Q&A: Cooking by the Sun and Regarding Meat and Milk
Cooking by the Sun and Regarding Meat and Milk
Question
Hello and blessings.
It is stated in the Talmud that cooking by the sun is permitted, and Rashi wrote that it is not the normal way for people to cook. And Maimonides wrote that with meat and milk, if one cooked them by the sun, he is exempt.
Seemingly, I can understand this regarding the Sabbath, where the rule of purposeful labor is said, and that is a rule about the act and not the result. But regarding meat and milk, it is the very creation of cooked meat and milk, so why should I care how it was done? And similarly regarding cooking the Passover offering, it is said that in the hot springs of Tiberias one would be exempt. And seemingly the Torah prohibited cooking—why should I care how he cooks it?
Answer
Two comments:
- The concept of purposeful labor does not necessarily mean that the law is about the action and not the result. Some understood it דווקא to mean that the prohibition is on the result. Simply speaking, it is a requirement that the result stem from the action in an intentional way (therefore Rashi on Bava Kamma 60a holds one liable for indirect causation on the Sabbath). This is not the definition of the prohibition but a side requirement.
- Even when the law focuses on the result, we still find exemptions because of the manner in which the action was carried out. That is because the manner of execution defines my responsibility for the result. Admittedly, this is more plausible in cases of unintentional action and indirect causation, because there the manner of execution relates to the degree of connection between me and the result. But cooking in an unusual manner or with a deviation does not seem like a parameter that defines the degree of connection between me and the thing. I think the exemption for a deviation is because even if the purpose of the prohibition is the result, the prohibition still applies to my action that creates the result. The purpose is the reason for the verse and not the definition of the prohibition. Therefore one should not derive halakhic conclusions from the purposes of the prohibition, but only from its definition. For example, the purpose of the commandment to be fruitful and multiply is that I have children. And still, it is possible that the definition of the commandment is about the action and not the result (because the result is not in my hands).
Discussion on Answer
1. I mean that the result was the original goal of the action. As opposed to dragging a bench in a case of unintentional action, where the result was not the original goal of the action (even though the action certainly caused it). Therefore, in indirect causation, although a normal direct act is missing, since this was the plan from the outset (like winnowing, where the wind assists him), it is considered purposeful labor.
2. One suggestion: there is logic in setting fixed concepts in Jewish law. And if cooking by the sun, or cooking in an unusual manner, is not considered cooking for several purposes, then that is how it is defined for all purposes. A second suggestion: even in cooking, the result is not in my hands—only the action is. I light the fire and place the dish on it. The cooking is a result of the natural order of the world. Therefore Jewish law defines the prohibition or the commandment on the basis of my action and not on the basis of the result. The result is only the reason for the verse.
By the way, in any case where we do not derive law from the reason for the verse, you can ask why they set the definition differently from the reason. My assumption here is that we do not derive law from the reason for the verse, even though the reason is correct.
1. What do you mean by “in an intentional way”? In terms of the person's intention? Because insofar as it produced a prohibited result, that was intentional. Or do you mean from the perspective of how others view the act I am doing?
2. That is a correct distinction. With being fruitful and multiplying, I understand that it cannot be defined in terms of the result, but insofar as it is possible to define it closer to the reason for the verse, why did the Sages make a definition that includes as much of the reason as possible?