Metzora (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Friday eve of Parashat Metzora, 5765

Questions

1. What is meant by “to be judged as a new matter”?
2. What is the difference between “stating another rule not of the same character” and “to be judged as a new matter”?
3. Are these interpretive rules textual or halakhic?
4. A classification of the rules by relevant biblical circumstances, and by instructions for their application.
5. Which comes first: deriving the general from the particular, or the particular from the general?

The Rules

• A matter that was included in a general rule and then singled out to be judged as a new matter.
• A case singled out to state another rule of the same character.
• A case singled out to state another rule not of the same character.
• A matter that was included in a general rule and then singled out to teach.

“In the place where they slaughter the burnt-offering, they shall slaughter the guilt-offering; and its blood shall be dashed against the altar round about.”

— Leviticus 7:1

“And he shall slaughter the lamb in the place where he slaughters the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the holy place; for like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering belongs to the priest; it is most holy. And the priest shall take some of the blood of the guilt-offering, and the priest shall put it on the lobe of the right ear of the one being purified, and on the thumb of his right hand, and on the big toe of his right foot.”

— Leviticus 14:13-14

“(4) Any matter that was included in a general rule and then singled out from the general rule to be judged as a new matter—you cannot restore it to its general rule until Scripture explicitly restores it to its general rule. How so? ‘And he shall slaughter the lamb in the place where he slaughters the sin-offering and the burnt-offering, in the holy place’—there was no need for Scripture to say, ‘for like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering belongs to the priest.’ Rather, since it was singled out to be judged as a new matter, with respect to the thumb, the toe, and the right ear, one might have thought that it does not require the application of blood to the altar. Scripture therefore says: ‘for like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering belongs to the priest.’ Thus Scripture explicitly restored it to its general rule, to teach you: just as a sin-offering requires the application of blood to the altar, so too a guilt-offering requires the application of blood to the altar.”

— Illustrative baraita, beginning of Sifra

A Matter That Was Included in a General Rule and Then Singled Out to Be Judged as a New Matter

Introduction

In this page we will discuss the interpretive rule of a matter that was included in a general rule and then singled out to be judged as a new matter. This is the fourth of the four rules that deal with a particular case singled out from a general category, and at the end of our discussion we will consider the connection and the differences among them.

The Derivation

The rule of a matter singled out to be judged as a new matter, like all the rules of this type, serves for interpretation in a case where a specific halakha (Jewish law) is written separately from the general category to which it belongs. When that law is a “new matter,” the particular case has thereby left the general category to which it belonged, and until Scripture itself restores it to that category, we cannot do so on our own. We will illustrate this by means of the derivation brought in the illustrative baraita.

The verses in chapter 14 deal with the guilt-offering of the person being purified from tsaraat. This guilt-offering belongs to the general class of guilt-offerings, all of which are most holy offerings, are slaughtered in the north, and whose blood must be dashed on the altar. Yet whereas in all other guilt-offerings all the blood is placed on the altar, in this guilt-offering some of the blood is placed on the right earlobe, the right thumb, and the right big toe of the person being purified. Thus this is a particular case singled out from the general category to be judged as a new matter, because it contains a law that does not fit the ordinary laws of guilt-offerings. The exegete asks whether one may infer that here too the blood must be placed on the altar, as with all other guilt-offerings. He answers yes, because Scripture itself restored it to its general category by saying: “for like the sin-offering, the guilt-offering belongs to the priest.” Had Scripture not restored it, we could not have done so ourselves, and the rule of applying blood on the altar would not have applied here.

In Babylonian Talmud, Zevachim 49a-b, the Gemara notes that apparently there was no need to write that its slaughter is in the north, since once Scripture restored this guilt-offering to the general class of guilt-offerings, that rule could be learned from them. For all guilt-offerings, the rule appears at the beginning of chapter 7, as cited above. From here the Gemara learns that slaughter in the north is indispensable, since Scripture repeated the law in order to indicate that failure to observe it invalidates the offering.¹

The Relation to the Rule of “Stating Another Rule Not of the Same Character”

Tosafot, in the discussion in Zevachim 49a, s.v. “because it was singled out,” ask why the fact that the sin-offering of the person being purified requires libations is not regarded, in contrast to other sin-offerings, as the basis for classifying it as a new matter. Rabbi Jacob of Orléans, cited in Tosafot, explains that the requirement of libations does not contradict the general rule, but merely adds to it. By contrast, putting blood on the thumb, toe, and ear contradicts the law governing other guilt-offerings, since in the other guilt-offerings all the blood is placed on the altar.

