Vayeshev (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help
Midah Tovah — Friday eve of Parashat Vayeshev, 5766

The Questions

1. What is the logic of the rule, “one exclusion following another serves only to include”?
2. Its applications on the level of plain-sense interpretation and on the level of midrashic interpretation.
3. What are the implications for long series of exclusions?
4. Does the Babylonian Talmud agree with the Jerusalem Talmud’s ruling that three consecutive exclusions all exclude?
5. Considerations of economy of formulation and textual availability in the background of interpretations based on the principle of “one exclusion following another.”

The Hermeneutical Principles

• One exclusion following another serves only to include.
• Exclusion following exclusion following exclusion.

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

“The pit was empty; there was no water in it.” Since it says, “the pit was empty,” do I not already know that there was no water in it? Why then does Scripture say, “there was no water in it”? There was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it.

— Rashi on Genesis 37:24; Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 22a; Chagigah 3a

“They cast him into the pit, and the pit was empty; there was no water in it.” There was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it. There were two pits: one full of pebbles, and one full of snakes and scorpions.

— Genesis Rabbah 84:16

The interpretation here is based on the doubling of two exclusions in the verse, and apparently makes use of the hermeneutical principle, “one exclusion following another serves only to include.”¹ We explained the logic of the interpretation: the second exclusion excludes the first exclusion, and the de facto result is therefore inclusion, that is, a qualification of the first exclusion. “The pit was empty” excludes everything, and then the second exclusion explains that the emptiness is only with respect to water; this implies that snakes and scorpions were in it. In other words, the inclusion here is relative to the state created by the first exclusion. A pit, taken in itself, may contain anything, so when we are newly told that it contained snakes and scorpions but not water, that is an exclusion, not an inclusion. The principle teaches that the inclusion is only relative to the state after the first exclusion, since it turns out that the first exclusion was not absolute. The pit was not completely empty; its emptiness was only partial.

We then surveyed several additional examples of this hermeneutical principle in use, and saw that rabbinic literature contains many different manifestations of it. We presented the differences among them by means of a table illustrating the range of appearances of this principle.

We noted that in some cases the exclusion is superfluous, while in others there is no way to formulate the verse without it. We also saw that in some cases the second exclusion simply cancels the first, and does not merely qualify it.

Passage / feature	Are the exclusionary expressions identical?	Are the exclusions adjacent?	Does the inclusion cancel one of the exclusions?	Could the verse have been written differently?	Are the two exclusions on the same axis?	Is the interpretation midrashic or plain-sense?
Megillah passage	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Midrashic
Sanhedrin passage	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Midrashic
Bava Kamma passage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Midrashic
Our passage	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Plain-sense

We emphasized that in most of these cases it is hard to see the inclusive conclusion as a logical result of the biblical wording, unlike the present case. We suggested that there are several different forms of application here, and their common denominator is that in all of them we treat the verses, despite their different structures, as though they were written in the form of our verse: the second exclusion excludes the first.

We wondered whether this is a hermeneutical rule or a plain-sense interpretation, at least in the present case, where we saw a reasonable rationale for the inclusive reading. Perhaps for this reason the rule “one exclusion following another” is not explicitly mentioned here, since in our case it is simply a plain-sense interpretation. We suggested that perhaps on this point there is a dispute between the midrash and the Babylonian Talmud.

We also noted that perhaps when the exclusions appear one after another, the interpretation is plain-sense, whereas when they appear in different places, it is an interpretation. The question whether the exclusion is superfluous in the wording of the verse also seems relevant to the question whether we are dealing with plain-sense interpretation or with an interpretive derivation.

We asked ourselves whether this interpretation could be made by the school of Rabbi Ishmael, since they are not generally inclined to expound duplications, and usually maintain that “the Torah speaks in human language” (see the sheet on Parashat Vayetze, 5765–66). Admittedly, in our case we are not dealing with genuinely duplicated expressions, since “empty” does not mean “there was no water in it” — it is a broader exclusion — but even so one must consider the possibility that the Torah is merely speaking here in human idiom. In other cases presented there, the expressions are entirely identical; for example, in Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 23b, where all the exclusions are derived from the word “priest,” a case to be discussed below.

We also noted the difficulty in characterizing exclusionary words, which are varied and diverse, and it is not always clear that they are in fact words of exclusion. In order to decide to interpret by this principle, one needs a prior assumption that there is some key word that should be sought out and interpreted as one exclusion following another.

