A Look at Revenge: Mind and Heart (Column 596)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

You could see that in these turbulent days I don’t really have the mood to write columns—certainly not on current affairs, but not even on theoretical topics. Somehow these days depress me, and when the cannons roar, the muses fall silent. Not only because of the dead we’ve had—and sadly will likely have more—but because, in my estimation, the inflamed martial euphoria now taking shape is leading us into a foreordained chronicle of yet another glorious failure. Beyond that, I must warn that the impression being created—as though the disputes we had here are already behind us—is itself a grand illusion. I can already envision what will be here after that failure joins the terrible one we already experienced, and of course the demonstrations and controversies that will follow (whether Bibi should go or not). What we had here over the past year will, I believe, pale beside what still awaits us. For the moment everyone wants blood, and around that we have briefly united. When we sober up from this destructive mood and see the results of our withdrawal pangs from this euphoria, we will find ourselves in a different situation.

And then I remembered that the next column I had planned to write was supposed to deal with revenge (following a question I was asked here)—an issue tied at the core to the question of reason and emotion, or the mind and the heart. The events of these days provide circumstances in which it is fitting to address this topic, and therefore I decided to try nonetheless to write something. As is my way, I will try to keep a cool head and not be led captive by hot blood, and I thought a good way to cope with these emotions is to write about this very matter. Given the situation (mine and in general), I will do so rather briefly, and therefore will not enter into many additional lessons from the events of recent days.

Methodological Note

Of course I could bring verses and various rabbinic sayings that address this (I’m sure you can find as many as you like online), but in my eyes that has no importance and no meaning. In any case, each person takes those sources and does with them whatever he wishes. In the end, each of us kneads the sources and arrives at the expected conclusion he wanted from the outset (I’ll leave you to supply the headlines: left, right, moderate or extreme).

This also changes according to circumstances. When the blood runs hot, the conclusion will always be in favor of revenge; in other situations, the opposite. When one wants to restrain excessive avengers who arouse in us fear of anarchy and problematic deeds, one will bring sources condemning revenge against them, and in other cases do the reverse. In the end, no one has ever formed a position on such a question in light of the sources. On the contrary: we always subordinate them to the position we formed in advance. This is true for every intellectual and moral topic, but regarding revenge it is doubly true, since a very powerful emotional element is involved. In these stormy days you can find, under every green tree, fine examples of the dishonesty and ridiculous use of sources. So I will spare you and myself that dishonesty, and I will try to explain my own view on the subject without resorting to counterfeit “support,” as is customary.

Revenge: A First Look

The question I was asked concerned the relation between justice and revenge. The term “justice” clearly carries a positive connotation, whereas “revenge” carries a negative one. Every act of revenge contains an element of justice, since the one harmed is the one who deserves to be harmed as a result of what he did; and yet revenge is generally considered bad. To understand the matter better, we need to break it down.

First, we need to understand the aims of revenge. There are several aspects here that are important to distinguish; I will list the basic ones:

• Justice. Revenge is retribution upon the one who harmed, such that he too will suffer.
• Deterrence. Revenge may deter other potential offenders.
• Education. Revenge clarifies and sharpens for the offender himself and for the public at large that the original harm was evil and must not be done.
• Protection. Revenge can sometimes neutralize the offender, and then it has an aspect of protection (if he is killed or imprisoned, he will not harm again).
• Catharsis for the victim and for society. Channeling the justified feelings of revenge and frustration in useful directions (the benefit being the previous aspects). It is important to distinguish this from (a), since there we spoke of an ethical and/or metaphysical matter, while here the matter is psychological.

Aspect (a) is clearly positive. True, at times there is a sense that this aspect is the Almighty’s domain, not ours. But I think that when people reject revenge it is mainly because of its negative aspects. Were it not for them, there would be no bar to justice being carried out by us (if it is just, why not?!).

I will now list the problems with revenge:

1. It is hard to set a reasonable, proportionate boundary. The avenger may do disproportionate things to the offender (stab him to death because he cut him off on the road, or do things that place himself or others in mortal danger just to take revenge). Sometimes a person may take revenge without justification at all (for example, when he decides that so-and-so is guilty when that is not the truth).
2. Sometimes revenge will be carried out even though it entails severe harms from other perspectives that should have prevented us from avenging, even if the revenge is justified and proportionate.
3. Revenge can continue without end (revenge for revenge, and so on—like blood feuds among Arabs).
4. Revenge creates an atmosphere of anarchy and undermines social institutions.
5. Revenge operates on an emotional basis. This, to my mind, is the most fundamental point, and it underlies most of the problems just listed. But it is important to understand that this aspect is problematic in itself as well: a person ought not act from the gut but from the head.

