Behar-Bechukotai (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help. Mida Tovah — Sabbath eve, Parashat Behar-Bechukotai, 5766

Questions

1. When something leaves a general category in order to be governed by a new rule, does it still remain part of the category?
2. Is it an ordinary member within the category, or a different species within the broader type defined by that category?
3. Is there a difference in this respect between a case in which Scripture explicitly returns it to its category and one in which it does not?
4. In such a case, can one learn back from it to the category by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach”?
5. Must a derivation based on the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach” necessarily rest on some interpretive difficulty?

Hermeneutical principles

• An item that left the general category.
• An item that went out to be judged by a new matter.
• Binyan av (inductive derivation from a paradigm).
• Let the unspecified be learned from the explicit.

“And if it is an animal from which an offering may be brought to the Lord, then whatever one gives from it to the Lord shall be holy. He shall not replace it or exchange it, good for bad or bad for good; and if he does exchange one animal for another, then both it and its substitute shall be holy.”

— Leviticus 27:9-10

“And every tithe of herd and flock, every tenth animal that passes under the staff, shall be holy to the Lord. He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad, nor shall he exchange it; and if he does exchange it, then both it and its substitute shall be holy; it may not be redeemed.”

— Leviticus 27:32-33

Our Rabbis taught: Why was it stated, “He shall not inspect whether it is good or bad, nor shall he exchange it”? Was it not already stated, “He shall not replace it or exchange it, good for bad,” and so forth? Since it says, “He shall not replace it or exchange it,” that implies an individual offering. As for a communal offering, an altar offering, and a Temple-maintenance dedication, Scripture therefore says, “He shall not inspect.”

Rabbi Shimon said: Animal tithe was included in the general category, so why did it leave it? To tell you: just as animal tithe is an individual offering, an altar offering, an obligatory offering, and not a partnership offering, so too every offering that is an individual offering, an altar offering, an obligatory offering, and not a partnership offering.

Rabbi said: Why, then, did animal tithe leave the category? To be judged with respect to substitution by designation and substitution of the animal itself, in order to teach you: substitution by designation is offered, whereas substitution of the animal itself is not offered; substitution by designation is redeemable, whereas substitution of the animal itself is not redeemable; substitution of the animal itself takes effect both on something fit and on something unfit, whereas substitution by designation takes effect only on something fit.

The Gemara asks: Because Scripture included in it substitution by designation, should it thereby be diminished? Yes, for we say: what Scripture included, it included, and what it did not include, it did not include. But what would have led us to think otherwise? Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: Because it is something that went out to be judged by a new matter, and therefore you have only its novelty.

— Babylonian Talmud, Temurah 13b

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

In last year’s article we dealt with the threefold tannaitic dispute presented in the Temurah passage above. The dispute is rooted in a biblical phenomenon: the apparently unnecessary repetition of a particular case from within a general category. The Torah sets out the laws of temurah (attempted substitution of sacrificial sanctity) for all offerings: if a person tries to transfer the sanctity of one offering to another animal, both remain holy. Elsewhere, the Torah repeats the laws of temurah specifically with regard to animal tithe.

At first glance, this seems to be the basis for a derivation by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach”: a law stated regarding a general group is repeated concerning one particular member of that group. This is indeed Rabbi Shimon’s view, and therefore he learns from animal tithe that just as it has the sanctity of an offering, so too this must be true of all consecrated items. From here he concludes that sanctity of value does not generate temurah. We noted that the inference from animal tithe to the other consecrated items assumes that the relevant point of similarity is the intrinsic sanctity of the tithe. We asked why that parameter was chosen specifically, rather than, for example, concluding that temurah applies only to offerings of lesser sanctity, as is the case with animal tithe.

We explained this in light of the rationale given by Maimonides at the end of the Laws of Temurah, according to which the law of temurah is a kind of penalty intended to prevent the devaluation of sacrificial animals, so that people will not replace an offering with a cheaper animal. On this basis we explained a number of details in the laws of temurah.

