Q&A: Regarding Presumptions
Regarding Presumptions
Question
With God’s help,
In the yeshiva where I study, we are currently dealing with a Talmudic passage concerning coercion in a condition related to a bill of divorce. The passage appears in Tractate Ketubot 2b. The passage connects to a similar discussion in Tractate Nedarim, if I remember correctly on 27a, where the Mishnah deals with someone who is forbidden by vow unless he comes to eat, and an unavoidable circumstance occurred that prevented the person bound by the vow from arriving for the meal, so he is exempt because of the coercion. The Ran and other medieval authorities explain the law as being because he did not vow with that in mind, that is, on the basis of a presumption. Can it be said that such a presumption is a kind of additional unstated condition: that if an uncommon unavoidable circumstance occurs, the condition is nullified, and the nullification of the condition is basically just the fulfillment of that unstated condition?
Answer
Simply speaking, every presumption is an implied condition. So too with regard to a mistaken transaction, and considerations of “with this in mind” in buying and selling.
See my remarks here:
Discussion on Answer
With God’s help,
I apologize if this comment was sent again; the comment simply didn’t appear on my computer. In any case, what I meant to ask in response to the Rabbi’s answer is: according to this, according to the Ran, would there never really be an exemption of coercion in a condition, a vow, and the like, but only fulfillment of the condition? And are there medieval authorities who do hold that the exemption is an exemption of coercion and that the condition is entirely nullified? In Rashi this can be understood that way, but I wanted to confirm it through additional sources.
I hope I understood the question. The Ran says that he did not vow with that in mind, and therefore the condition is not nullified in itself, but rather qualified in a case where he was coerced. But if he was not coerced, the condition remains in force, and the divorce depends on his coming. According to the other medieval authorities, who do not make this depend on a presumption, this is an exemption of coercion. As far as I remember, at least in the passage about coercion in bills of divorce, that is the view of almost all the medieval authorities in Ketubot there, so I didn’t understand what sources you are looking for. For example, Maimonides’ view, in his remarkable approach (as the Maggid Mishneh describes it), is that if the person who made the condition died within twelve months—so that it is clear the condition will in fact be fulfilled, namely that he will not come—one must still wait until the end, and only then was she permitted to remarry. It is proven from here that according to his view the condition definitely remains in place, and the exemption is only an exemption of coercion, and that is also the accepted practice. Likewise, the entire discussion in the Jerusalem Talmud about “coercion is not like someone who acted” (with the variant readings between Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan) assumes that we are dealing with an exemption of coercion.
Many thanks. Just to note that in the Tosafot HaRosh on the page, it also seems to come out like the Ran’s view.
With God’s help,
According to this, can one say that in every case of coercion regarding a condition and the like, according to the Ran, there would not be an exemption on the basis of coercion, since everything depends on the condition? And are there medieval authorities who hold that the exemption regarding a condition is an exemption of coercion, and that the condition is completely nullified as a result? In Rashi one might perhaps understand it this way, but can this be confirmed by additional opinions?