Vaetchanan (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve of Parashat Va-etchanan, 5765

Questions

1. Is a doorway with only one doorpost obligated in mezuzah?
2. Is the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” a matter of peshat (plain-sense interpretation) or drash (rabbinic exposition)?
3. Why does it not appear in the tannaitic lists of hermeneutical principles?
4. What is the relation between this rule and the rule “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include”?
5. Which of the two has a logical basis?
6. What is the relation between the conclusion of the drash and the plain-sense interpretation?
7. What is the significance of plural language in Scripture?
8. How many “general and specific” principles are there?
9. Is there a hermeneutical principle of “general and general”?

The Principles

• An inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude.
• An exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include.
• Inclusion after inclusion.
• Exclusion after exclusion.
• General statement and specific detail.
• General statement, specific detail, and general statement.

“And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates.”

Deuteronomy 6:9

Rav Pappa happened to visit the house of Mar Shmuel. He saw a certain doorway that had only one doorpost on the left, and a mezuzah had been affixed to it. He said to him: “According to whom is this? According to Rabbi Meir? …

“What is Rabbi Meir’s view? For it was taught: A house that has only one doorpost — Rabbi Meir obligates it in mezuzah, and the Sages exempt it. What is the reason of the Sages? Because in Deuteronomy 6 the word is written as ‘doorposts.’ What is Rabbi Meir’s reason? As it was taught: ‘doorposts’ — I might think the minimum number of doorposts is two. But when Scripture says ‘doorposts’ again in Deuteronomy 11, in the second paragraph, where it need not have said it, that is an inclusion after an inclusion, and an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude. Scripture thereby reduced the requirement to one doorpost. These are the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: This is unnecessary. When Scripture says, in Exodus 12, ‘on the lintel and on the two doorposts,’ it need not have said ‘two.’ Why then did it say ‘two’? This establishes a general rule: everywhere that Scripture says ‘doorposts,’ it means only one, unless Scripture explicitly specifies two.”

Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 34a

A. A Doorway with One Doorpost

Introduction

In the passage in Menachot, early rabbinic sages dispute the law of a doorway that has a doorpost¹ only on one side. The Sages exempt such a doorway from mezuzah, whereas Rabbi Meir obligates it. It should be noted that even in halakha (Jewish law) there is a dispute among the legal decisors on this question; see Tur and Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 287:1, and Shakh there, subsec. 1.

Yet the verse itself uses the plural form, “doorposts.” This would seem to imply that two doorposts are required in order for the doorway to be obligated in mezuzah. That is precisely the view of the Sages in the baraita. Rabbi Meir, however, obligates even such a doorway in mezuzah. At first glance, one might have expected Rabbi Meir to interpret the plurality in the verse as stemming from its address to all Israel: each person is to place a mezuzah on the single doorpost of his own house. On that reading, the plurality in the verse would be a plurality of doorways, not of doorposts. It seems, however, that the Gemara does not understand the matter this way. For the Gemara, it is apparently obvious that since the Torah could have used the singular, its use of the plural compels us to interpret the verse as requiring two doorposts.

The rationale offered for Rabbi Meir’s view may rest on one of two different expositions: that of Rabbi Ishmael or that of Rabbi Akiva. Both arrive at the conclusion that the verse requires only one doorpost, against the view of the Sages.

The Dispute Among the Early Sages

Rabbi Ishmael derives this by means of the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude.” This is a Torah principle whose meaning is that because the Torah includes twice in the same matter, its real intention is specifically to exclude. In our case, that exclusion teaches us that one doorpost is enough for the doorway to incur the obligation of mezuzah. Below we will explain Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition in greater detail.

Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, argues that there is no need for this exposition, because there is a clarifying indication from elsewhere that the expression “doorposts” means one doorpost — unless the Torah explicitly specifies “the two doorposts.” Rabbi Akiva’s wording suggests that he accepts Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition in principle, and that he too would have reached the same conclusion from it. He claims only that in this case the exposition is unnecessary, because we have a verbal interpretive proof, which apparently he regards as preferable.

Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, probably does not accept Rabbi Akiva’s derivation. It would seem that here they follow their general methods: Rabbi Akiva derives inclusions and exclusions from every word, and even from every letter. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, adopts the principle that “the Torah speaks in human language” — see the pages for Parashat Toledot and Parashat Vayetze. The fact that the Torah added the word “two” is not meant to invite exposition. The phrase “the two doorposts” is ordinary human speech, and therefore, according to Rabbi Ishmael, there is here no superfluous word available for interpretation.²

The Basic Difficulty in Rabbi Akiva’s Exposition

At first glance, Rabbi Akiva too agrees that the plain meaning of the word “doorposts” is plural. The Gemara indicates that Rabbi Akiva would not have said what he says merely on the basis of the verse’s plain meaning, were it not for a special clarifying indication. If so, absent any further constraint, it appears that Rabbi Akiva too would agree that the word “doorposts” should be interpreted as referring to multiple doorposts, as in Rabbi Ishmael’s method — that is, that a doorway requires two doorposts in order to be obligated in mezuzah, and not, as we suggested above, that the plurality is directed toward all Israel.

In any case, according to Rabbi Akiva’s conclusion, the expression “doorposts” seems to mean one doorpost. It is not clear how, in his view, an expression that appears in the Torah in the plural can be understood as referring to a single doorpost. A similar question may be raised even according to Rabbi Ishmael. After all, the Torah itself uses the plural and says that one must place the mezuzah “on the doorposts of your house.” How can the exposition, by means of the rule of “inclusion after inclusion,” overturn the Torah’s own language? Once the two inclusions lead us to exclude, and to infer that the mezuzah obligation applies even to a single doorpost, how can we then read the Torah’s command, which speaks of “the doorposts of your house,” and say that the meaning of “doorposts” is one doorpost?³

Two Ways to Understand the Clarifying Indication

Let us first distinguish between two possible ways of understanding Rabbi Akiva’s clarifying indication:

1. Rabbi Akiva explains matters as we suggested above: the plurality stems from the Torah’s address to all Israel, and the “doorposts” are everyone’s doorposts — that is, a plurality of doorways, not of doorposts. Yet for the actual obligation of mezuzah, one doorpost suffices.
2. Rabbi Akiva holds that the literal meaning of the word “doorposts” is one doorpost.

Neither of these possibilities is free of difficulty. Let us begin with the second.

If the literal meaning of the word “doorposts” were singular — one doorpost — then there would be no possibility at all of deriving an “inclusion after an inclusion.” The word “doorposts” would not include anything, since it would be stated in the singular and not in the plural. On this proposal, Rabbi Akiva ought to dispute Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition directly, not merely claim that it is unnecessary. This consideration seems to indicate that even according to Rabbi Akiva this is not a matter of literal meaning. Accordingly, Rabbi Akiva too agrees that the literal meaning of “doorposts” is plural, except that the Torah is speaking in the plural to all Israel. It should be noted that this also accords with the simple linguistic sense of the word “doorposts,” which is plural. These two considerations thus seem to favor the first interpretation.

Yet this possibility too raises difficulties. First, on that reading it is not clear what exactly the clarifying indication establishes. According to this proposal, it is not offering a lexical interpretation of the word “doorposts,” but only a syntactic mode of usage. In other words: the word “doorposts” may be used in two ways — either it refers to a single doorpost while addressing all Israel, or it requires two doorposts for the same individual. Sometimes the Torah uses it in one way, and sometimes in the other; both meanings exist and are valid. If so, what evidence is there from the fact that in Exodus the Torah uses the word one way, that in Deuteronomy it uses it in the same way?⁴ A lexical meaning may indeed be learned from one passage to another, but a syntactic use of a word need not be identical in every context.

Second, we must ask what is special about the word “doorposts.” Apparently every plural form could raise the same question, with the same two alternatives. If so, even if there were a valid proof that the Torah always uses plurals in this way, we should apply it to every biblical word written in the plural, and not specifically to “doorposts.” We should then always interpret a plural word in the Torah as directed toward all Israel, rather than as indicating an actual plurality. But that is not how plural forms in Scripture are in fact interpreted, and certainly no proof is ever brought from here to justify such a reading.

These two considerations seem to point specifically toward the conclusion that the clarifying indication supplies a lexical interpretation of the word “doorposts” — that is, the second interpretation. On that reading, “doorposts” really would be interpreted literally as singular, and then we would have a double exclusion, making the force of the clarifying indication quite clear. But if so, we are simply brought back to the difficulties already noted with the second interpretation. It therefore seems that neither path is correct. The question thus returns: how are we to understand this clarifying indication, and what is its relation to the peshat of the verse?