We then remarked that, although it may seem as though we are expounding the rationale of the verse, in cases where we have a textual hint, such as the repetition of a particular within a general category, the Torah itself hints that we should inquire into the rationale of the verse. This is a general principle, fundamental and very important for understanding rabbinic interpretation: where there is a textual cue directing us to seek the rationale of the verse, such as the need to identify a relevant point of similarity for a derivation, there we certainly do inquire into the rationale of the verse.

Nearly every use of the hermeneutical principles contains such a methodological cue: similarity in wording that tells us to construct a gezerah shavah (verbal analogy based on shared language), or the emergence of a particular from a general category that tells us to learn from the particular to the general category, and so forth. We decode that cue by applying the relevant hermeneutical principle through our own reasoning, and we thereby derive a halakhic (legal) conclusion. The interpreter’s reasoning determines in what respect the two sides are to be compared in a gezerah shavah, or what exactly is to be learned from the particular that emerged to the general category within which it had been included.

That, then, is Rabbi Shimon’s view. Rabbi disagrees with Rabbi Shimon. He holds that in our case the emergence of the particular does not return and teach about the general category, because it went out to be judged by a new matter. In other words, its emergence is not superfluous, since it was written separately in order to teach us the law of substitution by designation. In the case of animal tithe there is an additional mechanism besides ordinary temurah, that is, substitution of the animal itself. If one mistakenly calls an animal that is not the tenth “tenth,” it too acquires the sanctity of animal tithe, in addition to the actual tenth animal. This is a mechanism similar to temurah, and is therefore called “substitution by designation,” but we saw that it is apparently not part of the laws of temurah at all, but rather part of the laws of animal tithe.

In any event, the principle of “an item that went out to be judged by a new matter” qualifies the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach,” because when there is no unnecessary repetition one cannot learn from the emerged particular back to the general category. See also the page for Parashat Metzora, 5765. We noted that these two principles appear in several places in rabbinic literature as alternatives that exclude one another.

There are, however, cases in which the emerged particular does still belong to the general category. That is when there is a verse that explicitly returns it to its category. From this it follows that the principle of “went out to be judged by a new matter” contains two different innovations:

1. If it went out to be judged by a new matter, one cannot learn from it back to the general category, nor from the general category to it. This is a qualification of the principle of “an item that left the general category.”
2. If there is a verse that explicitly returns it to its category, then the general category does again teach about it. This is an independent principle.

We presented two different interpretations of our baraita. See Rashi and Tosafot, s.v. “to be judged,” ad loc.:

1. The emergence to be judged by a new matter is intended to teach us the law of substitution by designation in animal tithe, beyond the ordinary substitution of the animal itself that exists in all offerings. On that basis we would think that animal tithe has only substitution by designation, since in such a case “you have only its novelty.” A repetition of the law of temurah is therefore needed to teach us that animal tithe also has ordinary temurah. This is the verse that explicitly returns it to its category.
2. The emergence to be judged by a new matter is intended to teach us that substitution by designation takes effect only on something fit to be offered, unlike substitution of the animal itself, which takes effect both on something fit and on something unfit. The return then teaches us that, with respect to substitution of the animal itself in animal tithe, temurah takes effect even on what is unfit, just as it does in the substitution of the animal itself in other offerings.¹

B. The Difference Between “Left the General Category to Teach” and “Went Out to Be Judged by a New Matter”

Introduction

We have seen that the principle of “went out to be judged by a new matter” contains two distinct elements:

1. A qualification of the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach”: if the emerged particular is governed by a new law applying specifically to it, one does not learn from it back to the general category.
2. A new principle: if Scripture explicitly returns it to its category, it once again belongs to that category.

