More on the Rabbi Karim Controversy: Homosexuality, Refusal of Orders, Burning the “New Testament,” and the Nature of Women (Column 16)

Shlomi:
Do you think there is any point (perhaps even an obligation) to trying to look for a rationale for the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse? (That is the more accurate term, since what exactly is forbidden in the mere fact that a person has a homosexual inclination?) As is well known, the sages disagreed whether mitzvot have reasons, or whether “the mitzvot were given only to refine people through them.” It seems that as the conflicts intensify, many prefer to give up the attempt to look for a rationale, for understandable reasons. What is your view?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Obviously the prohibition applies only to the act, not to the inclination. Where did I write otherwise?
To the best of my understanding, it is clear that mitzvot do have reasons. Still, they are not always accessible to us, and certainly not to each and every one of us. I am also not sure to what extent searching for reasons falls under the rubric of Torah study (perhaps Torah in the person rather than in the object; see my two articles on this by searching here on the site). Therefore the question whether to look for reasons anyway is a personal one. Let each person do what he wants and what he understands to be right. I think it is worth trying at least to find reasons, if only to quiet one’s pangs of conscience. On the other hand, I do not think it is right to give up intellectual honesty (for example, the sweeping claim that all mitzvot are grounded in moral reasons, which plainly seems untrue). In sum, there is no reason to give up in advance, but there is also no reason to declare that you have found a reason if you have not. One should search as much as possible.
I would add that although halakhically we do not derive law from the reason of the verse, when one does find a reason and it seems persuasive, it is sometimes used in interpreting the parameters of the mitzvah. That is, the reasons for mitzvot can have practical halakhic implications (see, for example, Tosafot HaRosh on Bava Metzia 90, who wrote that when the reason is clear, we do derive law from the reason of the verse).

The rabbi:
I just thought of something. For anyone who says there is no difference between women and men: check how many women there are among all the commenters on this entire site and its branches—articles, responsa, and posts. As I recall, there was one.
The same is true in lectures I give. In almost every lecture, a few listeners stay afterward to comment and argue after it ends. I think there has never been a woman among them. And if I don’t remember correctly, then perhaps there were a few isolated cases out of several hundred, by a rough estimate.
Once someone asked me why there is a separate women’s league in chess. Physical strength should not be a factor there. I’ll leave that as an exercise for the readers.
——————————————————————————————
Ayala:
A response only to the last sentence—
What is the connection between what you demonstrated—that women rarely argue and ask questions after lectures or participate in the site’s Q&A, etc.—and the separation of the chess leagues? On the face of it, what you describe could indicate differences in women’s interest in these subjects, not differences in levels of thinking. In other words, it is true that usually women do not show great interest in religious or philosophical debates, but *when they do*, there is no difference between women and men in their ability to understand and discuss these topics.
And that is the point with chess. Women who come to play chess, even if they are a minority among the larger female population that is interested in other areas, are already there. And in my opinion it has still not been proven that men’s playing ability is automatically on a different level from women’s. Therefore, in my opinion, the separation between the leagues is indeed puzzling.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Hello Ayala.
First of all, if what I wrote brought about another female response here on the site, then it was already worthwhile.
There is no necessary connection between the two things. And in any case, I was not trying here to demonstrate differences in level of thought (at most it demonstrates differences in fields of interest, and even of that I am not sure; perhaps it is shyness, or something else). What I did demonstrate is that there are differences between the genders.
As you may recall, Rabbi Karim spoke about women’s sentimentality, and people were very angry with him for it. And I did not understand what all the fuss was about: can one really deny that there are differences between women and men? That is why I brought the examples here. Or perhaps his critics thought the difference is not in the area of sentimentality. So what? Is one not allowed to be mistaken? Therefore my sense was that the attack was based on an a priori assumption that there are no differences, and for that I brought these examples.
As for differences in chess level, I do not know what would count in your view as proof of automatic differences. I do not even know what the term “automatic differences” means. The fact is (as far as I know) that the women’s chess league is at a lower level than the men’s. One can of course offer many explanations for this, and I have not investigated the matter. But there is a difference here. That is what I was trying to demonstrate.
By the way, since we are talking about proof for claims, it seems to me that your claim that there is no difference in level (among those who are interested) is also unproven. In your view, can claims for equality be advanced even without proof, while only claims of difference require proof?

Shlomi:
Thank you for the answer. Interesting. Regarding the fact that the prohibition is really on the act—you did not write otherwise, and I did not think you thought otherwise. I am only commenting on the terminology. When you use the title—“Is homosexuality immoral?”—one might think you are speaking about the inclination itself. That is simply the common use of the word “homosexuality,” not the sexual act itself.

I would like to add one more comment—the claim that the reason for the prohibition is that such relations do not lead to procreation and contain nothing besides pleasure itself was made by the Rambam (Guide for the Perplexed III:49) and Sefer HaChinukh (mitzvah 209).
The Chinukh comments there that for this reason they prohibited marrying off a woman to a minor, since it is a kind of promiscuity, and likewise that a man should not marry an old woman or a barren woman who is unable to bear children.
This reason persuades me even today. You wrote that nowadays a homosexual couple can procreate by various assisted means. What do you mean? As far as I know, their way of procreating is to take sperm from one of them and use a surrogate mother. But that of course is not procreation that results from the fact that the two males are lying with one another. Even 2,000 years ago, a man could have had a child from a woman and arranged with her that he would take the child and raise it together with another man.

