On Causing a Secular Jew to Sin

Tzohar – 5766

Rabbi Michael Abraham

Causing a Jew who does not observe the commandments to transgress is a highly relevant issue that arises in many different contexts. It is, of course, connected to the question of our attitude toward secular Jews in general, but not only to that question.

The accepted assumption is that there is a clear prohibition against causing a secular Jew to sin. For example, many people are careful when crossing a road on the Sabbath not to cause a driver to stop his car, thereby leading him to violate the prohibition involved in turning on the brake lights.

There are several responsa (see, for example, Minchat Shlomo, I, sec. 35; Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim V, sec. 13) that deal with offering food to a secular guest even though he will not recite a blessing. There, however, the question is different, since there is room to be lenient because of the desecration of God’s name and the hatred of religion (or of religious Jews) that could be aroused by such behavior; see there.

There are also several discussions about holding a bar mitzvah for secular Jews, which usually involves Sabbath desecration by them and by their guests (see, for example, the articles of Rabbi Ronen Lubitz, Tzohar 20; Rabbi Eliezer Simcha Weiss, Techumin 19; and Rabbi Yonah Fodor, Techumin 18). These discussions deal with the question of causing someone to transgress for his own benefit, since the very act of causing the transgression may draw him closer to a life of Torah and commandments, and strengthen his Jewish identity. The same is true of inviting secular Jews to synagogues, which involves traveling on the Sabbath[1].

As stated, the underlying assumption of all these inquiries is that the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” applies also in relation to secular Jews, and the discussions revolve mainly around questions concerning the parameters of that prohibition and its application in these cases[2].

Reading these discussions arouses an intuitive uneasiness. We ignore the fact that we are dealing here with a person for whom commandments and transgressions are not part of his world. My feeling is that causing a secular Jew to transgress should be discussed on a more basic and deeper plane than the technical parameters of the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’ My initial intuition is that a secular person is simply not someone to whom the category of transgression applies at all, and therefore his being caused to sin should be examined not only in terms of whether the one causing him thereby commits a transgression, but also in terms of whether he can, in any sense, be made to stumble at all. Can a secular Jew commit transgressions in the first place?

The discussion requires recourse to several very weighty topics in Jewish law. Because of the limited space and the breadth of the issue, I cannot do so in detail, and I shall therefore content myself with sketching a possible line of thought, based on reasonable foundational assumptions (though not always agreed upon, and certainly not necessary). My purpose here is not to prove my claims, but rather to show their possibility within Jewish law. Put differently: to find a halakhic rationalization for the initial intuitions mentioned above. The approach proposed here is not common among halakhic decisors, but it is Torah, and we must study it[3].

A. Point of Departure: the Prohibition of ‘Do Not Place a Stumbling Block’

The Torah forbids us to cause another person to transgress, as it is written: “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” The prohibition applies to Noahides as well.

The prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ concerns the one who causes the stumbling. The basis of the prohibition is not that the other person committed a transgression, for that is already forbidden by the Torah in connection with the transgression itself. The basis of the law is that if I cause someone to sin, I myself have violated a prohibition. Let us illustrate. Some halakhic decisors wrote that a person does not violate ‘do not place a stumbling block’ if the causing was done through speech[4]. In such a case, the exemption does not stem from the possibility that the transgressive act might never be done; rather, it is a formal exemption concerning the one who caused it. The person who was led astray will commit a full transgression, since the act will in fact be done. My causation and responsibility for the transgression are also clear. And yet there is an opinion among the decisors that the one who caused it would be exempt. We thus see that the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ is a prohibition on the one who causes the stumbling, and it does not necessarily depend on whether the other person transgressed or not.

However, beyond the formal parameters of ‘do not place a stumbling block,’ it is clear that such a person caused a transgression to come into being. Therefore one should be stringent because of ‘afrushi me-isura’—the duty to keep another person away from prohibition[5]—even if there is a formal exemption under the law of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’

A further remark concerning ‘do not place a stumbling block’: in certain cases, the halakhic directive regarding wicked people is “Feed the wicked man and let him die.” Some have written that one may cause him to commit transgressions so that he ‘die’ in his wickedness[6]. Seemingly, such a transgression ‘drills a hole in the ship’ shared by all of us. How can it be permitted to cause a transgression to be committed and spiritual damage to be created in the world merely because the transgressor is wicked? Some raised precisely this difficulty on the basis of the rule of ‘afrushi me-isura.’ Chavot Yair (sec. 142) wrote about this: “Whoever can heal my malady on this point deserves to be called a master physician.” In any event, the apparent conclusion is that the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ is not a derivative of the fact that a transgression has been committed in the world, but rather an interpersonal prohibition vis-à-vis the person who was caused to stumble. For that reason, when the other person is wicked, there is no obligation toward him not to cause him to stumble.

On the other hand, later authorities already wrote[7] that the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ also contains a dimension of the relation between man and God, for otherwise we would not be bound by it with respect to gentiles (who are not included in the term ‘your fellow’). This gives rise to the opposite conception, according to which a transgression creates a problem not only for the person who commits it, but in the world itself; therefore we must reduce as much as possible the number of transgressions committed in the world.

If so, there seems to be a frontal contradiction here regarding whether the obligation is toward the person who is caused to stumble or toward the Holy One and His world. The only possible resolution, apparently, is the view that causing a wicked person to sin does not damage the world, but only the wicked person himself, and toward him we are not bound by interpersonal obligations. By contrast, with a righteous person, and even with a gentile who fulfills his duties, there is indeed an obligation upon us to prevent the damage—if not toward him (since he is not included in ‘your fellow’), then with respect to the spiritual damage done to the world itself.

