Ki Tavo (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help. Midah Tovah — On the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Ki Tavo, 5765

Questions

1. What is a “free” verbal analogy, and how does it differ from a verbal analogy that is not free?
2. How do the priest and the owner wave the first fruits together without an interposition?
3. Upon whom does the obligation of waving rest?
4. When do we apply a verbal analogy in both directions?
5. What is the source of the law of waving in first fruits?
6. May the sages interpret Scripture in a tendentious way?
7. Do contextual findings in the academic study of halakha necessarily indicate a lack of intellectual honesty on the part of the sages?
8. In what ways can the Torah be extended?

The Hermeneutical Principles

Gezerah shavah (verbal analogy). Asmachta (scriptural support).

“The priest shall take the basket from your hand and place it before the altar of the Lord your God.”
(Deuteronomy 26:4)

“His hands shall bring the Lord’s fire-offerings; he shall bring the fat together with the breast, the breast to wave it as a wave-offering before the Lord.”
(Leviticus 7:30)

It was taught in a baraita: “`And the priest shall take’ teaches that the first fruits require waving”; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob. What is Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob’s reason? He derives “hand” from “hand” from peace offerings. Here it is written, “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand,” and there it is written, “His hands shall bring.” Just as here it is the priest, so too there it is the priest; and just as there it is the owner, so too here it is the owner. How is this done? The priest places his hand beneath the owner’s hand and waves.
(Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 61a-b and parallels)

A. Waving in First Fruits and in Peace Offerings

Introduction

In the baraita cited above, Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob rules that the first fruits require waving. He bases this law on a verbal analogy from peace offerings.¹ Later in the baraita another law is presented concerning the waving of first fruits: the waving must be performed by both the priest and the owner together.

In the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 36b (and similarly in Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 19a), there is a parallel exposition regarding the meal-offering of a suspected adulteress and of a nazirite woman. These too require waving, and there as well the suspected adulteress or the nazirite woman, that is, the owner, and the priest do it together.

The Fundamental Difficulties in Understanding the Exposition

The structure of the midrash (rabbinic exposition) is as follows: first it establishes that there is a law of waving with respect to first fruits. It then compares first fruits to peace offerings and concludes that the owner and the priest wave together.

At first glance, the verbal analogy seems to rest on the assumption that there is already a law of waving in first fruits by the priest. A second assumption is that there is a law of waving in peace offerings by the owner. The verbal analogy now comes and teaches that first fruits also involve waving by the owner, and peace offerings also involve waving by the priest, and therefore in both contexts the owner and the priest wave together. According to the simple understanding of the verse as read by our midrash, the owner’s hand, from which the priest takes the basket, is the hand that waves the basket.

It should be noted that the rule accepted by us is that a verbal analogy cannot remove a verse entirely from its plain meaning, except in one case. See Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 24a; Rashi there; and Tosafot, s.v. “seven days,” Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 131b.

Accordingly, the structure of the exposition seems very strange: how can it emerge at all that the one who waves in first fruits is the priest? From the verbal analogy between “your hand” and “his hands” we learn from peace offerings, where the one who waves is the owner. The plain sense of our verse also speaks of the owner’s hand, and a verbal analogy cannot uproot the plain sense of the verse.²

One may ask even more sharply. Later in the exposition the conclusion is reached that in first fruits too the one who waves is the owner. If so, what is the logic of interpreting the term “your hand” in the verse as referring to the priest by force of a verbal analogy, against its plain meaning, when even according to the law generated by this very exposition those hands are indeed the owner’s hands?

There is yet another unclear point in the logical movement of the midrash. At the beginning, we learn the law of waving in first fruits from peace offerings. Afterwards, we return and learn waving by the priest from first fruits to peace offerings. But if the source for waving in first fruits is peace offerings, from where do we know that the one who waves is the priest? Seemingly, the one who waves should be the owner, as in peace offerings. From here it would appear that there is already a law of waving in first fruits prior to the verbal analogy, and that it is by the priest. The verbal analogy then merely transfers this law to peace offerings, and transfers the law of peace offerings to first fruits.

