Shelach (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

---

With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Friday afternoon before the Sabbath of Parashat Shelach, 5766

Questions

1. Should one prefer an interpretation that fits the wording better, or one that fits the reasoning better?
2. What is the relation between this problem and the question of the relation between peshat (plain sense) and drash (interpretive exposition)?
3. What is the connection between the question of peshat and drash and the different approaches to the rule of “two verses that contradict one another”?
4. Do laws learned through the hermeneutical rules create an alternative interpretation of Scripture?
5. What are the two types of drash?

The Hermeneutical Rule

Two Verses That Contradict One Another

“If you err and do not observe all these commandments that the Lord has spoken to Moses; all that the Lord has commanded you through Moses, from the day the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations; then, if it was done unintentionally without the awareness of the congregation, the whole congregation shall offer one bull from the herd as a burnt offering, a pleasing aroma to the Lord, with its meal offering and libation according to the rule, and one he-goat as a sin offering.”

— Numbers 15:22–24

“…But if one individual sins unintentionally, she shall offer a one-year-old female goat as a sin offering.”

— Numbers 15:27

(111) “‘If you err and do not do’: idolatry was included among all the commandments for which the community brings a bull, yet Scripture singled it out from that general category in order to make it more stringent and to subject it to a fixed offering, so that the community should bring for it a bull and a goat — a bull for a burnt offering and a goat for a sin offering. Therefore this passage was stated.

“‘If you err and do not do’: Scripture speaks of idolatry. You say that Scripture speaks of idolatry, but perhaps it speaks of one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? Therefore Scripture says, ‘And if it was done in error from the eyes of the congregation’: Scripture singled out this commandment and stated it separately. And which commandment is this? This is idolatry. You say this is idolatry, but perhaps it is one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? Therefore Scripture says, ‘If you err and do not do’: all the commandments came to teach about one commandment. Just as one who transgresses all the commandments casts off the yoke, breaches the covenant, and brazenly rejects the Torah, so too one who transgresses this one commandment casts off the yoke, breaches the covenant, and brazenly rejects the Torah. And which commandment is this? Idolatry, as it is said: ‘to transgress His covenant’ (Deuteronomy 17:2). And ‘covenant’ means nothing other than Torah, as it is said: ‘These are the words of the covenant’ (Deuteronomy 28:69). Rabbi says: ‘all’ is stated here, and ‘all’ is stated elsewhere. Just as the ‘all’ stated there speaks of idolatry, so too the ‘all’ stated here speaks of idolatry.”

— Sifrei to Numbers, Shelach, sec. 111

(112) “‘And if one person sins unintentionally’: idolatry was included among all the commandments for which an individual brings a ewe or a female goat, a ruler brings a he-goat, and the anointed priest and the court bring a bull; yet Scripture singled it out from that general category in order to make it more stringent and to subject it to a fixed offering, so that an individual, a ruler, and an anointed priest should bring for it a one-year-old female goat as a sin offering. Therefore this passage was stated.

“‘One person sins’: Scripture speaks of idolatry. You say Scripture speaks of idolatry, but perhaps it speaks of one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? One must say that the subject here is idolatry. Rabbi Yitzhak says: Scripture speaks of idolatry. Or perhaps it speaks only of one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? Argue as follows: the community was included in the general category, and Scripture singled it out and changed its sacrifices; the individual was included in the general category, and Scripture singled it out and changed its sacrifices. Just as there Scripture speaks of idolatry, so too here Scripture speaks of idolatry.”

— Sifrei to Numbers, Shelach, sec. 112

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

In our parashah there appears an enigmatic passage, and from the verses themselves it is difficult to understand exactly what it is discussing. From the peshat of the verses (see Malbim here, sec. 33), it emerges that the passage deals with a situation in which the people of Israel unintentionally transgress all the commandments of the Torah. In verse 23 the Torah repeats and emphasizes that it is speaking of all the commandments, from those given to us on the day we were commanded at Sinai and onward throughout all of history.¹

At first glance, the individual or community that sins here appears to be in the state of a “captured child,” that is, someone who errs with respect to all the commandments of the Torah. Such a state means that the person does not know at all that the Torah was given and that it contains commandments, and certainly does not know what those commandments are.