In the system of the Thirty-Two Principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, the principle “one exclusion following another” appears, and at first glance the example given there seems to be a plain-sense interpretation (an examination of Sefer Keritut raises doubts about that conclusion). We noted that this list is associated with the school of Rabbi Akiva, so it is not surprising that it is absent from the thirteen principles of Rabbi Ishmael in the baraita at the beginning of the Sifra. This conclusion fits thoroughly with the fact that the school of Rabbi Ishmael does not expound duplications, because it holds that “the Torah speaks in human language.”

We concluded last year’s article with a discussion of different operations of negation and their logical meanings, illustrating them through the distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions.

B. Exclusion Following Exclusion Following Exclusion

Introduction

In this article we will try to focus on interpretations that deal with several consecutive exclusions. This is, apparently, the case we encountered in the Megillah passage in last year’s article (see also below). We will try to learn from them something about the use of this principle in general, and to apply to them some of the conclusions that arose in the 5765 article.

What does one do when there are three consecutive exclusions, and not just two as in the usual case? The basis of the discussion appears in Jerusalem Talmud, Horayot, at the beginning of the tractate, and in the parallel passage in Babylonian Talmud, Horayot 2b, and elsewhere.

An Individual Who Acted on the Court’s Ruling

The Mishnah at the beginning of Horayot states:

If the court ruled that one may transgress one of any of the commandments stated in the Torah, and an individual went and acted unintentionally on their ruling — whether they acted and he acted with them, whether they acted and he acted after them, or whether they did not act and he acted — he is exempt, because he relied on the court.

— Mishnah, Horayot 1:1

The Mishnah rules that an individual who committed a transgression carrying karet (the severe penalty of extirpation) on the instruction of the court — that is, he relied on their ruling — is exempt from bringing an individual sin-offering for his inadvertent act. It emerges in the Gemara that this Mishnah follows Rabbi Judah, but the Sages disagree with him and maintain that the individual is liable to a sin-offering for his inadvertent act. According to them, the individual’s exemption applies only when many people acted on the court’s ruling. In that situation the court brings the bull-offering for an erroneous ruling, and that exempts the individuals who acted on its instruction. A parallel to this appears at the beginning of the Sifra on Leviticus (Dibura deHovah, beginning of parashah 7), and as is well known, “the anonymous Sifra follows Rabbi Judah.” These occurrences are therefore consistent, and all come from the school of Rabbi Judah, which probably belongs to the school of Rabbi Akiva.

In all these sources, Rabbi Judah derives his view from the verse in the passage of the sin-offering, Leviticus 4:2 and 27:

Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a person should sin unintentionally regarding any of the commandments of the Lord that must not be done, and does one of them … And if one person from among the common people should sin unintentionally in doing one of the commandments of the Lord that must not be done, and becomes guilty.

— Leviticus 4:2, 27

The Jerusalem Talmud there states:

“If the court ruled, etc.” — “a person should sin,” “one” should sin, “in doing” should sin: these are exclusions. One who relies on himself is liable, while one who relies on the court is exempt. Everywhere else you say that one exclusion following another serves to include, but here you say that one exclusion following another serves to exclude? Rabbi Matanya said: This case is different, because Scripture has written exclusion following exclusion following exclusion.

The interpretation states that in these verses there are three different exclusions regarding the kind of sin that obligates a sin-offering: “a person” should sin, “one” should sin, “in doing” should sin.

The language of the Jerusalem Talmud does not specify what is excluded by each of these exclusions. One of them is the subject of the interpretation in our passage, namely the exclusion of one who relies on the court’s opinion. The source for this is “a person should sin” (see Mareh HaPanim on the Jerusalem Talmud there, who brings several views on the point), meaning that liability for a sin-offering exists only when the sin is the person’s own, to the exclusion of one who relies on the court’s opinion, in which case he does not bring a sin-offering. The other exclusions are detailed elsewhere; see Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 93a.

The Shabbat passage explains that even one who disagrees with Rabbi Judah and maintains that an individual who acted on the court’s ruling is liable — and so too the halakha (normative Jewish law), as we noted above — does not dispute that there are exclusions here; he simply derives something else from this exclusion.

