Q&A: Sabbath Labors
Sabbath Labors
Question
The principle is that prohibited labor on the Sabbath is intentional, constructive labor.
There are cases where we find that if someone intended to perform a labor but it was not completed in full, even though in terms of his own actions he did everything he could, it is still considered a labor and we do not require the result to occur; and there are cases where the result is indispensable. What is the difference?
For example, in baking, as long as the bread has not baked he has not violated the prohibition of baking, and if he removed the loaf from the oven he has done nothing at all (on the Torah level; Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 4a). Likewise, regarding the labor of carrying out, it is explained in the Mishnah in Shabbat 102a that if he threw an object and another person caught it, or alternatively, in the Talmud there in Rava’s view, if he threw it and after the throw remembered that it was the Sabbath, he is not considered an inadvertent transgressor even though he can no longer do anything, and the placement comes about through his force (as with someone who causes damage by shooting an arrow).
It would seem, then, that in carrying out, as long as the labor was not completed, even though the person did everything he could do in this intentional labor, he is not liable, just as with removing the bread from the oven.
But in sowing, where the very act of placing the seed in the ground is the prohibition, and even if he later takes the seed out he is still liable—how is that different from baking, and from throwing in a case where he has no way to stop the object he threw? And what difference does it make if another person caught it? (That should be like a broken vessel with regard to the Sabbath prohibition.) Or alternatively, if he remembered that it is forbidden (according to Rava’s view)?
Another practical difference besides what was mentioned: in a case where he placed the bread near the end of the Sabbath, and the baking would only be completed after the Sabbath, would he then not be liable? And similarly, hypothetically, if he threw something on the Sabbath and it came to rest after the Sabbath?
Answer
As far as I remember, the Eglei Tal discusses this at length. In general, cooking is an unusual labor, because you do not really do anything. You place a pot on the fire or light a fire under the pot. The cooking happens on its own. Therefore, there we require the act to be completed in order to make you liable; otherwise, in truth nothing happened here at all. The labor of cooking is the result, except that there is a condition for making you liable: that you were the one who caused it. (This is a case of indirect causation as labor, like winnowing where the wind assists him.) In contrast, with sowing there is room to discuss it. On the face of it, it is the same thing, but one can distinguish and say that in sowing the definition of the labor may be the very placing of the seed in its place of growth, while the sprouting is only a condition. The proof is that the sprouting can happen after the Sabbath, and when it occurs that shows that the placement in the ground was the prohibited labor. By contrast, in cooking the result must be obtained on the Sabbath, and that shows that the labor is the result and the placement is only the condition.
Discussion on Answer
After all, if it comes to rest after the Sabbath he would be exempt, so it is clear that this is not like sowing.
Thank you.
Meaning, in the labor of carrying out as well, the placement is an indispensable condition, even in the case of throwing where he no longer has any way to stop what he set in motion? (Just clarifying.)