A Third Proposal for Understanding the Clarifying Indication

To propose our own reading, we must first ask whether Rabbi Akiva’s clarifying indication is a rule of plain-sense interpretation, or rather a rule of drash. At first glance, it seems to be a thoroughly plain-sense consideration, based on a clear interpretive and logical argument, and not on any formal hermeneutical rule. On the other hand, the plain meaning of the word “doorposts” is clearly plural, and that fact specifically suggests that this consideration belongs categorically to the realm of drash. Support for this may be drawn from the fact that Rabbi Ishmael does not accept Rabbi Akiva’s argument. If it were a simple and straightforward logical consideration, why would Rabbi Ishmael reject it? It seems, then, that we are dealing with drash — and in matters of drash we already know that there is a fundamental dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva.

If Rabbi Akiva’s consideration is indeed a form of drash, then we can understand the meaning of his clarifying indication while avoiding all the difficulties raised above. On our proposal, the literal meaning of the word “doorposts” is plural. Rabbi Akiva’s consideration proves, on the level of drash and not on the level of literal peshat, that nevertheless it is to be read as though it referred to one doorpost. If so, Rabbi Akiva too can expound the verse by means of “inclusion after inclusion,” since the literal meaning of “doorposts” is indeed plural. More than that: on our reading, Rabbi Akiva’s clarifying indication applies specifically to the word “doorposts,” and not to every plural word in Scripture, precisely because this is drash and not ordinary plain-sense interpretation.

We can now resolve the basic difficulty we raised in Rabbi Akiva’s view. The literal meaning of the word “doorposts” is indeed plural. Yet Rabbi Akiva’s clarifying indication leads us to interpret it, on the level of drash and for halakhic purposes only, as though it were singular.

Returning to Rabbi Ishmael’s Exposition

We noted above that the very same problem can be raised with respect to Rabbi Ishmael. According to his view, the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” teaches us that the meaning of the word “doorposts” is singular — and, as noted, Rabbi Akiva agrees with that result in principle, though in his opinion it is unnecessary. That seems to contradict the literal plain meaning.

According to our approach, however, we should say here as well that for Rabbi Ishmael the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” is itself a rule of drash. It does not alter the literal meaning of the word “doorposts”; rather, it adds a further layer of interpretation. We therefore continue to read the word in its straightforward sense, but on the level of drash we learn that from the standpoint of halakha, one doorpost is enough for the doorway to require mezuzah.

The rule of drash “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” will be discussed in the next chapter.

B. The Rule “An Inclusion after an Inclusion Serves Only to Exclude”

Introduction

In the previous chapter we reached the conclusion that the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” operates on the level of drash, and is not a rule of plain-sense interpretation. We must therefore examine how it works, and where it appears, if at all, in the various lists of hermeneutical rules. For a survey, sources, and discussion, see the article by Shmuel Yissachar Shprecher, “An Inclusion after an Inclusion Serves Only to Exclude, and an Exclusion after an Exclusion Serves Only to Include,” Higayon 2, Aluma, Jerusalem, 1992.⁵

On the page for Parashat Vayeshev we discussed the parallel hermeneutical rule: “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include.” At the outset, we must correct an error mentioned there. We wrote there that this rule appears as rule 4 in the list of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, and that the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” appears there as rule 3. That was mistaken. In the list of the thirty-two principles appear the rules “exclusion after exclusion” and “inclusion after inclusion.” The first of these derives from a double exclusion that two things are excluded. In the same way, rule 3 there derives from a double inclusion that two things are included. The rules “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” and “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include” are different rules, opposite in character, and they are not included in the list of the thirty-two principles.

In the fifth part of Sefer Keritut, called Lashon Limmudim (sections 12–13), Rabbi Samson of Chinon lists principles that were not included in the tannaitic lists — there are thirty such rules — and among them are these two. He notes that only when it is impossible to exclude twice do we interpret a double exclusion as inclusion, and only when it is impossible to include twice do we interpret a double inclusion as exclusion. That is the difference between the two rules in Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s list and these two rules.