Therefore, in my answer to the questioner I focused on point 5 and wrote that revenge is bad because it is driven by instinct rather than by deliberation. As noted, this point includes all the others and adds to them.

Private and Public Revenge

All of this is mainly true when revenge is not institutionalized, i.e., when it is carried out by private individuals—especially those who were wronged. When it is carried out by courts, it is more balanced and measured, and this is generally the right way to do it. The reason is that most of the benefits can be achieved that way without the harms. What will be lacking is catharsis for the victim (and perhaps for the public). But this is a deficiency well worth bearing in order to prevent the other harms.

It is important to understand that sometimes institutions also operate emotionally and can thus bring upon us all the harms I listed. This can happen even in courts, though there are administrative constraints (rules of evidence, the right to representation and to appeal, legal and legislative limits, etc.) that try to minimize this possibility. But revenge carried out by a public–governmental body, like a government, is indeed prone to the same problems. True, the government is a public body and not a private person who was harmed; but when the harm is public (as in our case), the government may well go with the prevailing public mood and act like a private person who was harmed. This is because its members are also part of the public (unfortunately), because it lacks the procedural constraints courts have, and also for purely electoral reasons (the scourge of populism). In this way, public revenge too can lead to problematic actions from all the aspects I listed. Therefore, in my view the decision to go to war should not be handed over to a government—or even to the Knesset. At the very least, I would expect significant procedural oversight of such decisions (requiring a special majority, multiple votes, and the like).

Incidentally, in halakhah consultation is sought with the Sanhedrin and with the Urim and Thummim, at least for an optional war (milḥemet reshut), since for it there is no clear halakhic directive and the king’s discretion is required in making such a decision. Among us, such a decision is made in a rather small forum, which is itself controlled mainly by one person. This means that our wars—especially a war of revenge like the one now launched—are liable to fail in all the same pitfalls I listed above regarding revenge. By the way, there is another interesting halakhic aspect that bears on the matter. As is known, the unintentional killer is handed over to the blood avenger (with limits, such as the protection of a city of refuge), and there the aim is clearly catharsis and perhaps also to impress upon people the duty not to be negligent regarding human life. But what is less known is that an intentional murderer is also killed by the blood avenger, as Maimonides writes at the beginning of the Laws of Murderers:

A. Whoever kills a Jewish person violates a negative commandment, as it is said [+Exodus 20:13+]: “You shall not murder.” And if he murdered intentionally in the presence of witnesses, his death is by the sword, as it is said [+Exodus 21:20+]: “He shall surely be avenged.” By tradition they learned that this is death by the sword; whether he killed his fellow with iron or burned him with fire—his death is by the sword.

B. It is a commandment upon the blood avenger, as it is said [+Numbers 35:19+]: “The blood avenger shall put the murderer to death.” Anyone eligible to inherit is a blood avenger. If the blood avenger did not wish, or was unable, to kill him, or if he has no blood avenger, the court executes the murderer by the sword.

Note that this is done only after a court ruling. Thus we gain catharsis for the blood avenger (since he himself kills the murderer) while preventing most of the problems that may arise from personal revenge, because there is an orderly court procedure with all the legal constraints. It is interesting to note that these laws appear in the Laws of Murderers and not in the Laws of the Sanhedrin, and it seems this is because they do not address court procedure but rather the permission for the blood avenger to kill the murderer (hence they are part of the Laws of Murderers and not the Laws of the Sanhedrin).

Interim Summary

The necessary conclusion is that there is justice in revenge, and it also has nontrivial benefits. But the fear of the harms that a policy of revenge may cause should greatly limit a person’s scope to avenge. Usually it is preferable that the matter be carried out by a public body—and even then with great caution and with procedural constraints. Where is the boundary? I cannot define it in a general, sweeping way. Use common sense.