In last year’s essay we raised several difficulties with this interpretation, and we assumed that these are what underlie the first midrash quoted above, which interprets the Torah as referring to a community that erred in the sin of idolatry. As we saw, the conclusion of the second midrash, which deals with the inadvertent sin of an individual, according to which that passage too deals with inadvertent idolatry, is apparently learned from the first midrash. We showed that this explanation answers several difficulties in understanding the course of the two midrashim.

We discussed at length which hermeneutical rule underlies the midrashic inference. From the midrashim it is clear that this is one of the rules of “a matter singled out from a general category.” In an ordinary transgression, an individual brings a ewe or a female goat for a sin offering, and the community brings a bull as a sin offering, whereas here the individual brings only a female goat and the community brings a bull as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering. Since this is a departure of the particular case from the general category, from which a stringent conclusion is inferred, the conclusion by elimination was that this is the rule of “a matter singled out from a general category in order to make a different claim, not in keeping with its original context.” From here we learn to be more stringent with inadvertent idolatry, subjecting it to a fixed sin offering.

We noted that the structure of the midrashim is problematic. At the opening of both these midrashim appears the law learned from the singling out of idolatry from the general category — namely, that idolatry is treated more stringently and is subject to a fixed sin offering — and only afterward comes the discussion of how we know at all that the passage is speaking about idolatry. Our conclusion was that the hermeneutical rule was not used here to prove the law, since the law is explicit in the Torah. The hermeneutical rule taught us to which situation that halakha (Jewish law) applies: to inadvertent idolatry, and not to inadvertent transgression of the whole Torah. In the second midrash quoted above, this is explicit in the opinion of Rabbi Yitzhak.

We explained why the conclusion is that it refers specifically to inadvertent idolatry and not to another transgression. We saw that among the three cardinal sins, idolatry specifically uproots the whole Torah, and therefore it is equivalent to transgressing the whole Torah. One who does not believe in God, or who worships another, renders all the commandments he observes devoid of significance as commandments.

As we saw, the peshat interpretation is very strained in practical terms. By contrast, the proposal of the midrashim above seems far from the intent of the Torah’s wording. This tension raises the question of the relation between peshat and drash. In the essay we cited Nahmanides (Numbers 15:22), who offers an interpretation that accords both with the drash and with the literal reading. He determines that the text speaks of situations in which the meaning of the sin of idolatry is a violation of all the commandments of the Torah, or a severing from the Torah.

Is Nahmanides’ interpretation “peshat”? Seemingly yes, since it is the interpretation that answers the difficulties in the best way, and as we explained, the term “peshat” does not denote only a literal reading, but rather the simplest interpretation in view of the full range of considerations.² Sometimes, however, when the proposed interpretation moves very far from the intent of the words, we tend to treat it as “drash” rather than “peshat.” The definition of the distinction between these two planes, and the balancing of wording against reason, are very difficult both to define and to carry out.

In this year’s essay we will deal somewhat with this tension, and with different angles on the relation between peshat and drash.

B. The Relation between Peshat and Drash — Part One

Introduction

Nahmanides’ way of reconciling the midrash and the peshat leads us to ask what we should do when the best interpretation from the standpoint of reason is strained from the standpoint of the language of the verse. Nahmanides tries to reconcile them and satisfy both.

The question of the tension between language and reason bears, in one way or another, on the question of the definition of peshat and drash, and on the questions concerning the relation between them. In this year’s essay we will try to shed some light on these difficult and intricate issues.

Peshat and Drash as “Two Verses That Contradict One Another”

Last year we cited the words of the Hazon Ish, who said that it is preferable to force the language rather than to force the reasoning. Some have brought support for this from the Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah, sec. 228.³

We have already mentioned that Nahmanides tries to reconcile the two planes and create some kind of synthesis between them. Is that proper? Is the interpretation produced in this way peshat or drash? Is it not more correct to leave two independent planes of interpretation: peshat and drash?