If our words are correct, the conclusion is that the transgressions of a wicked person are not transgressions in relation to the world. He cannot blemish the world; at most he can harm himself. Why do his actions not damage the world? Perhaps this is an instance of the principle that a person cannot prohibit that which is not his. The Torah does not give a person the power to harm another when he does so intentionally[8]. But this still requires further analysis.

C. Is a Secular Person Subject to the Category of Transgression?

We have seen that a wicked person, even though he is commanded not to commit transgressions, has lost the power to cause spiritual damage to the world. His deeds are not full transgressions. What about a secular person? Our assumption is that he is usually not wicked, and therefore, seemingly, the interpersonal obligation to prevent him from transgressive acts still stands. But here another angle arises.

Maimonides discusses the laws of the resident alien (ger toshav), and writes (Laws of Kings 8:11):

Whoever accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them is among the righteous of the nations of the world and has a share in the world to come—provided that he accepts and performs them because the Holy One commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher that the Noahides had previously been commanded concerning them. But if he performs them because reason compels him, he is not a resident alien, nor among the righteous of the nations of the world, but only among their wise men.

Maimonides’ words imply that one who fulfills commandments because his own reason dictates them, rather than because the Holy One commanded them to Moses at Sinai, is not a resident alien and not among the righteous of the nations of the world, but at most among their wise men. In our terms, such a person is wise and moral, but his deeds are not commandments. The basis of this is that fulfilling commandments requires commitment to the Torah from Sinai. Fulfilling commandments in some other way has no religious value, and apparently is not even regarded as a religious act at all.

Admittedly, Maimonides is speaking about a resident alien; however, several later authorities applied his words to an ordinary Jew as well[9]. And conceptually the matter is simple: commandment-fulfillment cannot exist in one who does not believe in the Commander[10].

Let us consider the matter from the opposite direction. Maimonides counted the commandment to believe as the first commandment in his enumeration. Several commentators objected[11]: how can one command someone to believe, when belief is itself a condition of being commanded? Without belief, commandment-fulfillment does not apply.

This assertion is unrelated to the dispute among the decisors whether commandments require intention. Even according to the view that commandments do not require intention, that is because the commandment-act of a Jew is presumably performed for the sake of the commandment. Several decisors likewise wrote that if there is an opposite intention, or an intention not to fulfill the obligation, then there is in fact no commandment-act even according to the opinion that commandments do not require intention[12].

The conclusion that emerges is that a person who does not believe in God and His commandments is not capable of fulfilling commandments. One may still ask whether the principle cited by the Talmud in Kiddushin regarding a wicked man who betroths a woman on condition that he is wholly righteous can be applied here, since we are concerned for the validity of the betrothal because perhaps he entertained thoughts of repentance in his heart. If so, perhaps when he puts on tefillin a thought of belief flashes through him, and his act counts as a commandment-act. But this is, apparently, an assessment that must meet a standard of plausibility. If there is no plausibility that such a thing will happen (in those cases where indeed there is none), it is difficult to assume that this rabbinic statement can be applied to him as a kind of legal fiction.

One practical implication, for example, concerns being called up to the Torah in the synagogue, in the case of a person to whom the entire religious matter is wholly foreign, and who goes up to the Torah only because his son is becoming bar mitzvah, or as a kind of folkloristic ceremony, an expression of Jewish culture, and the like. In such a case, this is nothing but a blessing in vain[13].

The question now arises regarding prohibitions. We have seen that a person who does not observe Torah and commandments because of complete disconnection is not capable of fulfilling commandments. But would his violation likewise fail to count as a transgression? With regard to the issue of commandments requiring intention, it seems obvious that there is a distinction between a positive commandment and a prohibition: a positive commandment requires some degree of intention, whereas a prohibition does not.

But above we distinguished between the law of commandments requiring intention and our present discussion. The question whether commandments require intention is a dispute internal to the world of commandment-observers. There, and only there, does it make sense to invoke a principle such as “an unspecified act is presumed to be for its proper purpose.” But on the plane with which we are dealing, reason suggests there is no distinction between positive and negative commands: a person who is not capable of performing a commandment because God and His commands are not part of his world is likewise not capable of committing transgressions. In the example we mentioned above: had Maimonides listed a prohibition applying to one who does not believe, would we not have raised the same difficulty—what room would there be to count such a prohibition? It seems that belief in the commandment and in the One who commands it is required even with respect to prohibitions.

To remove any doubt, although the point is obvious, I add that there is certainly an obligation to try to turn children back to their fathers’ hearts, and to “restore these errant sons, by ways of peace, to the strength of the Torah” (in the language of Maimonides, Laws of Rebels 3:3). What is said here concerns only the meaning of their deeds while they are still in that condition, namely, that of those who err[14].

D. Discussion in Light of the Sin-Offering Liability of the Tinok Shenishba

What has emerged from our remarks thus far is that a person who does not believe at all is outside the realm of performing acts that have halakhic significance, whether as commandments or as transgressions.

If we wish to examine the halakhic foundations of this claim, we must turn to the laws of the wicked person, the apostate, or the tinok shenishba[15]. Regarding the wicked person, we already saw above what his status is, and we noted that the ordinary secular Jew does not fall into that category. Regarding the apostate as well, there is room to discuss whether a secular Jew in our day has the status of an apostate (for there is no apostasy here in the national sense, only in the religious sense; and even then, in most cases he is more like one under compulsion than like an ordinary apostate, who is treated as an intentional sinner). As stated, the ordinary secular Jew of our time apparently falls under the halakhic category of tinok shenishba. If so, it would seem, on the basis of our argument, that a tinok shenishba is likewise not someone to whom the category of transgression applies.