Regarding the morality of the matter, I agree that one cannot see a moral problem here. In my opinion this is true of all the sexual prohibitions. If, from your point of view, immorality is a situation in which an injustice is done to one of the parties (a simplistic definition, but it seems to me many would agree), then there cannot be a moral problem even with a brother and sister who want to sleep with one another, or a man who wants to sleep with his mother, if both sides consent. The fact that this repels a modern person still does not make it immoral. Homosexuality too repels many people, and certainly was perceived as repellent by almost universal consensus until a few years ago. Familiarity with it and social acceptance can change over time. Do you agree with that?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
B. Obviously it is not by virtue of their life together itself—so what? Each of them can procreate.
Indeed, social attitudes can change, and they already are changing. Even in the religious ציבור.
——————————————————————————————
Shlomi:
No one ever disputed that. There is no new development here in our day. The claim is that two men who have sex, while they are having sex, cannot procreate, and in their act there is nothing but pleasure itself, and the Torah tried (here and in the sexual prohibitions generally) to limit pleasure as an end in itself, since it leads a person away from his purpose and destiny.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
To that I said that according to this logic, it should also have been necessary to prohibit any other relationship that does not lead to procreation. Is the great outrage and the “abomination” really a life that does not lead to procreation?
——————————————————————————————
Shlomi:
That argument really does not apply only to male homosexual intercourse. According to this approach, the Torah prohibited intercourse with an animal for the same reason, and as I noted above, Sefer HaChinukh says that this is the root of the sages’ prohibition on marrying a barren woman or an old woman unless one has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation or has another wife (Rambam, Ishut 15:7). The great outrage is against a life in which one is drawn after excessive sexual desire, and one aspect of that is the matter of procreation.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Would they then also permit living with a man for someone who already has children, or when he has another wife?
——————————————————————————————
Shlomi:
Ask more strongly—why do the verses speak of male intercourse and bestiality, and from them they learned to prohibit a barren or elderly woman, rather than the reverse?
The answer to both questions seems simple to me. Intercourse with a barren or elderly woman is less severe (and even that one prefers to avoid) because it does not undermine the underlying principle of the importance of procreation and the opposition to sexuality that consists only of pleasure. At the end of the day, people see here a man married to a woman, which appears to have the potential for procreation. They will not necessarily know whether he has already had children with her, tried to have children with her, or can have children with her. In addition, it is also not a certainty. A woman who was barren yesterday will not necessarily be barren tomorrow, and likewise not all women lose fertility at the same age, and there have already been surprises. That cannot be said about intercourse with a man or with an animal, where even after a thousand acts of intercourse they will never be able to produce children through the intercourse itself. The absoluteness here is much stronger.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
You did not answer what is abominable about it. And you also did not answer why they did not permit living with a man once he has already fulfilled procreation, or alongside another wife. For the benefit of all onlookers, let him put up a sign on the house or at the wedding canopy that he has already fulfilled procreation.
And regarding your remarks: is living with an elderly woman not obviously a case where there is no procreation? When one marries an 80-year-old woman, is that not clear enough? Is that too an abomination?
——————————————————————————————
Shlomi:
Of course I answered. The difference is very great. When you meet a person (whose biography you have not read, since your acquaintance with most people you meet is at that level) and you see that he lives with a woman, even if she is barren or elderly, it is not absolutely clear to you that the man lives with her and has never in the past fulfilled, or will never in the future fulfill, the commandment of procreation with her—as opposed to a person who sleeps with a man or an animal, where you do not have the slightest doubt that with them themselves there is only sex and nothing more, even if he has already fulfilled it with another or lives in parallel with another.
The very fact that you propose a sign or an announcement at the wedding only proves this. In a marriage to a barren or elderly woman there is no absolute need for that, because one can think of another explanation, unlike marriage to a man, where there is no doubt you would need to explain. And even if you explain, who will check that the sign is in place? Who will make sure that everyone saw it? Perhaps you will also ask him to declare it everywhere he goes? It is neither practical nor possible to rely on that; it will lead people to think that intercourse with a man is possible even without those conditions. The conspicuousness here is of a completely different order, and its effect is correspondingly different.

Obviously one can always imagine an edge case of an elderly woman whom everyone knows, where it is absolutely clear that there was not and will not be procreation here. But edge cases do not overturn the general principle. After all, one can find such cases for any other explanation you might offer and for any other law or halakhah. These are cases left to the judge’s discretion and to considerations of morality and education, and one may assume such a person would be protested against. I think such cases do not blunt or obscure the general principle.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
In my view this rationale is implausible, and certainly does not explain the abomination involved. But apparently we will remain in disagreement.

Arik:
“But beyond all this, the very explanation that relies on a woman’s sentimentality seems ridiculous to me. How can such a generalization (even if it has some substance on the statistical level) justify terrible distortions of justice resulting from disqualifying women from testimony? Then let them question the woman carefully and gently. Can it be that the solution is not to let her testify and thereby release murderers or fail to extract money from robbers because we have no testimony about it? In my opinion this is absurd. Again, there is an assumption here that the laws of the Torah are based on moral or rational-natural reasons—and that is not so.”

So does the rabbi hold that the rule disqualifying women from testimony is unrelated to its effect on the correctness of the ruling?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Indeed. If it were because of the correctness of the ruling, then by not accepting women one only makes matters worse. A situation in which there are witnesses and one does not hear them is always worse than a situation in which one accepts a woman’s testimony cautiously.
——————————————————————————————
Arik:
If so, is the rabbi retracting his earlier remarks that this rule was stated on the assumption that women are not proficient in financial dealings, etc., and therefore do not know how to testify?

