Vayikra (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Friday eve of the portion of Vayikra, 5765

Questions

1. How does the rule of general-particular-general operate?
2. What are synchronic and diachronic descriptions of this rule?
3. More on the dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva.
4. What are the “aspects” involved in interpretations based on general and particular?
5. On the division into genera and species.
6. An illustration of the historical process by which the system of hermeneutical principles was conceptualized and formalized.

The Hermeneutical Principles

• General-particular-general
• Amplification-restriction-amplification
• Binyan av (argument by analogy)

Or if a person swears, uttering with his lips to do harm or to do good, whatever it may be that a person utters in an oath, and it escapes his notice, but then he comes to know it and becomes guilty in one of these matters.

— Leviticus 5:4

Mishnah. Whether the matter concerns oneself or others, and whether it concerns things with substance or things without substance, one is liable. How so? If one says: “By oath, I shall give to a certain person,” or “I shall not give”; “I gave,” or “I did not give”; “I shall sleep,” or “I shall not sleep”; “I slept,” or “I did not sleep”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea,” or “I shall not throw”; “I threw,” or “I did not throw.” Rabbi Ishmael says: One is liable only for the future, as it is said: “to do harm or to do good.” Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, I know only matters that involve harm or benefit. From where do I know matters that involve neither harm nor benefit? He said to him: From the amplifying wording of Scripture. He said to him: If Scripture amplified for this, it amplified for that as well.

— Mishnah, Shevuot 25a

Rabbi Ishmael says: One is liable only for what concerns the future. The Rabbis taught: From “to do harm or to do good” I know only matters that involve harm or benefit. From where do I know matters that involve neither harm nor benefit? Scripture says: “Or if a person swears to utter with his lips.” I know only the future; from where do I know the past? Scripture says: “whatever a person utters in an oath.” These are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Ishmael says: “To do harm or to do good” means the future. Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, I know only matters involving benefit or harm. From where do I know matters involving neither harm nor benefit? He said to him: From the amplifying wording of Scripture. He said to him: If Scripture amplified for this, it amplified for that as well.

Rabbi Akiva’s argument against Rabbi Ishmael is a good one. Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Ishmael, who served Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah, who interpreted the entire Torah by general and particular terms, also interpreted by general and particular terms. Rabbi Akiva, who served Nahum of Gimzo, who interpreted the entire Torah by amplification and restriction, also interpreted by amplification and restriction.

What is Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning, that he interprets by amplifications and restrictions? As it was taught: “Or if a person swears” — an amplification; “to do harm or to do good” — a restriction; “whatever a person utters” — he amplified again. An amplification, a restriction, and an amplification: this includes everything. What does it include? It includes all matters. What does it exclude? It excludes a matter of mitzvah (a commanded act).

And Rabbi Ishmael interprets by general and particular terms: “Or if a person swears to utter with his lips” — a general term; “to do harm or to do good” — a particular term; “whatever a person utters” — it again becomes a general term. A general term, a particular term, and a general term: you may infer only according to the character of the particular. Just as the particular is explicitly about the future, so too all cases are about the future. The general term serves to include even matters that involve neither harm nor benefit, provided they concern the future. The particular serves to exclude even matters involving harm and benefit when they concern the past.

Why not reverse it? Rabbi Isaac said: It must be similar to “to do harm or to do good” — that is, a case whose prohibition is because “he shall not break his word.” This excludes the other case, whose prohibition is not because “he shall not break his word,” but because “you shall not deal falsely.”

Rav Isaac bar Avin said: Scripture says, “Or if a person swears to utter with his lips” — a case in which the oath comes before the act spoken of, not one in which the act comes before the oath. This excludes “I ate” or “I did not eat,” where the deed came before the oath.

— Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a

If a person sins and acts treacherously against the Lord by dealing deceitfully with his fellow regarding a deposit, or a pledge, or robbery, or by defrauding his fellow;

or if he found lost property and denied it, and swore falsely concerning any one of all the things a person may do and thereby sin;

then, when he has sinned and become guilty, he shall restore the robbery that he robbed, or the thing he extorted, or the deposit entrusted to him, or the lost item that he found;

or anything about which he swore falsely. He shall repay it in full and add a fifth to it; he shall give it to its owner on the day of his guilt.