But this very claim is, seemingly, the subject of a dispute among the tannaim and amoraim in tractate Shabbat (68a), where Rav and Shmuel disagree with Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish regarding the law of the tinok shenishba in connection with sin-offerings for his transgressions.

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish hold that he is considered under compulsion, and therefore is entirely exempt from a sin-offering. Rav and Shmuel, however, hold that a tinok shenishba is liable to bring a sin-offering for every type of transgression he committed.

Now the view of Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish seems to fit precisely with what we said above: that a tinok shenishba is under compulsion, and is not regarded as an offender at all. Still, one must discuss whether there is a prohibition against causing them to sin, for even causing a person to commit a transgression under compulsion, according to some decisors, involves ‘do not place a stumbling block’[16]. That is, even according to Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish one cannot necessarily conclude that there is no prohibition against causing a secular person to transgress. True, he himself is under compulsion and has not violated a prohibition; therefore perhaps there would be no duty of ‘afrushi me-isura,’ but we ourselves may still violate ‘do not place a stumbling block.’

The practical difference arises in situations where there is no formal prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’ We saw that in such situations one must still ask whether the rule of ‘afrushi me-isura’ remains in force—that is, the obligation to see to it that transgressions do not multiply in the world. But in our case, where from the side of the person being caused there is no transgression, there is no problem at all.

All this was said regarding an ordinary person acting under compulsion. But conceptually there is a strong distinction between a tinok shenishba and an ordinary person under compulsion. An ordinary person is someone to whom transgressions do apply; therefore perhaps even when he commits a transgression under compulsion there is still a stumbling block here. But a tinok shenishba is not merely an ordinary person under compulsion. In his case, commandments and transgressions simply do not apply at all. If so, perhaps with respect to him there would, according to all views, be no prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block,’ even according to those opinions that recognize such a prohibition even in the case of a transgression committed under compulsion.

All this, however, applies only according to Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish. As a practical ruling, Maimonides decides in accordance with Rav and Shmuel (see Laws of Unintentional Sins 2:6 and 7:2), that a tinok shenishba must bring a sin-offering for every type of transgression he committed[17].

Here, however, one must ask what exactly the transgression is for which they are liable, and this touches on the general understanding of sin-offerings. According to our claim, the sin for which the offering is brought is the lack of knowledge. The actual performance of the transgression is only a condition for liability. A proof of this is that when a person commits one hundred transgressions of the same kind in a single lapse of awareness, he brings only one sin-offering. Why only one? Simply because the sin is the lapse of knowledge; only if that lapse never finds practical expression (that is, if no transgression is actually committed) does it not require atonement. But once one transgression has been committed, the fact that the same person violated that same transgression several more times has no further significance. He sins only in his lack of knowledge. The liability to several sin-offerings when, during the same lapse, one commits several different kinds of transgression stems from the fact that such a situation is treated as several lapses, not one.

Let us sharpen the novelty of this claim. It is commonly assumed that one is not liable for a sin committed under compulsion. But when the sin is unintentional, there is, after all, an act of transgression. Yet to require a sin-offering for atonement one needs blame, and the blame lies in the lack of knowledge. According to that common view, the sin is not the lapse itself but the transgressive act. By contrast, according to what we are suggesting here, the lack of knowledge itself is the transgression for which the sin-offering is brought. The transgressive act is required only as a condition for the obligation to bring the sin-offering.

As stated, if the correct understanding were that lack of knowledge is only a condition for liability while the obligating factor is the transgressive act itself, then one should have to bring a sin-offering for every single transgressive act.

The exemption in the case of compulsion probably stems from the fact that an act done under compulsion is not attributed to the doer, and therefore the condition for sin-offering liability has not been met—namely, that an act of transgression be performed by him[18]. But in the case of a tinok shenishba, according to Rav and Shmuel, the act is indeed attributed to him, only he does not know. Therefore such a child is regarded in Jewish law as an unwitting sinner[19].

In any event, what emerges from our analysis is that for those liable to sin-offerings, the transgression lies in the lack of knowledge, while the act of transgression is only a condition for the obligation to bring the offering. If so, when a secular person commits a transgression there is no problem at all, even if we cause him to do so, for his act is not regarded as a transgression in the first place. As for the sin-offering liability, that is brought for the transgression of not knowing, and that is not something we caused. That person does not know the law in question (just as he does not know the rest of the laws), and one additional act committed within that same lapse of awareness adds or subtracts nothing[20].

In conclusion, we should note that we are dealing with transgressions such as Sabbath desecration or eating without a blessing, where there is no doubt that every secular person has already done this thousands of times in his life. If so, in such a case, according to all opinions, one more act makes no difference.

There is room here for an additional lenient consideration: if a person commits a certain transgression hundreds and thousands of times (such as violating the Sabbath or eating without a blessing), a single additional occurrence has no real significance[21]. Likewise, in the case of someone driving on the Sabbath, the care taken not to step into the crosswalk so as not to cause him to stop—and thereby add another prohibition—does not seem logically compelling. I have not, however, found an explicit source for this reasoning, apart from a rather puzzling rule cited by the decisors regarding ‘do not place a stumbling block’ when one merely increases the quantity of a prohibited act[22].

For example, in Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim II, sec. 80), Rabbi Feinstein cites the Ritva (Avodah Zarah 14b) and the Meiri (ibid. 6a), who discuss selling an animal to a gentile when there is concern that he may crossbreed it. They write that if he already has another animal, there is no prohibition. They ask why there is no prohibition, since in the end one is causing an additional prohibition to be committed. Their answer is: “Even though it is possible that the one causing the stumbling increases the prohibition, we are not concerned.” See there further authorities as well (apparently the great majority of them), from whom it emerges that when one merely increases an existing transgression, he does not violate ‘do not place a stumbling block.’