In the article on Parashat Metzora, 5765, we discussed the relation between these two principles and the principles of “bearing one claim of its own kind” and “not of its own kind,” and we will not return to that here. The basic point is that the principle of “bearing not of its own kind” is very similar to the principle of “went out to be judged by a new matter,” except that there the particular is not returned to the general category even when Scripture apparently does so explicitly.

The Second Element

In our case, Scripture explicitly returned the particular to the general category, and therefore it can again be associated with that category. What does this mean? Does it now allow us once again to learn from the particular back to the general category from which it emerged, as in the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach”? In other words, does the explicit wording cancel the qualification contained in the first element, thereby allowing us to apply that principle after all?

According to both interpretations cited above, the answer is no. The return to the general category allows us to learn from the general category to the particular, but not from the particular to the general category:

1. According to the first interpretation, we learn from the general category that ordinary substitution of the animal itself also applies to the particular, and not only substitution by designation. This is precisely the return of the particular to the general category. Its emergence from the category was intended to teach the innovation, the “new matter”: animal tithe also has substitution by designation. Its explicit return to the category teaches that it also has substitution of the animal itself, like the category as a whole.
2. According to the second interpretation, the explicit return of the particular to the general category is intended to teach that substitution of the animal itself also takes effect on what is unfit to be offered, just as with other offerings. Here too the particular is returned to being an ordinary member of the category.

The difference between the two interpretations concerns the initial assumption that the return is intended to negate. According to the first interpretation, the initial assumption was that substitution of the animal itself would not apply to the particular at all, namely animal tithe. According to the second interpretation, the initial assumption was that substitution of the animal itself would apply only to what is fit to be offered, as in substitution by designation.²

Can the Principle of “An Item That Left the General Category to Teach” Be Applied Here?

What, then, about the possibility of learning from the particular back to the general category, as in the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach”? At first glance, it seems that we do not do this here. The return to the general category means only that we draw conclusions from the general category to the particular, not from the particular to the general category. In last year’s article we cited the Gemara in Temurah there, which explains that Rabbi learns that the law of temurah exists only with respect to offerings consecrated for the altar, like the anonymous first opinion, that is, from the wording of the verse and not from the emerged particular. The conclusion is that one who reasons with the principle of “went out to be judged by a new matter,” even if Scripture explicitly returned it to its category, cannot learn from the particular back to the general category. Why indeed should that be so?

The apparent reason is that when there is an emergence to be judged by a new matter, the departure from the general category is not redundant. The particular was taken out of the category in order to teach us the novel law, namely substitution by designation. Hence there is no redundancy here that might hint to us to learn from the particular to the general category. We have already noted several times that learning from the emerged particular to the general category is based on the interpretive difficulty created by redundancy. Where there is no problematic redundancy, there is no need for such solutions, and therefore no justification for learning from the particular to the general category.

The Meaning of This: Species and Type

The implication is that in our case the particular is not an ordinary member that belongs to the general category. It contains something that does not teach about the general category, and therefore is not present there. To be sure, it also shares an aspect with the category. It is therefore more accurate to say that it constitutes a distinct species within the category, rather than an ordinary member within it.

In the case of the laws of temurah, the law of substitution of the animal itself is written with respect to all offerings. The Torah then removes animal tithe from that general category and writes the law of temurah specifically concerning it. If what stood here were an ordinary law of temurah, namely substitution of the animal itself, then the emergence would be redundant, and we would learn back to the general category that the law of temurah applies only where there is intrinsic sanctity. That is indeed what Rabbi Shimon learns. According to Rabbi, however, the law of temurah written concerning animal tithe is a unique law of temurah, and therefore it is already clear that the particular is a different species within the class of consecrated items to which the law of temurah applies. It has its own unique law of substitution by designation. The emergence from the general category is therefore understandable and does not constitute redundancy. Consequently, even if Scripture returns it to its category, that is only in order to teach something about it in virtue of its belonging to the broader class, not in order to teach something about the class itself. If we were to return and learn the innovation about the class itself, the particular would once again become an ordinary part of the class rather than a different species. The general category and the particular would become identical in every respect.