(Incidentally, I do not tend to agree with the rabbi on this point. We are dealing with a general directive. When a general directive is given, it is usually determined according to the majority. If Hazal viewed women the way people today view 10-year-old children (and it may be that this is what Hazal thought), then it is not implausible that in their opinion it was preferable to refrain from bringing them as witnesses.
(There might also then be exceptions, such as a suspicious case, an emergency enactment, etc.)
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
First, I did not claim that this is the reason women are disqualified. I merely raised such a possibility in principle, and I said that if indeed this is the reason, then there would be room to change the law. Usually I raise this claim in the context of discussing changes in halakhah. Regarding the disqualification of women, it is hard to know what its reason is, although the Gemara itself somewhat implies that it is because “the dignity of the king’s daughter is inward.”
Second, there is a difference between sentimentality and a lack of understanding of life. Take the extreme example of an imbecile, who is also disqualified from testimony because he does not understand. His testimony is not worth much, and so there is logic in disqualifying him. If women do not understand, then they are disqualified similarly to an imbecile, and that is not like a disqualification due to concerns about withstanding examination because of sentimentality.
The question of why Hazal disqualified women from testimony depends on the condition of women in their time and on their assessment of that condition. Today the situation is different, and to think that the testimony of a contemporary woman contributes nothing to clarifying judicial truth is absurd and unreasonable.
——————————————————————————————
Oren:
I was reminded of an interesting interpretation by Hizkuni on Genesis 18:15: “And Sarah denied it, saying, ‘I did not laugh,’ because she was afraid. And He said, ‘No, but you did laugh.’”
On this Hizkuni says: From here we learn that women are disqualified from testimony because they deny out of fear.

Rashbi too feared that his wife would reveal his hiding place to the Romans if they threatened her.

I think that even nowadays it would be correct to say that women are more affected by pressure situations, and that the concern that under pressure they will distort the truth is greater than with men.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Oren,
For some reason this insight did not penetrate the general legal world. I think that anyone who proposes such an explanation should ask himself whether he would propose to other legal systems that they disqualify women.
Even if this is true and women stand up less well under pressure, I have already written that this is not a reason to disqualify them categorically. At most one should question them carefully and treat what they say with caution.
And beyond that, in the testimony of a woman (to testify that her husband has died, thereby permitting her to remarry), women’s testimony is accepted. If there were a real concern about distortion of justice, how could this be done? The same applies to the words of the Noda BiYehudah and Terumat HaDeshen, who accept a woman’s testimony in a case where only women are present (a murder in a mikveh, courtesy of Agatha Christie). So we see that women’s testimony is accepted in life-and-death matters when there is no choice.

Yisrael Goren:
Rabbi Abraham, good week,

Something needs to be done for the sake of discussion culture. The rabbi’s recent articles really contribute to this, but it is important to encourage young people to develop a leisure culture of debate, like in old England.

I suggest that the rabbi use this platform to call on young people to begin organizing in every city to hold a debate once a week.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I hereby call on them. I am sure that from now on a mass movement will begin in the streets of the cities.

The rabbi:
Here is yet another argument about the term “sotah”: http://news.walla.co.il/item/2979770

Yehonatan Yeshurun:
Regarding halakhah and morality, there are two steps here, and the second seems to me very novel indeed.
The first step: halakhah does not necessarily overlap with morality, in the sense that the parameters of halakhic prohibition do not necessarily overlap with the parameters of moral prohibition. For example, one can murder by indirect causation, which from a halakhic standpoint involves no prohibition, and there are other examples as you showed elsewhere. That is understandable, because halakhah and morality are two different planes.
But in the second step, you argued that there is no connection at all—that is, that the very halakhic prohibition has no connection to morality.
When the Torah prohibited male homosexual intercourse and called it “an abomination,” one may well fail to understand this, as you noted, but to claim that from the Torah’s own perspective there is no moral flaw in it, simply because you do not understand what the problem is—I of course understand the pressure of the question, but the answer, which perhaps satisfies locally here, in fact empties all of halakhah of any content beyond a kind of game of God’s whims, who gave us random, meaningless commands (incidentally, this sounds very much like Leibowitz—is that what you mean?),
If we continue honestly with this approach, then the prohibition on murder does not necessarily teach that there is any moral problem with murder. That is both very strange and very diminishing of halakhah.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
It seems to me that wanting to elevate the status of halakhah is not a consideration in determining what it really is. Desire is one thing and reality another.
I also disagree that this turns halakhah into random whims. There are other values, beyond morality, and halakhah takes care of them. Where does the assumption come from that only moral values are meaningful? It is perfectly obvious that a considerable part of halakhah has no connection to morality. So what is it for, if there are only moral values in the world? What is the moral significance of the requirement that the wife of a kohen who was raped must separate from him? It seems to me that reducing halakhah specifically to morality empties it out. And regarding the example of murder, according to your approach it is still unclear why halakhah does not punish murder by indirect causation if it is clearly morally forbidden?
——————————————————————————————
Yehonatan Yeshurun:
Thank you for the answer.
It is clear that a considerable part of halakhah has no connection to morality (what is called “between man and God”); for example, most matters of ritual impurity and purity. These are indeed laws that one must observe because we were so commanded, without knowing the reason.
However, they make no such claim—that is, no one will argue that the red heifer is a command connected to morality (as opposed to our fulfillment of the command, but that is already another matter).
Moreover, it is clear that general commands will also harm individuals in ways that are not moral (like the wife of a kohen whom you mentioned), but that is an effect of every legal system.
By contrast, the commands that deal with matters between people—it is reasonable, and accepted in the tradition (“What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow”—this is the whole Torah, and many more such statements), that they indeed also came (and perhaps primarily) to serve as a signpost and marker for how one ought to behave; and because halakhah is on the earthly plane, it has formal parameters, and there will always be ways to circumvent them (which is also an explanation for indirect causation in murder).
Moreover, here we are dealing with a prohibition whose reason is explicitly stated: because the act is “an abomination” (a word I do not know how to interpret in a non-moral way), that is, in the Torah itself the rationale is moral.
It is simply an unreasonable claim (for the reasons I wrote) and an unaccepted one (in the sense of tradition and received interpretation of the Torah) to detach this whole section and turn it into a kind of “red heifer.”
Incidentally, can you give an example of values, non-moral values, that halakhah protects through the command “You shall not murder”?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
This is really not found in every legal system. Do you know of any Israeli law that has no rational or moral basis at all? Therefore, the presence of such laws in the halakhic system suggests that it has aims of other kinds (which are not clear to me, and I assume not to you either). If so, I do not see why there should be any special difficulty specifically with “You shall not murder,” or any other moral prohibition.
The explanation you proposed for indirect causation in murder is quite implausible. This is not a loophole in a law that is generally sound. There is a special rule that exempts indirect causation throughout the Torah. This was not forgotten; it is intentional. My question is why exempt it? Morally speaking, it is not even lighter than murder by one’s own hands. After all, we are speaking even where it is clear that he will die because of my actions (according to almost all views).
If you do not want to posit other unidentified purposes, one can also understand the additional purpose of moral prohibitions (like murder), and indeed of all prohibitions, in a completely general way—namely, obedience itself (“the mitzvot were given only to refine people through them”). According to this suggestion, every moral mitzvah has two facets: the moral one and obedience to God’s word. This makes it possible to see the reason for the mitzvah as the moral element, while still speaking of a different category of obligation. But, as I said, in impurity and other prohibitions you will not be able to find such a rationale, and therefore it does not seem very important to me to insist one way or the other.
——————————————————————————————
Mikha:
Yehonatan: You write that you do not know of a non-moral way to interpret the word “abomination.” Tell me, when you read verses such as “You shall not eat any abominable thing. These are the animals that you may eat: the ox, the sheep, and the goat; the deer, the gazelle, the roebuck, the wild goat, the ibex, the antelope, and the mountain sheep”—do you see a moral difference between eating roebuck and eating rabbit, between a cow and a camel? What is that difference? Is “A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man,” which is defined as an abomination, a moral prohibition (that is, the very act of women wearing men’s clothing is morally wrong in itself, apart from any consequences that may result from it)? How so?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Mikha,
As you say, I already wrote here in the past that the word “abomination” is discussed in Nedarim 51 (= “you are mistaken about it”), and that there are other biblical contexts in which it does not seem to be interpreted in the moral sense. For some reason I cannot now find what I wrote.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I now see that these things were written in the column itself. My apologies; apparently I am already confused by the sheer number of comments and articles.