Finally, it is not clear what precisely the taking by the priest from the owner’s hands, as commanded in the verse, consists in. If it refers to the waving itself together with the owner, then the verbal analogy is not needed at all. And if the waving is learned from peace offerings by means of a verbal analogy, then it is unclear how the priest’s taking from the owner’s hands is realized.

Two Divergent Versions Regarding the Role of the Verbal Analogy

At first glance it is not entirely clear what is learned from this verbal analogy, and how. On the one hand, it seems that the continuation too is learned from a comparison between the two sides of that same analogy. On the other hand, the analogy appears as an answer to the question “What is the reason?”, that is, as the source for the very law of waving, and not necessarily for the requirement that they wave together. Third, at the opening of the baraita there is an additional source: “`And the priest shall take,'” and it is not clear what role this phrase plays in the course of the exposition.

One might have suggested that the verse “`And the priest shall take'” is the source for the law of waving in first fruits, and that the verbal analogy adds only the law of the double waving. But this does not fit the language of the midrash, for immediately after the opening sentence the midrash asks: “What is Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob’s reason?” This implies that the verbal analogy is the reason even for the basic law of waving in first fruits.

It should be noted that in parallel versions of the exposition, the opening also includes the continuation of the verse: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand.'" According to this version, the entire verse appears to be the source for the law of waving. The midrash asks how Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob derives the law of waving from this verse, and to that it answers by bringing the verbal analogy. However, in the Menahot passage only the words "And the priest shall take'” appear. This implies that the source for the basic law of waving does not require the word “from your hand”; that is, this law is not based on the verbal analogy. The priest’s taking from the owner’s hands is itself the waving of the first fruits. According to this version, this is not an exposition at all but an explicit law in the verse.

It should be noted that Maimonides, in Laws of First Fruits 3:12, cites the version found in Menahot:

From where do we know that they require waving? For it is said: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand,” to include the first fruits in the law of waving.

His language clearly shows that the source for the basic law of waving is not the verbal analogy but the taking by the priest. It also shows that the waving is learned from an inclusion in the verse, and therefore the source is not the verbal analogy. The Radvaz, however, comments there as if it were self-evident that Maimonides learns this from the verbal analogy, but Maimonides’ wording clearly suggests otherwise. By contrast, Tosafot, s.v. “the first fruits,” Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 47b, implies that the very law of waving is learned from the verbal analogy, in line with the Radvaz’s approach.

Another Implication of the Difference Between the Two Versions

There may be another difference between the two versions. If the source for waving in first fruits is “`And the priest shall take,'” then in first fruits the priest is the one who waves, and this is indeed explicit in our midrash, as will be discussed below. But if the source is the verbal analogy, then it apparently teaches us about the hands that do the waving, and in the verse those hands are the owner’s hands. If so, the verbal analogy would seem to imply that in first fruits too the one who waves is the owner, contrary to what appears in the midrash, or at least that both of them wave together, without either one being prior or principal. We shall encounter these approaches among the medieval authorities below.

A Bilateral Comparison Between the Two Sides of the Verbal Analogy

The bilateral comparison in the verbal analogy here also requires explanation. A verbal analogy always begins from a state of difference between the two sides, for otherwise there would be nothing to learn from one to the other. In such a situation, we usually transfer a law from one side to the other, and do not compare both sides in both directions. Such a process is appropriate when one side contains an explicit Torah law, and the other side contains an absence that can be filled in some way. In that case, the verbal analogy fills only the empty side.