Thus, emergence to be judged by a new matter expresses a different relationship between the particular and the general category from which it emerged: in this case the particular constitutes a different species within the general class. By contrast, in the case of “an item that left the general category to teach,” the particular is simply one among the members of the category, and is identical to them.

An Implication: Is Substitution by Designation Part of the Laws of Temurah?

It may be possible to take this one step further and make it depend on the two interpretations cited above. If substitution by designation really belongs to the laws of temurah, that is, if it too is a kind of temurah, then animal tithe is a species within the class of consecrated items that are subject to the law of temurah. But if substitution by designation belongs to the laws of animal tithe and not to the laws of temurah, then this is not really a discussion about the laws of temurah at all. In that case animal tithe is not a different species within the class of consecrated items; rather, it is identical to them in every respect. True, it has one different local law, namely substitution by designation, but that is a law belonging to animal tithe, not a difference regarding the laws of temurah. Particular differences certainly exist even among the ordinary members included within those consecrated items. Some are offerings of lesser sanctity and some are most holy offerings; they are offered in different ways, and so on. None of this prevents them from constituting uniform members within the class, because the class is defined with respect to the laws of temurah, and in that respect they are all identical. According to the understanding that substitution by designation is a law of animal tithe, animal tithe is identical to the other consecrated items regarding the laws of temurah, and the difference between it and them concerns only one particular local law.

What would happen if Scripture had not explicitly returned the particular, namely animal tithe, to its category? At first glance, it would then have remained different from the category. Let us examine this in light of the two interpretations cited above:

1. According to the first interpretation, had there been no return, we would think that animal tithe has no law of substitution of the animal itself at all. In that case it would remain a particular wholly detached from the general category, and it stands to reason that the substitution by designation stated concerning it would be understood as a law of animal tithe, since it would not belong to temurah at all. The return is what restores it to being a member of the category with respect to substitution of the animal itself. As for substitution by designation, there is room to say that the understanding remains what it was beforehand, namely that this is a law of animal tithe.
2. According to the second interpretation, by contrast, we would know that substitution of the animal itself applies to it, but we would think that it applies only to what is fit to be offered, as in substitution by designation. Here it is more reasonable to regard it as a particular that belongs to the category, but constitutes a separate species. Substitution of the animal itself applies to it as it does to the other consecrated items, and therefore it is quite clear that it is one of them. Hence, according to this understanding, it is plausible that substitution by designation is a law of temurah. After the return to the category, we learn that substitution of the animal itself in animal tithe is like it is in the other offerings, meaning that it continues to be a different species within the category. Here too it seems likely that the understanding of substitution by designation does not change, and that it remains simply a law of temurah, though one that applies only in this species.

A Difficulty from the Gemara in Zevahim 49a

In the article on Parashat Metzora, 5765, we cited Tosafot, who explain that the two principles, “an item that left the general category to teach” and “went out to be judged by a new matter,” can indeed operate in parallel. One may learn from the general category to the particular when Scripture explicitly restores the particular to the category, and at the same time one may learn from the particular to the general category by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.”

The source is the passage in Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim 49a, with a parallel in Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 7a, which states:

As it was taught in a baraita: If something was included in a general category and went out to be judged by a new matter, you may not return it to its general category unless Scripture explicitly returns it. How so? “He shall slaughter the lamb in the place where one slaughters the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the holy place, for like the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” and so forth. There is no need for Scripture to say, “for like the sin offering, so is the guilt offering.” Why, then, does it say it? Because the guilt offering of the metzora went out to be judged by a new matter, namely the right thumb, the right big toe, and the right ear. One might have thought that it would not require the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar. Therefore Scripture says: “for like the sin offering, so is the guilt offering.” Just as the sin offering requires the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar, so too the guilt offering of the metzora requires the placing of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar.