A Conjecture About the Choice of the Exclusionary Words

At first glance, the exclusion seems to come only from the second verse, verse 27, since it is there that the three exclusionary words appear. However, from the wording of the interpretation it seems that it is specifically the exclusion from the first verse, verse 2, that is taken into account, for the wording used is “a person should sin,” which appears only in verse 2.

Perhaps the reason lies in the question of textual availability — that is, whether a word is free for interpretation (see last year’s article on textual availability in exclusions). If we look at the verse, the words “in doing” and “one” are not necessary to the formulation of the verse, and it is therefore plausible that they are intended for exclusion. But it is hard to see how the verse could be formulated without the word “person.”² Therefore the midrash directs our attention to the parallel verse, where the word “person” also appears, thereby creating textual availability for that word as well.

We should note that in the parallel Babylonian passage in Shabbat, the entire interpretation seems to deal only with verse 27; the word “if” does not appear there. It is possible that the wording of the midrash in the Jerusalem Talmud is erroneous, and that another verse was quoted there merely out of force of habit.

Three Exclusions

The Jerusalem Talmud then raises a difficulty against this exclusionary interpretation. Usually in the Talmud we assume that when there are two exclusions, we interpret them by the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include,” rather than taking both as exclusions. If so, why are three exclusions here taken as exclusions? The Jerusalem Talmud explains that the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” applies only when there are two exclusions in the passage. Here, however, there are three exclusions, and in such a case that rule does not apply, so all three are intended to exclude.

Now, the Gemara at the end of Shabbat 93a explains that according to Rabbi Meir there are only two exclusions here, because the word “should sin” is not written with each of the exclusionary words; it appears only twice. The Gemara rules that the phrase “one person” is one exclusion, not two, and therefore Rabbi Meir derives only one additional teaching beyond the exclusion of the individual who acted on the court’s ruling.

If so, in the Babylonian Talmud the Jerusalem Talmud’s difficulty returns: why, when there are two exclusions, are they not interpreted inclusively? Apparently the Babylonian Talmud holds that the structure here is not a case of “one exclusion following another” at all, and therefore there is no inclusion here. If so, then even one who thinks there are three exclusions is not excluding because of the Jerusalem Talmud’s qualification — that with three exclusions we exclude rather than include — but because this is a structure that does not produce inclusion. It seems, then, that the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with the Jerusalem Talmud’s qualification.

We must understand two points that emerge from the Babylonian approach:

1. Why is the Jerusalem Talmud’s rule correct in the first place? Then we must examine why the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with it, and what the point of dispute between them is.
2. Why, according to the Babylonian Talmud, is the specific structure of consecutive exclusions in our case — counted as two according to one tanna and as three according to another — interpreted for exclusion rather than inclusion?

As for the question concerning Rabbi Meir, who does not derive inclusion even though according to him there are only two exclusions, that may depend on the fact that, according to the Babylonian Talmud, all the expounded words appear in verse 27. If so, the word “person” is not textually available, since it is not viewed as duplicated against verse 2. It therefore cannot be seen as an exclusion at all, and certainly not as a basis for the rule “one exclusion following another.”

As background for understanding the logic of the Jerusalem Talmud, let us now examine several additional cases of multiple exclusions.

Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 23b³

In tractate Megillah 23b, it is derived that the valuation of land and of persons is carried out by a court composed of nine Israelites and one priest. The source is that the word “priest” appears ten times in the passage dealing with valuations. The first “priest” is expounded for its own sake, that is, it teaches that a priest is required, thereby excluding ordinary Israelites. The second “priest” also, at least at first glance, excludes Israelites, but precisely for that reason it is a case of one exclusion following the first exclusion, and the Gemara therefore concludes that it comes to include. The conclusion is that the second judge on the valuation court may be an Israelite. The third “priest” is likewise an exclusion following an exclusion, and therefore it again includes an Israelite, and so on with all the rest. Thus we arrive at a court of nine Israelites and one priest.⁴

The Gemara then asks why we should not treat the third occurrence as a first exclusion, rather than as an exclusion following an exclusion. After all, once we have concluded above that the second occurrence comes to include, it is no longer an exclusion, and so the third occurrence that follows it is not an exclusion following an exclusion. It should therefore exclude rather than include. On this understanding, the fourth exclusion would indeed be an exclusion following an exclusion and would include; the fifth would exclude; the sixth would include; the seventh would exclude; and so on. If we were to understand the exclusions in that way, the conclusion would be that the valuation court should have five Israelites and at least five priests.⁵ The Gemara leaves this as an unresolved difficulty.⁶