— Leviticus 5:21–24

Rabbi Eliezer interprets by amplifications and restrictions, whereas the Rabbis interpret by general and particular terms. Rabbi Eliezer interprets by amplifications and restrictions: “and deals deceitfully with his fellow” — an amplification; “regarding a deposit or a pledge” — a restriction; “or anything about which he swears” — he amplified again. An amplification, a restriction, and an amplification includes everything. What does it include? It includes all matters. What does it exclude? It excludes documents.

And the Rabbis interpret by general and particular terms: “and deals deceitfully with his fellow” — a general term; “regarding a deposit or a pledge or robbery” — a particular term; “or anything about which he swears” — again a general term. A general term, a particular term, and a general term: you may infer only according to the character of the particular. Just as the particular is explicitly something movable and whose essence is monetary value, so too everything must be something movable and whose essence is monetary value. Land is excluded because it is not movable. Slaves are excluded because they are compared to land. Documents are excluded because, although they are movable, their essence is not monetary value.

— Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 37b

A. Conceptualization and Formation of the Methods of Interpretation

Introduction: Two Tannaitic Disputes About “General-Particular-General”

In the section dealing with the offering brought for an oath — one of the guilt-offerings — which appears in this week’s Torah portion in chapter 5, there are two contexts that the Sages interpret by means of the rule of general-particular-general. In both contexts there is a tannaitic dispute, and in both there appears a rare methodological remark by the Sages, who explicitly define — though very laconically — the different methods of interpretation used by the parties to the dispute, as well as their historical origins. As we proceed, we shall see that these interpretations do indeed reflect the process by which the hermeneutical rules were shaped and conceptualized.

In the first case, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael disagree about liability to bring an offering for an oath of utterance concerning the past. When one swears about the future — “I shall do such and such” — and does not fulfill it, everyone agrees that one must bring an offering. But when one swears about an event that supposedly occurred in the past and it turns out that it did not occur at all, Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael disagree whether an offering is required. In the second case, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree about liability for the oath concerning a deposit in cases involving land.

What This Means: Interpretation and Halakha (Jewish Law) in Historical Perspective

In the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a, the Sages state that Rabbi Akiva belongs to the school of Nahum of Gimzo, which interprets the Torah by amplification and restriction. The other side belongs to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, which interprets by general and particular terms, and the foundation of that method lies with Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah. In the discussion on 37b, Rabbi Eliezer appears to belong, on this issue, to Rabbi Akiva’s school. It should be noted that Rabbi Eliezer was one of Rabbi Akiva’s teachers, so it is strange that the method of amplification and restriction is associated specifically with Rabbi Akiva, and before him with Nahum of Gimzo. Why do they ignore Rabbi Eliezer, who stood between them?¹

There are other discussions in which a dispute appears between those who interpret by general and particular terms and those who interpret by amplifications and restrictions — see Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 4b, Nazir 35a, and others. Examination of the sources yields a highly tangled picture, since, as already emerges from Shevuot 4–5 and Hullin 67–68, and as several medieval commentators noted — see, for example, Tosafot on the words “Rabbi Akiva,” Shevuot 4b — even those who interpret by amplifications and restrictions sometimes interpret by general and particular terms, and vice versa.

Thus, although the Talmud presents the matter as a historical development of two consistent schools, the totality of the passages suggests that these two schools did not in fact possess coherent methods regarding the derivation of general-particular-general or amplification-restriction. We have already noted several times — see, for example, the sheet on the portion of Toledot — that over the course of history the two methods were combined, and a method, or perhaps several methods, emerged that unified the two forms of interpretation. It is possible that what we see here is a good example of that process. Later we shall illustrate this more sharply in these very passages.

It should also be noted that even on the level of legal ruling the situation is far from clear. For example, in the two passages cited above, Maimonides’ rulings seem, at least on the face of it, to contradict one another. In the discussion of the oath concerning a deposit, Maimonides rules like the Sages, who interpret by general and particular terms — see Laws of Robbery 9:1 — whereas in the matter of an oath concerning the past he rules like Rabbi Akiva, who interprets by amplifications and restrictions — see Laws of Oaths 1:2.

One may ask whether Maimonides, in his rulings, is obligated to maintain coherence at the level of methods of interpretation at all, or whether he rules only on the halakhic plane and not on the methodological-exegetical, meta-halakhic plane. In any event, once the law has been ruled this way, we may return to the interpretive methods that underlie the accepted rulings, and the law as ruled — even if Maimonides himself did not intend it that way — expresses a combined interpretive method.

