Uprooted Halakhot (Column 618)
We are used to the fact that at times the Sages take verses beyond their plain sense. They derive various midrashic teachings from them and interpret them in ways that do not look like the simple meaning of Scripture. In such cases, the peshat remains in place and, alongside it, a derash interpretation is added. But it turns out there are verses that seem to instruct a concrete halakhic norm for which we have neither an alternative interpretation nor any textual difficulty—yet they are not ruled as binding halakhah, and at times the halakhah even follows the opposite. In an article in Middah Tovah (5767), on Parashat Bamidbar, I called these “uprooted verses,” or “uprooted halakhot.” In this column I wish to touch upon this odd phenomenon. I will state at the outset that I have no full explanation for it; the column is mainly devoted to raising the question.
The prohibition of lifnei iver
In Parashat Kedoshim, the Torah writes a prohibition against setting a stumbling block before the blind (Leviticus 19:14):
“You shall not curse the deaf, and before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block; and you shall fear your God—I am the LORD.”
The Sages expanded this prohibition to include one who gives another bad/unsound advice and one who causes another to sin. So writes Sefer HaChinukh, mitzvah 232:
Not to cause Israel to stumble by giving them harmful counsel; rather, when they ask advice we should guide them toward what we believe is straight and good, as it is said (Leviticus 19:14): “Before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.” And the language of the Sifra: “Before one who is blind regarding a matter—if he seeks counsel from you, do not give him advice that is not fitting for him.” And our Sages of blessed memory said: “A person should not say to his fellow: ‘Sell your field and buy yourself a donkey,’ while he [the adviser] is circling to take it from him.”
This negative commandment also includes one who assists a transgressor, for he brings him to be enticed thereby to transgress yet again in other instances. From this angle our Sages said (Bava Metzia 75b) that in a loan with interest both lender and borrower violate lifnei iver…
It applies in every place and every time, to males and females. One who violates it—by leading his fellow, knowingly, to follow advice that is not fitting for him, or by assisting him in a matter of sin, such as handing a cup of wine to a nazirite, and the like—has transgressed this prohibition. It is as one who violates a royal command; however, lashes are not administered, as there is no [direct] act.
Sefer HaChinukh writes that this is a prohibition regarding causing Israelites to stumble. But this seems to stand in tension with the Talmud, which forbids causing bnei Noaḥ (Noahides) to sin as well. Minḥat Ḥinukh there senses this and writes:
“‘Not to cause… rather, we should guide…’—I do not understand the author’s intent in writing ‘Israelites,’ for the prohibition of lifnei iver applies also to a gentile, as he himself later notes and as is explicit in Avodah Zarah. And Maimonides (Laws of Murder 12) writes ‘whoever causes a blind person…’ without limiting to Israel. To distinguish and say that only regarding a matter of prohibition is it forbidden to cause a gentile to stumble, but not regarding advice—whence do we know such a thing? Since the verse applies also to a gentile, advice in worldly matters is also forbidden with respect to him. And even though it is explained in Bava Batra—and ruled by the Rambam, Laws of Murder—that it is forbidden to give a gentile good advice [when it harms Israel], nevertheless to give him bad advice is also forbidden by lifnei iver. I do not know whence the author derived otherwise; further inquiry is required… We see that the Torah forbids placing a stumbling block even for a gentile…”
He suggests that perhaps the prohibition against facilitating a transgression applies even for Noahides, but the prohibition of giving unfair advice applies only toward fellow Jews. As he himself notes, however, this is forced—both derive from the very same verse.
One might have suggested that here there are two aspects: one prohibition between man and his fellow, and another between man and God. Causing another to sin brings about a violation of a command, which wrongs not only the person himself but also the Holy One (Who does not want transgressions in His world). But giving harmful advice or physically tripping someone up are inter-personal wrongs, and thus perhaps were stated only with respect to Israel. This nuance can perhaps be detected in the wording of the Chinukh itself: regarding advice he emphasizes “his fellow,” whereas regarding facilitating sin he later mentions that this applies also vis‑à‑vis a gentile. Perhaps this is the meaning of the Chinukh’s addition at the end: “and it is as one who violates the king’s command.” What sets this sin apart from every other? Surely anyone who transgresses violates the King’s command. According to our approach, his intent may be that one who facilitates a sin is considered as if he himself transgressed that very sin; it is not merely the sin of facilitation.[1] Consequently, that facet—facilitating a sin—applies also vis‑à‑vis a gentile; but only that facet. Giving bad advice or physically tripping someone up are duties between man and fellow, which do not apply vis‑à‑vis a gentile.
Is there a prohibition against physical tripping?
The wording of the Chinukh yields a very puzzling conclusion: it omits the basic prohibition of physical tripping—placing an obstacle before a person. He focuses on the two expansions taught by the Sages (misleading advice and facilitating sin) but ignores the explicit prohibition’s plain sense. Minḥat Ḥinukh (ibid., sec. 4) writes:
From the author’s words—and from the Rambam—it appears that this verse of lifnei iver has been removed entirely from its plain meaning; namely, that if one actually placed a stone before a blind man he does not transgress—so it would seem from the author’s opening words and from his note that there are no lashes… But I do not understand: it is explained in Yevamot that throughout the entire Torah a verse never departs from its plain meaning, except for ‘and it shall be that the firstborn’—which the Ramban explains to mean that the plain sense is also expounded, even if additional teachings are hinted, except for that case which is entirely uprooted from its plain sense. Here, then, though what is derived by derash is true—unlike the Cutheans and Sadducees, may their names be blotted out, who insist on the literal sense—still, the literal sense is also true: it is forbidden to trip a blind person on the road. Whence did we derive that the explicit sense is not included in the prohibition?
I found in the Melamed Leho’il (on Malveh VeLoveh 4) that since lifnei iver is juxtaposed to the deaf (in the verse), and it states “and you shall fear your God,” therefore ‘Cursed is the one who misleads a blind person on the road’ [Deut. 27:18] remains in its literal sense. … But for me there is difficulty: shall we remove the verse entirely from its plain sense? If one trips a blind person by literally placing an obstacle, perhaps he also violates this prohibition—and is included in the curse—so that he would receive lashes and be disqualified as a witness; and perhaps even vis‑à‑vis a gentile, as above; further inquiry is required.
I saw in Torat Kohanim (as brought by the Korban Aharon) that the Ra’em and other greats already addressed why the Sages removed the verse from its plain sense, and he brings what we cited from the Melamed Leho’il, adding further reasons of his own. But for me it is difficult, for the baraita also expounds this, yet it is not necessary to remove it from its plain sense; its simple meaning remains true. Perhaps, following the Korban Aharon himself, the word “titten—give” does not fit except as a term of placing… and indeed Onkelos translates, by molekh ‘give’ as in the holy tongue, whereas here, for ‘lifnei iver lo titten mikshol,’ he translates ‘lo tasim’—do not place, which supports the Korban Aharon that the verse’s meaning is as expounded…
He proposes that perhaps physical tripping would require the verb “tasim—place,” whereas “titten—give” refers only to spiritual stumbling; but this is, of course, forced. According to the approach above, one might have said that physical tripping is a matter between man and fellow, whereas the discussion here concerns only the aspect between man and God. Yet giving bad advice also seems interpersonal. Perhaps physical tripping is subsumed under giving unsound advice.
As the Minḥat Ḥinukh notes, removing a verse from its plain sense is astonishing. Even when we derive additional laws by derash, the text is always also read literally: “A verse never departs from its plain meaning” (the Yevamot passage he cited mentions one exception concerning yibbum: “and it shall be that the firstborn”). Indeed, the Yad Ramah (Bava Batra 26a) writes regarding indirect damage (grama):
The reason is that although his act did not affect the damaged object directly, nonetheless the very act he performed is itself prohibited: it is forbidden to cause something that leads to damage to people—either because of ‘before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block,’ or because of ‘you shall love your fellow as yourself.’