It is worth noting that in the Megillah passage the exclusions are all produced by the very same word itself, unlike other cases such as “empty” and “there was no water in it.” Moreover, it is difficult there to say that this is the intention of the verses themselves, as we could in the case of “the pit was empty; there was no water in it,” were it not for the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include.” On its face, that seems to be an interpretive derivation rather than a plain-sense reading. Still, according to our proposal last year, we treat all those words as though they were written one after another, and then formally apply to them the logical consideration of the example in our portion: the exclusion “there was no water in it” functions as a qualification of the exclusion “empty,” and therefore de facto produces inclusion.

Comparison with the Jerusalem Talmud, Horayot

If we examine the Megillah passage in light of the Jerusalem Talmud’s determination above, a problem emerges. Suppose the word “priest” had appeared three times in the passage. In that case, according to the Jerusalem Talmud in Horayot, none of them would come to include, and we would have to interpret three exclusions, that is, a court composed specifically of three priests. Likewise, in a case of ten exclusions, the necessary conclusion would be that the court must consist specifically of ten priests.

But what is the conclusion of the Megillah passage? According to the straightforward meaning of the Mishnah, which requires one priest, all the exclusions after the first indeed include, just as in the rule of one exclusion following another. According to the objection raised there, the words are interpreted as alternating inclusion and exclusion. In any event, neither of these two possibilities accords with the Jerusalem Talmud.

This becomes even sharper when we notice that two possibilities arise there, and one of them is presented as an objection to the Mishnah. Even when all possibilities are considered, including those that run contrary to the wording of the Mishnah itself, the Jerusalem Talmud’s possibility is not raised. It seems from this that the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with the Jerusalem Talmud head-on.

The author of Mareh HaPanim on the Jerusalem Talmud, Horayot, notes the difficulty from the Megillah passage, but he specifically brings proof from that passage in support of the Jerusalem Talmud’s answer, because the Gemara there is unwilling to treat the third exclusion as inclusion and instead regards it as exclusion. From this he infers that the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” was said only of two exclusions and no more.⁷

However, as we noted, in the possibility raised there and left as a difficulty, there is no position that all the exclusions exclude. The view that appears is only that the third returns to excluding, but the second is still an inclusion in any case. So in any event this is not like the conclusion of the Jerusalem Talmud in Horayot.

The early authorities on Horayot also raise this problem and address it in various ways. We will now survey the different approaches that arise regarding this passage.

The Approach of Tosafot HaRosh

Tosafot HaRosh, in his novellae to Horayot, s.v. “A person should sin,” rules on the basis of the Megillah passage that the Babylonian Talmud does not accept the Jerusalem Talmud’s distinction between two exclusions and three. According to the Babylonian Talmud, one always excludes, so long as exclusion is possible. Only where exclusion is not possible does one include.

It seems that according to the Rosh, the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” does not arise from any inherent logic of the kind we presented last year — the limitation of an exclusion that turns it into an inclusion. Rather, in his view every exclusion should exclude. Only when we do not find anything to exclude do we include. In the Megillah passage there is nothing further to exclude from each occurrence of “priest,” and therefore some of them serve to include, whereas here we found something to exclude from each of the exclusionary words.

According to the Rosh, then, the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” is not really a rule at all, but a kind of application of “if it is not needed for its own context.” If we do not succeed in using the exclusionary word as an exclusion, we use it for some other purpose, and what remains is inclusion. It may be that if we found some other use for it — for example, an analogy between verses, or something else — that too would be acceptable. Presumably, according to this view, textual availability is required in order to exclude from a given word; otherwise, why should we interpret the word at all if we have nothing to exclude from it? From the Rosh’s words it seems that this rule comes to solve interpretive difficulties.

We may note that according to this view, the difficulty we raised above in connection with the Shabbat passage — why, according to Rabbi Meir, who thinks there are only two exclusions, no inclusion is derived from them — is easily resolved. According to the Rosh, we do not include because we have the possibility of finding an exclusion. It thus follows that even where there are two exclusions, one does not always include, exactly as the Rosh says.