“An Exclusion after an Exclusion Serves Only to Include”

We discussed the hermeneutical rule “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include” on the page for Parashat Vayeshev. There we saw that it appears in several different forms in rabbinic literature. The subject of that essay was one of its clearer appearances, in which the reasoning of “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include” seems to be based on a simple logical consideration.

The verse there was “And the pit was empty; there was no water in it.” The double exclusion in that verse teaches us to include snakes and scorpions as being present in the pit. The logic of this exposition is very simple: the second exclusion excludes not the subject itself, but the first exclusion, and when one excludes the exclusion, inclusion is created. In other words, the second exclusion teaches us that there is less exclusion than we had thought, and therefore an inclusion results. In our example: the pit is less empty than we had assumed, and we therefore conclude that it contained snakes and scorpions.

Our claim there was that the other appearances of the rule “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include” are based on the same logic, except that sometimes we are dealing with a rule of drash and not with a straightforward interpretive consideration. There are cases in which the language of the text itself does not suggest that the second exclusion excludes the first one — for example, when the two exclusions appear in different places. In such cases, we expound the two exclusions as though they were written one after the other. That is an artificial application of the same logical mechanism. See also Shprecher, around notes 15 and 17.

Is There a Logical Basis for the Rule “An Inclusion after an Inclusion Serves Only to Exclude”?

Can a parallel analysis explain the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude”? It seems quite clear that it cannot — see Shprecher in the notes just mentioned. Even if we understand the two inclusions as referring to one another, an inclusion of an inclusion does not generate an exclusion. There is an asymmetry between “exclusion after exclusion” and “inclusion after inclusion,” parallel to the asymmetry between two negations and two affirmations. The negation of a negation produces a reversal into a positive result, whereas an affirmation of an affirmation also produces a positive result — that is, no reversal occurs. The rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” therefore does not seem to rest on this sort of logical foundation. From a logical standpoint, a double inclusion ought to include even more.

When, however, we examine our exposition on the halakhic level, a different picture emerges. The Torah includes twice by means of the word “doorposts,” and from this we learn to exclude a doorway with one doorpost. The halakhic conclusion is that one doorpost suffices to obligate the doorway in mezuzah. At first glance, this is not an exclusion but an inclusion: the plain meaning of the text implies that only a doorway with two doorposts is obligated in mezuzah, whereas from the exposition we include a doorway with one doorpost as well. More than that: from this perspective, even the status of the basic wording is reversed. Linguistically, the word “doorposts” is indeed an inclusion, but halakhically it is an exclusion. Its halakhic meaning is that only a doorway with two doorposts is obligated in mezuzah — that is, it excludes a doorway with one doorpost. The exposition specifically includes such a doorway. This way of looking at things turns the entire picture upside down.

And indeed we find in Responsa of Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano, no. 101, the following:

“An inclusion of obligation after an inclusion of obligation serves only to reduce the conditions of obligation… Thus the second inclusion is itself a full inclusion, since it includes within the obligation an object that had previously been restricted in its defining conditions.”

In light of Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano’s remarks, we may view the matter in two ways:

1. On the halakhic level: the word “doorposts” is not itself an inclusion but an exclusion. It excludes a doorway with one doorpost from the obligation of mezuzah. If so, this exposition is not an inclusion after an inclusion but an exclusion after an exclusion. The result is therefore a halakhic inclusion: a doorway with one doorpost is also obligated in mezuzah, as we saw above. On this proposal, there is room to understand the logic of “an inclusion after an inclusion” in precise parallel to the logic of “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include,” as explained above. Still, this direction does not sit well with the terminology “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude.”
2. On the factual level: the exposition is indeed an inclusion after an inclusion, but the inclusion is not on the halakhic plane; it is on the plane of factual meaning. In the word “doorposts,” one doorpost is expanded into two. The result is an exclusion on the factual plane — reducing it back to one doorpost — which is in fact a halakhic inclusion.

It should be noted that from the overwhelming majority of commentators it appears that these two rules are mirror images of one another. But from this it would follow either that the rule “inclusion after inclusion” must also be interpreted as resting on a logical foundation, or that the rule “exclusion after exclusion” must also be interpreted as resting on a non-logical foundation. Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano chooses the first path. In his view, this rule too is based on a logical consideration, and therefore he focuses the discussion on the halakhic level. The two possibilities we raised above point in that direction. But as Shprecher already argues, apparently this is not correct, at least not according to all views. The two rules differ in character, and therefore Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano’s conclusion is not compelled.

