G-d's knowledge

Michael

Can we please carry on the conversation – (it shows how interesting I’m finding your book). I’m about to start chapter 5

I WROTE TO YOU

Divine knowledge and free choice:

I have a ‘solution’ to this paradox – and have not seen it anywhere else (I don’t think)

When we say that G-d knows what I am going to do, this statement is talking about G-d’s present knowledge and my future action. When I say that I am acting freely, then I am saying that my present action is not determined or constrained by any past event.

Divine knowledge is talking about the relationship between the present and the future; free choice is talking about a relationship between the present and the past. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two – they are talking about different things.

YOU REPLIED

This book adresses to deal with the philosophical problem, not the theological one. But I also touch a little the theological aspects. As I write there, the Newcomb paradox denies a priori also the option of devine knowledge in advance about our free choises, hence you need not to deal with such suggestions. Irecomend you to read this discussion (the end of the 4-th chapter).

But as to your suggestion, if I understood it, it is equivalent to the RA'AVAD argument in HILCHOT TESHUVA of the RAMBAM (5, 5), and manny others (For example, Yehudit Ronen in her logical paper, in Hebrew). But to ny opinion it answers another question: How does G_D know it in advance. The real question is a second one: assuming that he really knows – can I steal choise freely now? Newcomb shows that it cannot be the case. That question is not connected to the question of constraints. It is logic, not physics.

AS to your definition, you wrote:  When I say that I am acting freely, then I am saying that my present action is not determined or constrained by any past event.

That is not exact. The determinists say that there is no extrnal constraint. You do exactly what you decide, but you yourself "want" exactly what your character leads to. And because of that G_D can know it in advance without assuming that he himself or any other external force constraints you. That is what they call compattibilism.

Let us put it another way. In your analysis you ignore the essential assumption that free choise need the existance of two real options. But if G_D knows in advance there is only one. You may say that I'll feel free to choose (feel no constraints), but the real fact is that I have only one possibility. I think we can agree that even a hypnotized man which feels free even he is not, cannot be considered as a "free choiser".

NOW ME AGAIN

Thanks again for engaging with me:

Am I correct in my understanding of your argument: You reject my analysis because G-d does not know the future? You give two reasons:

1. If G-d knew a few months ago that I was going to read your book, then it was also true 1000 years ago – and that (forgetting about G-d), the statement “Korer will read Michael Abraham’s book in 2018” must therefore be a necessary statement. This is obviously absurd – therefore G-d cannot have known it – because temporal facts cannot have a truth value.

G-d cannot know information which does not yet exist.

1. Newcomb’s Paradox: G-d is the prophet; the result of the thought experiment is a paradox. Therefore, G-d cannot be the prophet.

The first thing that I would say is: Doesn’t it say in the Torah (somewhere) that G-d’s knowledge is not like our knowledge. This means, I think, two things: firstly, that His knowledge is ‘different’ to normal knowledge; secondly, it is enough the ‘same’ as normal knowledge to be called ‘knowledge’.

When I studied philosophy (50 years ago!) – one definition of knowledge was: ‘justified, true, belief’.

I think that the aspect in which our knowledge is the same as G-d’s is that it must be ‘true’; and the difference is the ‘justification’ –  that we can only be said to know something if our true belief is justified – I guess, by some causal connection from the fact to our brains. And G-d does not need any justification – He is above time or He knows ‘himself’ or whatever. (I’m a bit stuck as to whether we can say that G-d has the third component – a ‘belief’)

So, going back to your above arguments. (I hope that I have understood them correctly)…..

Your argument 1:

Maybe, for us, temporal facts cannot have a truth value before the date of their occurrence – because, as you say in your book, we end up with logic reversing the direction of causality. But, for G-d, they do have a truth value – because G-d is outside the whole framework of reference.

This, I think, solves the logical problem of our free choice. We do have more than one logical possibility for our future action. G-d’s knowledge of my future free choice has no logical bearing on ‘temporal facts’ here on ‘Earth’. “Yakov Korer will decide to eat an apple on 23 March 2019” – may or may not be true, from G-d’s point of view (daat elyon), but has no truth value for me (daat tachton)

Your argument 2, Newcomb’s Paradox:

With any paradox, there must be a fault either in the logic of the argument or in the assumptions. You say that it proves that the prophet (G-d) cannot know the future. I think that it proves that the prophet (G-d) cannot convey his knowledge to us. It seems logical to me that there must be constraints on G-d’s power. He cannot go against the laws of logic. So also, G-d cannot share His knowledge of my future free choice: He cannot tell me that tomorrow I will freely choose to do something.   (Newcomb’s paradox is subtler. The prophet is not conveying a fact about the future but he’s making an ‘if… then…’ type statement. But I don’t think that it affects my argument).

So, in conclusion. I think that G-d does know the future, and, going back to my initial argument, His knowledge does not affect my free choice

Wishing you all the best