Vital:
Hello Rabbi Michael Abraham,
With all due respect,
It is important to remember that halakhah has normative lenses through which it views factual cases, and it is not alone in this. When a legislator, for example, determines that there is statutory dangerousness in certain offenses, which justifies detention, is that not a normative determination of facts? When one assumes that imprisonment causes deterrence or rehabilitation, is that not a normative determination of facts? In fact, every causal assumption, even in the “pure” normative world, presupposes facts. So why regret it?
In fact, this also works from the other side—the norms fix the facts. See the law of the two paths; see the Ben Ish Hai’s responsum about the presumptive status of niddah when a woman wore menstrual clothing because of the evil eye; and other examples in Rabbi Daichovsky’s excellent article in Techumin, whose exact volume I do not recall. In fact, every absurd halakhic ruling—and there are plenty of them, in full awareness—assumes in some sense a normative conception of facts, so I do not accept the basic premise in your remarks. In fact, the casuistic nature of halakhah often makes it difficult to know what is law and what is reality, and whether indeed there even are such two things. I know that Rabbi Michael Broyde (?) thinks so, and it would be nice to present his opinion as well, since it is very important to the discussion…
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Hello Vital. Your messages are a riddle to me.
1. I did not understand what you said. Which of my remarks are you referring to? Which premise of mine do you reject? What is your question?
2. Of course halakhah, like a court, also determines facts through legal rules. Who said otherwise?
3. If it seems worthwhile to you to present someone’s opinion that you think is important to the discussion, then please go ahead and present it.
4. What did you bring from Shi Wosner’s article? (I assume you meant him and not Rabbi Wosner.)
Michi Abraham 3 months ago
Vital
And also in Rabbi Wosner’s article on the ontological conception of halakhah. It is not so clear that there is a separation.

Rani:
Regarding the New Testament:
1. Why does the word “Reform” appear in quotation marks? Is this not completely Reform? If you think halakhah says one should burn it, and this is void today because it does not suit the times, then one can say the same about many mitzvot, such as court-imposed punishments, sacrifices, and so on and so forth. I do not understand how this fits with your own statement that the Torah’s mitzvot are eternal.
2. I do not understand what is meant by facing squarely the criticism of the mitzvah. Obviously, if the mitzvah did not exist, I would think it improper / wrong / immoral to act this way, and the mitzvah does indeed run against my intuition—so what? That is true of many mitzvot. I do not know how to justify it and it does not interest me. The fact is that this is the mitzvah, at least as I understand it, and I do not know how to explain it, like many other mitzvot.
I do not see any double standard here either if I criticize gentiles who burned our books; I do indeed see that as immoral. If I were to do it, I would do it despite that, because halakhah commands it, not morality. In addition, I can say that the gentiles did it out of hatred, because that is indeed how it appears to me from a historical point of view. That is not hypocrisy.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Hello Rani.
1. Indeed, one can say that about many mitzvot. Hazal too interpreted and changed halakhah and deviated from the plain meaning of Scripture. And so too in all the generations after them down to our own day. The discourse that nothing may be changed is only a theoretical discourse. In practice, many things change all the time. Do you really think that the eternity of the Torah means that there are no halakhic changes? That is a denial of facts.
As for the difference between Reform change and legitimate change, see my article here:
mikyab.net/מאמרים/האם-יש-עבודה-זרה-נאורה-על-היחס-לגויים-ו/
2. As for hypocrisy and double standards, that is a matter of definition. You are basically arguing that you are allowed to do this because halakhah commands you to, while gentiles who do it because their halakhah commands them are not okay (because they do it merely out of hatred, not from lofty motives like yours). So if that is not a double standard, I do not know what is.
You can say that indeed there is a double standard here, but that you are forced into it by halakhah. Of course they too are forced into it by their halakhah. If you think one can live in such a world—I disagree with you. More than that: is it desirable to live in such a world? I disagree with you on that as well.
Of course this requires an explanation of how such a consideration can override halakhah, and which halakhot it cannot override. That is already a technical question, answered in part in the article I linked above.
But even if the halakhah cannot be changed, in practice it is clear that one should not do this today, even if it is against halakhah (afterward they will explain that our hand is not strong enough, etc., and then they will calm you down). On such considerations see my aforementioned article and what I brought there from Tosafot on Avodah Zarah and Bava Metzia (and there is much more), and also see here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A9/