The Origin of These Two Rules: Why They Do Not Appear in the Lists of Hermeneutical Principles

Above, we noted that both of these are rules of drash and not merely matters of plain-sense interpretation. Even the rule “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include,” which has a rational core, is not an ordinary logical consideration. As we saw on the page for Parashat Vayeshev, in most of its appearances — unlike the verse discussed there — it is a midrashic application. If so, we must now ask why these rules are not counted among the principles of Rabbi Ishmael or of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean.

Shprecher notes that the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” already appears in tannaitic literature. By contrast, the rule “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include” appears only in the Gemara, generally in anonymous form, which is usually regarded as later. Shprecher’s conjecture is that the older rule was “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude,” whereas “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include” is a later development that appears in several variants. The terminology developed by analogy to the older rule.

If the rule “an exclusion after an exclusion” really has a logical basis, then it is plausible that it could have developed even without tradition. Yet, as we saw, a considerable number of its appearances are nonetheless not logical. It therefore seems more likely that this rule did not arise from nothing, but developed out of existing rules of drash, and underwent gradual conceptualization and formulation over the generations — see the pages for Parashat Lekh Lekha and Parashat Vayikra. It is therefore no surprise that this rule does not appear in the tannaitic lists of hermeneutical principles, since in the tannaitic period it had not yet become a distinct and independent rule.⁶

By contrast, the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” is earlier, and it is likely that it already existed as a distinct rule in Rabbi Ishmael’s time. Why, then, does it not appear in his list of principles? We should recall that in our midrash it is Rabbi Ishmael who uses this rule. The solution that treats this rule as a matter of plain-sense interpretation could have solved the difficulty, but we saw above that this is not the case. It is a rule of drash.

A Possible Solution

As noted, these two rules are listed by Rabbi Samson of Chinon in Sefer Keritut, in the section Lashon Limmudim. We have mentioned more than once that he himself explains why Rabbi Ishmael did not count most of the principles listed by Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, and he offers three reasons for this — see the page for Parashat Vayeshev, chapter 1. But regarding the absence of these thirty rules from the earlier lists, he offers no explanation at all.

With respect to the rule “an exclusion after an exclusion serves only to include,” we have already seen one possible explanation. As for the rule presently under discussion, it may be that it is already included within other rules that do appear in those lists, and perhaps the same is true of all the other rules brought there. Under what rule might “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” be subsumed?

It would seem that it belongs to the family of inclusion and exclusion. True, these rules are more characteristic of the school of Rabbi Akiva, but we have already seen that Rabbi Ishmael also uses them — see, for example, the page for Parashat Korah. More than that, we saw there that the family of “inclusion and exclusion” rules is broad and ramified: there may also be biblical forms such as “inclusion and exclusion and exclusion,” or “exclusion and exclusion and inclusion,” and so forth.

If so, perhaps the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” is simply the rule of “inclusion and inclusion” — or, in Rabbi Ishmael’s more usual terminology, “general and general.” On this proposal, the terminology “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” arises because it is awkward to name a hermeneutical rule simply “inclusion and inclusion.” One therefore describes the configuration as “inclusion after inclusion,” and adds the rule telling us how such a biblical pattern is to be expounded.

A Possible Theoretical Framework for the Proposed Solution

In the passage in Babylonian Talmud, Bekhorot 51a, discussed on the page for Parashat Korah, we saw that wherever we find two adjacent general statements and the specific detail appears only afterward — a structure of “general, specific, and general” not in its canonical order — the Rabbis hold that we should place the specific detail between them and analyze the passage according to the ordinary rule of “general, specific, and general.” Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, by contrast, holds that we should not insert the specific detail between them; rather, we analyze the case according to the rule of “exclusion and inclusion.”