On this basis, several medieval authorities also derived the distinction between this rule and the rule of “a case singled out to state another rule not of the same character” see the page for Parashat Tazria. At first glance, in both cases a particular is singled out from the general category by differing from it in some law. If so, what is the difference between these two rules? When do we say “a new matter,” and when do we say “not of the same character”?

According to Tosafot, a case singled out to state another rule not of the same character is a particular characterized by an additional law beyond what exists in the general category. For example, the impurity of scall lesions, netakim, which are the example for the rule of “stating another rule not of the same character,” see the page for Parashat Tazria: they become impure through yellow hair rather than white hair. This is understood not as a contradiction of the general category, which becomes impure through white hair, but as an addition relative to it. In our example, by contrast, applying blood to the extremities contradicts the law governing the other guilt-offerings, and is not merely an addition.

In fact, the basis of this point appears in Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 7a, where the Gemara tries to associate the law of levirate marriage in the case of one’s brother’s wife with the rule of “a matter that was included in a general rule and then singled out to teach.” The general category is all forbidden sexual relations whose violation incurs karet, and the particular is one’s brother’s wife, who is permitted to the brother for levirate marriage even though she is otherwise a forbidden relative to him. The Gemara concludes that this example belongs specifically to the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter,” since the general category is one of prohibition whereas the particular is one of permission. The Gemara’s point is that the particular contains a permission that stands in direct opposition to the prohibition applying to all the other particulars in that general category. The Gemara thus determines that since the particular is characterized by a law opposed to the general category, and not merely added to it, it belongs to the rule of “a new matter.”

Application of the Rule

Thus, in the rule of “a new matter” there are two different levels:

1. When the particular leaves the general category and Scripture does not restore it to that category, one applies to it only the laws that explicitly govern it, and nothing more.
2. If Scripture restores it to the general category, it returns to being a particular within that general category.

If the particular is not restored to the general category, it is clear that one cannot derive laws from the general category to it. But in the opposite direction, the amoraim, the Talmudic sages, disagreed in the discussion in Zevachim 66a: may one derive from it to the general category, or not?²

Tosafot there, in Zevachim and likewise in the parallel discussion in Yevamot, raise a difficulty according to the view that one may also derive from the particular to the general: why not learn from this guilt-offering that all guilt-offerings require application to the thumb, toe, and earlobe? Tosafot answer that even according to this view, one derives only something that is not the special innovation in this case, such as the fact that its slaughter is in the north, and not a law unique to it, such as application to the extremities. Tosafot explain that with respect to the non-innovative laws, we apply the rule of “a matter singled out to teach,” see the page for Parashat Tzav, and derive from the particular to the general. But with respect to the innovative laws, we apply the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter,” and do not derive them for the whole general category. Rashi writes similarly in the discussion in Zevachim 49b. Tosafot give two reasons for this:

1. If one were to derive even the innovative feature, it would no longer be a “new matter.”
2. If one were to derive even the innovative feature, there would be no difference between this rule and the rule of “teaching about the whole general category.”

These two answers of Tosafot sharpen two important points regarding the interpretive rules in general. We will now consider these two points, one after the other.

A Textual Rule or a Halakhic Rule?

The first answer mixes the learned conclusion into the considerations of the derivation itself. It holds that if we were to derive the general category from the particular, there would not in fact be a case here of “singled out to be judged as a new matter.” We should recall that on the page for Parashat Shemini we distinguished between two levels in discussing an a fortiori inference. There is the biblical level, that is, the set of laws that are present and absent in Scripture. We saw there that leniency and stringency are determined only on that level. After that come the conclusions of the derivation, which create an additional stringency in the derived case, and that additional stringency is not taken into account when weighing the derived case against the source case. Here Tosafot write that with respect to the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter,” we do combine the two planes. If we were to derive the general category from the particular—for example, if we were to infer that all guilt-offerings require application to the extremities—then there would be no case here of “singled out to be judged as a new matter” at all. This is so even though, on the biblical plane, there is indeed something new here, since the application to the extremities is written only in this one case. What determines whether this is a new matter is the law that actually applies in halakha, not the biblical plane.