This approach is difficult from several angles:

1. Why does the Jerusalem Talmud not accept such an approach? And if there is some reason or tradition not to do so, why posit a dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds?
2. Why does the question whether to exclude or not begin only with the second exclusion? In other words, why is it only the second exclusion that serves for inclusion? Why not say that even with the first exclusion, if we do not find anything to exclude, we should include? One might perhaps explain that usually when there is one exclusion, the second is superfluous and therefore should be used for inclusion — but that is not necessarily so.
3. It is still unclear why the Megillah passage assumes that every second exclusion comes to include, and does not say that ten priests are required. The possibility that all the words exclude Israelites is rejected out of hand. Without the Rosh’s view, the Gemara’s assumption is clear, because there is a rule that every exclusion following an exclusion must include. But according to the Rosh, the Gemara there is unclear.

Perhaps one could explain this on the basis of Rabbenu Hananel there, who says that if the Torah had wanted ten priests, it would have been enough to write the word “priest” once. Since it was written ten times, that proves that ten priests were not intended. The question then becomes what the Torah did intend. It is not clear why the answer should specifically be five and five. Perhaps, according to the Rosh, that is itself the answer to the unresolved difficulty in the passage there, which asked why not make it five and five.

For these reasons, most of the early authorities tend to reconcile the passages with one another. Let us now see the various possibilities that arise in their writings.

The Approach of the Rash in Tosafot and of Mareh HaPanim

The author of Mareh HaPanim sensed this problem, and explains that in the Jerusalem Talmud one can apply all the exclusions to the subject matter at hand and treat them all as exclusions, because they are different exclusions — apparently meaning different exclusionary words, excluding different things. But in Megillah all the exclusions concern the same matter, and come from the same word, “priest.” Therefore the decision is that half of them exclude and half include. He adds at the end of his remarks that this also seems to be the intent of Tosafot in the Babylonian Horayot passage. Indeed, in Tosafot on Horayot 2a, s.v. “These are,” this is brought in the name of Rashba in Niddah — though apparently this is Rabbi Samson of Sens, one of the Tosafists.

At first glance, this is a natural conclusion from the explanation we proposed in last year’s article. There we suggested that the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” is based on viewing the second exclusion as qualifying the first, and thereby in practice including. According to that, if the second exclusion acts on the same axis as the first, it qualifies it. And if the third exclusion also acts on that same axis, there is no reason to suppose that it now goes back and cancels the qualification introduced by the second; had that been the Torah’s intention, both could simply have been omitted and we would still have arrived at the same conclusion. But if all the exclusions operate on different axes, there is no reason to suppose that any one of them qualifies the first exclusion and thereby includes. In such a case, we assume that they all exclude.

In last year’s article we distinguished between cases in which the second exclusion includes and cancels the innovation of the first exclusion, and cases in which it qualifies it along a different axis; see also the table above.

According to this approach, the difficulty in the Shabbat passage is well resolved, because even with two exclusions, if they are made through different words, we do not include. But it is hard to understand a number of other cases in which we do apply the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” even though the exclusions are made through different words.

It may be that the Rash intended this distinction only where there are more than two exclusions. In that case the outcome depends on whether the words are identical or different. But with two exclusions we always interpret one exclusion following another in the usual way. If so, the question in tractate Shabbat — why, according to Rabbi Meir, we do not derive inclusion — returns in full force.

Rashi’s Approach

The author of Mareh HaPanim reports that Rashi resolved the difficulty from the Jerusalem Talmud in another way. He explains that here the three exclusions appear in the same verse, and in such a case we learn that they are all intended to exclude. By contrast, in the valuation court the exclusions occur in different verses, and in that case we proceed as in the Babylonian Talmud. He says that he found this in the baraita of the Thirty-Two Principles.

As we saw above, here too it would seem that the intended distinction applies only where there are more than two exclusions. As can be seen from last week’s article and from the table above, when there are two exclusions we include even if they are found in the same verse and are adjacent — for example, in the case from our portion, “the pit was empty; there was no water in it.”