One possible explanation of this is based on the assumption that the rules of “general and specific” form an entire family of rules. All possible combinations — such as “general and specific,” “specific and general,” “general and general,” “specific and specific,” and likewise combinations of three elements and so on — are configurations that should be expounded according to the same system of laws. The fact that in Rabbi Ishmael’s list only the rules “general and specific,” “specific and general,” and “general, specific, and general” are explicitly mentioned may simply be because those three contain all the information needed for all the possible combinations: the law that applies when a specific detail follows a general statement, when a general statement follows a specific detail, and what to do when yet another general statement is added at the end.

Let us recall the basic laws. When a specific detail follows a general statement, it defines and narrows it to “nothing but what is in the specification.” When the general statement appears afterward, it once again broadens the narrowed class into a wider class: “items similar to the specification.” From this we concluded on the page for Parashat Korah that the structure “general and general and specific” — two adjacent general statements followed by a specific detail — is, according to Rabbi Ishmael, equivalent in its results to the structure “exclusion and inclusion.”

If this proposal is correct, then it is entirely possible that the same is true of the “inclusion and exclusion” expositions of the school of Rabbi Akiva. Both schools assume a full family of rules built from general statements and specifics, or inclusions and exclusions, in various combinations. The disagreement between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva concerns only the basic inferential laws governing those rules: what one does when a specific detail comes after a general statement — “general and specific,” or, according to Rabbi Akiva, “inclusion and exclusion” — and vice versa. Once these basic laws are defined — apparently three of them, since Rabbi Ishmael lists three “general and specific” rules — the entire system of each school is fully defined, and all the various combinations can be arranged in complete parallel.

The Rule of “General and General”

According to our proposal, the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” is nothing other than the rule of “general and general” according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael. We must now suggest, in light of that school’s inferential laws, how the rule of “general and general” should look in their system, and compare it with the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude.”

In ordinary cases, each general statement works in the direction of expansion. Therefore, when a structure of “general, specific, and general” appears, the final general statement broadens the class under discussion. But in the case of two consecutive general statements, it seems impossible to proceed in that way. The first general statement always presents the entire class. From that point onward, one can only narrow it by means of various specifics. When the structure is simply “general and general,” it is not clear what the ordinary laws of “general and specific” instruct us to do.

The simplest solution would be double inclusion — that is, that under this rule we should include even more. This is presumably the rule of “inclusion after inclusion” that appears in Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s list of thirty-two principles, rule 3. But we have seen that when there is no way to include more, the rule that tells us to exclude comes into force. In the ordinary framework of “general and specific,” the first general statement fixes the entire class. Clearly, from there one can only narrow it, and therefore a narrowing principle necessarily applies.

In our example, the Torah establishes that one needs “doorposts,” that is, two doorposts, in order to incur the obligation of mezuzah. The question that then arises is: why does it say this twice? It is impossible to include beyond two doorposts, since no doorway exists with more than two doorposts. The only possible solution in this case is that the Torah is hinting specifically at an exclusion — namely, a doorway with one doorpost.⁷ As we saw above, this is indeed a halakhic inclusion, but not an inclusion of doorposts.

What happens in the general case of “inclusion after inclusion”? Since we have seen that there is generally no situation in which the first general statement can be expanded further — after all, it defines the field and framework of the discussion — there is no doubt that we must narrow it. On the other hand, the structures “general and specific” and “general, specific, and general” also instruct us to narrow the first general statement. What, then, is the difference between those structures and the structure “general and general”?

A possible way out is that we do indeed exclude, but not necessarily by the mechanisms of “general and specific” or “general, specific, and general.” Since there is no specific detail here, we cannot derive either “items similar to the specification” or “nothing but what is in the specification.” The situation is more fluid, and we narrow and exclude according to what seems appropriate. In other words, “inclusion after inclusion” — when it is impossible to include further — is simply a form of exclusion.

Even in an ordinary exclusion there are no fixed rules about what exactly to exclude or how to exclude it. The same is true of ordinary inclusion. For example, in the exposition of the verse “You shall fear the Lord your God” — to include Torah scholars — how did we arrive specifically at Torah scholars? Only by means of some context-specific reasoning. The hermeneutical rule determines that, in the case at hand, one must exclude or include; the exegete determines what content to pour into that formula — what to exclude, or what to include.

A Linguistic Note

We have seen that the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion” is in fact one of Rabbi Ishmael’s “general and specific” principles — namely, the rule of “general and general.” We must now explain why this rule is formulated as “an inclusion after an inclusion,” rather than “a general statement after a general statement.”