Even if he did not harm directly with his hands, there is certainly a prohibition here—either from lifnei iver or from “love your fellow.” The Yad Ramah sees the source for the prohibition against causing damage in the verse lifnei iver. How can one learn a prohibition to cause harm from this verse? We are forced to say he understands the verse in its simple sense: a prohibition against causing physical harm. The ban on placing an obstacle before a person is a ban on harming him.
A note about facilitating a rabbinic prohibition
Poskim discuss whether one violates lifnei iver when causing a fellow to transgress a rabbinic prohibition. For example, witnesses to a loan with interest transgress lifnei iver; what about witnesses to a loan that involves only avak ribbit (a rabbinic proscription)—do they violate lifnei iver from the Torah? Kometz HaMinḥah (ibid., sec. 3) addresses this and writes:
I was uncertain whether one who sells another something prohibited only rabbinically thereby violates lifnei iver from the Torah—for he causes him to stumble; and even giving bad advice for mundane matters constitutes lifnei iver from the Torah. Yet I then found Tosafot (Avodah Zarah 22a s.v. teipok lei) which indicates explicitly that even regarding a rabbinic prohibition one violates lifnei iver de’oraita. But Tosafot in Ḥagigah 18a (s.v. ḥolo shel mo’ed) ask: the labors of Ḥol HaMo’ed are rabbinic—yet we say in Avodah Zarah that one violates lifnei iver—and they answer that there it is because the verse’s plain sense supports it… It emerges that for a rabbinic prohibition one does not violate lifnei iver from the Torah—this is difficult. The matter is not clear: is causing one to violate a rabbinic prohibition worse than giving him bad advice in worldly matters—which is a Torah transgression of lifnei iver? … According to Tosafot in Ḥagigah 13a, even a rabbinic matter that has a strong asmachta [scriptural allusion] incurs lifnei iver from the Torah—what distinction is there? If the Torah commanded only for de’oraita prohibitions, then even with an asmachta it should not apply; and if not only de’oraita, then it should apply even to purely rabbinic prohibitions… The Rema (Yoreh De’ah 160:1), citing many Rishonim, brings that in avak ribbit (rabbinic) there is no prohibition on the borrower except because of lifnei iver—it would seem then that he violates lifnei iver [from the Torah]. The Minḥat Melekh (Malveh VeLoveh 4, s.v. katav haRashba) implies that for a rabbinic prohibition, lifnei iver is itself rabbinic. To me this is difficult—for is that worse than giving bad advice in mundane matters, which is from the Torah? …
He wonders: how could one not violate lifnei iver de’oraita? Causing another actual harm is certainly lifnei iver, and a rabbinic violation is harm in every sense (no less than financial or physical harm).
However, if facilitating a sin is itself a matter between man and God—since he caused a sin to come into the world (hence it applies also toward a gentile, and perhaps the facilitator is considered as having transgressed vis‑à‑vis the Almighty)—then if the violation is only rabbinic it is difficult to see why this would be a de’oraita lifnei iver. He caused a rabbinic prohibition to come into the world; he is thus a rabbinic transgressor. One could perhaps view him as giving bad advice or as physically causing harm; yet perhaps physical tripping is not prohibited at all, and facilitating a rabbinic violation is not “unsound advice,” for when the violator is merely a rabbinic shogeg (unwitting) there is, strictly speaking, no sin at all. Nothing happened to him (see Netivot HaMishpat §234, and my Columns 582–583).
What is an “uprooted halakhah”?
In Column 370 I distinguished two types of relationship between derash and the plain sense: (1) derashot that add further laws beyond the law in the peshat. For example, derashot that include something via the word “et.” In Pesaḥim 22b we find: “‘Et the LORD your God you shall fear’—this includes Torah scholars.” No one imagines that the derash here displaces the peshat. The peshat commands awe of the Almighty, and the derash adds an additional law: awe of Torah scholars. That is the case for most of Ḥazal’s derashot. (2) There are derashot in which the derash changes or replaces the peshat. For example, the derash “‘An eye for an eye’—monetary compensation” appears to remove the verse from its literal sense: instead of gouging out the damager’s eye we levy monetary payment. Here the plain reading is replaced by an alternative via derash (a gezerah shavah on the word “taḥat—in place of”). (Even there, I already wrote that perhaps this too is not replacement but addition; see that column.) But the simple understanding is that it is a replacement. Likewise, in the Yevamot passage mentioned by the Minḥat Ḥinukh (which seems to say this is unique), the derash uproots the peshat.
What about the two expansions the Sages make of lifnei iver (bad advice and facilitating sin)? To which of these two types would you assign them? I am not at all sure they are derashot. Simply put, they are extensions of the plain sense; in any case, they are not alternative interpretations that come to replace the plain sense. True, the Minḥat Ḥinukh proposed that perhaps this is learned from “titten” (“give”) rather than “tasim” (“place”), in which case one might say it is an alternative interpretation (though still not a derash but a claim about the peshat). But, as noted, this is forced. It is hard to accept that anyone would seriously claim that the verse’s language is not speaking of physical tripping. One can say the verse speaks also of spiritual stumbling or of bad advice, but its simple sense is physical tripping.
If there is no removal from the plain sense here, why, then, does the Chinukh (and perhaps also the Rambam and others cited by the Minḥat Ḥinukh) not see in it a binding halakhah? On what basis is the peshat canceled, given “a verse never departs from its plain meaning”? Perhaps because Ḥazal in the Talmud did not explicitly legislate the halakhah of physical tripping (though perhaps they did not need to, due to its obviousness, and mentioned only the novel expansions). Strange as it sounds, the conclusion seems to be that, at least according to the Chinukh, a verse’s existence is not always sufficient for it to enter halakhah; it needs Ḥazal’s imprimatur. Note: I am not speaking of a derash that removes the verse from its peshat. There is no apparent reason here to ignore the peshat, and yet—without Ḥazal’s endorsement—it may be an “uprooted halakhah”: an explicit verse not practiced as halakhah despite no clear interpretive reason.
Techumin as an uprooted halakhah
The Talmud (Ketubot 28b and parallels), and later the Rishonim and Poskim, record a dispute whether the prohibition of techumin (Sabbath boundaries) is rabbinic or biblical. Arukh HaShulḥan (OḤ 397) summarizes:
Every person may go on Shabbat up to two thousand cubits beyond the city—that is the Sabbath boundary. The Sages supported this by a verse: “Let no man go out from his place on the seventh day”—these are two thousand cubits, as it says regarding the borders: “You shall measure from outside the city on the east side two thousand cubits” … Thus, two thousand cubits is called the city’s surrounding area, and this is “let no man go out from his place”—from the city’s place… According to the Rambam there is also a biblical boundary of twelve mil … this follows the Yerushalmi … However, most of our sages agreed that in our Talmud it is explicit that there is no biblical basis to techumin and it does not follow the Yerushalmi.
According to most authorities—and such is the common ruling—going beyond the boundary on Shabbat is rabbinic. Yet the Torah states explicitly: “Let no man go out from his place on the seventh day,” which appears to have no other interpretation. Still, most poskim regard it as merely an asmachta (a scriptural support). No difficulty in the peshat is presented, and no alternative interpretation is offered. Nevertheless, the poskim ignore this explicit law. This is even more severe than what we saw above: regarding lifnei iver we at least saw other interpretations (advice, facilitating sin), and the question was why we focus only on those and abandon the peshat. But the law of techumin is cited and agreed by all: there is a prohibition of boundaries in halakhah. Nor is there any other law derived from that verse. Yet most authorities hold it is rabbinic. This is a much starker disregard of the verse’s peshat—and indeed of the verse altogether.