Thus, in the terms we introduced on the page for Parashat Shemini, the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter” is not a textual rule but a halakhic rule. It establishes a relation between halakhic contexts and not between biblical contexts. It is quite possible that Tosafot’s second reason disagrees with this assumption, and therefore seeks a different explanation.

Two Levels of Comparison Between Interpretive Rules

Tosafot’s second reason also sharpens an important point. Up to this stage, we have seen that the biblical circumstances in which these two rules are applied are different. In the rule of “stating another rule not of the same character,” the departure from the general category consists in adding another law to what applies in the general category, whereas in “a new matter” the departure from the general category consists in adding a law that contradicts what applies in the general category. But now we must ask whether there must also be a difference in interpretive consequences between the rules. That is, must the halakhic conclusions in the two contexts also be different?

In their second answer, Tosafot maintain that between these two rules there must be a difference in application, and not only in biblical circumstances. Let us sharpen the point further. We have seen that the difference between these two rules lies only in the biblical circumstances to which they apply: the rule of “a new matter” deals with a case where the particular contains a law that contradicts the laws of the general category, whereas the rule of “not of the same character” deals with a case where the law in the particular is added to what applies in the general category, but does not contradict it. Yet one might have said that in both of these circumstances we should act in exactly the same way, namely, apply to the particular only the laws that appear in it, and no more, whether for leniency or for stringency.

This is indeed what the Ra’avad writes in his commentary on the illustrative baraita: the law of these two rules is one and the same. The difference between them lies only in the biblical circumstances to which they apply. Both rules teach that in these two circumstances one applies to the particular only what is written in it, and nothing more, unless Scripture explicitly restores it to its general category.

On this the author of Middot Aharon writes as follows:

“The interpretive rules cannot differ merely in degree if their resultant law is one and the same. If a case that does not differ in essence, but only by a new and conflicting rule, does not return to its general category until Scripture restores it, then this would also include a case that differs in both essence and law, and everything would be one matter. Why, then, make them two distinct rules? He should have grouped them as a single rule and brought two examples, from which we would understand the two different gradations…”

The author of Middot Aharon explains that if the application is the same and only the circumstances differ, these two contexts should have been included under a single rule, and the illustrative baraita should have brought both kinds of examples.³ That is, he assumes that between any two interpretive rules there must be a difference not only in the biblical circumstances but also in the application.

This indeed seems to follow from Tosafot’s second answer. In their first answer, however, they apparently followed the view of the Ra’avad, who is prepared to recognize different rules even when there are different circumstances to which the same interpretive principle is applied. Thus the author of Middot Aharon requires two differences between any two rules: both in the biblical circumstances and in the interpretive principle applied. The Ra’avad, by contrast, is satisfied with a difference in circumstances alone.⁴

The Difference in Application

We must now clarify what the difference in application actually is between the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter” and the rule of “stating another rule not of the same character.”

The author of Middot Aharon cites here the words of Rabbi Nethanel ha-Kadosh of Chinon, also quoted in Sefer HaKeritut. Rabbi Nethanel notes that in the rule of “stating another rule not of the same character,” it is not said that the particular may be restored to its general category when Scripture restores it. From this he concludes that in that rule the particular cannot be restored to its general category even if Scripture restores it. If Scripture does restore it, we interpret that only with respect to the specific matter addressed by the verse, and no more.

He explains this by defining an additional level at which the differences between the biblical circumstances of these rules are to be understood. The rule of “stating another rule not of the same character” is characterized not only by the fact that the particular has an additional law beyond the laws of the general category, but by the fact that the subject itself is altogether different, see the page for Parashat Tazria. Netakim are essentially different from the other lesions, and not only with respect to the specific law that they render one impure through yellow hair rather than white hair. Se’et and baheret lesions do not render one impure on the scalp and beard, whereas netakim do not render one impure on the skin of the flesh. These are two entirely different halakhic phenomena, and not merely a case of one particular law that was explicitly singled out in Scripture. By contrast, in the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter,” the particular that was singled out—in our example, this guilt-offering—is exactly of the same kind as the general category, namely guilt-offerings, and the difference lies only in the conflicting law found in the particular. In such a case, if Scripture restores it to its general category, we fully equate them, apart from the new matter itself, as explained above.