It is very important to understand that these conclusions are not necessarily tied to left and right, to humanism, or to the value of the life of a Jew or a non-Jew, and the like. The harms expected from conduct of revenge are harms by everyone’s lights, and therefore all should agree that it is important to prevent or at least limit them. Take Elor Azaria as an example, who killed a bound terrorist. The “left,” of course, condemned him because of the value of human life—one must not harm someone who poses no direct threat. And the “right,” predictably, supported him enthusiastically. The discussion was mainly about the value of life and its boundaries. In column 1, the column that opened this site, I wrote that I have no moral problem with what he did. In my view it is right and proper to kill a bound terrorist (that way we can even save the rope), and of course there is no reason to treat him medically, as is being done these days (though I would certainly have spared myself and all of us the bestial demonstrations by the “La Familia” gang at Tel Hashomer). But that is a decision that must be made publicly (by the legislature, or at least by a senior military commander, or the military prosecution) and not handed to a private individual. And again, this is not because I feel sorry for the terrorist’s life, but because revenge requires deliberation and must not be carried out emotionally. It is very important to detach the question of revenge from the hyper-emotional left–right question (see also column 151 and many others). Because we do not detach them, not only is the revenge itself carried out emotionally, but the discussion about it is itself tainted by emotionalism. That column was foundational for the entire site, and not by chance I now return to the same point: the need to separate emotions from our decisions and conduct.

Back to Us

I assume none of my readers lives on the moon, and therefore there is no need to expound on the marvelous consensus that has formed in the studios and in the media regarding the need to flatten Gaza without constraints (“without the High Court and without B’Tselem,” to use Rabin’s phrase). Suddenly the great leftists are explaining to us that now it is clear that one cannot live alongside Gaza or Hamas (not always distinguishing between the two): it’s either them or us. Smotrich’s statement about “flattening Huwara,” which drew wild criticism in Israel and abroad, has suddenly become consensus—the sane center. Suddenly it is no longer beastly, no longer morally intolerable, and not even practically impossible. Lieberman’s “toppling Hamas” (even if not in two days), which was met with torrents of ridicule and scorn, has become a mantra on everyone’s lips. As Avraham rightly wrote here in the Q&A, all those arguments have disappeared and the leash is off. In my view, however, this is not hypocrisy, as he interpreted it, but gut reactions. I estimate they will also disappear before long and we will return to our usual debates (and even more so to the good old right–left wars, or Bibi–anti-Bibi).

The pinnacle of pinnacles was an interview two days ago (Tuesday) conducted by Rino Tzror with Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland. Eiland is a highly respected officer, former head of the National Security Council, with rich experience, intelligent and measured, whose words are heard with great respect everywhere. It is very worthwhile to listen to him to get an unmediated impression. Despite the measured tone and slow speech (well, he was an army officer), one cannot avoid the impression that the man is speaking from the gut like the most zealous Ben-Gvir supporter. He speaks of destroying Gaza, of deportation, of carrying out a humanitarian “Shoah”—and all without batting an eyelid. The interviewer is left stunned (while trying to keep his composure), and so was I. Not only on the moral plane, but on the practical–strategic one. Does he really think anyone will allow us to do this over time?

This is all the more surprising when you recall Eiland’s personal, intellectual, and ethical qualities. I didn’t check, but I am quite certain that he too was among those shocked by the statements of Smotrich and Ben Gvir—which were far more moderate than his. And I have yet to mention Haim Yellin, an unequivocal man of the left, whose words and descriptions in the media of what happened on the ground and what must be done now shake the entire public and arouse enormous empathy and sympathy—and rightly so. And likewise with other retired generals and various experts in the studios. Suddenly it turns out there is no left in Israel, and in fact there is no sane right either. Everyone here voted for Otzma Yehudit (and that’s only for lack of choice, because Baruch Marzel was not allowed to run). In any case, I’m still waiting for mass apologies to Ben Gvir and Smotrich.

One must understand that the recent events taught no one anything new. Even Bibi, one of the well-known sustainers of Hamas (in my estimation there is a plaque on their headquarters wall with his name as a memorial—he is one of their greatest donors and supporters), told us in a fiery speech to the nation that “we always knew who Hamas is” (see for example here). If so, I don’t understand what is new now. Why is it now clear to everyone that Gaza must be flattened without the High Court and without B’Tselem, whereas before, everyone (including Bibi) opposed that? It seems it is only because they succeeded—i.e., they managed to carry out what they always wanted to do. But why is success a criterion at all? If that is what they want to do—and they have always spoken of it openly—then our policy toward them should have been such all along, no? In many past columns (see, for example, columns 1, 47, 185, 226, 229, 353, 377, 436, 441 and more), I wrote about the failure of evaluating an offense and punishing it based on its outcomes.

