Answer

I don’t recall having written anything systematic about the learning of the topic of stipulations and their rules. But I didn’t understand what the problem is. In the accepted approach, we learn from the stipulation of the sons of Gad both the concept of stipulations and also the rules of stipulations. Seemingly, without that there would be no stipulations in the Torah at all, since this is a novelty, and the rules of stipulations are treated under the principle that you apply a novelty only to its specific case. When someone makes a stipulation without the formal rules of stipulation, then the stipulation is void but the act remains valid, and that is like making a stipulation without the Torah’s novel rule regarding stipulations.
Indeed, there are other approaches as well (for example, Rabbenu Tam in Tosafot Yeshanim, who disagrees with Rabbi Isaac in Ketubot 75 regarding one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah), and there are also those who distinguish between the different rules of stipulation themselves. For example, regarding a double stipulation, there are opinions that it is not learned from the stipulation of the sons of Gad, but rather follows from the principle that from a positive statement you cannot infer the negative. As is well known, Rabbi Chaim made a distinction here between two different laws.
But what is the problem with this picture?
.