However, when both sides are explicitly filled by the Torah, there is no reason to choose specifically one of them. At that point two possibilities open up:

1. Not to perform a verbal analogy at all. In our case, for example, we might say that in first fruits the one who waves is the priest, whereas in peace offerings the one who waves is the owner. There is therefore no absence to be filled, and no room for a verbal analogy. The Torah itself fixed the laws as different.
2. To perform a bilateral verbal analogy and equalize the two sides, as is done in our midrash.

What happens in our midrash? At first glance, this seems to depend on the two versions we have mentioned. According to the version in Menahot, both sides are indeed filled: in first fruits it is written explicitly that the priest waves, “`the priest shall take,'” while in peace offerings it is written explicitly that the owner waves. But according to the second version, the very law of waving in first fruits is also learned from the verbal analogy. If so, it is indeed unclear why we do not suffice with a verbal analogy from peace offerings to first fruits, which teaches that first fruits too require waving, and why we then continue and return it back to peace offerings to teach that in both cases they wave together.

Clarifying the Midrash

From everything said thus far, it emerges that the source for the basic obligation of waving in first fruits is not the verbal analogy but the verse itself, in accordance with the version in Menahot, and not with the Radvaz. The verse also teaches that the waving is done by the priest, not by the owner. Since the derivation is based not on the word “your hand” but on the words “And the priest shall take,'" there is no obstacle to understanding that the waving is not done by the owner. The priest's taking from the owner, explicit in the verse, is itself the waving. This explains the version found in Menahot, in which the second half of the verse is omitted and only "And the priest shall take'” appears, without “`the basket from your hand,'” because that is the source for the priest’s waving of the first fruits.

After bringing the source from the verse for the basic obligation of waving, the midrash asks: “What is Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob’s reason?” The intent here is not entirely clear, but from the answer that the midrash gives, namely, that the priest and the owner wave together, we learn that the difficulty was not about the very obligation to wave but about the identity of the one who waves. Apparently the midrash knew that waving is done by the owner, as in peace offerings, and it therefore asked how Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob derives waving from this verse, according to which it emerges that the waving is specifically done by the priest. The answer is that by means of the verbal analogy the waving is done by both together.

We now have two filled sides of the verbal analogy: in first fruits the waving is done by the priest, and in peace offerings by the owner. In such a situation we perform a verbal analogy and compare the two sides to one another. Why, then, do we not refrain from making the analogy, and instead decide to apply it in both directions? The answer is that in both cases the owner’s hands are mentioned, and so the Torah hints that the two cases should nevertheless be compared to one another. Even in first fruits, where the one who waves is the priest, the owner’s hands also participate in the waving, and therefore the conclusion is that both of them wave together. From there we then return and learn the same for peace offerings.

At this point the verbal analogy also accords with the plain meaning of the verse. In both cases the verse really refers to the owner’s hands, and therefore there is room for a comparison between the two cases. That is, the verbal analogy does not teach that the word “your hand” means the priest’s hand. It merely adds the priest to the owner’s hands. The comparison adds the priest to the waving performed by the owner’s hands, and therefore it does not conflict with the plain meaning.

Is There a Dispute Between the Sugyot Regarding the Meaning of the Exposition?

It should be noted that the difference in wording between the various discussions does not necessarily imply that the discussions themselves disagree. The situation is not symmetrical. The versions in Sukkah and Makkot cite the entire verse at the beginning of the exposition, but from this it does not necessarily follow that the very law of waving is learned from the verbal analogy. It may be that even according to that version the law of waving is learned from the verse itself, and that the verbal analogy merely adds the comparison regarding the identity of those who wave. In the version in Menahot, however, it appears quite clearly that the source for the law of waving is not the verbal analogy but the verse itself.

Who Is Primary?

In the verse concerning the waving of peace offerings, Leviticus 7:30, it is explicit that the owner is the one who waves, and the hands mentioned there are the owner’s hands. If so, the indicator for performing the verbal analogy is specifically the verse in our parashah, since here too the owner’s hands are mentioned, hinting at similarity to the case of peace offerings, while the verse explicitly states that the priest is the one who waves. Therefore the conclusion is that in our case both wave together, and the verbal analogy then returns and teaches that the same is true of peace offerings.