I recently saw a quotation from a class by R. RA’M HaCohen (Shabbat, Class 12, p. 196):
In practice, there is a difficult question here: how do we rule that “techumin is rabbinic” when, in the background, stand the plain verses—interpreted by many—as laws of boundaries? When the question arises whether those who went out to save may return, one can treat that as a rabbinic issue—and I have seen R. Zalman Nechemia Goldberg shlita so rule, and so have I ruled for years. Still, a study of the sugya and straightforwardness oblige us to ask: how did an entire section get excised from the Torah?
A good question. On the face of it, this appears to be another “uprooted halakhah.”
The prohibition to touch sacred vessels
In the article cited above I discuss the prohibition of touching sacred vessels. The Torah (Numbers 4:15) states:
“When Aaron and his sons have finished covering the holy and all the holy vessels, when the camp journeys, then the sons of Kehat shall come to carry; but they shall not touch the holy, lest they die. These are the burden of the sons of Kehat in the Tent of Meeting.”
And further (ibid., vv. 17–20):
“The LORD spoke to Moses and to Aaron, saying: Do not cut off the tribe of the families of the Kehatites from among the Levites. Do this for them and they shall live and not die when they approach the most holy: Aaron and his sons shall come and appoint them, each to his service and to his burden. But they shall not go in to see when the holy is swallowed [i.e., when it is being covered], lest they die.”
These verses are rather ambiguous, and in Ḥazal and the commentators various readings can be found. Among those possibilities is one that appears explicit: a prohibition to touch the holy vessels (see v. 15).
Ibn Ezra and Ramban indeed treat this as a prohibition. But according to most opinions we do not find such a prohibition—certainly not in Ḥazal and the halakhic codes. I cited there a somewhat ambiguous phrase in Saadiah Gaon that may refer to such a prohibition (he writes: “The Levites shall not touch”), but even that is uncertain.
In fact, we even find in the poskim an explicit negation of any prohibition of touching. Rambam, in the Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative 72), brings a warning that the Levites must not engage in priestly service (punishable by death at the hands of Heaven), and that priests must not do Levite service. In that context he cites Sifrei Zuta (and similarly Semag, Lo Ta’aseh 296):
“‘To the holy vessels and to the altar they shall not approach’—you might think that if they touched they would be liable; Scripture therefore says ‘but’ (aḥ)—they are liable only for service, not for touching.”
Thus, touching does not incur punishment. This is in direct opposition to the verse’s “lest they die” (perhaps that is only a promise of Heavenly death; but such deaths are also a halakhic punishment). Even so, one might still have understood that while there is no punishment, there remains a prohibition. Here, however, Rambam (Klei HaMikdash 3:9) writes:
“…All the Levites are warned regarding the service of the altar, as it is said, ‘But to the holy vessels and to the altar they shall not come near, lest they die’—they shall not come near for service; but to touch is permitted.”
So here it emerges that touching is entirely permitted. According to Rambam, the verse is uprooted from its plain sense altogether: the verse mentions both warning and punishment regarding touching, while the halakhah rules that there is neither warning nor punishment. True, the Sifrei Zuta derives this from the word “aḥ—but,” yet that word does not appear in our verse that explicitly speaks of touching. There it speaks of approaching the vessels, and “but” teaches that only approach for the purpose of service is liable. But our verse explicitly says not to touch, and the poskim ignore it. Again, this seems to be an uprooted halakhah. Note that here the uprooting is particularly blunt: Rambam not only ignores the prohibition but states explicitly that touching is permitted.
The Sabbath rest of one’s child
Another example of an uprooted halakhah is the Sabbath rest of one’s child. The verse says (Exodus 20:9; cf. Deut. 5:13):
“But the seventh day is a Sabbath to the LORD your God; you shall not do any work—you, your son or your daughter, your male or female servant, your animal, and the stranger within your gates.”
That is, the Torah explicitly commands the rest of one’s children. Indeed, the rest of one’s animal—also mentioned in the verse—is a universally accepted prohibition. Regarding the rest of one’s utensils, as is well known, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree. What do the halakhic works state about the obligation for one’s children to rest?
Rashi ad loc. cites the Mekhilta:
“‘You, your son and your daughter’—these are minors. Or perhaps it refers to adults? You must say: they are already enjoined themselves; rather, it comes only to warn adults regarding the rest of minors. Hence what we learned (Shabbat 121a): ‘A minor who comes to extinguish—we do not heed him, for his rest is upon you [i.e., incumbent upon you].’”
So it would seem there is a warning to adults to ensure the rest of minors, learned from this verse. A closer look, however, shows that this is not the accepted picture in the halakhah.
In the sugya in Shabbat 121a cited by Rashi, we find a complete disregard for the law of a child’s Sabbath rest. The Mishnah there treats a case where a fire broke out in a house, and a gentile or a child comes to extinguish it. The Mishnah states:
“If a gentile comes to extinguish, we do not say to him ‘extinguish’ or ‘do not extinguish’—for his rest is not upon us. But if a minor comes to extinguish, we do not heed him—for his rest is upon us.”
The Gemara asks on the Mishnah:
“But if a minor comes to extinguish, we do not heed him—for his rest is upon us.” Learn from here that when a minor eats forbidden foods, the court is obligated to separate him? R. Yoḥanan said: [The Mishnah speaks] of a minor acting with his father’s knowledge.
Seemingly, the Mishnah implies that if a minor eats nevelot (violates prohibitions), we must separate him—since a minor who comes to extinguish is not heeded. The Gemara sees this as contradicting the general rule (ruled in Yevamot 114a and parallels) that the court is not obligated to separate a minor from violations. One would expect the Gemara to immediately cite the verse that commands the rest of one’s child, and resolve: specifically for Shabbat there is a special obligation that one is enjoined regarding the minor’s rest; thus, if we see a minor violating Shabbat, all agree we must separate him—even though for other prohibitions there is no such duty. But the Gemara’s resolution does not introduce such a distinction. It answers instead that we are speaking of a minor acting with his father’s knowledge—i.e., the prohibition is because the minor functions as the father’s agent, or as if the father directly feeds him prohibition; that is forbidden for all Torah prohibitions (see Yevamot there, regarding the general ban on directly feeding a minor forbidden items). In other words, even the conclusion does not grant any special status to Shabbat regarding minors. The Gemara entirely ignores the verse about the child’s rest.
Tosafot there (s.v. sh’ma mina)—and likewise the Rashba, Ritva and other Rishonim—add that in our sugya the extinguishing is a rabbinic prohibition (for he does not need the coals); and in the Yevamot sugya it is clear that for a rabbinic prohibition, all agree there is no duty to separate him. That is, they assimilate our case entirely to the general rules of separating minors from sin and see no uniqueness to the fact that this concerns Shabbat violations. Again, I would have expected the Rishonim to dismiss this and say that, regarding Shabbat, there is a special duty of the child’s rest—which would therefore apply even to rabbinic violations (rabbinically). Note as well that in the Yevamot sugya, Shabbat violations are listed together with other prohibitions; it appears Ḥazal saw no special feature in Shabbat vis‑à‑vis our duty regarding minors—even though the matter is explicit in the verse.
The only exception I saw among the Rishonim is the Rashba who, though he explains our sugya like the others, at the beginning of “Mi SheHeḥshikh” (Shabbat 153b) explains it like the Mekhilta Rashi cited:
“Wherever there is in the act itself a biblical prohibition—if we tell a minor to do it—there is likewise a biblical prohibition, as it is written: ‘You shall not eat them’—read: ‘you shall not feed them.’ And we say in Yevamot (114a): A person should not say to a child ‘bring me a seal, bring me a key’—but one may leave him to pluck or throw [i.e., not actively instruct]. And above (121a) it is also taught: a minor who comes to extinguish—we do not heed him; and the Gemara establishes it as a minor acting with his father’s knowledge—meaning he thereby violates ‘you shall not do any work—you and your son.’”
