Q&A: Intuition and the Categories of Thought
Intuition and the Categories of Thought
Question
I saw a point in Notebook 0 on faith / belief that bothered me a bit. You go on at length there explaining that belief in God, even if it cannot be observed or logically proven, is no less reliable than the certainty we have in the sciences. You explain there that in science too (as in faith / belief) there is extensive use of intuition, for example in inductive inference and in identifying causal relations, and that intuition is not a subjective feeling that can easily be dismissed. What I didn’t really understand is the heavy use of the concept of intuition in this context. As I understand it, there are two claims being mixed together here. There are the categories of thought through which we recognize reality, among them causality, induction (and even earlier concepts like the concept of an “entity” and the concept of “matter”), and indeed these categories too cannot be proven; rather, they are the forms through which we cognize reality. Even so, I have never seen anywhere that recognition / acceptance of the categories of thought belongs under the concept of intuition. As far as I understand, the concept of intuition comes to describe an ability to make true claims even when the person making them cannot provide an empirical or logical justification for the claim (and one must search for such a justification), and intuition can also include the ability to assess the validity of various hypotheses, and more. In any case, in my opinion one should distinguish between intuition and the categories of thought, even though neither can be logically proven (quite the opposite: we base proofs on the categories of thought).
Answer
You are assuming Kant, but in my opinion both of you are mistaken. Contrary to Kant, in my view the validity of causality and induction does not come from their being our a priori categories of thought; rather, these are true claims about reality that we know by means of intuition (and not through empirical experience). I elaborated on this in Truth and Stability and Two Carts.
Discussion on Answer
Indeed, that is my right, and that is indeed what I did. A reader is supposed to follow a text in light of the definitions offered in it, not in light of definitions he brings from elsewhere. Beyond that, I am not defining but making a claim. My claim is that intuition is not thinking but cognition.
As for Kant, you are mistaken (because in his view this is thought), but I have already explained this elsewhere and won’t repeat it here again.
I hadn’t planned to respond to these things (I offered, as a reader, a suggestion for improvement; I did not come to argue with you), but after browsing the responsa on the site I felt a need to put my feeling in writing, and I hope you’ll forgive me for my great impertinence.
My impression is that when people ask you questions, you respond more or less to the point, but the moment they comment on / criticize things you wrote, you respond briefly and impatiently, while dismissing the point retroactively, and usually your response doesn’t really answer the comment / criticism, to the point that I really don’t understand why you bother responding at all. If you see no need to defend your words, or think the comment is foolish, what is the point of responding with a half-substantive reply? In my opinion, no response is preferable to a partial one.
An inability to accept criticism is a very problematic thing, and I can’t understand where it comes from in your case, but from a whole collection of your responses to comments / criticisms (not questions!), I have become convinced that you suffer from an inability to accept criticism, and in my opinion that is really a shame. It is evident that you want your views to influence others, and when they comment on / criticize your work, you really hold them in contempt, whereas any serious book author would be happy—and would even ask—to receive comments on his words, both in order to correct them and in order to write more clearly so that the general public can understand them (not everything that is clear to you from your words is clear to an outside reader).
As a representative example I bring my comment above. I wrote it as the impression of a reader with general knowledge and education in these topics (someone without a background in philosophy of science would have a very hard time understanding the argument that faith / belief is on the same plane as science from your brief remarks there), and I argued to you that in order to establish this claim, you are implicitly defining in an innovative way concepts like intuition and the categories of thought, and doing so without even a proper introduction explaining that your positions on these subjects differ from the accepted view (even if you explain it in your other books, you could note that you have a special approach on a certain issue and refer the reader to the source of your discussion).
Every reader comes with his own conceptual framework for each field (especially in fields that have already been chewed over extensively), and if you want to redefine those concepts, it would be better—in order to prevent confusion—to introduce your new approach first rather than smuggling it in incidentally (all the more so since you do not really need to do this in order to make the argument that faith / belief stands on the same plane as science).
Unless your intention is that people should delve in and try to reconcile your words as though you were one of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but from experience, a person who does not understand / agree with something prefers to remain with his own view rather than exert himself to reconcile what he read.
Again, I stress: I really don’t care what you do, but you ought to encourage and ask for criticism and impressions from readers in the general public about your writings, if only in order to understand how they are understanding your words (you are writing for the general public, aren’t you?), and not reject every comment with a wave of the hand. Good luck.