Accordingly, one might say that since in both cases the hands under discussion are the owner’s hands, the owner’s waving is the primary one, and the priest’s waving is only accompanying. This would be true in both cases.³ On this approach, the derivation works as follows: in our verse it is proven that the waving is done by both owner and priest together, and the verbal analogy teaches that the same applies to peace offerings.

By contrast, if we understand the verbal analogy as bilateral, the priest being learned from here to there and the owner from there to here, as the language of the midrash suggests, then there is no primary and secondary element. Rather, there is a double obligation resting on both the owner and the priest to wave.

If the very law of waving is learned from the verbal analogy, as the Radvaz holds, then clearly the basic law rests on the owner and is expressed in the phrase “from your hand.” The Radvaz presumably understands that the words “`And the priest shall take'” then add the priest as well to those who wave, and the verbal analogy transfers this back to peace offerings too.

The Dispute Among the Medieval Authorities on the Question of Who Is Primary

Tosafot in several places in the Talmud raises the question of how the waving is actually performed. In the midrash itself it is explicit that the priest places his hand beneath the owner’s hands and they then wave together. But if that is how they do it, there is a problem of interposition between the priest’s hands and the object being waved, and according to halakha this is forbidden. See Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 94a concerning partners, who must wave through one of them, for otherwise there would be an interposition.

Several principled approaches were offered to solve this problem:

Tosafot’s approach — s.v. “priest,” Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 61b and parallels — is that the priest and the owner touch different sides of the vessel, the owner at the handles and the priest at its lower rim. Tosafot adds that this also seems to follow from the Mishnah at the end of tractate Bikkurim, 3:6.

Rashi’s approach — in Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 94a, cited in Tosafot to Menahot 61b and printed there as “Old Rashi” — is that the priest in fact touches the owner’s hands, and there is indeed an interposition. Tosafot notes that this also seems to follow from the Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah, concerning the meal-offering of the suspected adulteress. Rashi explains that the primary waving is that of the owner, and therefore the fact that there is an interposition between the vessel and the priest’s hands is not a problem. According to this explanation, one can better understand why the midrash states that it is the priest who must place his hands beneath the owner’s hands, rather than the other way around. If the obligation were symmetrical for both of them, either one of them could have been the lower one.⁴

Tosafot in all these places asks Rashi: from where does he derive the claim that the owner is primary? The source in the midrash teaches us that there is a Torah obligation on both of them.

According to what we have said, however, Rashi’s source is the very consideration mentioned above. Since the hand under discussion is the owner’s hand, the addition of the priest is only ancillary to the owner’s obligation, and the owner is primary. As we noted, this also fits thoroughly the instruction that specifically the priest should be below, and this point is somewhat difficult for Tosafot’s approach.

A third approach is brought by Tosafot, s.v. “he puts in,” Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 36b. Tosafot there explains that there is a scriptural decree requiring both priest and owner, and therefore in such a case there is no law of interposition. In the discussion at the end of the chapter “Two Measures,” by contrast, the case is one of partners, and there each one has an obligation. There the interposition is therefore disqualifying.

On the simplest understanding, Tosafot seems to mean that the nature of the obligation resting on priest and owner differs from the obligation resting on partners. When partners bring a sacrifice that requires waving, each of them is independently obligated to wave. By contrast, the waving of priest and owner in first fruits, and in the meal-offering of the suspected adulteress and the nazirite woman, is a single obligation upon both of them together. The case in which the priest’s hands are under the owner’s hands is the ideal halakhic form of the waving, and therefore it is not meaningful to speak here of interposition.

This approach does not treat the owner as primary. Indeed, as we saw above, the movement of the midrash seems to be bilateral, from first fruits to peace offerings and back again, rather than following the approach more compatible with Rashi.