At first glance, the interpretation that relies on textual considerations and the interpretation that relies on reason are a case of “two verses that contradict one another.” In the essay on Parashat Bo, 5765, we dealt with the rule of “two verses that contradict one another,” and we saw that Rabbi Yishmael tries to reconcile and arrive at a middle position that will satisfy both, whereas Rabbi Akiva prefers to choose the preferable interpretation — by force of a third verse, or by force of reason; see the remarks of the Ravad cited there — even though this leaves the difficulty with respect to the other verse unresolved.

As we saw there, these are principled approaches. Clearly, when there is an interpretation that truly reconciles and genuinely fits both poles, Rabbi Akiva too will adopt it. The dispute is when some interpretive difficulty still remains even after the reconciliation. In such a case, is it still preferable to adopt the best interpretation, or is it preferable to relinquish one of the two conflicting poles?

Here too, in the matter of the relation between peshat and drash, it seems that one can go in either of two directions: to reconcile, or to choose and decide. This concerns the relation between literal considerations and content-based rational considerations. Yet with respect to peshat and drash, it may be that even if there is an interpretation that reconciles them, it is still not correct to choose it, because peshat should not be tied to drash. These are two different interpretive planes, and it is not correct to find a peshat explanation for the midrashic conclusion.

At first glance, Nahmanides’ approach here resembles the path of Rabbi Yishmael: he proposes a compromise between the two opposing poles. The Hazon Ish and the Beit Yosef, by contrast, come closer to the path of Rabbi Akiva. They prefer to decide in favor of one side — reason — at the expense of the other — the wording. Unlike Nahmanides’ approach, on their view the difficulty in the wording remains intact. They are willing to force the language so that it will fit the reasoning.

Using Reason at the Expense of the Literal Interpretation

We must now ask whether the interpretation that emerges from their approach is peshat or drash. This apparently depends on the question: what is “peshat”? It is commonly said jokingly that “peshat” is my interpretation, and “drash” is yours. More seriously, it would seem that “peshat” is an interpretation that fits the literal wording, whereas drash is an interpretation that fits the reasoning better, even if that comes at the price of a certain interpretive strain. According to this approach, the relation between peshat and drash is the relation between verbal considerations and other considerations, such as reason. The split between peshat and drash is created when there is a difficulty in the simple literal interpretation, and then we use an interpretation that fits the literal meaning less well; such an interpretation is called “drash.”

If we assume this, then it seems that the interpretation that emerges from the approach of the Hazon Ish and the Beit Yosef is drash and not peshat. They recommend abandoning the exclusivity of verbal considerations in favor of conformity to reason.

Yet it is clear that the Hazon Ish and the Beit Yosef are trying to propose a method for shaping a peshat interpretation and not a midrashic interpretation. We should note that they are not speaking at all about biblical interpretation, but about sugyot in the Oral Torah. In contexts involving interpretation of the Oral Torah, there is no meaning to the use of the hermeneutical rules of drash.⁴ There we naturally seek the true interpretation, one and only one, in our view. And about that, those sages instruct us not to ignore reason, and even to force the language in order to fit the reasoning. If so, it seems that in their view this is the way to arrive at a peshat interpretation and not at drash. If so, what is the method for arriving at the midrashic interpretation?

It seems that the term “peshat” is not necessarily the literal interpretation, but rather the simplest interpretation in view of the full range of considerations. The question addressed by the Beit Yosef and the Hazon Ish is what weight should be given to reason as against the wording within the framework of shaping the peshat interpretation.

It should be noted that the guidelines that it is preferable to force the language more than the reasoning are not easy to apply. How far can one go with this? How does one quantify the degree of strain in language? And in reasoning? Perhaps our reasoning itself requires correction. And in general, is there no room in the Torah for scriptural decrees? See the essay on Parashat Vayera, 5765.