Hello A,
Maybe this too is part of my unwillingness to accept criticism, but I don’t accept this criticism either.
It seems to me that I always respond substantively, and certainly in this thread. I sometimes use irony, but that is only a style of phrasing substantive, reasoned arguments. It may be that sometimes I write briefly, but those are constraints of time and place (you should check how many people contact me here and how many I am supposed to answer, and understand that I cannot elaborate at length and relate to each one as if this were a private lesson. That is besides the posts and other activities. With all due respect, I do not work for any of you).
If we take your criticism here as an example, I answered all your questions here. Any reasonable reader who read this (especially you, since from your words it is clear that you know Kant) could easily understand what I meant. I do not see any lack of clarity in my responses here.
It is possible that I was mistaken and things are not clear, and then of course you are welcome to ask, comment, and argue. Sometimes I assume readers know basic points that were explained here and elsewhere in the past, and that is indeed not always true. So you are welcome to comment and ask. In addition, exactly as you wrote that you would expect me to do, I referred you to two of my books in which my definition of intuition is explained. You return again to your own definitions, and to that I answered that if you want to discuss my words you will have to use my definitions. That is not waving you off at all, but an entirely substantive response. Therefore I do not accept that claim of yours either.
Bottom line: I do not accept this criticism either (what can be done? A lost cause).
It’s true that regarding the first claim (my lack of understanding—why you call the categories of thought intuition) you responded to the point.
But regarding the second claim—that the things are not written clearly in the notebook (!), and that a person who does not know your approach on these matters will get confused and won’t understand what you mean, and therefore it would be advisable at the very least to note (in the notebook!) what intuition means in your approach, and that you do not accept Kant’s categories of thought, etc., and only then place faith / belief opposite science—you did not respond to the point.
Why do you expect a reader who comes with a classical conceptual framework (Kant!, not concepts from the newspaper or the street) to understand implicitly (!) from your words that you do not accept Kant’s categories, and that you have a new approach to the meaning of the concept intuition, without pausing over this for at least a few words and with a reference (in the notebook!) to places where you elaborate your approach on such weighty issues?
Again, maybe I’m dense and slow to understand, but try giving the notebook to someone who does not know your approaches on these matters, and let’s see whether he can figure out (from the notebook alone) your innovations regarding the categories of thought and intuition, or whether he will have difficulty understanding the words. That is the only thing that can settle the argument as to whether, in their present form in the notebook, the things are understandable or not.
I thought your complaint was about my words here. As for the notebook, I’ll check it again. Thanks for the comment.
I reread the notebook again and again, and I’m retracting a bit: you really do go on at length there explaining what intuition is in your opinion, and you attribute causality, induction, and various primary intuitions to it.
Only one sentence is missing in order to prevent people from misunderstanding your words, namely: “What Kant would attribute to the a priori categories of thought, I call intuition (as I explained in my books, etc.).”
You have to agree with me that it is a bit absurd to mention Kant and Hume and their ideas, and on the other hand to discuss one of the subjects most identified with Kant (the a priori forms of cognition) and call them intuitions, without mentioning even once what they are commonly called in the world, and that in contrast you have a different approach.
Again, maybe to you this is clear according to your own approach, but the general public does not identify the categories of thought with intuition; rather, it sees intuition as an inner sense of the correctness of a certain idea for which one still has to find proof. (See also “intuition” on Wikipedia.)
1. Kant does not claim that a priori cognitions do not express reality; he too agreed to the existence of “reality in itself” (noumenon), only our access as human beings is only to the appearances of reality (phenomenon), so I’m unable to understand what exactly your disagreement with Kant is.
2. Of course it is your right to define intuition however you wish, and by the same token it would also be possible to bring empirical knowledge under the umbrella of the concept intuition as well (who says the senses provide us with information about an existing reality), but since I assume these notebooks are meant to stand as a work in their own right, and are intended for the general public (including those not exposed to your other innovations), it would be preferable at the very least to begin with the classical and familiar distinctions: a posteriori knowledge, a priori knowledge, objective and subjective, certainty and probability, and of course intuition—and only afterward define the concepts as you understand them, including the concept of intuition (which I do not think you are defining in the accepted way).
Especially since for the matter for which they are needed, I’m not sure there is any necessity to present things the way you did rather than in their familiar form.
But that is already up to your judgment. (There are also several spelling mistakes that should be corrected).