It seems that this is precisely the meaning of bilateral learning from the two sides of the verbal analogy. The two sides join one another and create one obligation. We do not have here a joining of separate obligations, that of the priest with that of the owner, but one obligation of the combined entity. We are not combining two separate obligations from the two sides of the verbal analogy; rather, each side contributes another detail to the totality.

The proof that there is indeed a prohibition of interposition between the hand of the one who waves and the object waved is found in Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 94a, at the end of the chapter “Two Measures.” There it is explained that partners wave through one of them, because if all of them were to wave, each would have to wave separately so that there would be no interposition, but the Torah said “a waving” and not “wavings.”⁵ We thus see that the obligations resting on two partners differ from that of priest and owner in first fruits. The obligations of partners are a combination of private obligations and not the creation of one comprehensive obligation; therefore, if they were to wave in the same manner as priest and owner in first fruits, one of them could be disqualified because of interposition.⁶

To sum up: we have found three principled approaches among the medieval authorities regarding the question of who is obligated in the waving, and what the relation is between the priest’s obligation and the owner’s obligation. According to Tosafot, there is an obligation upon each of the two individually. According to Rashi, the obligation is on the owner, and the priest is only an ancillary addition. According to Tosafot in Kiddushin, the obligation is one obligation on both of them together. The sharp point of disagreement among these three approaches lies in how to understand the bilateral comparison between the two sides of the verbal analogy: is it the combination of two obligations, or the joining of the addressees of the obligation to wave, or merely the addition of a secondary law to the owner’s obligation? As noted, the last reading is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the language of the midrash.

B. Several Remarks on the Characteristics of a Verbal Analogy

“A Verbal Analogy Cannot Be Partial”

In the sheet for Parashat Vayera, at the end of the second section, we encountered the rule: “A verbal analogy cannot be partial” — see Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 22b. There we saw that according to Rashbam, Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 120b, this rule means that a verbal analogy must be symmetrical. Rashi, by contrast, in the passage in Keritot,⁷ holds that the rule merely means that once one has chosen a direction for the verbal analogy, one must exhaust that direction fully, that is, compare the target to the source in all respects, but not necessarily reverse the direction and learn from the target back to the source.

There we explained that the meaning of such symmetrization is that the verbal analogy expresses an essential similarity between the two contexts under discussion — what we are here calling the “two sides.” If the contexts are essentially similar, then they should be compared in all directions. According to Rashi, however, a verbal analogy does not necessarily express essential similarity. At least in some cases it functions only as a formal tool for transferring laws from the source to the target. In such a case there is no necessity for symmetrization, because there is no assumption of essential similarity between the two contexts.

What about our verbal analogy? Here too the matter seems to depend on the two versions that have accompanied us throughout. According to the version in Menahot, there is already a law of waving in first fruits before the verbal analogy. If so, the verbal analogy compares the waving in first fruits and in peace offerings. According to the second version, however, the law of waving itself is learned by verbal analogy from peace offerings. That means the analogy does not compare the waving in the two cases, but rather compares first fruits and peace offerings themselves.

But what basis is there for comparing first fruits to peace offerings as such? Granted, if we compare the laws of waving, there is room for an essential analogy. The acts of waving are similar, and so it is plausible that they are carried out in a similar way. But bringing peace offerings and bringing first fruits are entirely different acts.

Therefore, according to the version in Menahot, it may indeed be a case of an essential comparison. More than that: on this reading it is clear why the Gemara compares in both directions. Since we are given contradictory laws — in peace offerings the owner waves, whereas in first fruits the priest waves — this itself interferes with the essential similarity between them. Therefore we harmonize them and equalize the two cases through combination. According to the second version, however, the verbal analogy is only a formal mechanism for transferring a law from the source to the target. We transferred the law of waving from peace offerings to first fruits. But now there is no clear reason to continue and compare the manner of waving as well, for there is no essential similarity between the two sides. Once again, the Radvaz’s understanding of the exposition appears problematic.