If so, let Scripture write this in this case and not write it in that case. This works well if we hold that when something went out to be judged by a new matter, it itself does not learn from its general category, but its general category can learn from it with respect to slaughter in the north. But if we hold that neither does it learn from its general category nor does its general category learn from it, then this verse is needed for its own sake. Once Scripture has returned it, it has returned it.

The guilt offering of the metzora, that is, the person afflicted with tsara’at, left the category of guilt offerings, since in its case some of the blood is applied to the extremities. This raises the possibility that the slaughter of the metzora’s guilt offering need not take place in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, as with other guilt offerings, since it has left the category and one cannot learn from the category to it. The Gemara therefore says that the verse explicitly returns it to its category, by stating “He shall slaughter the lamb,” which is said concerning the metzora’s guilt offering, to teach that it too requires slaughter in the north. At the same time, the Gemara raises the possibility that perhaps, because the metzora’s guilt offering left the category with respect to the application of blood to the extremities, we might not have to place the rest of the blood on the altar as is done with other guilt offerings. Therefore it says, “for like the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” and we learn from the sin offering that the rest of the blood must be placed on the altar.

Up to this point, the argument proceeds in the usual way: because Scripture explicitly returned it to its category, we learn from the general category to the particular. But now the Gemara asks the opposite question: why should the Torah not write the requirement of slaughter in the north only with respect to the metzora’s guilt offering, so that we might learn from it to the other guilt offerings? In its conclusion, the Gemara makes this depend on the dispute whether one learns from the particular to the general category or only from the general category to the particular. Indeed, according to the view that learns the general category from the particular, there is an apparently superfluous verse concerning the general category of guilt offerings, and the Gemara explains that it comes to teach that slaughter in the north is indispensable.

The Gemara does not state what kind of derivation is involved in learning from the particular to the general category. The Shitah Mekubetzet there, note 19, explains that the derivation from the metzora’s guilt offering to the other guilt offerings is by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.” In other words, there is a view that even if a particular went out to be judged by a new matter, and therefore we do not learn from the general category to the particular, we nevertheless do learn from the particular to the general category by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.”

This assertion directly contradicts both interpretations we saw here. In fact, it contradicts Rabbi’s opinion in the Temurah passage, which explicitly states that the law that temurah exists only with respect to offerings consecrated for the altar is not learned from the emerged particular, namely animal tithe, by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach,” because here it went out to be judged by a new matter, and thereby detached itself from the category. The source for that law lies elsewhere. Thus, even when Scripture explicitly returns it to its category, we still do not learn from the particular to the general category by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.”

Resolving the Difficulty

At first glance, it seems that Rabbi in the Temurah passage follows the view that one does not even learn from the particular to the general category. The other view indeed disagrees with Rabbi, and perhaps it follows Rabbi Shimon.

On second thought, however, that is not necessary. From the formulation of the Gemara in Zevahim it emerges that the discussion there concerns a case where Scripture does not return the particular to its category, for the Gemara says that the particular certainly is not learned from the category, and the dispute concerns only whether the category is learned from the particular. It is therefore clear that this is a case in which there is no return of the particular to the category, for once the particular has been returned to the category it is certainly learned from the category.

In fact, this is compelled by the very structure of the Gemara’s argument. The Gemara raises the possibility that slaughter in the north need not be written with respect to guilt offerings generally. In that situation, the verse teaching that the metzora’s guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north does not return the particular to its category, because in such a case there is no “general category” in the verse at all. Slaughter in the north would be written only with respect to the metzora’s guilt offering, and with respect to guilt offerings generally there would be no verse requiring the north at all. Thus the metzora’s guilt offering would indeed have left the category of guilt offerings, but there would be no return to the category. It is precisely concerning such a case that the Gemara in Zevahim brings the dispute whether one can then learn back from the particular to the general category.

