Question

Hello Rabbi,
I very much enjoyed the first book in your trilogy. But one significant issue still remained unclear to me: at the beginning of your book, and more generally at the foundation of your approach, you argue that intuitions, which are a mode of cognition that is not direct observation, are the basis of all science and rational thought. Therefore they are an integral part of the rational sphere.
On the other hand, in your discussion of the theological proofs from epistemology and morality, you argue that one cannot both be an atheist and trust epistemology or moral judgment—and still remain rational. But I do not understand why. After all, trust in epistemology and morality is among the most basic human intuitions (at least in the plain or statistical sense: apparently even more so than belief in God). If so, why do they need justification at all in order to be rational?
True, it is correct that morality has no reasonable meaning without God, and therefore belief in morality necessarily means belief in a Creator. But regarding the argument from epistemology: an atheist can argue that his most basic intuition gives him trust in it, and although the probability that a world would randomly come into being in such a way that one could trust it is almost zero, it still exists according to everyone, and his intuition teaches him that this is the kind of world we are in. Why does he need to add further justification to that? Indeed, one can argue that if this is such a world, then it is more reasonable that God created it than that it came about by chance—but then we have once again returned to an inferential argument (which one can oppose despite its plausibility) and not a revealing argument.
 
Thanks,
Uriel