It appears that the main thrust of the guidance of the Beit Yosef and the Hazon Ish is only to tell us that peshat is not necessarily the literal interpretation, and that we must not ignore considerations of reason when shaping the peshat interpretation. How much, and how, is a matter for ordinary common sense. We can now see that they do not necessarily disagree with Nahmanides. Their purpose is to point out that shaping a peshat interpretation should take rational considerations into account and not only linguistic ones, and that is precisely what Nahmanides himself did.

What Is Drash? A First Proposal

According to this proposal, the relation between peshat and drash is not like the relation between an interpretation that fits the literal wording and one that fits the reasoning. True, a peshat interpretation will usually fit the literal wording better, but that is only because it is the simpler interpretation, and therefore, among other things, it also fits the literal wording better. By the same token, it should also fit the reasoning better. The question is what proportion should be given to each of these two when they conflict.

If so, what is drash? If indeed it is not correct to tie the question of language and reason to the question of peshat and drash — that is, if both textual considerations and rational considerations together make up peshat — then what is drash? Presumably drash is an interpretation that is not the simplest in terms of both these components. But if so, why use it at all? If we use it because difficulties remain even with the best interpretation, then if it turns out to be preferable from the standpoint of the linguistic or rational difficulties, we should conclude that it itself is the peshat interpretation. But if it does not resolve the difficulties better, why should we adopt a more difficult interpretation when we already possess an optimal one?

It seems that if we do adopt the approach that the peshat interpretation is the most comfortable one in light of the whole range of considerations, then there is no escape from the conclusion that an interpretation in the mode of drash is one shaped by additional principles, which come in addition to the principles of peshat interpretation. The reason for using them is not some difficulty in peshat, because an interpretation that resolves the difficulty in peshat is itself peshat. The midrashic interpretation is one that by its very nature exists alongside the peshat interpretation, which is the simple interpretation. In other words: at Sinai we received tools by means of which we are to construct other interpretations of Scripture — not as an alternative to the peshat interpretation, but as a parallel addition to it. The foundation for using them is the assumption, received from Sinai, that Scripture is interpreted on several parallel planes.⁵

Examples in Different Situations: Two Types of Drash

If we derive some halakha from an extra vav — see the essay on Parashat Naso, 5766 — then the result is not an interpretation of the verse that contains that vav, but a law that branches out from the verse. It is not an interpretation of the verse at all, only a law that is incidentally hinted at in it. Here there is no competition between the peshat interpretation and the midrash, and both live peacefully side by side. The same is true of gezerah shavah (verbal analogy). Here too there is no proposal of an alternative interpretation, but rather the branching out of an additional law learned from the superfluity.

By contrast, in the exposition “‘An eye for an eye’ — money,” the peshat does not live peacefully with the drash. Here we adopt two interpretations of the verse, and they stand in direct frontal opposition to one another.

From these examples, it seems possible to generalize and say that drash by means of the hermeneutical rules is usually the extraction of some halakha from the verse by means of those rules. There is no alternative interpretation of the verses here. Their interpretation is the peshat, and the hermeneutical rules serve us to extract additional laws from that same verse by way of hint.

At first glance, rules such as qal va-homer (a fortiori reasoning) or binyan av (inference from a prototype case) are exceptional. These are rules of logical inference that operate on the content of the verses, and not on hints in their wording. As we have already noted several times, these are content-based rules and not textual rules. By means of these rules, we learn laws from the content of the verses themselves and not from superfluity or another side textual phenomenon, such as verbal analogy, general and particular, and the like.

But even these rules do not create alternative interpretations of the verses. These rules too extract additional laws that branch out from the laws explicitly found in Scripture.

Expositions of the type called “disclosure of the matter” are expositions that reveal the meaning of the verses. But with such expositions, the accepted assumption is that these are tools of peshat interpretation and not tools of drash.

Our conclusion is that there are two kinds of drash. Drash that offers an alternative to the peshat interpretation is not based on the hermeneutical rules. And drash that is based on the hermeneutical rules does not create an interpretation of the verse. If so, the reason for adopting a midrashic interpretation cannot be the use of the tools of drash transmitted to us — that is, the hermeneutical rules — for in situations where there is an interpretation of a verse in the mode of drash, the matter is not one of exposition by means of the hermeneutical rules at all.

