Q&A: Why Not Berkeley?
Why Not Berkeley?
Question
Hello Rabbi, I read your book Truth and Unstable and enjoyed it.
The book deals with the question of the validity of our axioms (the fact that this is our logic does not mean that the world is indeed like that — “the world doesn’t owe you anything,” etc.). As I understand it, your answer is that our axioms, through synthetic perception, draw close to the sensory world because, כביכול, we see them with the mind’s eye. At a certain point you part ways with Berkeley, who cast doubt even on sensory reliability, and say that most people are not bothered by that kind of skepticism.
I wanted to ask: what is the justification for basing our entire world of logic on the senses? After all, seemingly the senses too can be challenged, and one could say that our reliance on them stems from our logic and not from any actual justification.
And if so, I did not understand what the whole move of the book helped, if in the end a person must admit that he has no justification for the very beginning of our world of cognition.
And simply put, why does Berkeley’s skepticism not bother you?
I hope I was clear.
Thank you very much
Answer
I didn’t understand what it means to base logic on the senses. I did not base logic on the senses. I based the premises of logical arguments on eidetic perception.
It is true that I have no justification for first principles, but a justification for first principles is an oxymoron. If they have a justification, then they are not first principles. Your assumption is that there must be a justification for something (that is, an argument of which that thing is the conclusion) in order for it to be acceptable, but that assumption itself has no justification. It is self-evident, and that is that.