At first glance this reasoning is difficult to understand. After all, in the end he is causing the other person to transgress; what difference does it make that the other person would commit another transgression even without this? But according to our approach the matter becomes intelligible, since once a person is already engaged in a prohibited act, there is no obstacle to causing him to add another prohibition of the same kind. But this too still requires further analysis[23].

E. Two Additional Sources from the Decisors

Let us present two examples from the decisors in support of our argument:

1. Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch, in Teshuvot VeHanhagot (p. 358), permitted inviting guests for the Sabbath even though they would drive there by car. His reason is that this is not considered causing them to stumble, since he is acting for their benefit. He compares it to a doctor who operates on a patient in order to heal him, though in the course of the operation he wounds and injures him. The permission is based on the fact that the act, taken as a whole, is for the patient’s benefit, and therefore is not classified as injury at all. So too in our case: causing him to drive on the Sabbath is not classified as Sabbath desecration, since it is done for his benefit, and perhaps he will eventually draw closer to the enduring strength of the Torah as a result.

Rabbi Weiss, however, objected to this in the article cited above (chapter 3): in the end, the drive is a full-fledged desecration of the Sabbath, so what permission is there to cause a Jew to desecrate the Sabbath, even if it is for his benefit? It is not comparable to a doctor, because if the latter acts for the sake of the operation, he is not called one who injures at all (and certainly the patient himself agrees to it). By contrast, with respect to driving on the Sabbath, the invitation does not transform the act of driving into something that is not a transgression.

Admittedly, later on (chapter 6) we will present the reasoning of “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths,” and we will see that we do make calculations of this sort with regard to Sabbath desecration. But in our case this is very far-fetched, for there is great uncertainty whether he will actually draw closer to Judaism as a result, and how much. How can one knowingly cause him to desecrate the Sabbath for the sake of that? Therefore Rabbi Weiss rejected Rabbi Sternbuch’s view[24].

We may add another difficulty to Rabbi Sternbuch’s view. Even if indeed there is no prohibition here of ‘do not place a stumbling block,’ and the one causing is not himself an offender, why is he permitted to assist in increasing transgressions in the world? From the standpoint of ‘afrushi me-isura’ he is obligated to prevent the other from driving on the Sabbath, and certainly not to invite him[25].

However, in light of our remarks here, Rabbi Sternbuch’s conclusion is entirely correct, and this in several ways: (1) the act of that person is not an act of transgression at all. Consequently, there is no causing him to sin, and therefore we are duty-bound to draw him closer to Torah as much as possible. And even if the act is a transgression, he has certainly already driven on the Sabbath many times in the past, so he is already liable for that. (2) Beyond this, he commits thousands of prohibitions in the course of his drives, and will probably continue to do so even on that very Sabbath itself (even if one does not invite him, he will drive elsewhere). Thus the quantitative consideration we mentioned above also enters into the picture[26].

These different rationales can yield different practical consequences in a case where I invite someone to my home not in order to bring him closer, but simply out of a desire for a friendly visit, or when there is concern for desecration of God’s name if I do not allow him to eat without a blessing. According to our reasoning—that there is no causing here and no act of transgression—such an invitation would also be permitted. According to Rabbi Sternbuch’s reasoning, however, it would seem to be forbidden; only where the invitation is for the guest’s own benefit would it be allowed. It would also seem that when the invitation is intended to prevent desecration of God’s name, it would still be forbidden, since that is not for the guest’s benefit, and hence there is injury to him. And in fact, in the responsa of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who discussed giving food to a person who does not recite a blessing, the main issue is that one causes him to violate the prohibition of hatred toward the Jewish people and toward those who observe the Torah, and not so much the issue of desecration of God’s name[27].

2. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, in the above-mentioned responsum in Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim V, sec. 13), discusses whether it is permitted to offer food to a guest when it is known that he will not recite a blessing.

Within that discussion (subsection 6), he addresses the question whether the blessing of one who does not believe is considered a blessing at all. He writes that the divine name in the blessing of a heretic is analogous to a Torah scroll written by a heretic, and therefore there is no blessing here; it is like a blessing without the divine name and kingship.

It seems, however, that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein is dealing specifically with a heretic, that is, someone who knows his Master and rebels against Him. But with a tinok shenishba—someone who does not know to whom blessings are directed and does not believe in the Creator of the world or in His commandments—it is obvious that his blessing is not a blessing at all, not only because it lacks the divine name and kingship, but even in terms of the meaning of the words, which is simply irrelevant in his case[28].

In the end, Rabbi Feinstein inclines to the practical conclusion that one may allow him to bless, since he will recite the blessing with the understanding of the one who is giving him the food and instructing him to bless God. He even suggests that perhaps he entertained thoughts of repentance in his heart (as in the case of the wicked man who betroths a woman ‘on condition that I am wholly righteous,’ in the Kiddushin passage mentioned above). But a tinok shenishba, who does not believe and does not even know what is being discussed, seems incapable of blessing God. Moreover, the likelihood that he entertained thoughts of repentance in the course of the blessing is altogether negligible, and worse than the case of the heretic who knows his Master and rebels against Him.

We should note that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s discussion depends on the question of the intention of the words in the blessing, and no proof can be brought from there regarding whether such a person belongs at all to the realm of commandments or transgressions. On the contrary, Rabbi Feinstein’s assumption is that the category of transgression does apply to him, and that there is, in principle, a prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ with respect to him. However, it may be that this assumption there is only because he is discussing a heretic and not a tinok shenishba, and this requires further examination.