See, however, the Tosafot just mentioned, on Shevuot 4b, who prove that even Rabbi Akiva agrees there with the view of the Sages, and disagrees only with Rabbi Eliezer, his teacher. If so, according to Tosafot it is entirely possible that already in the views of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael themselves there was some degree of combination between these two methods of interpretation. On that basis, one may assume that Maimonides too was aware of this, and that he also saw the accepted interpretive method as one combined system, which he therefore ruled as law.

This may perhaps solve the question we raised above: why this method of interpretation is named after Rabbi Akiva and Nahum of Gimzo, while Rabbi Eliezer is absent from its historical description. In the next section we shall see a more substantive proposal that may clarify this historical puzzle.

Formalization and Conceptualization of the System of Hermeneutical Principles

The exchange between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva concerning an oath of utterance about the past appears in the discussion three times, all of which we cited above. We shall see here that this is a sharp and illuminating demonstration of the process by which the rule of general-particular-general was conceptualized and formalized. For our purposes, it is a paradigm case for the process undergone by the entire system of hermeneutical principles, as described on the sheet for Lech-Lecha.

In the version found in the Mishnah, only the legal dispute itself appears, followed by a laconic exchange that does not mention the hermeneutical rules of general and particular at all. Rabbi Ishmael opens the discussion and derives from “to do harm or to do good” that liability applies only to an oath concerning the future — “according to the character of the particular,” in the language of the baraita. Rabbi Akiva argues against him that if he limits liability only to matters exactly like the particular — “to do harm or to do good” — then he ought also to exclude matters involving neither harm nor benefit, that is, matters that do not affect a person for good or ill. Conversely, if he includes matters involving neither harm nor benefit, then he ought to include everything.

The second version appears in the baraita at the opening of the Talmudic discussion. There too the rule of general-particular-general does not appear, and the interpretations still have no defined structure. Unlike the Mishnah, there Rabbi Akiva is the one who opens, and Rabbi Ishmael responds by stating that from “to do harm or to do good” we learn that liability applies only to an oath about the future. Rabbi Akiva then argues that if Rabbi Ishmael extends the law along the axis of harm and benefit, he ought to extend it along the axis of time as well. Rabbi Ishmael’s answer does not appear there: why, in fact, does he understand the extension asymmetrically?

That very difficulty is what the Talmud answers in the third formulation, brought by Rabbi Yohanan, who also cites a baraita. There no dialogue between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael appears at all; rather, the two positions are presented side by side. We should note that only there do the rules of general-particular-general and amplification-restriction-amplification appear explicitly. It is not entirely clear from the wording of the Talmud how much of what is said there belongs to the baraita itself and how much is Rabbi Yohanan’s explanation of its language.

In any event, the use of the hermeneutical rules does not appear at all in the original exchange between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael, but only in the amoraic formulation. Only there do we encounter the familiar formulas of general-particular-general and amplification-restriction-amplification. This structure seems to be a concrete expression of the process we described on the sheet for Lech-Lecha, where we saw that the system of rules available to us is the result of a historical process of conceptualization and formalization. The three formulations that appear here may represent three stages in that conceptualization: the Mishnah, where the wording is broad and still unformed, entirely intuitive; the second stage, the first baraita, which spells out what is learned from each of the three components of the general-particular-general structure, but still without mentioning the formal rule itself; and only the third stage, in Rabbi Yohanan’s words, where the final formulation appears, explicitly using the rules of general-particular-general and amplification-restriction-amplification.

Perhaps this is why these methods of interpretation ultimately came to be named after Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael, even though they did not found them. Apparently they were the ones who consolidated the accepted form of these methods as they have come down to us. We should note that if what we are saying is correct, then it is possible that even in the days of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael the structure had still not yet fully crystallized. Rabbi Eliezer was only an intermediate link. He neither founded this method nor consolidated it, and this may explain why his name is not mentioned in connection with it.

B. The Discussion of the Oath of Utterance: “Amplification and Restriction” versus “General and Particular”

Summary from the Sheet on Va’era: A Diachronic Description of the Rule of General and Particular

Before turning to the details of the discussion, let us summarize the schema of the operation of the rule of general-particular-general from the sheet on Va’era.

