration of the divine name. There, after all, the requirement would be a minimal number of individuals, whereas from the word “within” we learn a collectivist requirement. Yet above we saw that according to Rabbi Yose, at the second stage of the derivation, the “congregation” in the Korah passage is compared to sanctification of the divine name,²¹ and we saw the same in the Sanhedrin passage. Does this necessarily force us back to a formalist conception of gezerah shavah 2?

It would seem not. Until now, following the Sanhedrin passage, we have presented the requirement of a “public setting” in desecration or sanctification of the divine name as a requirement of a minimum number of people. But it may be that sanctification or desecration of the divine name also depends on the presence of a community as a collective, and not merely on a quantity of individuals. The reasoning is that only when the Shekhinah itself is present is desecration or sanctification of the divine name in its presence deeper. According to this, it may be that in practice a gentile indeed does not help, as with a prayer quorum, but the inclusion of a minor as an adjunct might help for this matter.

Footnotes