Two Types of Verbal Analogy

The writers on the hermeneutical rules distinguish between two kinds of verbal analogy — already Ramban does so in his glosses to the second root of Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot: there is a verbal analogy that interprets what is written in the Torah, and there is a verbal analogy that teaches us a law that is not written there.

In our case too, we must distinguish between the two versions. According to the version in Menahot, the comparison is between the two acts of waving. If so, the verbal analogy introduces two laws: that in first fruits the owner also waves, and that in peace offerings the priest also waves. But according to the second version, the verbal analogy compares first fruits and peace offerings. In that case it may indeed be teaching us what “your hand” or “his hands” means — namely, that both of them wave together.

A “Free” Verbal Analogy

The term “free”⁸ means redundant. A free word in the Torah is a word that has no explanation according to the simple meaning. In the discussions in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 64a and Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 22b-23a, a distinction is made among three kinds of verbal analogy: one that is free on both sides, one that is free on one side, and one that is not free at all. “Free on both sides” means that in both sides of the analogy the word that serves as the basis of the analogy is superfluous. “Free on one side” means that it is superfluous only on one side.

Already in the Talmud, practical differences are noted among these categories. A verbal analogy that is free on both sides is expounded and not refuted — that is, even if one has a possible objection to it, the objection is not taken into account. With respect to a verbal analogy free on one side, it is certainly expounded, but the tannaitic sages dispute whether objections may be raised against it; see the discussion in Niddah. Regarding a verbal analogy that is not free at all, the amoraic sages dispute there whether it is expounded and yet open to objection, or whether it is not expounded at all.

What is the situation in our case? It is not entirely clear. It seems that one could have written “`And the priest shall take the basket'” without the words “from your hand.” And in the case of peace offerings too, Leviticus 7:30, the opening part of the verse could have been omitted, since there is clear repetition there.

If this is correct, then we have here a verbal analogy that is free on both sides. In such a situation, we understand that the comparison between the two sides is something necessary, for otherwise we have no explanation at all for why those words were written in the Torah.

According to the first version of our exposition, the one from Menahot, the data establishing an obligation of waving exist before the verbal analogy, and the comparison is between the two wavings. Above we asked why we perform a verbal analogy between two sides that are already filled. We can now understand that there is no option not to perform it. If we ignore the free words, then the Torah contains words with no meaning. It follows that they must have been written for the sake of the verbal analogy. But since both sides are already filled, the only remaining possibility is to compare them in both directions.⁹

The Number of Free Terms: Another Remark on the Radvaz’s Approach

It should be noted that according to the Radvaz’s approach, this problem still remains, since one could have sufficed with a verbal analogy that teaches only the basic law of waving, and no more.

One possible answer within the Radvaz’s approach would be as follows: since this is a verbal analogy that is free on both sides, we are called upon to apply it in both directions. The reasoning is this: had the Torah wanted us to apply this analogy only in one direction — for example, only from peace offerings to first fruits, in order to teach the very law of waving — it would have sufficed to write only one free word. Making the second word free would have been unnecessary.

According to this suggestion, the quantity of “freeing” also dictates the mode in which the verbal analogy is to be applied. Freeing of words on both sides instructs us to compare them in both directions. According to the approach developed above, this means that there is an essential similarity between the two compared sides. By contrast, the freeing of only one side instructs us to learn the target from the source. One may still ask which side must be free — the source or the target — or whether that is irrelevant. In the terminology used above, we would say that in such a case the verbal analogy is only a formal tool for transferring a law from one place to another, but it does not reflect an essential similarity.

According to this suggestion, it may be that the above dispute between Rashi and Rashbam, over whether one must apply a verbal analogy in both directions, depends on the circumstances in which the verbal analogy appears. Perhaps there is no disagreement here at all; everything depends on the degree to which the terms are free.

