What does it mean that it is accepted by us that the Holy One, blessed be He, is good? How is that different from the claim that it is accepted by us that the Holy One, blessed be He, answers prayers and watches over each individual? (The craziest thing is that there’s still someone who believes in those strange things after the Holocaust. Yes, yes… I know all the excuses that reconcile individual and general providence with what happened then in Europe, but as the Rabbi nicely wrote, all those “reconciliations” turn the above dogmas into claims that have nothing whatsoever to do with reality. Someone who believes them has no way to get feedback from reality in order to update his beliefs.)

Reality does not show that He is not good, and I’ve explained this in several places. Just now there was a short thread about it:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%9b%d7%99%d7%a4%d7%95%d7%a8-%d7%a9%d7%9C-%d7%94%d7%90%d7%9C%d7%95%d7%94%D7%99%D7%9D
If you accept the Torah, it says that He is good and cares for us. Reality does not show otherwise, in my opinion. So there is a conflict, and one must find a resolution for it. The Torah indeed says that He exercises providence, but there one can argue that the policy changes (and we see this in open miracles and in prophecies), which is not plausible regarding His character (He does not stop being good). Therefore the “it is accepted by us” regarding providence has no basis, whereas regarding His goodness it does have a basis.

What does the Rabbi think about Maimonides’ negative theology in the context of the Holy One’s goodness? Is God’s goodness in the same sense as human goodness?

A. The Rabbi wrote that if one accepts the Torah, one accepts God’s goodness. I assume the Torah is the source for the Rabbi’s assumption that He is good. On the other hand, there is a lot in the Torah about God’s burning anger. We see that there are two kinds, and not only goodness. (By the way, “preserving kindness for thousands” is still in force in our time and hasn’t expired yet, right?)
B. The Rabbi wrote that it is more plausible that policy changes and not character. Let’s set character aside and talk, for our purposes, about His policy toward benefiting His creatures. That is the issue, not His character. (Character in the sense of a trait. The trait “good” means bestowing good. Upon whom? Upon Himself? I have no idea whether God does good to Himself or not. As opposed to His bestowal of good toward us.) Even if it is plausible that His character has not changed (what exactly is the basis of that reasoning?!?!) still, the policy of benefiting can certainly change.
C. At the beginning of Avot: “Moses received the Torah from Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua,” etc. The commentators wrote that this comes to tell you that even ethical teachings originate at Sinai. Do you doubt this, even though it is the answer that makes the most sense (or does the Rabbi have a better plain-sense reading?) to the very legitimate and troubling question why, specifically at the beginning of Avot, we chose to note the chain of transmission of the Torah?

David, His goodness is an action-attribute. It is what He does in the world.

A,
A. It comes not only from the Torah, but also from the fact that He implanted within us the desire to do good and the commitment to morality. See the Fourth Notebook, part 3.
B. There is no reason to assume that He stops doing good, and I also do not see that He stops. So there is no reason at all to say that. I understand this is connected to the previous question here in the thread—is it you writing them under a different nickname?
C. A better plain-sense reading in Pirkei Avot? Even if I don’t have one, that really doesn’t matter. There is excellent evidence that morality is binding even before the revelation at Sinai (“Where is Abel your brother?”). But there are certainly other interpretations. Even if I accept the connection made to the description of the chain of tradition, your point does not necessarily follow. After all, even regarding several laws given to Moses at Sinai, some medieval authorities wrote that the meaning is that they should be related to as though they were given at Sinai, not that this is actually so. If so, what they wanted to say is that morality is binding as if it were given at Sinai, even though that is not actually the case. But even the connection you made is not necessary. The fact that they mentioned the tradition was to teach you the tradition. In all the other mishnayot, do you understand exactly why the statements were brought where they were brought? The connections are associative and of other kinds, and not always based on content. So in my view this is a homiletic interpretation that is neither necessary nor plausible.