Q&A: The Attributes Derived from the Proofs
The Attributes Derived from the Proofs
Question
With God’s help,
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to know how the Rabbi sees the descriptions of the Holy One, blessed be He, that emerge from the cosmological and physicotheological proofs (and also from morality, etc.).
Are those attributes attributes of His essence, or attributes of action?
After all, if they are attributes of His essence, then that is a problem, because they violate the unity of the Creator.
And if they are attributes of His actions, then how can one infer from this that we need revelation?
Answer
Hello Moshiko.
First, I do not see any fundamental difference between these two types of attributes. Kant already taught us that every attribute is only in the phenomenon, that is, in the being as it is perceived by us and not in the thing in itself. Colors, sounds, shapes—all of them are concepts that exist only in our consciousness and not in the world as it is in itself. Therefore, when I describe the Holy One, blessed be He, with any attribute whatsoever—not only attributes of action—I am referring to my perception of Him, not to Him Himself. What goes on in Him Himself? I do not know. It is possible that that utterly simple essence can be perceived by us in multiple ways. When one looks at Him morally, one sees in Him the source of moral validity; when one reflects on the creation of the world, one sees in Him the Creator of the world; and when one contemplates Him ontologically, one sees in Him the perfect being.
Second, I do not know where the assumption of unity in this sense came from (that we are speaking of a simple essence without a multiplicity of descriptions). I can think of several arguments in its favor, but I am far from convinced that it is correct. The fact that Maimonides or any other thinker arrived at the conclusion that this seemed logical to him does not make it, in my view, a principle of faith. Personally, I do not see any problem with saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, is both perfect, and the Creator of the world, and its planner and assembler, and also the source of moral commands. What is the problem with that?
And third, beyond all this, these are not really attributes at all. These are His functions, not descriptions of what He Himself is (by the way, in my opinion these are not even attributes of action. They are not attributes at all). You may ask: if so, why did I write the previous two paragraphs? Because they are true and important, even if not for this issue.
Discussion on Answer
I did not understand the question.
How can you make assumptions about what will happen if you have no understanding at all of the essence of the thing? Seems to me the question is simple.
You can predict future processes only if you know the thing, no?
I think he means: if we have no grasp of God’s essence, how can we say that He has a purpose in creation and from that expect revelation, and believe in such a revelation when it reaches me (by virtue of the fact that I expect His revelation)?
I do not understand why I need to know Him in order to assume that if He wants something from me, He has to tell me that.
In addition, this is not some conclusion hanging in midair. A tradition reached me that there was a revelation, so this is not an a priori expectation. That tradition fits with the conclusion that if the Creator wants something from me, He has to tell me so.
The Rabbi wrote in the fifth notebook, if I remember correctly, on pages 17-18,
that after we see that God created the world, designed it, and laid down within it the laws of morality—we assume that He wants something from us, and therefore He needs to tell us.
(I do not dispute that if we assume He wants something from us, then revelation is required; I dispute the assumption that He wants something from human beings.)
And I do not understand how one can suppose that God wants something from us if we do not know Him?!
[By contrast, regarding the question of why God killed so many creatures during evolution, and why it was such an unproductive process, the Rabbi answers that we do not know His essence.]
After all, only after the assumption that God wants something from the world and from us can we reach the conclusion that revelation is required, and consequently that Judaism is true. But without that information, we have no interest in believing in revelation.
As I explained, revelation comes to us through tradition. The a priori argument is only an accompaniment to that tradition.
Beyond that, if X does something, then he apparently wants something from it. You do not need to know X in order to infer that.
The evolutionary leftovers—that is a completely different question, and I explained it there. First, that is apparently a necessary result of the laws of nature. Second, I argued that if I see that He acts differently from what I think, then apparently His mindset is different. But the proof from complexity still stands regardless of the question of how His mind works. And third, regarding the evolutionary leftovers, even if we assume that this was His choice and not a necessary result of the laws of nature, I see that He acts differently from what I would do, and therefore there the conclusion is called for that His mindset is different. But in situations I have not seen, there is no reason to assume that.
I think that this a priori argument is not only not merely an accompaniment to tradition (certainly not in the way you present it in the notebook), but rather the foundation for tradition, a kind of the King of Khazar’s dream (as you wrote in the notebook).
Also,
I think the statement, “if X does something, then he apparently wants something from it. You do not need to know X in order to infer that,”
comes very close to gross anthropomorphism. After all, the deistic God is completely different from a body as we know it from experience.
I would be glad to know why the Rabbi thinks otherwise.
P.S.
Does the Rabbi think that if one accepts the teleological proof, then the understanding that God wants something from the world increases significantly?
I wrote what I had to write. In my opinion everything is clear and simple, and I do not see what there is to add here.
Moshiko is not claiming that this refutes the proof, but that it refutes the foundation on which trust in our tradition is based. That trust is based also on knowledge of God’s existence and that He wants something from human beings.
I understand. And I explained why, in my opinion, that is not correct.
Thanks for the quick response 🙂
Indeed, I can understand what you wrote regarding Maimonides.
Just, I think you did not answer the end of my question.
Assuming that attributes exist only in our consciousness (actions, etc.) and not in the objective essence—
then how can one infer from that understanding that we need revelation?