If so, the question we asked above reawakens: why does another interpretive possibility arise in addition to the peshat one? Why at all forge an additional interpretation alongside the optimal interpretation, namely peshat? In addition, we must ask ourselves: if indeed the hermeneutical rules are not the tools by which midrashic interpretations are formed, then it is unclear how we form the interpretive alternative on the plane of drash at all.

Another Proposal: Nevertheless, Literal Meaning versus Reason

Let us reexamine the situation of conflict between language and reason. Suppose a certain verse has a given optimal interpretation, in terms of literal wording, fit with other verses, content, and reason. Even so, this optimal interpretation is formed within some conflict that exists between the literal interpretation and the reasoning. The simpler interpretation produces some balancing of the two kinds of considerations and arrives at the conclusion that the interpretation is X. But now we can ask ourselves the following question: if indeed X is the correct interpretation intended by the Torah, then why did it not formulate the verse in a better way — that is, in a way suited to that interpretation X?

For example, in the exposition of “an eye for an eye.” If indeed the more correct interpretation, from the standpoint of the whole range of considerations, is the midrashic one, according to which the intent is monetary compensation, then why did the Torah not write this law in a formulation that would express this on the literal plane as well? Why must we arrive at this interpretation by means of a compromise between wording and reason, or tradition? Could the Torah not have written explicitly that one who injures another must pay money in place of the eye?

From such a consideration, we can arrive at the conclusion that the optimal interpretation is not exclusive after all. There is significance to the fact that the Torah chose a non-optimal formulation — see the essay on Parashat Toledot, 5766, and elsewhere, concerning considerations of optimality in the wording of the Torah. Apparently it wishes to hint to us that there is room for the literal interpretation alongside the optimal interpretation as well.

If so, a non-optimal formulation hints to us that this verse has two parallel interpretations. This itself can be a reason to adopt the non-optimal interpretation as well, alongside the optimal interpretation.

As a general definition of what we have just described, let us say the following: given a verse for which the literal interpretation raises difficulties — because of reason, or because of other sources — we seek the optimal interpretation in light of the full range of considerations. In such a situation, one can ask two kinds of questions:

1. What is the optimal interpretation of the verse, in light of the full range of considerations, literal and substantive?
2. But we must also ask the opposite question: what should the best wording have been, if this indeed were the interpretation?

If the answer to question 1 gives interpretation X, we immediately ask question 2 about it. If the answer to question 2, with respect to interpretation X, is not the wording that lies before us in the verse, then necessarily there are two interpretations here: the optimal one and the literal one. We still have not proposed a criterion that determines which of these two is peshat and which is drash.

For example, in the verse “an eye for an eye” there is a dilemma between the literal interpretation and other considerations — moral ones, the spirit of the Torah, and the like. The answer to question 1 is presumably the interpretation that sees here an obligation to pay monetary compensation. But the answer to question 2 is negative. The wording before us is not the optimal wording for expressing such a law. On the contrary, that wording expresses a different law — the removal of an eye literally. If so, the question why the Torah chose such a wording is still not solved, despite the fact that the monetary interpretation is the optimal one in light of the whole range of considerations.

We therefore infer that this verse must have two interpretations: the optimal one, which is monetary, and the literal one, which is bodily. Which of the two will be peshat and which drash? It seems that once we have proved that there are two interpretations, the literal interpretation returns to the status of peshat, whereas the interpretation that is optimal in light of the full range of considerations is drash. Therefore we will not be surprised that halakha is shaped primarily by the midrashic interpretation.

Application to the Oral Torah

The reversal described here can also be applied to the Oral Torah. Admittedly, when there is a conflict between considerations of wording and considerations of content, we seek the optimal interpretation in light of both. This is the reason for adopting a restrictive re-reading of a difficult Mishnah, or for saying that the text is elliptical and something is missing. But once we have found such an interpretation, we still have not finished. True, this is the optimal interpretation in light of the full range of considerations, and therefore it is the one that will determine the halakha. But now we ask ourselves why the Mishnah nevertheless chose to formulate itself in this way, and did not write explicitly that it is speaking specifically about the case posited by the restrictive reading — a slave who is bound and asleep.