Chaim:
Hello Rabbi,
Did you explain in the first part of the article your approach regarding the LGBT community?
I would be glad if you could elaborate on your view regarding the proper attitude toward members of this community.
Is this really the nature of such a person from birth and always? Is it forbidden/permitted to “judge” them for this inclination?
Is this phenomenon similar to any other public violation, such as public Sabbath desecration, or is a special attitude called for here?
What is their status within the religious community? Can they serve as prayer leaders? Rabbis? etc…
Thank you.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Hello Chaim.
I do not know which article you are referring to. I explained these matters at length in an interview on the “Kamocha” website, to which I also refer in this post. See there.
For scientific questions, it is best to turn to people who research the subject and for whom it is an area of expertise, not to me or to any other rabbi.
——————————————————————————————
Chaim:
I have already asked and heard various different approaches and explanations, including on the scientific side of the issue.
My impression is that the rabbi too has looked into the matter, and I wanted to know the conclusions the rabbi reached after his own investigation (which I tend to trust), and not necessarily because of your status as a rabbi.
I would be glad to hear.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I did not investigate the matter; I spoke with several people who are knowledgeable about it. First, the expression “the nature of such a person from birth and always” is vague. This touches on the question whether it is innate or acquired. My understanding is that it is commonly thought that in most cases it is innate (though not necessarily in all cases). Whether it is genetic or not—I understand that this is unclear. One thing I did learn from my inquiries is that one should not believe anyone who presents scientific certainties in the course of the debate. In many cases the facts are presented tendentiously, and the discourse is very far from open. There is LGBT terror against anyone who dares present a position they do not accept, and of course on the religious/conservative side as well there is no open discourse. Regarding the questions of how to relate to them—see the interview.

Yondav:
Just a small question for now—
Are marriages within the family “immoral”?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
In principle, no. True, there are usually expected harms to the offspring, but if one imagines that there is some way to address them, there is no moral problem here when it is done with the full consent of both parties.
However, see my remarks here:
mikyab.net/כתבים/תגובות-בעיתונות/גילוי-עריות/

The rabbi:
I have now seen this:
“The word ‘deviants’ does not come from a judgmental place but as a scientific definition”
Rabbi Levinstein: “The word ‘deviants’ does not come from a judgmental place but as a scientific definition.” In a closed talk he gave to his students in Eli, Rabbi Yigal said that one must indeed embrace a person who suffers and help him, and that “there are people who were born with opposite inclinations; the Torah does not judge them as to whether this is good or bad, but it forbids the act itself.” Moshe Vistuch

15 Tammuz 5776, 21/07/2016 10:28

The head of the pre-military academy in Eli, Rabbi Yigal Levinstein, referred this week for the first time to the speech he delivered at a conference run by the LIBA Institute last week and to his remarks about the LGBT community. In a conversation with students, part of which was published on the Walla site, Rabbi Levinstein sought to clarify his position and said that the word “deviation” does not come from a judgmental place but from the place of a scientific definition. “Until 1973, American psychologists defined opposite inclinations as a deviation from the natural order. Following great pressure they were forced to change the definitions and stopped claiming that it was a deviation, but originally their definition was that this was a deviation.”

The man truly does not understand what he is saying. As I explained, it is exactly the opposite: a statement like his can only come from a judgmental place, and it has not the slightest connection to a scientific definition, with or without the American Psychiatric Association. Ridiculous. Michi