The Rashba writes that alongside the ban on directly feeding a minor prohibitions, there is a special prohibition for Shabbat, learned from “you and your son,” cited above. He explains the Gemara’s answer—minor acting with his father’s knowledge—as an instance of this. From his explanation follows a significant leniency: a minor acting with his father’s knowledge is a reason to be stringent only regarding the child’s rest—i.e., Shabbat—and not for every case of separating a minor from sin.
This view is unique, and it sharply highlights the stark disregard in the Gemara and the other Rishonim. Particularly so because the Rashba and Rashi—who cite that derash on the Ḥumash—explain the sugya itself like the other Rishonim, as dealing with the general law of separating minors from sin. The likely reason is that, as we saw, the sugya itself does not mention the special Shabbat verse at all, implying the Gemara certainly did not consider a special Shabbat prohibition of the child’s rest beyond the general duty elsewhere.
A related formulation appears indirectly in the Yere’im (§101):
“And regarding this it is taught in the Mekhilta: ‘Your son and your daughter’—these are the minors about whose rest you are enjoined. You might think it refers to adults? They are already enjoined themselves. Thus it teaches: ‘your son and your daughter’—the minors. And this is what we learned in Shabbat (121a): ‘A minor who comes to extinguish—we do not heed him, for his rest is upon you.’ And in Yevamot (114a) R. Yoḥanan establishes it as a minor acting with his father’s knowledge. But if not with his father’s knowledge, his father is not enjoined upon his rest—as it says there: ‘A minor who eats nevelot and terefot—the court is not obligated to separate him.’ And ‘your son and your daughter’—which we establish as minors—[applies] to a minor acting with his father’s knowledge, who knows that it is pleasing to his father; since his father desires the act, he acts.”
He does mention the child’s rest, but even there he does not draw a sharp distinction between it and separating minors from other prohibitions. It reads as though whenever a minor acts with his father’s knowledge, one must separate him in all prohibitions, not only Shabbat.
These words of the Rashba and Yere’im seeped, faintly, into halakhic rulings (see Mishnah Berurah 334:65 and Sha’ar HaTziyyun ad loc. n. 54). But the overwhelming majority of poskim omit any mention of a separate law of the child’s rest. Several Aḥaronim remarked on the relation between the ban on feeding a minor prohibitions and the command of the child’s rest.[2] Yet the halakhic literature’s disregard for this explicit command remains striking.
A possible solution: “for the moment, not for generations”
In his Third Principle (shoresh shlishi), Rambam rules that we do not count commandments that do not apply for generations. Within that discussion he addresses our sanctuary-passage and writes:
“Others have also erred in this principle and counted [as a commandment]: ‘So that they not be able to see the holy swallowed’ (end of Parashat Bamidbar). They also counted ‘they shall not serve any more’ (Beha’alotekha) for the Levites. These do not apply for generations but only in the wilderness. Although they said (Sanhedrin 81b) that [there is] a hint regarding one who steals the kesot [holy instruments], ‘they shall not come to see’—there is sufficient proof from their saying ‘a hint,’ and that the verse’s plain sense is not so. Nor is this among those liable to death at the hands of Heaven, as is explained in the Tosefta (Zevahim end ch. 18; Keritot ch. 1) and in Sanhedrin (83a).”
Rambam holds that the prohibition arising from the verse’s simple meaning (not to see the sacred vessels) is not counted because it does not apply for generations (see also his Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive 93).[3] Yet the prohibition to steal the sacred vessels—which does apply for generations—is not counted because it is only a “hint,” not the peshat.[4]
R. Pinḥas Frankel (riph”f) on Sefer HaMitzvot of Rav Saadiah Gaon explains that Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot likewise does not count the prohibition of seeing the sacred vessels because it is not for generations.[5] He counts the ban on stealing the vessels because, in his view, one counts even mitzvot learned from derash. He argues for support from the Bavli (Yoma 54a):
“Rav Ketina said: When Israel would ascend on pilgrimage, they would roll up the curtain and show them the keruvim embracing one another, and they would say: See how your affection is before the Omnipresent—like the affection of male and female. Rav Ḥisda objected: ‘They shall not come to see when the holy is swallowed’ (Num. 4:20)! Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: that [prohibition applied] at the time of returning the vessels to their covers. Rav Naḥman said: It is like a bride: as long as she is in her father’s house she is modest before her husband; once she comes to her father‑in‑law’s house, she is not modest before her husband.”
And Rashi there comments:
“‘In her father’s house’—in betrothal; so too Israel in the wilderness were not yet familiar with the Shekhinah.”
That is, the prohibition applied in the wilderness because Israel were not yet “at ease” with the Divine Presence, like a bride in her father’s home before marriage. After arriving at the husband’s home the relationship is freer; thus, the Levites may see the sacred vessels. Perhaps the same logic would apply to touching the vessels: it, too, was only “for the moment,” not for generations; hence, the enumerators do not count it.[6] R. Pinḥas Frankel indeed proposes this himself there (“ve’emnam”).
In principle, this looks like a possible solution for all the uprooted halakhot: the verses were not stated in vain, nor did halakhah uproot verses; rather, some verses were stated only for their moment, not for generations.[7]
And yet—uprooted verses
Still, the poskim’s disregard for these verses calls for explanation. We would expect them to raise the issue of the commandment and, as a solution, suggest that it is not for generations. But the poskim simply ignore it. The commandment of the child’s rest is troubling in the same way. There, too, there is stark disregard for an explicit Torah command—and in that case, it is hard to imagine that it was a one‑time command only for the wilderness. Why would there be any difference between Sabbath in the wilderness and Sabbath for generations, or between the obligation to educate children then and now?
The conclusion seems to be that there are verses that remain uprooted with respect to halakhah. The explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is apparently not exhausted by the distinction between “for the moment” and “for generations.” It may be that such commands remain as norms which are not formal mitzvot—yet are nonetheless expected of us—and therefore have no expression in codified halakhah. Even so, one would expect occasional remarks to this effect and explanations why such verses are formulated this way (as we saw regarding seeing the sacred vessels).
One might have said that the poskim did not bring these laws because they do not appear in the Talmud—even if, in practice, they do rule them. It is known that one of Rambam’s rules is not to codify a law without a clear source in Ḥazal (and several rule‑writers note that he will not even codify laws deduced from a question or minute inference in the Talmud), save for rare cases where he prefaces with “it appears to me.”[8] But even this does not resolve Rambam’s explicit rejection of a prohibition of touching, nor the poskim who write plainly that there is no such prohibition (as with the disregard of the child’s rest). Thus the question of uprooted verses remains, to my mind, requiring further inquiry.
Novel halakhot
Until now, we saw examples of uprooted halakhot—laws stated explicitly in verses that the poskim nonetheless ignore because Ḥazal did not anchor them in halakhah. But there are opposite examples: laws that do not appear in Ḥazal yet the poskim innovate as binding halakhah on the basis of Scripture. This is the reverse phenomenon.
Above we noted that the Mishnah Berurah brings the uprooted law of the child’s rest; it seems that in his Torah commentary the Ḥafez Ḥayyim follows this approach and innovates several laws by such interpretive reasoning, even without a Talmudic source. For example, on Exodus 23:5 he learns from the obligation to assist with the animal of one’s fellow (“you shall surely help,” “you shall not hide yourself”) that there is a duty to assist a person in need (e.g., a rosh yeshivah carrying the burden of his yeshivah) or a person carrying a heavy load—and certainly if that load is needed by another to aid him. His wording implies that this is not mere moral guidance but an outright obligation; one who fails to help a child carrying a burden violates a negative commandment—a fortiori from an animal.