The author of Mareh HaPanim is apparently referring to Rashi on Horayot 3a, s.v. “The ציבור brings.” But Rashi there asks, regarding the Babylonian Talmud’s derivation from the three exclusions, why we do not apply the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include.” To that he brings the Jerusalem Talmud’s answer that here there are three exclusions. He does not at all refer to the valuation-court passage in Megillah. Admittedly, he adds there the words, “Here, where there are three exclusions one after another in a single verse, all of them come to exclude. And so I found in the Thirty-Two Principles.”⁸ The author of Mareh HaPanim apparently understood that the addition that the exclusions must be “in a single verse” was meant to resolve the Megillah passage. But that does not seem to be Rashi’s meaning, since he does not refer to that passage at all. It seems rather that he wrote this merely as a habitual formulation.

In any event, this line of explanation apparently makes use of a different distinction that we proposed in last year’s article, when we asked whether the exclusions are adjacent. But there that distinction worked in the opposite direction: when the exclusions are adjacent, it is more plausible to interpret the second exclusion as qualifying the first, and therefore as including; when they are not adjacent, each one stands as an exclusion in its own right. By contrast, the explanation proposed here says that precisely when the exclusions appear in the same verse, they all exclude; and when they are scattered, there is interaction among them. This distinction seems formal, and its basis is unclear. Nor is its underlying rationale clear. As we noted above, Rashi’s wording itself does not suggest that he intended such a distinction at all.

Tosafot’s Approach

In Tosafot on Horayot, s.v. “These are,” it is written that one exclusion following another serves to include only when the number of exclusions is even. Therefore, in the Megillah passage the Gemara includes, since the word “priest” appears ten times. By contrast, in Horayot there are three exclusions, and therefore no inclusion is derived there; all of them exclude.

It appears from Tosafot that when there are three exclusions, the first excludes, the second ought to include, and the third ought to exclude. However, since there is no fourth exclusion that would include, it turns out that the second exclusion too does not come to include. The logical reason for this is unclear. Why should the absence of a fourth exclusion reveal that the second does not include but excludes?

Perhaps Tosafot understands the matter as we suggested above: the second exclusion does not simply include, but qualifies the first exclusion. Once there is a third exclusion, it becomes clear that the function of the exclusions here is not to qualify the first exclusion, and thereby include, but rather to exclude independently. But according to this explanation, the Jerusalem Talmud would be right that from three exclusions onward, whether the number is even or odd, they should all exclude.

It is also possible that one should combine here one of the previous explanations: since the exclusionary words here are different, it appears that each has its own role, and therefore all of them exclude. But in the valuation court all the exclusionary words are identical, so their mutual relationship is obvious. Still, this does not seem to be the plain meaning of Tosafot’s language.

Explaining the Jerusalem Talmud’s Rule

Why indeed, according to the Jerusalem Talmud — and according to most views in the Babylonian Talmud as well — do we not apply the rule “one exclusion following another serves only to include” when the number of exclusions is greater than two? It seems that in such a situation it is very difficult to see the later exclusions as qualifications of the first exclusion. As we mentioned, even when on the plain-sense level the second exclusion cannot naturally be interpreted as a qualification of the first, on the interpretive level we nevertheless treat it that way.

If so, everything begins from a case like the one in our portion, where the consideration behind “one exclusion following another serves only to include” exists and is also reasonable in plain logic and in plain sense. From there one can extend the consideration even to cases where it is not persuasive on the level of plain sense. But if there are three exclusions, it is no longer reasonable to see the latter two as a qualification of the first, even when they are written in a form parallel to our verse.

This can be illustrated by the following example: if the verse had said, “The pit was empty; there was no water in it, and there were no scorpions in it,” then according to the Jerusalem Talmud we would not infer that there was something in the pit other than scorpions and water — for example, snakes. The reason is that in such a situation Scripture ought to have written it the other way around: “and there were snakes in the pit.” That is a more economical and efficient formulation than reaching the same result by means of two different qualifications of the first exclusion. Only when the pit contains both snakes and scorpions is the economical way to express this to say that there was no water in it, thereby qualifying the first exclusion, “the pit was empty.”

Perhaps from here there arises another answer to the contradiction from the Megillah passage. The exclusions there are all identical words, and therefore the consideration that the text could have been written differently, more economically, does not arise. How else could the requirement of one priest and nine Israelites have been written more economically? One must remember that in any case we need ten words that teach the requirement of ten judges. If so, the Torah simply writes them all as “priest,” and with that same number of words succeeds in teaching us the composition of the court as well.

Footnotes