Tzvika Bar Lev:
Hello Rabbi Michi, I think that even someone who says the reason for the prohibition is “moral-divine,” among other things because of the use of the word “abomination,” does not mean that he therefore understands any better exactly what is immoral about it. But he does understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself expressed the strongest possible reservation, using the word “abomination” and including this subject among all the “practices of the land of Egypt… and the practices of the land of Canaan” that we are forbidden to do, lest “the land vomit you out when you defile it, as it vomited out the nation that was before you.” That alone is good reason for two things:
1. To feel reservation even today.
2. To think it is important to speak about this on the public level, because the change in normative attitude toward such things—that is the simplest understanding of the verses in the context of “the practices of the land of Egypt and the land of Canaan” and the fear of “lest the land vomit you out.”
I did not find in your remarks any other possible way to understand the plain sense of the Torah. Perhaps you can sharpen this point?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
That the Torah strongly disapproves is clear. Did I say otherwise? The question is whether this is moral disapproval or religious-halakhic disapproval. The practical difference is that someone who does this is a religious offender, not a moral one. Speaking about it on the public plane is already a tactical question, and it should be examined not according to formulations in the Torah but according to practical usefulness. If there is benefit—let people speak. Certainly. But even when speaking, one should clarify that this is a religious prohibition, not a moral prohibition. Publicly that distinction is certainly important, and in my opinion religiously it is important too.
And in general, I am against fears of speaking. The liberal terror being wielded these days is something one should oppose very sharply. The rabbis who issued a proclamation supporting the right of every rabbi (and everyone) to express his opinion honestly did well. It is important to make clear exactly what they support, and from the wording of the proclamation (as distinct from the headlines it received) I saw that they did that.
It seems to me that the same reservation should be felt toward Sabbath desecrators, and even more so. Sabbath desecration is a sinful act done plainly. Homosexual relations, by contrast, are the result of a natural condition that is very difficult to cope with. Therefore there are mitigating circumstances. This does not permit it, but it is certainly a consideration in favor of a more understanding and inclusive judgment.
——————————————————————————————
Tzvika Bar Lev:
I think I pointed out how the Torah itself places this in a different status from Sabbath desecration. And indeed people certainly also talk about Sabbath desecration and the status of the Sabbath in Israeli public life, and this whole subject has certainly been in rather serious and ongoing discussion in the State of Israel for decades. So I do not understand what your point really is in the last paragraph.
What I see in the struggle religious people sometimes wage against the “gay struggle” is only the fear of “lest the land vomit you out” because of the normalization and full acceptance of homosexual relations as a socially, communally, and nationally accepted option. That is what the struggle is about. In my opinion no one is fighting over things outside that sphere. Maybe people do not formulate themselves correctly, maybe they say things that hurt people who are stuck with the inclination and this really harms them, maybe this struggle looks very bad in media terms—but that is exactly what the struggle is about, and nothing else. At least that is how I see it.
And this also means that your distinction does not really work—between moral reservation and religious-halakhic reservation. It is a reservation rooted in mutual responsibility and in fear of “lest the land vomit you out,” regardless of how exactly you classify it.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
1. First, the Torah really does not place this in a different status. A Sabbath desecrator is an apostate with respect to the whole Torah.
2. The Sabbath may perhaps be in public discussion (in my opinion not; if only because we have no public discussion of anything), but there is no condemnation and no rhetoric against Sabbath desecrators as there is against homosexuals.
3. The fear of the land vomiting us out does not persuade me at all. The land vomits out offenders. Already in the prophets and in Hazal this appears also with regard to the sabbatical year. A very strained explanation. Therefore, in my opinion, this is a taboo that is a remnant of an earlier period when people thought this was a grave moral offense, and nothing more.
4. Of course, there still remains the question of the utility and tactics of fighting it.
But of course one can disagree.
——————————————————————————————
Tzvika Bar Lev:
1. What does “an apostate with respect to the whole Torah” have to do with “lest the land vomit you out” and “abomination”? According to the plain sense of the Torah it is not the same thing. You can say that Sabbath desecration is also grave—I do not dispute that. And it is clear to me that people talk about that much, much more and invest much more in it. In my opinion, this is a debate in which I can prove factually that I am right. People talk about it much, much more. That also answers your point 2.
2. There is no condemnation of homosexuals in the sense you claim there is. There is reservation about the public display of it, in the style of the Tel Aviv parade, and that is exactly because it creates public licentiousness. If someone were celebrating relations between brothers and sisters in the same way, it is clear to me that the same protest would arise.
3. That is why we make a great effort to find orderly solutions for shemittah, and no one ignores it and throws it aside as though it were irrelevant. That is why there is otzar beit din; that is why there is an aspiration to reach a situation where one can observe the sabbatical year properly. The fear of the land vomiting us out is by no means a “strained explanation,” as you write. In my humble opinion it is the crux of the matter. For some reason it is more convenient for the sake of the argument you are trying to present here to suggest that maybe this is because of “homophobia”—why not assume the simpler thing: mutual responsibility and fear of “lest it vomit us out”? That is the consciousness of Religious Zionism, certainly. Not homophobia.
4. That can indeed be discussed. But in my opinion only that. Simply because the subject of sexual prohibitions in general, and specifically in this area—the ancient world was exactly like today: all the impulses and all the inclinations. And they celebrated everything while engaging in idolatry. So in my opinion there are no new insights from the new liberal era on this subject. I do not see how the discussion even begins about changing the Torah’s attitude to this in light of the change that has occurred in general society, when we are speaking of something that was very common in the ancient world.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Hello Tzvika.
We are repeating ourselves and apparently not reaching agreement, though it is not clear to me what exactly the disagreement is about.
The fact that this is a serious halakhic prohibition is clear. You are not disputing my claim that this is not a moral prohibition. So what remains is a disagreement over the reason people fight it with such great fury. You claim it is from fear that the land will vomit us out, and I claim it is not. I claim that the Sabbath and the sabbatical year are not issues in the public controversy (with no connection to attempts to find solutions; one can try to find solutions also for homosexuality, and that is not what is under discussion here), and you claim they are. I claim that the struggle in its present form is not useful, and you implicitly claim that it is. All this is a disagreement about facts and their assessment, and in my opinion you are greatly mistaken. But I see no point in repeating this again and again.
In the ancient world this was common, but legitimizing the phenomenon is new and modern (certainly compared to what existed a few decades ago). The question is how to deal with the current prevalent view that there is no moral prohibition here—but on that we agreed (at least for the sake of the discussion). So I do not understand the point you raised here.
And incidentally, I was not speaking here about homophobia. That was really not my subject. On the contrary, my claim was that saying this is an illness (or a deviation) is not connected to homophobia but to normative rejection of the matter.
——————————————————————————————
Tzvika Bar Lev:
That normative rejection of the matter, in your words, is in my opinion only because of “lest the land vomit you out.” I would be glad if you would explain why anyone would bother doing anything about the matter when he is fully aware of the liberal terror directed at every conservative on this front. It is no accident that the Haredim are silent on the matter. It is a conscious decision—they understand how problematic this is in terms of public relations, and in the end what matters to them is their private World to Come and the preservation of their sector, so they have decreed upon themselves complete silence on the subject. You said you think it is not because of “lest it vomit us out”? Then what is it because of? And to my taste, you really did not answer my argument, which says that the novelty of the last generations—that suddenly people no longer see a moral problem in the matter—is really no novelty at all with respect to our Torah. That was the background of the world in which the Torah was given, a world of idolatry and total sexual freedom (which, according to Hazal, were connected; they did not worship idols except to permit themselves public sexual immorality—you surely know the Gemara better than I do). So common sense indicates that the Torah objected precisely to what the religious spokesmen are now objecting to—turning this into a social norm, the total acceptance of it as an option for a family unit within society. It is not a popular struggle in a world of very bleak thought-terror, as you yourself described in your post, but I have no reason to think that this background—the understanding that there is mutual responsibility and fear of “lest it vomit us out”—is not what stands behind most Religious Zionist speakers in this area. Incidentally, tactically—I think that is what one should talk about: say that we do indeed have such a position, and these are its motives. The Torah understands that there are other moral understandings, but it has a very clear position on the subject, and it is a divine position; perhaps in our human morality we do not quite understand it, but we are certainly trying to act in accordance with it—just as with the Sabbath, and with kashrut, and with many other things.