It is therefore entirely possible that only in such a case is there a view that learns from the emerged particular to the general category. From the fact that the metzora’s guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north, while nothing at all is said about the place of slaughter for guilt offerings generally, we would infer that guilt offerings as a class must likewise be slaughtered in the north. According to this, it is clear that the basis of the derivation is not the principle of “an item that was included in a general category and left the general category to teach,” because there is no duplication here of the particular and the general category. The rule of the north is written only regarding the metzora’s guilt offering, that is, the particular, and does not appear in Scripture with respect to guilt offerings generally. This is an ordinary analogical derivation, a binyan av, from the metzora’s guilt offering, where the matter is explicit, to the general category of guilt offerings. Perhaps it is even an application of the rule that the unspecified is learned from the explicit.

But when Scripture explicitly returns the particular to its category, then we do have a situation where both the particular and the general category are written in Scripture. If there is any room to learn from the particular to the general category, it is only with respect to a side law not written explicitly, that is, to infer a feature of the general category from a feature of the emerged particular, such as the derivation from animal tithe to all consecrated items that the law of temurah applies only to offerings consecrated for the altar. Here there is no room for a binyan av or for “the unspecified from the explicit,” but only for the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.” As we have noted several times, the basis of such a derivation is duplication. But when the particular went out to be judged by a new matter, we saw that the duplication is not redundant, because it is needed in order to teach the new matter with respect to the emerged particular. In such a case, therefore, one would not expound by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.” Hence, when Scripture explicitly returns it to the category, there is no room to learn from the particular to the general category, and the words of the Gemara in Zevahim were said only concerning a case in which Scripture does not speak about the general category at all.

What follows from our discussion is that whenever something leaves the general category in order to be judged by a new matter, there is no possibility of learning back from it to the general category by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach,” because the emergence is not redundant. At most, one may learn some characteristic from it by means of a binyan av. There is therefore no contradiction at all between the passage in Zevahim and the passage in Temurah.

Must a Derivation by “An Item That Left the General Category to Teach” Necessarily Rest on Redundancy?

Despite everything said above, we saw that the Shitah Mekubetzet understood the derivation from the metzora’s guilt offering to guilt offerings generally as proceeding by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.” It seems that he holds that the return of the particular to its category with respect to placing the blood on the altar restores the situation to its original state and cancels the emergence from the category for a new matter. Therefore one can learn from the particular to the general category by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach,” even with respect to the place of slaughter.

In any event, even the Shitah Mekubetzet must concede that the emergence of the particular does not create duplication. There is no difficulty of redundancy here. According to his view, therefore, a derivation by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach” is not based on the problem of redundancy. As noted, the case under discussion is one in which slaughter in the north is not written at all with respect to guilt offerings generally, but only with respect to the metzora’s guilt offering. According to the Shitah Mekubetzet, it seems that this is itself a principle in the Torah: whenever the Torah states a law with respect to a particular that belongs to a general category, even if that law is not written at all with respect to the general category, one should learn that law from the particular back to the general category.

This is extremely difficult. We have already seen in several earlier articles that such a derivation does indeed have to be based on a difficulty, such as redundancy. We proved this also from the very terminology “an item that was included in a general category and left the general category to teach,” from which it follows that some things leave the general category but do not leave it in order to teach, whereas others do leave it in order to teach. We explained that when there is redundancy or some other difficulty, the particular leaves in order to teach, and only then is this hermeneutical principle activated. The words of the Shitah Mekubetzet are a very puzzling innovation, and they require much further examination.

And Yet, Evidence from Tosafot

In Tosafot, s.v. “According to,” on Zevahim 49a, an objection is raised against the one who says that the general category learns from the particular: why, then, should not all guilt offerings require the application of blood to the thumb, big toe, and ear, like the metzora’s guilt offering? In other words, why should we not learn from the emerged particular to the general category, at least according to the view in the Gemara that this can be done? Tosafot answer that the new matter itself certainly is not learned from the particular, because otherwise it would not be a “new matter.” That is, if we were to do so, the particular would no longer be different from the general category from which it emerged. This would be exactly the same situation as “an item that left the general category to teach.”