There, in subsection 9, Rabbi Feinstein also discusses directly whether the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ applies to a person who is considered under compulsion, like a tinok shenishba. In the course of that discussion he inclines to say that since such a person does not know at all that he is doing something forbidden, he is considered under compulsion, and there would be no prohibition even on the one who causes him to stumble. He brings several sources for this and remains uncertain. We will expand slightly on this in the next chapter.

F. Reversing the Picture of ‘Do Not Place a Stumbling Block’: the One Who Causes His Fellow to Sin Bears the Punishment in His Place

We find in several places that one who causes his fellow to sin ‘enters in his place for punishment’[29]. When a person commits a transgression because of me, if he is unwitting and I am intentional, the transgression is treated as though I myself committed it. This picture casts the prohibition in an entirely different light, and perhaps the opposite of what we have seen up to this point.

This can also be seen from another angle. We are commanded to desecrate the Sabbath in order to save another person’s life. The Talmud’s reasoning is: “Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may keep many Sabbaths.” On one side of the scale are the Sabbaths that the other person will keep; on the other side is the one Sabbath that I shall desecrate. On what basis can one decide such a scale? From here we learn that the Sages made a kind of total calculus, in which the determining consideration is the overall amount of Sabbath observance in the world. A person is not supposed to calculate only from his own standpoint, but from the standpoint of the overall balance[30].

One implication of this is the case of causing another person to transgress in a manner such that the person caused does not himself violate the transgression. For example, where the person acting is unwitting or under compulsion. Seemingly, if he is under compulsion, then from his own perspective no transgression has occurred, and one might therefore say that there is no causing here either. On the other hand, if we understand that the transgression is placed upon the one who causes it, then the whole order is reversed: perhaps precisely when the actor is under compulsion, the one who caused him has himself committed a full-fledged transgression. This would not be the transgression of ‘do not place a stumbling block,’ but the very transgression in which he caused his fellow to stumble. By contrast, where the actor is not under compulsion, the transgression is attributed to him and not to the one who caused it, and the latter violates at most ‘do not place a stumbling block’[31].

As an interim remark, we should note that our previous discussion still stands with respect to the duty of ‘afrushi me-isura.’ If the secular person is not someone to whom the category of transgression applies, then even if I could violate ‘do not place a stumbling block’ by causing him to stumble, it is clear that there is no obligation at all to keep him away from prohibition, for he is not committing a prohibition in the first place.

Let us now return to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s remarks (subsection 9) cited at the end of the previous chapter. If we read his words carefully, it appears that here his intention is exactly what we have argued. He claims that the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ does not apply to a tinok shenishba not because the formal parameters of causing are not met, but because there is no stumbling block here at all. The ‘child,’ who is unaware that he is doing something forbidden, has in fact not performed a transgressive act at all.

It is not entirely clear whether he says this even according to those opinions that recognize ‘do not place a stumbling block’ in cases of compulsion, or whether that very point is what he is discussing. If he says it even according to those opinions, then on those views the prohibition applies to the one who causes the stumbling even when the person caused did not transgress at all. If so, why does such a prohibition exist? Presumably because the transgression of the person caused is reckoned against the one who caused it. But all this is true only where the act bears the status of a transgression, and that may perhaps exist even in the case of compulsion. But with a tinok shenishba, who is entirely unaware of the prohibition, there is no transgressive act at all, and therefore the one who caused him did nothing prohibited either. In other words, on this side of the matter it seems that his claim is that the act of a tinok shenishba is unlike the act of an ordinary person under compulsion. And that is precisely our point: in the case of the ‘child,’ this is not an exemption of compulsion; rather, he is outside the realm of performing commandments or transgressions.

Rabbi Feinstein cites the Mishnah Berurah (sec. 169, subsec. 11), which writes that if the guest is poor, and the reason he does not recite a blessing is not wickedness but compulsion—because he cannot bless—then the commandment of charity is not thereby displaced, and one may give him food even without a blessing. Now it is obvious that one may not give a poor person forbidden food, even something prohibited only rabbinically, even for the sake of charity (see Shabbat 127b). From here it is clear that where there is compulsion, there is no act of transgression, and therefore no issue of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’

Later in that discussion (subsection 10), he concludes leniently when there is some reason for it (such as manners, or because of the commandment of charity). According to our view, it would seem that perhaps one could be lenient even without any special reason.

In practice, however, it seems that all this is unnecessary. First, Maimonides’ statement about one who clothes his fellow in a forbidden mixture is itself disputed (see the Kesef Mishneh ad loc. and the other commentaries; indeed, later authorities labored to find its source). Second, in all three places in Maimonides it is clear that his words concern only a case where the one causing the stumbling physically feeds or clothes the other with his own hands (for example, Reuven himself clothes Shimon or renders him impure). If so, this does not apply to every case of causing under the law of ‘do not place a stumbling block’; rather, it is an independent prohibition concerning direct and active causation. But most of the cases with which we are dealing are not cases of direct causation, but rather situations involving a duty of care that the other person not stumble. Even giving food is not necessarily direct in that sense, for although with respect to ‘do not place a stumbling block’ it is indeed causation, it is not literal feeding for the purposes of the special prohibition that Maimonides introduces.

G. Who Is a Tinok Shenishba: Between Knowledge and Obligation

Within Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s discussion there (subsection 10), he remarks that even if the poor person does not bless even when told to do so, and even if he knows that Torah-observant Jews recite blessings over food, and even if he knows that this is an obligation incumbent upon everyone, one should still give him food. The reason is that he is still considered under compulsion, for “he does not regard this as a real obligation.”