Oren:
I noticed that in some of the comments you argue that using terms like illness or deviation for homosexuality carries a normative charge. But with phenomena such as obesity, nearsightedness, and flat feet too, terms like “illness” are used, and these are phenomena without any normative charge. There are also deviations without any normative charge (for example, a man who prefers fat women, or a woman who prefers bald men). Perhaps the issue here is simply deviation from the normal.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Of course not every illness is based on morality. But every determination that something is an illness is always based on a norm (ought), not on a fact (is). For example, obesity is an illness because it is a problem to be obese. The desire not to be obese is a norm that serves as the basis for determining that this is an illness. The same is true of flat feet and nearsightedness. These norms can be moral or other kinds. In the case of homosexuality too, defining it as an illness need not be based on a moral value (since, according to my view, there is no moral problem with homosexuality), but can also be based on a religious value. Usually illnesses that are defined on the basis of the patient’s own norm are not connected to morality. Illnesses defined by society—are (like kleptomania). But homosexuality can be defined as an illness by religious society because of a religious value.

Eliyahu Feldman:
Rabbi Michi, it is not clear to me why you write that the halakhah concerning the burning of idolatry, etc., ought to change today. After all, this is a Torah law that is supposed to be eternal. True, putting Sabbath desecrators to death is also such a law, and we do not implement it today. But there there is a halakhic mechanism more than two thousand years old that prevents this. With regard to burning idolatry, there is no such mechanism, and if so we remain with the Torah’s original law—“you shall break down their pillars,” etc. Do you maintain that the sages today have the possibility of creating such a mechanism? Or perhaps here too you will say that the gentiles of old are not the gentiles of today?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Hello Eliyahu.
First, it is important to establish the principle that it is not right to burn copies of the New Testament in our day. It is not useful and will not lead to desirable results. After that, one should examine how this change can be implemented according to the rules governing changes in halakhah.
A Torah law is supposed to be eternal, but interpretations and applications depend on the situation and circumstances.
And beyond all that, there is also the question of constraints. There are measures that, even if halakhah requires them, it is not right to implement in practice. On this see here:
mikyab.net/כתבים/מאמרים/על-אורתודוכסיה-מודרנית-קריצות-ושימוש/

The rabbi:
Here is the Torah-based outburst: http://news.walla.co.il/item/2983446
An excerpt from the remarks:
He said that he “does not need the Torah; factually this is a deviation.” “I know he is sick because statistically most human beings are not like that,” he said during the lesson.
By that criterion I too am sick/deviant, because only a small percentage of human beings are 1.95 meters tall. Perhaps you will ask: but the Torah does not define unusual height as an illness? On his view, after all, one does not need the Torah—statistical unusualness is a scientific fact. So if homosexuality is an illness only because of its percentage in the population, without any value judgment, then my height is too, and so is Rabbi Kalner’s beard (I think there is a very small percentage of the population that has such a beard). Not to mention the kippah on his head, which is really an illness, since it is not even innate. He himself chose to put that on his head. A real deviation—God save us.