At first glance this is straightforward: a kal vaḥomer is one of the hermeneutic rules, and the learning from animal to human seems eminently reasonable. Even so, I am not aware of many poskim who would allow themselves to innovate a binding law by such reasoning that has no source in Ḥazal. They may recommend such conduct but will consign it to the moral sphere. Presumably this is because we do not find such a kal vaḥomer in Ḥazal (even if we do not find them objecting to it).
As is well known, there are very few derashot in post‑Talmudic literature with no source in Ḥazal. Usually this is because we lack the skill to deploy the hermeneutic rules. But kal vaḥomer is a rule that is quite easy to use—and we do so in all fields of thought. I would have expected derashot like that of the Ḥafez Ḥayyim to appear frequently in the poskim.
A prominent example of such a kal vaḥomer may be found in Responsa Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De’ah §233. The Gemara (Megillah 14a) seeks a source for the enactment to read the Megillah:
“Our rabbis taught: Forty‑eight prophets and seven prophetesses prophesied to Israel, and they did not diminish or add to what is written in the Torah—except for the reading of the Megillah. What did they expound? R. Ḥiyya bar Avin said in the name of R. Yehoshua ben Korḥa: If [Israel] sang a song for salvation from slavery to freedom, then for salvation from death to life—how much more so!”
We see the Gemara seeks a source for the enactment of reading the Megillah on Purim and bases it on a kal vaḥomer from Pesaḥ: if we sang a song for salvation from slavery to freedom, how much more so should we sing for salvation from death to life. In his novellae to Shabbat 32a, the Ḥatam Sofer explains Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot’s position that he counts Ḥanukkah and Purim in the 613 commandments: his claim is that a kal vaḥomer is one of the hermeneutic rules, and what is derived from it is de’oraita.
But in his responsum there he goes further and writes:
“I know that I have heard that nowadays entire generations gather and from afar they come to seek the LORD in the holy city of Ẓfat on Lag BaOmer at the hillula of Rashbi. Even if all their intent is for the sake of Heaven—their reward is surely great … Nevertheless, for this very reason I have been among the abstainers, like Ben Derotai, so that I need not sit there and change their practice in their presence, and so that I need not join them in this. For Peri Ḥadash (OḤ 496 in his ‘Customs of Prohibition’ §14) already danced many dances around those places that make a festival on a day when a miracle occurred for them …”
He explains that he does not ascend to Eretz Yisrael so as not to become entangled in the Lag BaOmer celebrations. His claim is that, although those who do so have good intent and great reward, there is nevertheless a prohibition, as Peri Ḥadash explained. What is the prohibition? He now explains:
“It seems to me that the reason they say [= the reason communities make a festival on a day when a miracle occurred to them—the Purim of Frankfurt or of Casablanca] is this very kal vaḥomer: from slavery to freedom we sang a song; from death to life—how much more so. But to fix a festival on a day when no miracle occurred and which is mentioned neither in the Talmud nor in the poskim, not even by allusion—only a custom to avoid eulogies and fasts—this is itself a practice whose very rationale is unknown.”
That is: every local festival set by a community to commemorate a miracle that occurred to it is founded upon that kal vaḥomer from the Megillah sugya. But on Lag BaOmer nothing happened to anyone; to make it a mo’ed involves “bal tosif.”
From his words it follows that the local festivals that communities institute derive their force from the Gemara’s kal vaḥomer in Megillah; it seems that, at least according to Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot, this is in fact a de’oraita obligation, like Purim. If so, this is an excellent example of a post‑Talmudic kal vaḥomer derash introducing a norm, even without a direct Talmudic source (the Talmud uses it only for the original Purim, which was set by an authorized court).
Closing note: can we learn from the Tanakh?
I cannot resist a general remark about our ability to learn from the Tanakh. Here we have seen that even commands that seem explicit in the plain sense of Scripture do not so quickly become halakhah unless Ḥazal anchor them. What, then, shall we say of insights, lessons, and values (not halakhot) learned from verses and biblical narratives? There the conclusions are far less determinative—and this only sharpens the general doubt I have repeatedly raised about our ability to derive much from the Tanakh (see Column 134—especially the many talkbacks that responded to the challenge I posed at its end—and much more in the Q&A and elsewhere).
[1] See in this regard Rashi at the beginning of Parashat Mattot (Numbers 31:16), and Rambam at the end of Hilkhot Kilayim (10:30) and parallels. Strictly speaking, however, this concerns only directly feeding a prohibition to a minor, not every facilitator.
[2] See Responsa Ḥidushei HaRim, OḤ §3; Responsa Eretz Ẓevi I §75; Responsa Pri Yitzḥak II §3; Responsa Mishkenot Ya’akov §118; Aḥiezer III §81; Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Shabbat ch. 24, and others.
All of these assumed, as a given, that there is a command regarding a child’s rest, and offered various explanations as to why the Gemara ignores it and why it is needed alongside the general ban on directly feeding minors prohibitions. Nonetheless, the Gemara’s and the codes’ disregard for this command remains striking, and it is hard to be satisfied by local answers of one kind or another.
[3] Even here the assumption is not trivial. Seemingly, the prohibition would apply for generations whenever the vessels are carried on the shoulder as in the wilderness. True, from the time the Temple was built this became irrelevant; but irrelevance is not the same as expiration of a command’s force (see Rambam, Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive 187, and our article in Yishlaḥ Shorashav on the Third Principle).
[4] It is quite clear that his intent is that this is not the peshat but a derash; this fits his Second Principle that a single text does not bear two true interpretations (Ramban, in his critiques, disagrees). See Ramban’s critique here showing that the term “remez” in Ḥazal does not necessarily mean mere asmachta.
[5] See also Kli Ḥemdah, Parashat Bamidbar §6.
[6] True, Rambam does not trouble to note this; it appears he learns simply that we derive no prohibition of touching at all—not because the honors to the sacred vessels in our passage applied only “for the moment,” but because the verse never meant touching in the first place.
[7] Thus says the midrash at the beginning of Parashat Ẓav: every expression of “tzav” denotes “immediately and for generations.” I.e., it is not a given that every formulation in Scripture is “for generations.” See on this in the first part of an article in Middah Tovah (5765), on Parashat Tetzaveh.
[8] See, for example, Terumat HaDeshen, Pesakim u’Ketavim §20; Tashbaẓ III §43 (Makhon Shlomo Uman & Makhon Yerushalayim ed., 5763, s.v. “Vayetze”); Maharlbaḥ §33 (p. 19c); Beit Yosef, YD 194:3 s.v. “What our master wrote: ‘Oh, or…’,” and more.
Discussion
1. I suggested in the column that perhaps causing someone to stumble is included within giving bad advice.
2. Meaning that it was said for its own time. But it is very strange that for later generations there is an איסור of techumin, yet they insist that it is rabbinic and that the verse was said only about those gathering the manna. If such a prohibition already exists, why not interpret it straightforwardly, that this is what the verse means?
3. There is no prohibition on touching any of the Temple vessels.
4. Is that only regarding Sabbath rest and not with other prohibitions? The Gemara and the Rishonim compare these to one another. Your definition would apply to all Torah prohibitions, where if a minor eats carcasses we are not commanded to separate him from it. So why is a verse needed for Shabbat?
3. Do you mean to say that in Maimonides there is no prohibition on touching the Ark (which is the prohibition of touching the holy object according to Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides that you cited)? You are right.