It is often argued with respect to many secular Jews that they are not tinokot shenishbu, since some of them know a little Jewish law. But in Igrot Moshe we see an important principle: knowing the information is no guarantee that the person is not under compulsion. What is required is also awareness of the personal obligation to observe the commandments. Even a professor of Jewish studies who knows all of Jewish law, down to every minor detail, but for whom it is merely an object of scholarly study about an ancient culture, can still be considered a tinok shenishba.

Conceptually this is certainly correct. Awareness of obligation is what matters, not possession of dry information. Someone who did not grow up in a Torah-observant home is almost always a tinok shenishba. He has virtually no serious initial basis for observing the commandments, regardless of how much information he has; therefore the fact that he does not observe them is a case of full compulsion. Hence, in my humble opinion, such a person does not belong to the realm of commandment-fulfillment or transgression at all.

This consideration raises many questions about contemporary discussions concerning our attitude toward secular Jews. Many cite various halakhic sources, but do not compare them to present-day reality.

We saw above, with respect to the consideration of ‘perhaps he entertained thoughts of repentance,’ that it is far from clear that this is applicable in our own time. Is there a reasonable concern that a person who grew up without even a spark of commitment to Judaism will suddenly repent while reciting a ritual, folkloristic blessing over food, or while putting on tefillin, or when called up to the Torah for his son’s ceremony in the synagogue? Even if so, it is not at all clear that this can be inferred directly from rabbinic sources that establish such presumptions. These are matters of assessing the human soul, and therefore they concern the evaluation of reality; and that changes in every generation according to time and place. The tinokot shenishbu discussed by Rav and Shmuel, or by Maimonides, were not regarded by them as truly under compulsion (at least regarding liability for a sin-offering). Is that true today as well? In our time, are they not at least like those who think the act is permitted, or like people acting under compulsion because of lack of information? Information about the obligation itself—or awareness of it—is relevant to this determination as well, and perhaps that factor was not so common in earlier generations. More generally, I would note that it is very difficult to relate to a secular person today as merely an unwitting sinner, whatever the reason may be that the Sages in the Talmud treated the tinok shenishba in that way[32].

Summary

We have proposed a halakhic direction according to which causing a Jew who does not believe to transgress does not involve the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’ The basis of the matter is not in the technical parameters of that prohibition, but in the fact that such a Jew is not someone to whom the category of transgression applies at all. The main reasons lie in the very possibility of such a Jew performing acts that have religious significance, and also in the fact that, in unwitting transgressions, what obligates is the lapse of awareness and not the act itself.

These claims are admittedly novel, but it seems that intuitive reasoning tends in their favor. Let the reader see and judge.

[1]    See, for example, the article by Rabbi Haim David Mimran, Tzohar 5.

[2]    Some discuss this from the standpoint of “Feed the wicked man and let him die,” that is, if someone is wicked and chooses to be a sinner, there is no prohibition against causing him to transgress. That discussion too concerns the parameters of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’ My assumption, in accordance with the overwhelming majority of halakhic decisors, is that the ordinary secular Jew is not ‘wicked’ (see the article by Rabbi Elisha Aviner, Tzohar 3, and others), and therefore that law does not apply to him.

[3]    Editor’s note: Something similar to this claim appears in the words of Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli (Amud HaYemini, p. 91), who wrote in explaining the Shakh: ‘In the case of an intentional sinner, there is no obligation to keep him away from sin unless it is in our power to prevent the transgression altogether; but if this is only in a one-time case, while on other occasions he will continue to persist in the transgression, there is no obligation at all to separate him from it…‘ However, he himself wrote (p. 101), in explaining the Tosafists on Shabbat 3a, s.v. ‘bava’: ‘Even toward those who have the status of apostates with respect to Sabbath desecration, there also exists… the commandment of rescue, and this too is rescue, namely that we reduce the sin.’

     The author’s response: The question of apostates is a different one, since they are generally regarded as intentional sinners, and therefore each of their transgressions is a full transgression (see below the quantitative consideration that we will briefly mention in the name of the Ran). Here we are dealing with unwitting sinners who are close to the category of compulsion; see further below.

[4]    See Sedei Chemed, Ma’arekhet Heh-Vav, sec. 26, subsec. 22, and Rabbi Weiss cited this as a supporting consideration in the article mentioned above. See also the book Lifnei Iver by Rabbi Yitzhak Eliyahu HaKohen Adler, Bnei Torah Publications, sec. 7. This is a very puzzling view, as Rabbi Weiss also notes, but it is nevertheless a good example of a formal exemption for the one who causes the stumbling even though his culpability is clear and complete, and even though a transgression was in fact committed.

[5]    The obligation to keep a person away from prohibition, even when I am not the one causing him to transgress. For its source, see Encyclopaedia Talmudit, entry ‘Afrushi MeIsura.’

[6]    See Encyclopaedia Talmudit, entry “Feed the wicked man and let him die.”

[7]    See, for example, Dibrot Moshe, Shabbat, sec. 2, and the above-mentioned Igrot Moshe, subsection 9.

[8]    In a case where that wicked person would perform an act that harms another person (such as murder), there is no doubt at all that we would be obligated to prevent it.

[9]    See the sources listed in the index volume of the Frankel edition on this law.

[10] According to this conception, it is difficult to understand why Maimonides says this specifically in the context of a resident alien. One may answer that such a situation is more likely to arise in the case of a resident alien than in the case of a Jew. In addition, the commandments of the resident alien—the seven Noahide commandments—are rational commandments. Precisely in commandments of that sort it is plausible that a person would fulfill them because reason dictates them. Perhaps one may therefore say that only in commandments of this type does Maimonides maintain that such a person belongs to the wise men of the nations of the world—that is, that his acts have moral value, even if not religious value.

[11] See Nachmanides in his glosses there.

[12] See the Bach and Mishnah Berurah, Orach Chayim sec. 475, subsec. 4.