B.:
I do not care about all the questions and discussions on the subject. What occupies me, and on this I would like to hear your view, is how it is possible that the Torah should command a person something that runs against his natural instincts. In a matter so central to life, this is comparable to the Torah commanding a person not to marry—there are no such mitzvot in the Torah.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
The Torah commands us not to speak lashon hara, even though this is a natural impulse that exists in all of us. The Torah commands “you shall not steal,” even though there are people who have a strong impulse to steal (kleptomaniacs). Indeed this is a difficult trial, and I do not know whether I would withstand it, but it is not essentially different from other commandments (although it is probably harder).
——————————————————————————————
B.:
I do not accept that at all, as long as you do not explain. The examples are not at all similar. Everyone has an evil inclination, of course. But still, no mitzvah runs against a person’s natural instincts. A father who educates his son not to be lazy, even though it is against his nature because he is lazy, is not considered to be educating him against nature or suppressing his natural instincts. The same applies to a person who overcomes anger because his nature is angry—this is not considered as though he is contradicting his very being. Likewise, a stingy person who trains himself toward generosity, though he really has to break his character trait and go against his nature—no one would call that an unnatural life, or a life of denial or falsehood, and everyone understands that it is good for a person, and in the end he will live a happier life, more harmonious, whole, and aligned with himself and the world. The same is true of the urge to steal, or the urge to gossip, or envy, or hatred, or cruelty, and the like. There are mitzvot in the Torah for which a person must “give up” or make an effort for a life of holiness and spirit, but there are no mitzvot in the Torah against the whole basic nature of a person—mitzvot that deprive him of his whole life (or even place him in a situation where it would be better for him not to live). This is explained in all the early and later books, especially the Rambam in the Guide and R. Meir Simcha in Meshekh Chokhmah—he also wants to say that that is why a woman is not commanded in “be fruitful and multiply,” because of the suffering of pregnancy. In other words, this can also be put differently: a person who accustoms himself not to get angry, or not to envy, or not to steal, or not to speak evil of others and harm them, will in the end live a happy life. But a person who tries to accustom himself to living without a wife (as long as he is healthy in body and not endowed with spiritual superpowers)—even if he is righteous and pious—will live all his days in suffering, conflict, difficulty, and also impure thoughts. Unless you hold that this can be changed, or that everything is false to begin with.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
You are begging the question, and what is more, with unsupported assumptions. You determined that all these are different from our case, but you did not offer a shred of argument for that. Why is homosexuality more natural than anger or the urge to speak lashon hara? Why is habituation different? A person who accustoms himself not to get angry / steal / speak lashon hara will suffer greatly unless he truly gets used to it. But that is also true regarding homosexuality. If a person truly got used to it, he would not suffer. But he will not get used to it. Fine—if he does not get used to it, then in anger and lashon hara too he will suffer, and so on. As I wrote, admittedly this is harder, but I still do not see an essential difference.
——————————————————————————————
B.:
I did not understand your opinion. And I am asking you because I assume you know the subject (of homosexuality) better than I do. Do you mean to say that one can change sexual orientation—or do you mean to say that one cannot change a person’s bad character traits and correct them? Or do you hold that in both cases one cannot get used to it and change, or that in both cases one can? Please clarify this point for me. [By the way: I do not think one can argue with the fact that bad traits harm a person with respect to himself, or (also) because of the society in which he lives, and therefore the option of recognizing them and living with them “in peace” is not similar. And it seems to me that everyone admits this—or will the gay community also have a parade for proud thieves and proud murderers and proud pedophiles—because that is how they were born and that is their nature?]
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
Indeed, in my unlearned estimate, it is no less difficult to change anger-proneness than sexual orientation. Not to mention kleptomania. Do you raise the Torah’s prohibition of stealing as a difficulty because of kleptomania? And what is your view of a kleptomaniacs’ parade? I do not think bad traits necessarily cause harm (a bit of lashon hara for pleasure harms no one; on the contrary, some permit it on Shabbat משום עונג שבת). They are bad because they are bad. My morality is not consequentialist. Moreover, homosexuality too is harmful in the consequential sense. It is hard/expensive for them to have children. They need to hold pride parades.
——————————————————————————————
B.:
All right. After I laughed. Are you saying that it is possible to change sexual orientation?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I am hardly an authority. It is commonly thought not, but there are reports of success. Since the subject is highly charged and emotional and is conducted under attacks of politically correct terror, I have fairly limited trust in reports from all directions. But I also do not know of orderly reports of dramatic change in the trait of anger, in the urge for lashon hara, or in kleptomania.
——————————————————————————————
B.:
Assuming it cannot be changed, for the sake of the discussion, please allow me to say one thing that you yourself taught me. At the beginning of our exchange you criticized: “postmodern arguments that empty every concept of content by taking things to extremes, without noticing that in doing so they empty themselves of content as well.” Is that not what you are doing now? As though you are basically saying that every command to overcome something is against nature, or that if one can change and get used to something, then one can get used to anything. But that is not true. Likewise, you say that if sometimes a person takes pleasure in doing something bad, that is a sign that it is good for him. But that is not true, and you know it. And I am not speaking about consequentialist morality; bad traits, beyond being immoral, are harmful in themselves. The idea is understood: the world is built in a certain way and the straight path is generally the most fitting, both for the world and for the person (of course one could argue from this perspective that homosexuality too is unfitting and harmful in several ways—but that is already something else). Or perhaps I misunderstood you. In short, so that we can talk and see what we agree on and where the point of disagreement is, my question is this: if I were to say that there is a mitzvah in the Torah not to marry, or not to divorce (as in Christianity), or to fast for several consecutive days (as in Islam), would that be acceptable to you or not? And do you see the other mitzvot as contrary to human nature in the same sense as telling a person never to marry at all throughout his life (and also not to find release in any other way)?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I did not understand the questions. In order to organize the discussion (and conclude it), I will return to the point of departure. What I am claiming is that mitzvot that go against nature do not raise any real problem. Even if sexual orientation cannot be changed (and I do not know the truth here), this is no different from kleptomania, anger, or the prohibition of lashon hara, except perhaps in degree (and even that is not certain). This may perhaps be painful, just as I feel pain for the poor kleptomaniac, but still I have no criticism of the Torah’s prohibition of stealing. With homosexuality the situation is similar (even though the prohibition, in my view, is not on the moral plane, though it is clear to me that it has some rationale). There can and should be pain over their difficult situation, but that is not enough to say that the prohibition is problematic. I do not see that I went to an extreme here in any sense, and I do not know what we are arguing about at all.
——————————————————————————————
B.:
With respect, you did not answer the question: do you see the other mitzvot as contrary to human nature in the same sense (or to the same degree) as telling a person never to marry at all throughout his life (and also not to find release in any other way)? I want an answer because it matters. (The extreme is as though there are only two possibilities left: either everything is easy and simple or everything is against nature.) You compare all these things as though they are equally difficult and contrary to nature in the same sense. But please answer the specific question as well.
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I already answered three times, and I will answer once more: no. Though in kleptomania it is quite similar, in my estimate.
——————————————————————————————
B.:
And what really, in your opinion, is the reason for the prohibition?
——————————————————————————————
The rabbi:
I do not know.

It seems to me there is confirmation here of the claim about women’s lack of interest in philosophical arguments.

With your permission, I would like to bring something like a source for your explanation regarding burning the New Testament—that this is a step which, even if our hand were strong enough, we would not take today, because it is a tactic against / for the eradication of idolatry that was relevant and useful in the past, and is neither relevant nor useful today.

There is something similar in the Hazon Ish regarding “they are lowered but not raised.” He writes that nowadays this law is no longer in force, because its whole purpose was to prevent a breach and a slide, whereas today it would only increase them. It is something meant to protect religion, and today it would only intensify the attacks against it.

I think this is exactly like what you are saying here regarding burning the books.

In what cases, for example, does the moral consideration override the halakhic one?

I discussed this at length in the third book of the trilogy. It applies only in places where the clash is incidental and not essential (that is, not every observance of the halakhah involves a clash with morality, but only certain cases). There are several precedents for this in the halakhic authorities: a transgression for the sake of Heaven; the view of most poskim not to invalidate the kiddushin of secular Jews, even though halakhically it would have been appropriate to do so; the institutionalization of prostitution in the Akeidat Yitzhak. And from my point of view, there is room for this in other places as well, even without precedents.