Q&A: In Talmud Study
In Talmud Study
Question
Lately I’ve started wondering about the analogies and a fortiori arguments in the Talmud, and especially about gezerah shavah. It seems like there isn’t any consistent parallel line from one place to another. There are things the Torah states explicitly and spells out in detail, and on the other hand there are things that are only hinted at by a word with the same root that appears elsewhere. Aren’t there dozens more places where similar words are written, one resembling another, and yet we did not make a gezerah shavah between them simply because we weren’t forced to answer any question? Does this concept function as a kind of default solution for difficult questions?
Answer
Hello,
The question of the interpretive principles is difficult and complicated, and not entirely clear to us. But it seems to me obvious that this is not a mathematical technique—that is, not every case of two identical words leads to a comparison. It is a broad and complex system of considerations, and reasoning is definitely one of them.
Michael Chernick, in his book on gezerah shavah, argues that the early gezerah shavah derivations were made only between pairs of words that are unique in the Hebrew Bible. Later this was expanded.
As I recall, there is a good treatment of the subject of these exegetical derivations in Rabbi Shmuel Ariel’s book Neta Betokhenu, especially in volume 2 (though not only there).
Discussion on Answer
Not really, Mr. Point, because after all there are still disputes about what that gezerah shavah is meant for, etc.—a matter that pushes all this dispute many more steps forward, and branches out a great deal. Which isn’t necessarily within our ability.
Point,
I really don’t understand this topic, but you’re assuming that all the rules have to be used all at once.
And that the source has no additional value. Think it through carefully.
No. I assume that if there were rules for learning Torah, they would be written in the Torah.
To say that there are rules for learning Torah that are not written in the Torah is equivalent to denying the Torah and believing in rules.
To believe someone who tells you that he knows something that is not written in the Torah is equivalent to denying the Torah and believing that person. It’s very simple and obvious.
At most, one can say that these rules by which the Torah is interpreted are a kind of midrash. Then there’s no need to raise objections. I can accept that. The problem is when people take the midrash on the Torah as prior to the Torah itself.
Fine, so I deny the Torah and believe in rules. What’s wrong with that? Is there a commandment not to deny the Torah?
There is reward and punishment.
If there were rules by which the Torah is interpreted, we would simply take the Torah, apply the rules, take the result, and throw the now-superfluous source into the trash.