4. My suggestion (just a suggestion) is as follows. If the minor commits the prohibition on his own, then there is no difference between Shabbat and other prohibitions. But if he does it at his father’s instruction, then on Shabbat it is forbidden to his father because his son’s rest is incumbent upon him, and the Gemara there expands this to say that even if the child does it on his own but with his father’s knowledge, it is as though his father instructed him with respect to his son’s required rest. And perhaps there is proof of this, since even in the case of eating carcasses, a minor may eat with his father’s knowledge so that his father saves himself a meal, and he benefits from it; that is, there too eating “with his father’s knowledge” is relevant. If so, why did they not say that even in the case of eating carcasses the court separates him in order to save the father? Rather, when he acts on his own but with his father’s knowledge, this is a special prohibition on Shabbat, by virtue of “his son’s rest.”
Nadav Shnerb, in his book Keren Zavit on the portion Tetzaveh, also comments on the verses “you shall throw it to the dog” and “you shall not touch their carcasses.”
4. On the contrary, in the Gemara and the Rishonim they do say that this applies to all prohibitions. They do not distinguish between Shabbat and other prohibitions. If he acts with his father’s knowledge, it is forbidden in all prohibitions.
“You shall throw it to the dog” is actually not a good example. It is quite clear that the intent is to say not to eat it, but to throw it to the dog—not that there is a commandment to throw things to dogs. Moreover, in Pesachim 25b they derive from here that every prohibition of eating includes a prohibition of benefit unless Scripture spells it out for you, as it did in the case of a carcass. That is, the verse teaches that with a carcass there is no prohibition of benefit.
As for “you shall not touch their carcasses,” in Rosh Hashanah 16 there is a derivation from here that this was prohibited to priests and not to Israelites, or that it was prohibited on the festival (“a person is obligated to purify himself for the festival”). See Torah Temimah there.
“You shall not curse a deaf person, and before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block” — one of the most beautiful verses in the entire Torah. (I assume they thought that a curse had real mystical efficacy, and therefore cursing a deaf person is like placing an obstacle that the blind person will fall because of—but that is a different topic for discussion.) Halakhah did to this verse what it did: it turned it into a metaphor and ignored the simple layer. Perhaps because it thought people did not need the simple layer, or because it is morality, or because it was internalized in them as students of the Chumash. Be that as it may, the intra-halakhic discussion of “uprooted laws” seems to me far less interesting, and even less important, than the basic lesson that the whole (Western) world learned from this verse: not to place an obstacle before someone who cannot see it, and not to curse someone who cannot hear. Not to play the hero against the weak. Not to be a villain. I can’t believe how people once learned from the Tanakh. What fun they had!
Fun is wonderful. 🙂
But don’t forget that even in halakhah, the simple conception is that it is forbidden to trip a blind person.
I won’t forget, but it is worth remembering that the final halakhah is the second story. The first story comes before it. I know that we do not rule from the Written Torah, but out of respect for it one should remember that it was there first. It is the foundation and infrastructure for what came later.
Our teacher, the Third Mahari”l, already taught us that the sages of the Oral Torah determine what the Written Torah is. Esther sent to the sages, “Write me for the generations.” The sages discussed whether to include Esther and Ecclesiastes, etc.
Beyond that, I am not dealing here with the question of honor, but with the halakhic question (what is binding and what is not).
Regarding “Let no man go out from his place,” there is the Tosafot interpretation that this refers to going out of the tent with objects, that is, the prohibition of carrying from a private domain to a public domain.
Perhaps one could say that this is the plain meaning—after all, it is clear that there is no prohibition on movement of the limbs on Shabbat (all the more so from the wood-gatherer, who was stoned for gathering wood and not for moving his legs), and there is no special reason in the plain sense to define “his place” as twelve mil rather than four cubits—so it is plausible to claim that the plain meaning is the labor of carrying.
Perhaps in the same way one could interpret the prohibition of the Levites’ “touching” as a prohibition of use (say, like “whoever strikes the Jebusites and reaches the water shaft,” and not “touching” as in forbidden sexual relations or the Tree of Knowledge), because a prohibition of touching without use makes no sense.
And from where do we know that logic is needed in interpreting the plain meaning of verses? — “Circumcise the foreskin of your heart.”
Regarding “Let no man go out from his place,” I thought of that, but it is strained. The labors do not appear in the Torah, except for the labor of kindling, regarding which there is indeed a dispute why it appears there (to separate the categories or as a mere prohibition). Therefore, in the straightforward sense this is not the labor of carrying but techumin. It is true that the Rishonim wrote that carrying is an inferior labor, and perhaps that is why there was a need to write it.
Well known. Over this our heart was sick.
Since the day the Temple was destroyed, the Holy One, blessed be He, has nothing in His world but the four cubits of halakhah.
That is what destruction looks like.
Indeed, I was mistaken. That was because I had seen only the Gemara in Shabbat 121 (and there one can interpret a distinction between Shabbat and other prohibitions, and that also seemed to me the meaning of the wording). But in the Gemara in Yevamot, which is cited in the Masoret HaShas, they compare Shabbat and untithed produce, and it is clear that there is no distinction. (Though there are all sorts of major discussions there about minors, and I did not study it carefully.)
Actually, it makes sense. The verse is in the context of gathering manna, which one gathers into a vessel. Scripture forbids taking the vessel out of the house into the public domain for the purpose of gathering manna.
And about that it was said: a fine destruction.
Also in the Shabbat sugya the Gemara conflates them.
But in Shabbat one could interpret that the conflation is only before they said that he acts with his father’s knowledge, and when he acts on his own there is clearly no problem of “his son’s rest.” No?
First, already in the question itself there is conflation. But even in the answer, the main point is missing from the text. This does not look like a distinction between one who acts with his father’s knowledge and one who does not, but rather between Shabbat and other prohibitions. That point does not appear there. Especially since in the initial assumption they thought otherwise, I would have expected them to mention that point in the conclusion. And indeed all the Rishonim there (including Rashi and Rashba themselves) continue to ignore this distinction even in the conclusion, and discuss the parameters of directly feeding a child prohibited food, and a minor eating carcasses, etc.
I see in Otzar HaHokhmah, in the novellae of Rabbi Joseph of Lunel, note 205 and at the end of note 207, that he seems to interpret the sugya in Shabbat in terms of the law of “his son’s rest.” And in Chikrei Lev, Orach Chaim, section 64: “One must investigate whether acting with his father’s knowledge applies also to other prohibitions, or perhaps it is forbidden only on Shabbat, for it is written: ‘You shall not do any labor, you and your son.’” I have not studied it, but it seems that at least there is discussion of the matter.
Nice. The plain meaning of the Gemara is otherwise, and so too it emerges from most of the Rishonim there. But also regarding the prohibitions of touching and “before the blind,” I brought only certain opinions.
I just wanted to note that Gersonides too, on the verse speaking about the prohibition of “before the blind,” understands that the prohibition did not depart from its plain meaning. His words:
“‘And before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.’ The meaning is that if someone is blind in a matter, you must not place a stumbling block before him so as to cause him to fall. For example, if he asked you about some matter whether it is permitted or forbidden, and regarding something forbidden you told him that it is permitted; or he asked you for advice and you gave him improper advice in order to harm him in whatever way; or if that person had bad traits and you provided him with the things by means of which he would do evil—in all these cases one transgresses ‘before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.’ And one who places a stumbling block on the road to cause a passerby there to fall also transgresses this prohibition, and is also liable for the damages, as explained from what is mentioned in the section ‘And these are the ordinances.’”
(Generally speaking, it seems to me that Gersonides is a Rishon worth examining in this issue, since he is among the few who tried to connect the plain meaning of the Written Torah with the Oral Torah.)