C. Another Interesting Midrash in Our Parashah: On the Way of Midrash

“And you shall answer and say before the Lord your God: ‘An Aramean sought to destroy my father, and he went down to Egypt and sojourned there with a few people, and there he became a great nation, mighty and numerous.'”
(Deuteronomy 26:5)

Originally, whoever knew how to read would read, and whoever did not know how to read would be prompted. Those who did not know refrained from bringing, so they instituted that both those who knew and those who did not know would be prompted.
(Mishnah, Bikkurim 3:7)

“(5) ‘And you shall answer and say’: the term ‘answering’ is stated here, and ‘answering’ is stated elsewhere. Just as the ‘answering’ stated elsewhere is in Hebrew, so too the ‘answering’ stated here is in Hebrew. From here they said: originally whoever knew how to read would read, and whoever did not know would be prompted. They refrained from bringing, so they instituted that both those who knew and those who did not know would be prompted. They relied on the verse ‘And you shall answer’: ‘answering’ means only repeating after others.”
(Sifrei Devarim, piska 301, s.v. “(5) And you shall answer”; and similarly in Yalkut Shimoni and Midrash Tannaim here)

Introduction

The midrash cited above describes a historical development of a rabbinic enactment that was grounded in scriptural exposition. This description is interesting and may shed light on the way rabbinic expositions are formed, and we shall therefore deal with it briefly here.

Description of the Development

The Mishnah cited above describes a historical development in the law of reciting the first fruits declaration. In the earlier period, someone who brought first fruits and knew how to read the passage of the first fruits declaration would read it himself, while someone who did not know how to read would have it read out for him. After some time, because of the shame involved, some people refrained from bringing first fruits, lest it become known that they did not know how to read. Therefore the sages enacted that everyone should be prompted, in order that people not refrain from bringing first fruits.¹⁰

The Mishnah ends there. But in the version found in several parallel midrashim — see the Sifrei quoted above — an addition appears: when the sages enacted this measure, they relied on the verse in the first fruits declaration that uses the word “and you shall answer.” The term “answering,” according to that exposition, means repeating after others.¹¹

The Difficulty

It is not clear what the relation is between the need that arose — preventing shame, or preventing people from refraining to bring first fruits — and the exegetical source. In other words, it is not clear whether this is a mere asmachta, or a full-fledged exposition.

If this exposition is fully valid, then the first fruits declaration would intrinsically contain a law of prompting, independently of those who do not know how to read, and we should have done this from the outset even if no practical need had arisen. But if the exposition is not fully valid, that is, if it is only an asmachta, then why is it important that they attached it to this exposition? What does this accomplish? Is it intended merely as a mnemonic device — see Encyclopedia Talmudit, entry “Asmachta” — so that we remember to prompt all those who bring first fruits? That seems puzzling, for it is hard to see what benefit such an asmachta would provide.

A further difficulty along these lines is that in several other places we indeed find that the language of “answering” means speaking after others. If so, it seems that this is not merely an asmachta but a genuine exposition. For example, see Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 12:1, regarding the verse in Deuteronomy 25:9 about halitzah:¹²

“`And she shall answer and say’ — answering is only by repeating after another.”

This seems to show that the meaning of the term “answering,” whether in the plain sense or in rabbinic exposition, is “repeating after another.” If so, how can our exposition be treated as a mere asmachta?

“`And She Shall Answer and Say’:” Two Interpretations

The author of Torah Temimah there cites commentators who struggled with this, because we find several cases where the language of “answering” does not mean repeating after others, such as: “the Levites shall answer and say,” or “all the people shall answer,” and the like.¹² The matter is especially difficult in light of the language of the Jerusalem Talmud, which states the point categorically and sharply: “answering is only by repeating after another.”