A general-particular-general structure consists of a two-stage process. When a structure of general and particular appears, the law derived applies only to what is exactly identical to the particular. When, after that structure, an additional final general term appears, it expands the content of the particular to everything similar to it. This again raises the question: why would it not have been enough for Scripture to write only the particular, so that we could expand from it by means of a binyan av to everything similar to it? It appears that the three-part structure is intended to serve as a delimiting framework. The purpose of writing the general term is to limit the expansion of the particular and to confine it only to whatever resembles the particular but lies within the general term. In other words, the conclusion is narrower than what would have resulted from a binyan av. See the illustration below.

According to Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, the double structure of general and particular already leads to everything similar to the particular — like the result of general-particular-general according to Rabbi Ishmael. The final general term in the three-part structure comes back and expands the class similar to the particular, restoring the scope almost to the original general term. The final expansion does not literally return us to the initial general term; one item is excluded from the in general. According to Rabbi Akiva, the purpose of the structure is to exclude that one item.

Application to the Discussion in Shevuot: A Synchronic Description of the Rule

As we mentioned in the first part, in the context of oaths there are two relevant axes that emerge from the biblical wording of the particular: the axis of substance, or content, of the oath — harm and benefit — and the axis of time — past and future. Rabbi Akiva extends the law along both axes; that is, the oath applies across the entire field. He still has to remove one item from the total set, since the structure of amplification-restriction-amplification, which Scripture adopted here — rather than being satisfied with a binyan av — is meant to hint that the scope does not include literally everything. One item must be excluded from it: a matter of mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, extends oaths only along the axis of content, harm and benefit, but not along the axis of time. Rabbi Akiva challenges him precisely at this point: why prefer one axis over the other?

From the Talmudic discussion it emerges that understanding the principled root of the dispute — general and particular terms or amplifications and restrictions — was necessary in order to understand why Rabbi Ishmael extends only one of the axes and not both.

Let us now try to understand the picture of the dispute as it emerges from our passage. We assume that the three formulations express one and the same dispute, which passed through a process of sharpening and conceptualization but was not substantially altered; the editors of the passage do not note that these are conflicting formulations. Both sides begin from the same threefold biblical structure, composed of three expressions: general, particular, and general — “or if a person swears to utter with his lips” as the general expression, “to do harm or to do good” as the particular expression, and “whatever a person utters” as the general expression — and they disagree about how to interpret it.

Rabbi Akiva’s Method

According to Rabbi Akiva, from the first general term — “or if a person swears” — we include matters involving neither harm nor benefit. From the second general term — “whatever a person utters” — we include oaths concerning the past. It seems clear that for him the starting point is the particular at the center — “to do harm or to do good” — and from it we expand along the two relevant axes, since according to Rabbi Akiva there is no possibility of distinguishing between them and choosing only one of them. As noted, Rabbi Akiva too excludes one item: a matter of mitzvah.²

One should note that in Rabbi Akiva’s method, after the two expansions, the particular is entirely erased. The two expansions neutralize the two restrictive features of the particular, and in the end all oaths entail liability except an oath regarding a mitzvah. Even this specific exclusion does not appear to be connected in any way to the character of the particular — “to do harm or to do good.” According to Rabbi Akiva, it is not clear why Scripture chose a particular of precisely this sort. In the final analysis, that choice seems to have no significance at all.

Rabbi Ishmael’s Method

That is precisely why Rabbi Ishmael does not accept Rabbi Akiva’s view. He maintains that precisely because Scripture is formulated in the pattern of general-particular-general, and because it chose this specific particular in the middle, Scripture hints to us that we must expand — but only along one of the axes.

What is the basis for deciding on which axis to expand? Two statements by Rabbi Isaac later in the final baraita answer that this follows from other textual nuances in the verses. Rabbi Ishmael’s move is that from the biblical structure itself we know only that we are to expand along one axis. This is the formal component of the rule of general-particular-general. The textual nuance in the verse, which is a local datum, only hints which axis we are to choose.³

This explains why, according to Rabbi Ishmael, Scripture constructs such a threefold structure: so that we should derive from it everything akin to the particular. Ostensibly, the very same result would have been obtained had Scripture written only the particular, and we would have learned from it by means of binyan av — that is, analogy — and expanded it to everything similar to it. Had only the particular been written, we would have learned all types of oaths, as Rabbi Akiva in fact does — this is stage A in Figure 1 below — even without the exclusion of a matter of mitzvah that exists in Rabbi Akiva’s approach.