Perhaps this is because we apply this rule only when we have no possibility of including twice. When such a possibility exists, one would use the ordinary rule of “inclusion after inclusion” in Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean’s list. When we see one general statement after another, the initial tendency is to include more, and that is precisely the rule of “inclusion after inclusion.” But when no further inclusion is possible, we exclude. That is why this rule is described as “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude”: in order to teach us that, contrary to initial intuition, here we do not include but exclude.

It may even be that the rule should be interpreted as follows: when there is no possible inclusion after an inclusion — that is, when no inclusion beyond the first general statement can be carried out — then the entire structure is intended only to exclude. It should be noted that, at least in literal terms, the sentence “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” is not quite correct. There certainly are cases of “inclusion after inclusion” that do include more and do not exclude; indeed, that is exactly rule 3 of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. The interpretation we have proposed resolves that problem.

Shprecher’s Proposal

In the article mentioned above, Shprecher proposes that the rule “an inclusion after an inclusion serves only to exclude” always concerns a word that admits two literal interpretations, one expansive and one restrictive. “To include” means to adopt the broader interpretation, whereas “to exclude” means to adopt the narrower one. He further explains that exclusion is always interpreted as a halakhic leniency. Our case contradicts his account, for here the result is a stringency — a doorway with only one doorpost is also obligated in mezuzah.⁸ In his terms, our exegete has actually chosen the broader meaning.

However, as we already noted above in discussing Rabbi Menahem Azariah of Fano, one may also speak of broadening and narrowing on the level of factual meaning rather than halakhic meaning. With respect to factual meaning, we really do choose here the narrower interpretation — even though, halakhically, it is not a leniency.

Beyond that, the claim that the word in our case admits two meanings is doubtful. Shprecher offers the interpretation that “doorposts” refers to many doorways, and the interpretation that it refers to two doorposts. But above we saw that Rabbi Akiva accepts Rabbi Ishmael’s exposition in principle; this means that he understands the word “doorposts” literally as referring to multiple doorposts, not to multiple doorways. Hence there is no true semantic double meaning in the word “doorposts.”

Thus, this very example contradicts Shprecher’s proposal, according to which there must always be two possible meanings, and the exposition instructs us to adopt the narrower one. According to our approach, by contrast, this rule may also apply to a word that has only one literal meaning. The exposition instructs us, for purposes of determining halakha, to interpret the word contrary to its literal plain meaning, and to derive the law only on the level of drash.

Why Does the Torah Use Such Confusing Language?

We must now ask ourselves a question that touches many expositions. If the literal meaning of the word “doorposts” is plural, and only on the level of drash do we treat it as singular, why did the Torah not write directly in the singular — “and you shall write them on the doorpost of your house” — so that we would not be misled about the halakhic meaning?

The answer to this question depends on one’s approach to the concept of drash, which we discussed briefly on the page for Parashat Masei. There we saw that some approaches hold that peshat is meant to teach us non-halakhic lessons — theological, moral, concerning the rationale of the verse, esoteric meaning, and the like. Other approaches maintain that drash is the true peshat, but that does not fit what we have seen here. Still other approaches maintain that peshat too must have halakhic significance. On that view, halakha is composed of a combination of drash and peshat together; that is Neshke’s position, and examples are discussed there.

For purposes of illustration in our case, we may suggest that according to Rabbi Meir the Torah is hinting to us that although one doorpost suffices for a doorway to incur the obligation of mezuzah, the doorway must nevertheless have two sides. In other words: according to Rabbi Meir, the second side need not be made of wood — or of the same material as the rest of the doorframe — but even Rabbi Meir requires that the doorway have a second side. That is why the Torah used the plural, even though its halakhic intention was satisfied by a single doorpost.

The practical implication would be a case in which one wall continues past the opening, while on the other side there is a doorpost only at the edge of the wall. According to our approach, in such a case even Rabbi Meir would exempt the doorway from mezuzah, because although Rabbi Meir does not require two actual doorposts, he does require two sides to the opening. Most legal decisors, however, do not rule this way — see Beit Yosef and Taz, Yoreh De’ah, at the beginning of section 287 — and therefore our remarks here are offered only as an illustration.

Footnotes