Who is meant by “the Third Mahari”l”?
The Third Mahari”l is Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz.
Regards, Fish”l
The Third Isaiah (Leibowitz). This is in addition to the two Isaiahs who composed the Book of Isaiah, according to the accepted view in academic biblical scholarship.
“When you come to war in your land against the enemy who oppresses you, you shall sound the trumpets, and you shall be remembered before the Lord your God, and you shall be delivered from your enemies.”
An explicit verse,
which is even recited in the Independence Day night prayer of the Zionists,
and somehow is not fulfilled.
A Google search shows that the excuses are unconvincing, and this is simply a commandment that was somehow, sometime, somewhere decided not to be observed.
May Rabbi Weber of the Temple Mount be remembered for good, for he is careful to blow silver trumpets during the prayer of the 24 blessings in order to fulfill the commandment.
The commandment of the trumpets is certainly included in halakhah and is brought in the halakhic authorities. It is not observed because today’s wars are not halakhic wars. Much has already been written about this.
What does it mean, “wars that are not halakhic”?
How, in our teacher’s view, would the current war be “halakhic”?
Wars that are not conducted in the name of halakhah and for halakhic reasons. A secular state does not wage wars according to halakhah.
Why is the level of the state’s religiosity relevant?
What is relevant is that an enemy rises against the people of Israel to destroy them,
and one must fight in order to save the hostages and also so that they do not rise against us.
That is an obligation, and apparently even an obligatory war.
And that is certainly a halakhic obligation.
How much of the leadership wears a shtreimel?
How did that become a condition in the commandment of the trumpets?
For some reason I get the impression that this is not trolling, although in terms of content it does look that way. Do you expect the IDF to blow trumpets before going out to war?
As for the question whether this is an obligatory war—see column 609.
Why trolling?
It is a straightforward question.
In the IDF and in synagogues and in malls and everywhere,
let us observe the commandment as we were commanded.
Exactly as we recite the Shema in the morning and evening.
A nonreligious soldier would not be required to hear the blasts and trumpet calls,
and the military rabbinate would do its job.
What is the problem with that?
I am serious and do not understand why not.
Because this is a public commandment, and today there is no Jewish public, certainly not a Jewish public that is obligated. Private commandments each person performs for himself. And I have not yet even entered into the parameters of the commandment (whether it applies only in an obligatory war, and the other qualifications raised by the halakhic authorities).
Perhaps uprooted laws are among the things to which reasoning does not apply, but rather they are contemplation of the ideal. The sages contemplated the above laws and understood that they are not for practical halakhah, as the rabbi explains in the third book of the trilogy regarding many laws.
Correction: not “understood,” but “contemplated the ideal, which is reality.”
One can say that ad hoc about anything. After all, this verse was written. So at most one could say, as with the stubborn and rebellious son, that it will not be actualized in practice—but it is still ruled as halakhah, only it does not occur in practice. Here, these things were not ruled as halakhah at all. So why were they written?
It could be that this comes to teach the greatness of the sanctity of the vessels [the ministering vessels], and not practical halakhah [that is how they saw it in the ideal], and likewise the other examples came to teach something else and not practical halakhah.
And this is not similar to the stubborn and rebellious son, because there it is halakhah: the sages saw in the ideal that this is halakhah, but not in practice—that is, it could be that a generation would come in which it would be practical halakhah. But in uprooted laws, the sages saw that this is not halakhah at all. It belongs more to the sphere of morality and the like, and over the generations it will teach various moral lessons.
Not likely. They at least should have said so. Their thunderous silence is hard to understand.
True. But we learn from our master that one reconciles things with the tools we have—that is, to be synthetic and not analytic, as explained at length in your book Two Carts 😁
According to the rabbi’s approach, let us posit the two possibilities for the answer: (a) not for future generations; (b) what I answered above. The rabbi asked: “However, the decisors’ ignoring these verses itself calls for explanation. We would have expected them to raise the matter of the commandment and, as an answer, suggest the possibility that this is not a commandment for future generations. But the decisors simply ignore it.”
According to the rabbi’s answer this is indeed difficult, but according to what I answered it is not difficult why the sages did not ask, for how is this different from all the commandments with applicability [ideal?] that Hazal did not trouble to spell out, but rather said from the outset what they said.
I do not understand. What is the explanation for the ignoring?
According to what I explained—that this is speaking about the ideal—the sages did not trouble to specify that it is an ideal, just as with the other commandments that they explained according to the ideal and did not trouble to specify it.
According to the rabbi’s answer, that this is dealing with a command not for future generations, then it is indeed difficult that the sages would raise the matter of the command and answer that the command was not for future generations. But according to what I answered, that this is dealing with an ideal, then just as throughout the rest of the Talmud the sages do not spell out that it is an ideal but simply explain what they see, so too here.
And the reason they did not even speak about it may be because they contemplated this ideal and knew it was not halakhah, but even for them it was difficult what it was, and they did not know, so they did not write—so to speak, leaving it as requiring further investigation.
Does this explanation seem possible to the rabbi?
No. I have not seen anything new here.
If it has not yet been mentioned, it is worth noting Maimonides’ view regarding “You shall not take [the name of the Lord your God in vain].” There too, the central approach is that the verse speaks about an oath, but Maimonides writes in the laws of blessings (on the basis of an explicit statement in the Gemara) that one who recites an unnecessary blessing is liable משום “You shall not take,” and straightforwardly this is biblical. According to most other approaches this is rabbinic (and therefore, for example, it is permitted to recite an unnecessary blessing in order to complete 100 blessings, which is very hard to say if it is biblical).
It is interesting that Maimonides is actually consistent with his view on techumin, where too he prefers to find a source in the Gemara that leaves the “plain-sense” prohibition in place.
I did not make the most important part clear— in the verse itself it is not speaking about an oath at all, but about bearing God’s name in vain, straightforwardly—without connection to an oath—whereas in the halakhic ruling one is biblically liable under this prohibition even without God’s name (though not liable to lashes).
Interesting in this connection.
Perhaps one could also add the verse, “Fathers shall not be put to death for sons, and sons shall not be put to death for fathers; each man shall be put to death for his own sin.”
Its plain meaning would seem obvious—why would the Torah warn about something so obvious? It is plain murder in every respect. (Perhaps because in their time it was common? I do not think so. Also, no one counted this, and it is not mentioned in the Chinukh, commandment 592.)
Therefore the Gemara in Sanhedrin 27 expounds this concerning testimony, and so too it is brought in the Chinukh, commandment 592.
By the way, in general one sees from the Gemara there that it understood the plain meaning of the verse “Fathers shall not be put to death for sons” as referring to punishment by Heaven—that the Creator does not punish fathers for sons and vice versa—and not to death at human hands, because as above that is obvious.
Yet Scripture in Kings states:
“In the second year of Joash son of Jehoahaz king of Israel, Amaziah son of Joash king of Judah became king… And when the kingdom was firmly in his hand, he struck down his servants who had struck down the king his father. But he did not put to death the sons of the assassins, as it is written in the Book of the Torah of Moses, which the Lord commanded, saying: ‘Fathers shall not be put to death for sons, and sons shall not be put to death for fathers, but each man shall be put to death for his own sin’” (II Kings 14:1–6).
Let us leave aside the fact that he did not know the explicit Gemara, since it was several hundred years after him. It is amusing that the verse notes
that only because of this verse he did not kill them—is there no prohibition of murder without this?
Admittedly, one should note the Gemara in Yevamot 79:
“And the king took the two sons of Rizpah daughter of Aiah, whom she had borne to Saul, Armoni and Mephibosheth, and the five sons of Michal daughter of Saul, whom she had borne to Adriel son of Barzillai the Meholathite…” But is it not written, ‘Fathers shall not be put to death for sons’? Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Better that one letter be uprooted from the Torah than that the Name of Heaven be publicly desecrated.”