Precisely because Scripture wrote this in the very distinctive form of a three-part structure, we reach the conclusion that the extension is made only along one axis, not along both. That is exactly the difference between general-particular and binyan av. According to Rabbi Ishmael, Scripture wrote the particular and did not speak about the oath of utterance in fully general terms because it wanted us to extend as in stage C of Figure 1, not as in stage A, which is what would have resulted from the rule of binyan av.

Note: Synchronic and Diachronic Description

On the sheet for Va’era we adopted a diachronic method for describing these rules. We explained them step by step, from the first general term to the following particular and then to the final general term, in a diachronic order: from earlier to later. Here, by contrast, we have explained this rule synchronically. There is no step-by-step progression here; rather, there is an overall look at the contribution of each part to the structure. The result is the same, but the relation between these two modes of description is not entirely clear.

It is possible that this too reflects the historical development we described above. At the earlier stage there is attention to the contribution of each part of the threefold structure separately. After formalization, a structure comes into being that expresses a mechanism with a defined form, in which each part has a meaning and a relation to the other parts.

Insert the attached diagrams here.

C. Aspects of Similarity: Species and Genera

A Contradiction Between the Two Discussions

Up to this point we have seen that, according to Rabbi Ishmael, the rule of general-particular-general is a kind of controlled analogy, or induction, from the particular to some generality. Is there a principle that tells us how to carry out these inductions? How are we to characterize the particulars given in Scripture and decide in which directions to extend them and in which directions not to extend them?

In the example discussed so far, the particular had two relevant characteristics: the fact that it was phrased in the future tense, and its content, which dealt with harm and benefit. Even there there was uncertainty as to which directions we should use in extending the particular, and that uncertainty was settled by means of textual nuances in the verses. In the second case, dealing with the oath concerning a deposit, in Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 37b, the situation is apparently similar. The interpretation there is also based on general-particular-general from the verses later in chapter 5 of our Torah portion, verses 21–24. The first general term is “and deals deceitfully with his fellow,” the particular is “regarding a deposit or a pledge,” and the second general term is “or anything about which he swears.” There too the Talmud assumes that the particular has two characteristics: it is something movable, and its essence is monetary value. But there we really do derive only according to the character of the particular: land is excluded because it is not movable, as are slaves, which are compared to land, and documents are excluded because their essence is not monetary value. If so, there is no real extension there at all. Ostensibly, the situation is identical to one in which Scripture had written only the particular and we would have extended it by means of binyan av.

It should be noted that in this passage there does not appear the formulation that explains what the general term accomplishes — namely, neutralizing one of the axes — and what the particular excludes. As for what the particular excludes, that is clear even without an explicit explanation. But why does it not say that the general term helps us expand along one of the axes? The reason, of course, is that in this case it does not expand anything at all. If we examine the passage there, we immediately see that even those who do not interpret by general and particular terms but by amplifications and restrictions nevertheless end up excluding one item: they exclude only documents. If so, they too apparently choose one of the axes and extend only with respect to it.

At first glance, this is completely parallel to what Rabbi Ishmael did in the previous discussion. It is a controlled extension of the particular, carried out only along one of the two axes that characterize it — land or movables. If so, it is not clear why this is presented here as amplification-restriction-amplification rather than as general-particular-general.⁴

Aspects of Similarity

There are several distinct rules of general and particular. Their differences apparently lie in the question how many aspects of similarity are extended from the particular that appears in Scripture.⁵ This also emerges from collecting the various references in the Talmudic discussions that deal with this subject — see Hullin 66a, Nazir 35b, Eruvin 27–28 — although there are apparent contradictions among the different passages. Resolving them, or at least mapping them, requires intensive study — see, for example, Dr. Adolf Schwarz’s book on the rules of general and particular — and this is not the place for that.

The rule “general and particular — within the general there is only what is in the particular” means that the law is applied only to what is identical to the particular in every respect. Usually this means three respects, though Tosafot on the words “And if you should say,” Hullin 66a, wrote that it means all relevant respects. By contrast, the rule of general-particular-general — “you may infer only according to the character of the particular” — is not “only what is in the particular,” but merely “according to the character of the particular,” that is, a broader class: whatever resembles the particular. The Talmud states that this refers to similarity in at least one respect — see Nazir 35b and elsewhere. The status of the other two rules is unclear, and we shall not deal with them here.