All this points to thinking, policy, and declarations that come from the gut. When one sees murder before one’s eyes, it is infuriating and boils the blood, and from there comes the emotional response we are seeing in our public “discourse.” But from the standpoint of the head, attempted murder is exactly as wicked as murder; and preventing murder is no less important than responding to murder already committed. Therefore, if we support flattening Gaza or toppling Hamas, we ought to have supported this always, irrespective of the recent Simchat Torah events. And if we do not support it, these events should not change that.

So What, Then?

I, for my part, do not intend to apologize to Ben Gvir or to Smotrich. In response to a question regarding remarks by Rabbi Sherki, I wrote that in my opinion there is no justification for flattening Huwara, nor Gaza. They were wrong in the past and are wrong now. It is a mad moral injustice, and as I thought then so I think now. Harming innocents is an injustice, and designating them as a target (as Rabbi Zini or Rabbi Sherki write) is a moral scandal. Even a person who supports murder is not worthy of the death penalty, and his infant all the less so. And those in Gaza who do not support murder—and there are such—certainly do not deserve to be wiped from the face of the earth. As noted, the practical results of an action—success or failure—should not change our attitude toward its perpetrator. That changes only from the gut, not from the head.

I wrote here in response to questions that I think it is permissible to harm any Gazan resident if that is necessary to achieve the goals (which no one, including the army and the government, apparently knows). I think, generally, that the goal can be the return of the hostages and eliminating the Hamas threat. Given that we act toward those ends, I have no moral problem with harming innocents (see on this in my article here), but we must remember that at least some of them truly are innocent. Therefore, if it is not necessary and will not lead to achieving the goals but will merely provide catharsis for our boiling blood, such an act incurs a grave moral prohibition. To view all of Gaza as a target ab initio is, in my view, something close to a Nazi idea (apropos the death penalty for those who support murder).

In short, the problem here is not moral but practical. Despite the enthusiastic declarations of soldiers and officers and civilians and politicians that “we will win,” our definition of victory and its goals must be precise—and to my impression, that has not been done. If we wish to take revenge—that is, to impose the death penalty on murderers—that is entirely legitimate. But then there is no justification for harming innocents (including those who support them). If we wish to harm them to prevent future harms or to deter, that already justifies proportionate harm to innocents (see my article), but still the innocents cannot be a target. Harm to them is at most an unavoidable side effect that will not be condemned. If we wish to eliminate Hamas—and certainly all of Gaza—as a strategic goal, there is no point entering moral questions because it will not happen (neither the elimination of Hamas nor the destruction of Gaza). It is simply impractical. The world is so far showing impressive and surprising patience, but I estimate that in a day or two it will wake up and we will be forced to stop. Even now, the Air Force bombings are, in my estimation, beyond the bounds of international law (and Biden has already hinted to us about this twice, in the course of a warm, enthusiastic Zionist speech). But even if you do not think so, the world surely does—and if not now, then in two or three days. And in general, what will happen after we flatten Gaza? Who exactly will rule there, and how? Do we intend to return to military rule in Gaza? To deport all the Palestinians? Is that a real option? Does anyone mean any of this seriously?

So if this will not achieve the toppling of Hamas nor the return of the hostages, and if we have no reasonable goals on the horizon, why on earth are we doing all this? And this even before the ground operation has begun, which will likely exact a heavy price from us as well. Again: it is justified to pay a price if it is necessary to achieve the goals—and if the goals are well defined and worthy. But I deeply fear we will pay it without achieving them. That, at least, is how it was every previous time.

My clear sense is that everyone is now acting from the gut. The enthusiasm of the soldiers is understandable. They are impetuous eighteen-year-olds, and most of them are not really thinking soberly about the situation (and perhaps it is good that they are not). But from the senior command and from the government I would expect more deliberation. The revenge we are engaged in can bring upon us—and upon the Gazans—disasters with no purpose. Contrary to the declarations of Rabbis Zini and Sherki, there is no justification for killing innocents for nothing—and certainly not for our own soldiers and civilians. The fact that we bungled and paid a heavy price arouses obvious frustration. The horrific deeds committed here boil the blood. But none of these is a plan of action, and they do not justify the prices that attend action without a plan.