Here the possibility of interpreting the Mishnah according to its plain sense reemerges, despite the difficulties. The choice of this literal wording indicates that we must take it into account despite the difficulties. Such a consideration shows that this Mishnah has two parallel interpretations: the one that fits the wording of the Mishnah will be the peshat, whereas the second will be the drash.

And indeed, the Vilna Gaon, and following him several later authorities, refer to these solutions as the “drash” of Mishnayot. The students of the Vilna Gaon write in his name that just as there is peshat and drash in the Torah, so too there is peshat and drash in the Mishnah.⁶

Returning to the Rule of “Two Verses That Contradict One Another”

It seems that there is one hermeneutical rule that is exceptional in relation to all the other rules. The rule of “two verses that contradict one another” is a rule based on a difficulty in peshat. Here there is a substantive constraint that causes us to deviate from the literal interpretation to another interpretation that contradicts it. According to Rabbi Yishmael, we seek a compromise that stands between the literal interpretation and the substantive difficulty arising from the other verse. According to Rabbi Akiva, we decide in favor of one side and leave the difficulty regarding the other unresolved.

If so, all midrashim that offer an alternative interpretation to the literal one because of substantive constraints or constraints of reason in fact use the rule of “two verses that contradict one another.” As noted, the Ravad — see the essay on Parashat Bo, 5765 — writes that every resolution of a contradiction in Scripture is based on this hermeneutical rule. There we challenged his words: why is a hermeneutical rule needed for this? Even without a tradition from Sinai about this rule, would we not seek a logical resolution of the two verses? There is a further difficulty with his words: is the result we arrive at an interpretation in the mode of drash, or a peshat interpretation? Seemingly, if the proposed interpretation is the one that resolves the difficulty in the best way, then it is itself the peshat interpretation, and there is no midrashic interpretation here at all.

In light of what we have said here, we can understand the Ravad very well. The compromise that we find between the literal and the substantive is indeed the optimal interpretation. But this interpretation does not complete the solution of the problem. The question still remains: why did the Torah write its words in a contradictory way that forced us into these interpretive maneuvers? Why could the Torah not write the matter directly, in such a way that the literal wording would fit well with the optimal interpretation we found?

This is the reason that a hermeneutical rule is needed here. This rule teaches us that although the interpretation we found is not optimal with respect to question 2 above — but only with respect to question 1 — nevertheless, for our purposes, this is the interpretation of the verses. However, as we saw above, despite the fact that it is the optimal interpretation, it will be the midrashic interpretation, because the literal interpretation will be the peshat.

We can now also understand why a tradition is required for this rule, and why the optimal product of resolving the contradiction is drash and not peshat.

The conclusion is that even when there are two verses that contradict one another, each of them must also be interpreted in its literal-peshat sense. The optimal interpretation that we arrive at by means of the hermeneutical rule of “two verses that contradict one another” will be the midrashic interpretation of those two verses.

Note: Narrowing the Dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva about “Two Verses That Contradict One Another”

One should note that in light of our analysis, the positions of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva come very close to one another. Rabbi Yishmael seeks a compromise, and from his perspective such a compromise is the midrashic interpretation, since this is a hermeneutical rule of drash. The literal interpretation of the two verses, although they contradict one another, is their peshat interpretation, and it remains intact alongside the midrashic one.

Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, tends to decide by choosing one of the verses and ignoring the other. For Rabbi Akiva, the chosen interpretation, supported by the third verse, is the one interpretation. The interpretation of the remaining verse is also a valid interpretation, because if we do not say this, it will not be clear why the Torah wrote it at all — exactly as we asked, according to Rabbi Yishmael, about the literal wording. Still, according to Rabbi Akiva it is not clear which of the interpretations is drash and which is peshat. Both are based on the literal wording of explicit verses. In any case, both will serve us simultaneously, with the dominant one being the stronger one, the one supported by the third verse.