Classification and Taxonomy: The Case of Three Aspects

At the root of the matter lies the logical division of a set into genera and species. Let us take a set of individual entities, for example the set of animals. This set is divided into several genera, for example birds, fish, wild animals, and domesticated animals. Each such genus is divided into species; for example, fish may be divided into mammals and others. Each species contains individual members.

Thus the overall set, the genus, and the species are all sets of entities. They may be characterized both by their extension and by their intension. A definition by extension consists in directly indicating all the individual members contained in the set in question. A definition by essence consists in listing the properties that define the set. Individual entities are not usually characterized by way of such properties; rather, they serve as the building blocks of the sets. Their properties are composed of the properties of the sets to which they belong. For example, the whale is an animal, and it is a fish and a mammal. A particular whale satisfies those definitions, and beyond them it has specific properties that are irrelevant to this classification.

When we consider the particular that appears within a general-and-particular structure, we are dealing not with an individual entity but with a species. Therefore, that particular has properties or characteristics — its intension — that define it as a species relative to the genera and larger sets above it. The properties of that species constitute the potential axes of expansion for the rules of general and particular. In the passages listed above, that species serves the logical role of an individual entity.

Application to Cases of Three Aspects

Let us now take the standard case discussed in these passages, in which the particular has three characteristics, or aspects: A, B, and C. This particular is included in groups at different levels — species, genera, and the overall set. The greater the number of characteristics, the fewer items are included in the group, and vice versa. Let us now examine the situation created by different generalizations of a particular possessing three such properties, as described in the attached schema, Figure 2.

In such a case there is a first-degree extension: an extension to a group whose members resemble the particular in all three respects. This is an extension that adds no properties, only additional entities that possess exactly those same properties — that is, entities characterized by all three properties. The next degree is an extension to a group that includes items similar to the particular in two of the respects. Here we have reached the species. There are three different species, each of which resembles the particular in two respects: one species resembles it in A-B, another in B-C, and a third in A-C. Our particular, of course, is included in each of these species.

Sometimes a legal extension can be made only to one of the three species — that is, an extension valid only with respect to a certain pair of characteristics — just as we saw above that Rabbi Ishmael extends only along one axis of characteristics and not along the other. The next degree is an extension to a group whose members resemble the particular in only one respect. Here we obtain a broader group, since this is already the genus. The number of genera is again three, and each is defined by one of the aspects: a genus whose members are characterized by property A, a genus whose members are characterized by property B, and a genus characterized by property C. Each of these genera contains two of the three species mentioned above. For example, the genus characterized by property A contains both the species characterized by A-B and the one characterized by A-C.

We should note that in three-part structures — general-particular-general, or particular-general-particular — the number of times the particular appears in the name of the rule determines the number of aspects involved in the extension. For example, particular-general-particular extends along two aspects, to the species. By contrast, general-particular-general extends along only one aspect, to the genus.⁶

Two Aspects: A Proposed Solution to the Problem Raised Above

From the description above, we can see that when we are dealing with a case that has two aspects — that is, where the particular has only two defining properties — a problem arises, as shown in Figure 3. This is the situation in the discussions of the oath of utterance and the oath concerning a deposit considered above. In both of those cases the particular had only two relevant characteristics. This is a problematic situation from the standpoint of the standard classification. In such a case, a genus is not defined at all. One may extend along one aspect and rise to a species, or extend to two species, and no more. But what about the genus? Here no such level is defined at all. By extending each of the two aspects, one immediately reaches the overall set.

If so, in such cases the degree of freedom left to us is extension along one axis or along both together — that is, extension to one species or to two species. The logical level of these two possibilities is not different, since the difference is quantitative rather than qualitative. In either case we rise only to the species, but there remains a possibility of extending to one species or to two.

Now perhaps we can begin to understand the contradiction we encountered above. On the one hand, Rabbi Akiva interprets by amplification and restriction. We saw that this means that he rises to the genus and not merely to the species. But what does he do when there are only two aspects? He does the same thing, namely, he amplifies to the maximum. Yet in such a case the result still has the character of a derivation by general and particular rather than a full derivation by amplification and restriction, because we rise only to the species and not to the genus.

We have touched here only the edge of a very tangled subject, one that requires much deeper study. Any error is ours alone.

Footnotes