     Is an opposite intention, or an intention not to fulfill one’s obligation, worse than the lack of intention of a secular person? There are arguments in both directions, but conceptually it seems to me that the secular person is worse.

[13] Igrot Moshe (Orach Chayim III, sec. 12) discusses a similar question.

     Another example concerns the pioneers, who were entirely foreign to anything holy, and therefore there is no basis for viewing them as fulfilling the commandment of settling the Land in the category of mit’asek—someone merely engaged in the act without relevant intention. Precisely in the case of a person who estranged himself from his duties and from tradition for various reasons, there is room to discuss whether his acts might indeed count as commandments, since he does know these matters and perhaps they are still relevant to him.

     This raises the question of the status of implicit faith. At first glance, one might say that every Jew is inwardly a believer, and therefore whenever a Jew fulfills a commandment he does so because of the hidden faith in his heart (indeed, that is precisely why some wanted to read Maimonides’ words above as applying only to a resident alien and not to a Jew).

     In my view, however, it is difficult to see room for such an interpretation, for commandments and laws are judged in the crucible of conscious awareness. No one can judge what lies in another person’s heart, and therefore it is not relevant to the halakhic meaning of those commandment-acts. A person’s actions should be judged only on the basis of his conscious intentions, and matters of the heart are not legally operative.

     See my article in Tzohar 22, where I argued that Religious Zionism examines things through the deep ideas that underlie them, and not through their concrete appearance. The same is true here as well.

[14] On the contrary, the very fact that they are not wicked but rather fully under compulsion strengthens the obligation to draw them close to Torah. They do not possess the knowledge needed in order to choose. And precisely because they are not wicked, our obligations toward them remain in force.

[15] Regarding the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ in relation to an apostate, see Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 151:6, and the above-mentioned book Lifnei Iver, near the end of p. 132. Even there, however, it seems that the discussion concerns our obligations toward them, whereas our discussion here concerns whether there is any act of transgression here at all (on the part of the secular person, whether he is caused to stumble or not). It is clear that from the standpoint of the prohibition against causing, the case of an apostate is easier than that of a secular Jew; but from the standpoint of the act of transgression, an apostate is more severe than a secular Jew, for the ordinary apostate knows his Master and rebels against Him, and an act of transgression certainly applies to him. By contrast, a tinok shenishba knows nothing, and therefore we suggest here that neither commandment-acts nor transgressive acts apply to him.

[16]    See, for example, the book Lifnei Iver, sec. 10, subsec. 1, and further below.

[17] The commentators already noted (see the sources cited in the Frankel edition’s index on that passage) that Maimonides himself wrote in Laws of Rebels 3:3 that captured children are like people under compulsion, and one who acts under compulsion is exempt from a sin-offering. It would seem, however, that his intention is that they are like people under compulsion, yet their acts nevertheless generate liability for a sin-offering.

[18] What about compulsion resulting from lack of knowledge? Here there is room to suggest two kinds of leniency: first, lack of knowledge itself is not a transgression. Second, even if lack of knowledge is a transgression, the act is not considered his act, since he is under compulsion with respect to it. The decisors, however, disagree regarding liability for a sin-offering in a case of compulsion caused by lack of knowledge, and Maimonides himself contains enormous contradictions on this matter (see Laws of Oaths 3:11 and 1:13, where it emerges that one who says ‘it is permitted’ is exempt from a sacrifice; by contrast, Laws of Terumot 5:8 implies that such a person is like an intentional sinner; while here, in Laws of Unintentional Sins 2:6 and 7:2, it seems that he is like an unwitting sinner liable for a sacrifice; and in Laws of Rebels 3:3 it seems that a tinok shenishba is like one under compulsion; while in Laws of Murderer 6:10 he wrote that such a person is not considered unwitting for the purpose of exile). This is not the place to elaborate.

[19] Still, it is not clear why such a child’s lack of knowledge is not full compulsion (especially according to those opinions among the decisors that lack of knowledge, where it was impossible to know, is itself compulsion. For this indeed one needs ‘a master physician,’ in the words of Chavot Yair cited above). Was that child supposed to know that there is a Torah and commandments, and to go learn them on his own? Perhaps all of this is only a special law in the area of sin-offerings; as regards being considered offenders, however, they are under compulsion in every respect.

     Well known in this context are the words of Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Ma’amarim, who writes that every gentile ought to know that such a wondrous world, once created, must have a purpose; therefore there is a claim against him that he should have gone out to investigate the purpose of the world and to learn the seven Noahide commandments. All of this is very forced indeed.

[20] Later authorities inferred from Maimonides’ wording in Laws of Unintentional Sins that a tinok shenishba must bring a sin-offering for every type of transgression found in the Torah. This is puzzling, for who says that he in fact committed every such transgression? As we have seen, one must actually perform the transgressive act in order to become liable; lack of knowledge alone is not enough. In Maginei Shlomo (Shabbat 68b), it was explained that there is a presumption that over the course of his life he committed every category of transgression at least once. According to this, there would be no room at all for concern about causing him to transgress, since the presumption is that he already committed it and is already liable for his lack of knowledge. This is exactly our point above.