In another formulation, the author of Middot Aharon says that in the rule of “a new matter” the difference is created by the Torah, and therefore the Torah’s restoration of the particular to its general category is effective, because the same authority that prohibited is the one that permitted. In the rule of “not of the same character,” by contrast, the difference is a factual difference and not a halakhic difference created by the Torah’s definitions. There, explicit restoration to the general category is ineffective, because the authority that created the distinction is not the Torah but reality.

Summary of the Differences Among the Four Rules Concerning a Particular Singled Out from a General Category

Let us now summarize the differences among these four rules.⁵ There are four degrees of restoration to the general category, and these distinguish the applications of the four rules:

1. The particular returns to its general category on its own—in the rule of “a matter singled out from the general rule to teach.”
2. We can restore the particular to its general category—in the rule of “stating another rule of the same character.”
3. Scripture can restore it to its general category—in the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter.”
4. Even Scripture cannot restore it to its general category—in the rule of “stating another rule not of the same character.”

There are parallel differences in the biblical circumstances in which these rules are relevant:

1. It left the general category on its own, but differs neither in essence nor in law—in the rule of “a matter singled out from the general rule to teach.”
2. It does not differ in essence, but it does differ in law: if the law is additional, this is the rule of “stating another rule of the same character.”
3. It does not differ in essence, but the law is contradictory: this is the rule of “singled out to be judged as a new matter.”
4. It differs both in essence and in law: this is the rule of “stating another rule not of the same character.”

The differences are presented in the following table:

Rule	Essence	Law	Application
Singled out from the general rule to teach	Same	Same	Returns to its general category on its own, and even teaches about the whole general category
Singled out to state another rule of the same character	Same	Additional	We can restore it to its general category
Singled out to state another rule not of the same character	Different	Additional	It cannot be restored to its general category
Singled out to be judged as a new matter	Same	Contradictory	Only an explicit verse can restore it to its general category

The Dispute About Deriving the Particular from the General in the Rule of “Judged as a New Matter”

We noted above that in the discussion in Zevachim the amoraim disagreed whether, in the rule of “judged as a new matter,” one may derive from the particular to the general category or not, although all agree that one may not derive from the general category to the particular. We also noted that Rashi and Tosafot explained that what can be derived is only those laws that are not the innovation because of which the particular is considered singled out to be judged as a new matter—in our example, the application to the extremities.

The author of Middot Aharon understands that this dispute concerns only a situation where there is no verse restoring the particular to its general category. According to him, it is not clear what the law would be when there is such a restoring verse: in that case, could we derive in both directions? Apparently yes. The Gemara in the discussion in Zevachim 49b says that in such a case the verse commanding slaughter in the north is superfluous according to both views. If so, after the restoration to the general category, it would seem that all agree that one may derive the general category from the particular.⁶

By contrast, from the Tosafot we cited above, it appears that this dispute still exists even after Scripture restores the particular to its general category. They ask, according to those who hold that one may derive from the particular to the general category, why we do not infer from this guilt-offering that all guilt-offerings require application to the extremities. If this dispute did not remain, according to Tosafot, after Scripture restored the particular to its general category, then the question could have been raised against all views: once Scripture restored this guilt-offering to the general class of guilt-offerings, why indeed do we not infer that all guilt-offerings require application to the extremities?⁷ This was apparently also the view of Rabbi Joseph ibn Lev, cited at the end of the chapter in Middot Aharon, who rejects the author’s position.

Still, according to Tosafot and Rabbi Joseph ibn Lev, it is not clear what practical significance remains to the fact that Scripture restored it explicitly to its general category. If there is indeed a view that one cannot derive the general category from the particular, or the particular from the general category, even in such a case, then in what respect has the particular returned to its general category?

The Priority of Deriving the General from the Particular

A final point that requires discussion is why there is, in fact, a preference for deriving the general category from the particular—which perhaps can be done even without Scripture restoring it to the general category—over deriving the particular from the general category.

It seems that the basis of this lies in the rule of “a matter that was included in a general rule and then singled out to teach,” where we see that the Torah sometimes singles out a particular in order to teach from it about the general category. Clearly the particular was not singled out to teach about itself, for if that were so, there would have been no reason to remove it from the general category.

Footnotes