It sounds from this Gemara that indeed, without this verse, it would not have been murder? Or is it saying this by way of rhetoric and homiletics? But concerning the verse in Kings, it seems that it is not said that way, but seriously: just an ignorant king who otherwise apparently would have murdered the sons.
This Shabbat we read in the portion about forbidden relations in Kedoshim, and there it says:
“‘If a man takes his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter, and sees her nakedness and she sees his nakedness, it is a disgrace, and they shall be cut off before the eyes of their people; he has uncovered his sister’s nakedness; he shall bear his iniquity,’”
yet it is obvious that there is no prohibition on seeing one’s sister’s nakedness (perhaps another prohibition).
And in general, in the whole section above in Acharei Mot it says, “the nakedness of … you shall not uncover.”
Whereas in part it says, “you shall not lie…”
One sees that the Torah speaks allegorically even in commandments.
Tonight I reread your article, and when I came to comment I saw that I had already commented twice and did not merit a response. I hope this time I will merit a response.
A— I do not understand why you think that “before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block” means a physical obstacle. To me it seems simple that in the Torah the meaning is metaphorical, like many metaphors in the Torah outside matters of halakhah (and see my comment above, also regarding matters of halakhah), because why specifically a blind person? Placing an obstacle to make someone fall is also not only for a blind person. So clearly the intention is metaphorical. And even according to your view, that you wanted the plain meaning to count, what is its plain meaning—someone who actually sticks out a foot and his fellow trips over his leg? Rather, clearly the intention is metaphorical even according to your view, namely any kind of harm.
And the same applies regarding “an eye for an eye,” and similarly above.
Only regarding “the firstborn that she bears” there is really no connection to metaphor; rather, it is simply a talmudic exposition that removes the verse from its plain meaning, and that is why Nahmanides mentioned only that. And in fact this very Gemara proves that it is only this, as you yourself mentioned as a difficulty, and according to my approach it is not a difficulty—on the contrary.
And even the Gemara regarding piggul is not similar to “the firstborn that she bears,” which removes it entirely from its plain meaning, in a way that is not at all similar, and does not preserve the plain meaning at all.
B— And I did not understand the difficulty from techumin at all, not even to begin with, because the plain meaning of the verse has nothing to do with techumin. Rather, the reality is that the manna was not supposed to fall on Shabbat, and the Holy One informed Moses to tell them not to go out searching for manna on Shabbat because there is none.
C— Regarding the verse “and they shall not touch,” there is also no difficulty, because it is not written in the language of prohibition: “tell them, do not touch the sacred vessels and do not die.” Rather, simply, the meaning is that when they travel from the camp they must cover the vessels and then carry them, and not carry them uncovered—and that is the meaning of “and they shall not touch.” And also “and they shall die” refers to the time of travel, like the case of Uzzah.
D— Regarding “his son’s rest,” your difficulty is not about the plain meaning of the verse but about Hazal’s exposition, because clearly the plain meaning of the verse certainly means your adult son and daughter, and Scripture is merely speaking in ordinary human language and nothing more than that. Rather, Hazal expounded in their usual way some inference, since there is no need to mention your son and your daughter, and about that you ask why this exposition was not brought.
But that too is not difficult: every baraita that was not taught, etc. And in fact it is clear from the Gemara against this Mekhilta, since the Gemara is astonished at the Mishnah that implies a minor eating etc.
And by the way, Rashba too does not learn exactly like the Mekhilta—that an adult is generally warned concerning the minor—but rather about a minor who acts with his father’s knowledge. And another puzzling thing in Rashba is that he begins with “you shall not feed them” and ends with “you shall not do any labor.”
And by the way, Nahmanides on this verse already brought this.
Indeed, the Mishnah Berurah is really puzzling—how he brought this exposition so simply.
In any case, there is Beit Ephraim on Yoreh De‘ah section 62, s.v. “And I saw in Rashba,” which holds that this is an asmachta, and there is Achiezer, part 3, section 81, which raises difficulties against him and against many others—see there for the whole matter.
That was already a long time ago, and I do not remember why I did not respond. Presumably I felt we had exhausted the matter.
I will write only regarding “before the blind.” The Torah certainly can speak allegorically, but in order to determine that this is what it is doing, one must bring proof. In the verse of “before the blind” there is no reason at all to think so. The proof is that only the Yad Ramah (on chapter 2 of Bava Batra) sees here a source for the prohibition of causing harm. That is, straightforwardly the verse is said only literally and not at all about a general prohibition of causing harm.
I already said that the proof is the verse itself, even according to your view; namely, why specifically a blind person? After all, placing an obstacle to make someone fall is not only relevant to a blind person. So clearly the intention is metaphorical, and even according to your view, in which you wanted the plain meaning to count—what is its plain meaning? Someone who actually sticks out a foot and his fellow trips over his leg? Rather, clearly the intention is metaphorical even according to your view, namely any harm. So the verse proves about itself that it is a metaphor; that is, the logic itself proves it, exactly like the verse in the previous comment, meaning from 11/05. (And I did not understand what you meant by “we exhausted it,” since in fact you and I did not discuss it there at all.)
And I did not understand why you do not address the rest?
That is not a metaphor but an example. And what you are doing is just being obstinate.
Seemingly, Rava’s words in Yevamot 24a are puzzling, for one can easily understand that even the plain meaning of the verse did not say to call the name of the firstborn by the name of the deceased; for this is the wording of the verse: “And the firstborn that she bears shall arise in the name of his dead brother.” It does not say, “You shall call his name by the name of his dead brother,” but rather “shall arise in the name of.” Everyone understands the difference.
And see your comment on 14/01/2024 at 19:13:
“‘You shall throw it to the dog’ is actually not a good example. It is quite clear that the intent is to say not to eat it, but to throw it to the dog, and not that there is a commandment to throw things to dogs.” Those are your golden words.
If so, then all the more so in our case.
It seems that not only the Gemara’s interpretations of verses are midrash; even their understanding of the plain meaning is not really the plain meaning?
Do you disagree that in fact the plain meaning is not what Rava explained, and if so there is no difficulty from this verse?
I would appreciate an explanation.
It could have been explained differently. But Rava holds that this is the plain meaning.
“It and its offspring”—according to the Rabbis in Hullin 78b–79a, this applies specifically to females and not to males. The opposite of the plain meaning of the verse.
That also belongs here, no?
I do not see the connection. Uprooted laws are laws that the verse obligates and we ignore. Interpretation not according to the plain meaning is a different sugya.
A— Here too, Scripture obligates that one not slaughter it and its offspring on one day, and according to the sages, a male is permitted and only a female is forbidden. An uprooted law.
B— And what is different about “before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block”? There too it is an interpretation not according to the plain meaning—a literally blind person.
C— Or in any case perhaps it belongs to what Rava said above, that only “shall arise in the name of his brother” departed from its plain meaning; here too this has departed from its plain meaning, according to the sages.
??
Some notes and suggestions, at first glance. (1) Regarding “placing a stumbling block before the blind,” Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot, for some reason, writes that the plain meaning of the verse deals with causing someone to stumble through bad advice (though it is not clear that he means to exclude physical tripping). (2) In Techumin, Rashi on the Torah writes that the primary meaning of the verse was said about those gathering the manna. (3) Perhaps an altar is not a sacred object but at most a sacred vessel, and therefore permitting touching it does not involve uprooting anything. (4) The requirement that “his son rest” would seemingly be analogous to “his animal” only if the person causes them to do it; but if they went on their own, it is permitted, and he is not responsible to watch the cow lest it make a furrow in the ground.