I have no information, and I am quite a small strategist. Therefore I can only offer unlearned assessments about the situation and certainly about the expected results. It is entirely possible that I am mistaken in my assessments—but at least I try to examine assessments with cold deliberation and not let my gut dictate my thoughts and steps (I have no steps, since, thankfully, I am in charge of nothing). I must say that I have been working on this for many years, and these days all the more so, and I recommend that you—and all of us—do likewise. My sense is that right now people are speaking and acting from the gut, and that is the main problem. Not just among the public, not just among the soldiers, but also not in the senior command and not in the government. Even the commentators and military experts—people not under the pressure of making practical decisions—are issuing pompous, empty declarations from the gut, including the measured and judicious among them (cf. Eiland).

I wrote in response to questions from recent days that I would expect the government and the army to set up a thinking body that would try to formulate policy for the situation that has arisen, and not to set out to action without thinking. They themselves have not demonstrated their thoughtfulness and creativity, and therefore I doubt their ability to do so going forward. Israel has marvelous, creative minds of all kinds, and they are apparently not in the army, nor in the government, nor among the adjacent bureaucracy. The present situation requires gathering several such minds under an “Order 8” emergency call-up and seating them at the table, and this should be done before we embark on practical actions. In my view, if such a team were to hold a day or two of brainstorming, there is a good chance it would reach more creative and effective results than we will obtain in the present situation.

A Note on the “Glorious Surrender”

The sense I described—that everything is operating from the gut—was with me from the start. Therefore I thought to raise my wife Daphna’s proposal, which went in a direction very contrary to the intuitions and the boiling blood. The claim was that perhaps there is a chance to bring forth the precious from the vile—that is, to exploit Hamas’s image of victory to reach with it a more effective arrangement that would include an exchange of prisoners/hostages. One can debate whether this is practical or not, but as I anticipated—and I wrote this before I posted the proposal—many of the responses there were from the gut (and of course they accused me of writing from the gut; apparently I have a tremendous urge to support child-murderers. Or perhaps the provocativeness of the thing charms me).

The proposal is, of course, unusual and outside the box; but precisely for that reason it is worth considering. I must say that I too think most likely it would not have succeeded, but I still think (all the more so now) that it was worth trying before setting out to destroy Gaza. When you have bullets in the chamber, you will achieve results only so long as you have not fired them. After you have fired them, you will achieve nothing (except the death of the one opposite you). If we have immense forces mobilized and international legitimacy (which will soon evaporate) to act, then it is certainly wise at least to consider an offer to Hamas to spare them the destruction that awaits them and to come out with the upper hand (if only because “they deserve it”—they caught us with our pants down). In short, sometimes—especially when one is not in the Wild West and not in Hollywood—Clint Eastwood’s immortal instruction is incorrect: Even if you want to shoot don’t shoot. First think a little bit, try to save the shooting, and then decide.

True, this is a frustrating, annoying path that does not give immediate release to boiling blood. It is hard to admit defeat, and it is certainly easier to declare under every green tree that we will win—as if it were great wisdom to defeat Hamas with aerial bombardment or even with a ground operation (the question is what “win” means; no one gets into that). I am very pessimistic about our chances of winning in any real sense (beyond bringing catharsis to a boiling public). But even if it is hard, perhaps precisely such a step would bring results. Perhaps not. In fact, most likely not. But what matters for my discussion here is not whether it is a good proposal (yes, I too know that a terror organization feeds off admissions of defeat, and that one must “speak Arabic” to them, and deterrence, etc., etc.), but whether anyone is prepared to consider such an option—or anything else out of the box and against the wind that is blowing so strongly and thrilling everyone (but depressing me). My impression is no; and that means we are acting from the gut, not from the head.

To begin closing the circle: what is happening now is a course of revenge, and it seems no one is prepared to consider its consequences and to think whether this is the right way that will bring us optimal achievements. We are conducting ourselves from the gut and not from the head—just like a blood avenger, only without constraints and without prior thought. The public is truly enthusiastic about the unity that was so lacking. But even if cooking for soldiers is nice, and even if impassioned declarations by eighteen-year-old youths about victory are also very nice (and I hope they all return safely, and do not “win” with such overflowing enthusiasm)—from leadership and institutions I expect revenge after prior deliberation and consideration of consequences. A prime minister and a chief of staff are not ordinary citizens. They are institutions, and their role is to show leadership. Leadership at this time is not necessarily to accede to the public mood, but sometimes precisely to stand against it (if indeed that is the conclusion one reaches). I greatly doubt whether they have the strength to do this, even if it were their conclusion. I doubt whether there was any serious inferential thinking there at all. Perhaps in the emergency government and the broader “kitchen cabinet” formed yesterday it will be easier to do this. Would that it be so. Time will tell.