The author of Torah Temimah resolves this by saying that “answering” always means responding to someone else. It does not always mean that someone is reading the text aloud for his fellow, but it does always involve dialogue. He brings there another explanation as well — somewhat forced, especially in light of the wording of our exposition, whether it is an asmachta or not — according to which the Jerusalem Talmud merely states the law and is not deriving it. The woman performing halitzah may answer only by repeating after another, but no claim is being made that the source of this law is the word “and she shall answer.” According to this, the meaning of “answering” is not necessarily “by repeating after another.”

According to both interpretations proposed here, we can understand the movement of the exposition with which we are dealing. Indeed, “answering” does not necessarily mean prompting by others. But when the need arose to enact that all bringers of first fruits be prompted, the sages expounded the word “and you shall answer” according to the interpretation of repeating after others. There are indeed other possible interpretations, but the need led to the adoption of this one.

“Led” in What Sense?

We ended the previous paragraph with the statement: “the need led to the adoption of the interpretation.” That sentence can be understood in three different ways:

1. This is not really the correct interpretation of the verse, neither in its plain sense nor in rabbinic exposition, but the sages enacted a regulation and cited the verse merely as an asmachta. As explained above, that approach is somewhat problematic.
2. This is one of several possible interpretations, and the sages adopted it because of the need. This suggestion too is problematic, for it is difficult to accept a tendentious interpretation of Scripture in light of needs, legitimate as those needs may be. One might have said that the sages saw that the verse could be interpreted in several ways and did not know how to decide between them by the accepted methods of interpretation. But in that case they should have followed the rules governing doubtful cases, not adopted one interpretation because of the need.
3. Therefore it seems that the development was different. In earlier times, those who brought first fruits would act each according to what he knew. At a certain point a problem arose, because people began refraining from bringing first fruits. As a result, the sages sat down to examine the issue. Then they discovered the verse “and you shall answer and say,” and asked themselves whether this might not be a command to have everyone repeat after others. Once they became convinced that this was so, they established the law. It was therefore a full halakha, not an asmachta: “answering means only by repeating after another.” In this account, the need was not the cause of the interpretation and the legal ruling, but the catalyst that led them to sit down and examine the matter.

As an example, we may cite Rabbi Akiva’s exposition in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 64b, which changed an earlier law according to which a woman was forbidden to groom and adorn herself during her menstrual days, solely so that she should not become repulsive to her husband. It stands to reason that he was not interpreting the verse tendentiously; rather, because of the need that had arisen, he examined the verse more deeply and found an exposition that enabled him to solve the problem before him.

A Possible Lesson for Current Controversies

There is often criticism of the results of academic study of halakha when such study determines that an interpretation emerged in response to a need.¹³ This criticism assumes that the meaning of such research is like possibility 2 above: the need determined the interpretation. But whether or not the researcher himself intended it that way, this is certainly not the only possible meaning of such findings. They may also mean what we called possibility 3: the circumstances lead the sages to examine the sugya, and then they discover a law, or a source, that had escaped notice until then, and this is what solves the problem for them.¹⁴

Another Possibility

In the sheet for Parashat Yitro we pointed out that asmachta and plain-sense interpretation are not the only possible relations between a law and the biblical text. There are different degrees of connection: full, partial, or empty. Even an asmachta is not necessarily merely a mnemonic device and nothing more; it may be an incomplete connection between the law and Scripture. Likewise, we saw there that according to Maimonides’ conception, creative midrash is not a means of uncovering what is already latent in the Torah, but a means of extending halakha beyond what is explicitly written, or fully latent, in the Torah.

Accordingly, another possible way to understand the description in our midrash is this: the Torah gave the sages possibilities for extending what is said in the Torah, and that is exactly what they did in our case. This raises the question of criteria: when, and under what circumstances, may one extend what is said in the Torah? Is this only a choice among several possible interpretations, or can it be a broader extension? Does every practical need permit such an extension? What are the limits of midrashic freedom? This takes us back to possibility 2 above, and this is not the place to elaborate further.¹⁵

Footnotes