Are There Indeed Two Types of Drash?

Above we saw that there are two kinds of drash. There is mechanical-formal drash by means of the hermeneutical rules, and it teaches us a law that branches out from the verses. It does not offer an alternative interpretation of the verses under discussion. By contrast, there is a drash that does not use the hermeneutical rules, but builds an optimal interpretation of a given verse in light of some balancing of content and literal considerations. This interpretation stands alongside the peshat interpretation and offers an alternative to it.

It is not clear what the source is for this additional type of drash. If in the midrashim of the hermeneutical rules we use hermeneutical rules that are a law transmitted to Moses at Sinai, then the second type of drash has no clear method, and therefore no clear source. What is the source of the legitimacy, or authority, of its use?

In light of what we said above, one may say that the second type of drash is nothing but an extension of the use of the hermeneutical rule “two verses that contradict one another.” The optimal interpretation is created as a result of contradictions between the literal interpretation and various constraints — of reason, or arising from other verses. The hermeneutical rule of “two verses that contradict one another” teaches us that one must seek an optimal solution to such a situation. It is precisely the rule by means of which we create the alternative midrashic interpretation.

And indeed, this rule does not guide us as to the method of how to build that optimal solution. It only teaches us that we must seek such an interpretation using our ordinary tools of logic.

Here we have returned to the first section above, where the relation between peshat and drash was presented as a problem of “two verses that contradict one another.” Only now we see that this is an application of that very hermeneutical rule, and not merely a metaphor. This is exactly what the Ravad meant in the words we cited in the essay on Parashat Bo, 5765, where he sees every resolution of a contradiction in Scripture as a use of the hermeneutical rule “two verses that contradict one another.”

The Development of the Hermeneutical Rules

Against this background, it is interesting to note that the rule of “two verses that contradict one another” does not appear among the seven rules of Hillel the Elder. It concludes Rabbi Yishmael’s list of thirteen rules. With respect to the other rules, one can see them as an expansion, elaboration, and development of Hillel the Elder’s rules, and commentators have already noted this. But the rule of “two verses that contradict one another” cannot be a development or elaboration of any of Hillel’s seven rules.

We therefore see that the second type of drash, the one that creates an optimal interpretation through ordinary rational considerations, crystallized in a relatively late generation. Until Rabbi Yishmael, the tools that had been formulated were the ordinary hermeneutical rules, which teach us how to extract laws from hints in Scripture. The rule of “two verses that contradict one another,” which teaches us to formulate an optimal interpretation as an alternative to the literal interpretation — in other words, the guidance of the Hazon Ish and the Beit Yosef mentioned above — is the product of later processes of formulation.⁷

Again: Inadvertent Idolatry

The midrash with which we dealt last year proposed two alternative interpretations of the verses in our parashah. The peshat interpretation speaks of an inadvertent transgression of all the commandments of the Torah. The midrashic interpretation speaks of inadvertent idolatry.

At first glance, this is a midrash of the second type — that is, an alternative interpretation to the peshat interpretation — and not the derivation of an additional law that branches out from the peshat of the verses. If so, this is a case of two parallel interpretations, one peshat and one midrashic.

We saw that Nahmanides proposes an interpretation that combines these two interpretations. Is this his way of dealing with a case of two verses that contradict one another? But question 2 still remains. Is the Torah’s wording in fact optimal in light of his proposed interpretation? Assuming that his interpretation is indeed the Torah’s intent, could the Torah’s wording not have expressed it better?

At first glance, the answer is negative. The wording plainly points to inadvertent transgression of the whole Torah and not to inadvertent idolatry. Therefore the tendency is to see the interpretation of the Sages as drash and not as peshat. The literal interpretation is the peshat, and it exists alongside the midrashic interpretation.

What would Nahmanides say to all this? It is unlikely that he rejects the parallel existence of peshat and drash. Perhaps he is only proposing his own optimal interpretation of the verses.

Because of the brevity of space, and because of the importance and general scope of the topic, we will continue to discuss it next week.

Footnotes