Q&A: The Ontological Argument
The Ontological Argument
Question
Hi.
From browsing the site, I understood that basically you accept the ontological argument, even if not as a certain proof.
Am I right?
If so, I’d be glad to hear your opinion on the criticism of this argument, and also your view of my response to that criticism.
The criticism is that the ontological argument is circular, because it assumes that God is a logically and metaphysically necessary being, and from that derives His existence.
My response:
The “accusation” that the ontological argument is circular is correct, except that there is no problem with circularity when it is attributed to an infinite being that is necessary by its very essence, like God. Whoever denies God that necessity is not addressing the concept at all in its accepted meaning.
That’s a bit rough, broadly speaking.
What do you think?
Answer
This criticism is incorrect, because the argument does not assume that; rather, it defines God that way, and from the definition it derives His existence. And that makes all the difference.
I do not accept your response (which is unnecessary), because the rules of logic apply to every object of our thought, including God.
Discussion on Answer
I am not inclined to accept the argument, because the assumption that the concept of an existing entity is more complete than the concept of that same entity when it does not exist seems problematic to me. But if you add that assumption, then the argument is indeed valid (there are other additions too, and I discussed them in my analysis of the argument).
But the claim of circularity is absurd, and I explained why. Circularity is when an argument assumes the conclusion (what is to be proven). Here there is no circularity at all, because there is no assumption. This argument is what Kant called an ontological argument, that is, an argument without assumptions. One starts from the definition of an entity and arrives by inference at the claim that it exists.
Only if the critic means to say that there is question-begging here by the very fact that the argument is valid—well, of course I accept that. But that is true of every valid argument, so it is not interesting.
The ontological argument is not valid, because one can conceive only of an entity than which none greater can be conceived if it exists, but not of an entity than which none greater can be conceived even if it does not exist.
In my humble opinion, one can refresh the attack on the ontological argument by the way of an island with a diameter of 23 pi.
For according to the ontological argument, one can conceive of an island with a diameter of 23 pi, and an island that does not exist does not have a diameter of 23 pi, and from this it follows that such an island indeed exists.
I tend to think that the ontological argument is correct precisely because it succeeds in exposing a necessary connection between the “assumption” (a factual claim about the world) and the “definition” (a formal claim that is true by virtue of its wording).
I think that anyone who understands the definition of God is, willy-nilly, assuming that such a definition is possible in the first place because of the real existence of such a reality. Otherwise, there would be no meaning at all even to the definition of the concept “God.”
And in other words: the concept of God is an anomaly (compared to other concepts—with or without a real counterpart in the world) in which logic is conditioned by ontology.
Amen!!!
Doron, you think the ontological argument is correct דווקא because it claims that one can conceive of something that would have certain properties even if it does not exist—you’re sure?
You could skip that step and just say outright that God exists precisely because there are no proofs for it.
1. I didn’t understand your answer to the first question. Do you basically accept the ontological argument?
2. Suppose you’re right and this is a matter of defining God that way (and not an “assumption” of His existence).
It seems to me that the critic would respond that there is indeed still a problem of circularity here, and therefore the whole argument fails.
What is your answer to that?