     In practice, however, this is very difficult. Why should we assume that every such person ate blood or forbidden fat? What if he is a vegetarian? (Indeed, in the book Shabbat Shel Mi, Shabbat 68b, on Tosafot s.v. ‘ve-hayyav,’ the author cites Maginei Shlomo and rejects his view.) Therefore, if I may dare to say so, I would suggest a novel explanation in Maimonides, and in my view it is conceptually sound. We saw that sin-offering liability comes for lack of knowledge. But the lack of knowledge of a tinok shenishba is really one thing: ignorance of the very obligation to observe commandments at all. For an ordinary person who is unaware of several prohibitions, we treat each lack of knowledge as a separate error. But for a tinok shenishba, the lack of knowledge has a single root, as noted above. Theoretically, one should therefore obligate him to bring only one sin-offering for all the transgressions he committed, since only one item of knowledge was absent from him (like a case in which the Sabbath itself was forgotten and he committed the same transgression several times). See Shabbat Shel Mi there, who cites this in the name of Maginei Shlomo and agrees with him on this point, and also Dibrot Moshe there.

     But as a matter of law we rule that he is liable to a sin-offering for every type of transgression. The explanation is found in Dibrot Moshe on Shabbat 68: this lapse is regarded as though he did not know all the prohibitions, since they stand as separate categories. The fundamental ignorance is one, but in the end all the commandments were hidden from him. By contrast, one from whom only a single commandment was hidden, and who violated it several times, has only one lapse even on the level of application.

     But if indeed all these lapses have one root, then the fact that he committed many transgressions of various kinds is enough to make him liable for all his ignorances together, a sin-offering for every type. He stands guilty of not knowing the entire Torah, and therefore he is liable for each category of transgression, even though it is not clear that he actually violated them all. All of this is a major novelty and requires further analysis.

[21] For a related issue, see the dispute among the medieval authorities in Yoma regarding slaughter for a sick person on the Sabbath—whether it is preferable to slaughter for him, which is one severe prohibition, or to feed him non-kosher food, which involves many lighter prohibitions. See also the discussion of Mahari Engel in Lekach Tov, sec. 15, where he asks whether quality outweighs quantity or not; he opens with that dispute. See also note 9 in my book Two Wagons and a Hot Air Balloon. All these sources deal with the relation between quality and quantity. Here we are dealing with a somewhat different question: does a small quantitative increase count as causing a transgression, or must every transgression involve an additional qualitative element rather than merely a quantitative increase? See the editor’s note above (n. 3), from Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, and my response there.

[22] See Rabbi Weiss there, and the book Lifnei Iver, sec. 5.

[23] Afikei Yam (II, secs. 5-6) discusses the nature of sin-offering liability and proves that, according to most views, the rule that one brings only one sin-offering is not a law in the offerings themselves but in the transgressions—that one who commits two transgressions in one lapse of awareness has committed only one transgression. Seemingly, this is exactly our point. His formulation there, however, is that the two acts combine into one act, not that the liability is for the lapse of awareness. Some of his proofs do indeed point in that direction (for example, the Ran in Nedarim 17a and the Ritva in Makkot 20a), and others do not.

     We should note that even according to his formulation there is still room for our view, because repeated causation would still amount, in the end, to one act of transgression, and therefore there is no added transgression. Admittedly, according to that formulation there would be room to discuss causing by way of increased quantity, but above I cited the views of decisors who are lenient in that regard (Rabbi Feinstein, and the Ritva himself, who is the author of the approach cited in Afikei Yam).

[24] It seems that Rabbi Sternbuch is dealing here only with the aspect of causing the stumbling. He did not claim that no transgression exists; rather, what concerns him is the inviter’s own transgression of causing it. As to that, he argued that if the invitation benefits the guest, then the invitation is not an act of causing. In other words, there is a stumbling block into which the guest fell, but the inviter is not a wrongdoer and is not regarded as the one who pushed him into it (something like the case of ‘do not place a stumbling block’ through speech, mentioned above; there too there is failure, but no formal act of causing). Once again we see a perspective focused only on the one who causes the stumbling, with disregard for the other aspects—namely, the multiplication of transgressions and the duty of ‘afrushi me-isura.’ We will shortly suggest an explanation that resolves that difficulty as well.

[25] A similar objection may be raised against all the cases brought by Rabbi Fodor in the article cited above, in which we commit a minor transgression in order to prevent a major one (see also the book Lifnei Iver, sec. 20). Here, however, there is not even any certainty that future transgressions are being prevented; on the contrary, the likelihood is quite small.

[26] Beyond all this, it is entirely plausible that this trip would simply replace some other trip of no value, so that one is merely changing the destination rather than causing Sabbath desecration as such. This consideration indicates that there is no problem here of ‘afrushi me-isura,’ but at most an issue of ‘do not place a stumbling block’—that is, a problem on the side of the one causing, who brought about the transgression, but not a duty to prevent the transgression of the one caused. But where one acts for the other’s benefit, there is no ‘do not place a stumbling block’ either, and therefore it is permitted.

[27] They assume that the discussion turns on whether the act is for the other’s benefit or not, within the framework of the prohibition of ‘do not place a stumbling block.’ See there the practical ramifications of that assumption (for example, at the end of subsection 5 in Igrot Moshe).

[28] As we noted above, there are considerations according to which a tinok shenishba is more deficient than a heretic or an apostate (with respect to the relevance of commandments, transgressions, and intentions), and there are considerations according to which he is less severe than they are (with respect to his wickedness and our obligations toward him).

[29] See Rashi and Nachmanides at the beginning of Parashat Mattot, and Maimonides at the end of the Laws of Kilayim, regarding one who clothes his fellow in a forbidden mixture, and many other sources. It is not entirely clear, however, that the source of this law is ‘do not place a stumbling block.’ Neither Rashi nor Maimonides mentions that prohibition in this context. In any event, for our purposes it is important only that a halakhic prohibition of this sort exists, regardless of its source.

[30] This still leaves the rule that ‘we do not tell a person: sin, so that your fellow may benefit,’ but that is not our topic here.

[31] See Maimonides there and the parallel sources.

[32] See in this connection also my response to Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun’s article in Akdamot 11.