At first glance, these words of Tosafot imply that, with respect to side laws and not the “new matter” itself, one does in fact learn by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach” even where the particular went out to be judged by a new matter. It should be noted that Tosafot here is speaking about a case in which the verse has already explicitly returned it to its category in connection with the blood rite, whereas according to our argument above, in such a case no one learns by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.”

At first glance, this is precisely the position of the Shitah Mekubetzet mentioned above: even when there is no difficulty of unnecessary duplication, if the particular went out to be judged by a new matter, one may still expound by the principle of “left the general category to teach.” According to this, Rabbi’s position in the Temurah passage is presumably like the other view, which does not learn back from the particular to the general category by that principle.

In their second answer, however, Tosafot explain that if we were to return and teach about the general category, then “went out to be judged by a new matter” would become “left the general category to teach.” In other words, Tosafot here indirectly determines and proves that one indeed cannot learn by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach” when the emergence is for the purpose of being judged by a new matter. According to this, the Gemara in Zevahim, which suggests learning slaughter in the north from the metzora’s guilt offering to guilt offerings generally, does not mean the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach,” as the Shitah Mekubetzet explained, but rather a binyan av, as we suggested above. This would seem to prove our point directly against the Shitah Mekubetzet, and the reasoning for distinguishing between the two passages is clarified by our discussion there.

Thus the two answers of Tosafot disagree with one another on the question whether, when something went out to be judged by a new matter, one may learn from the particular to the general category by the principle of “left the general category to teach.” Perhaps they also disagree on whether the principle of “left the general category to teach” is based on a difficulty and redundancy, as we have argued, or not, as in the view of the Shitah Mekubetzet.³

Conclusion Regarding the First Element

Leaving aside the remarks of the Shitah Mekubetzet cited above, the conclusion is that when a particular goes out to be judged by a new matter, it thereby detaches itself completely from the general category from which it emerged. The principle of “an item that left the general category to teach” is no longer applicable to it in any case. If Scripture explicitly returns it to its category, then one may learn from the general category to it, but not from it to the general category. Thus the principle of “went out to be judged by a new matter” neutralizes the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach” by its very meaning, and not only where Scripture does not return it explicitly, as might have been inferred from what we wrote last year.

What happens in a case where Scripture does not return it explicitly, that is, the first element? We saw that the two interpretations above lead to different conclusions about the relation between the particular and the general category if Scripture had not explicitly returned it. According to the first interpretation, in such a case the particular would stand as a separate category of its own within the broader field, and therefore it would have no law of substitution of the animal itself at all. According to the second interpretation, in such a case the particular would be a different species within the same class: it would have substitution of the animal itself, but only with respect to what is fit to be offered. As for the question whether in such a case one would reason by the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach,” different considerations point in different directions. On the one hand, according to the Shitah Mekubetzet there is no obstacle to doing so. On the other hand, according to our analysis, and according to one answer in Tosafot, it may seem that there is room to do so, like one of the views in the Zevahim passage.

But this is not correct. As we explained regarding the passage in Zevahim, that discussion concerns a case in which Scripture did not return it to the category because Scripture contains no statement at all about the general category, but only about the particular, namely the metzora’s guilt offering. In such a case the derivation is by binyan av. In our case, however, both the particular and the general category appear in Scripture, and the question is whether one can learn from some feature of the particular back to the general category. Here one might indeed have proposed that this is possible.

But the reasoning we offered rules it out. The reason is that in such a case the duplication is not redundant, since the particular went out to be judged by a new matter. In that situation there is no possibility of employing the principle of “an item that left the general category to teach.” The proof is from the Temurah passage: there, according to Rabbi, since we are dealing with something that went out to be judged by a new matter, it is clear that one does not learn from the particular back to the general category that temurah is relevant only with respect to offerings consecrated for the altar; another source is required for that.

Footnotes