Lesson 38: Beha’alotcha

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• Existence through inclusion in the collective
• Several concepts of make-up observance
• The nature of karet (the punishment of being “cut off”)
• On temporary karet

Summary

In this week’s article we deal with the commandment of Pesach Sheni (the “Second Passover” offering). The plain sense of the verses indicates that Pesach Sheni is a completion for one who did not offer the First Pesach, but as a matter of halakha (Jewish law) it is accepted that Pesach Sheni is an independent obligation. This requires explanation. It is fairly clear that even according to halakha there is a connection between the first and the second, but the connection is not one of completion—one who did not offer the first must offer the second—but rather a passive connection: one who offered the first is exempt from the second.

We examine the First Pesach as a communal obligation. It is a communal offering brought by individuals. We distinguish between two aspects of the First Pesach: the communal and the private. From this we derive women’s obligation in it, and the fact that the Pesach offering overrides ritual impurity and the Sabbath.

By contrast, Pesach Sheni is an obligation upon individuals. A ritually impure community offers the First Pesach in impurity and is exempt from the second. Therefore women are exempt from it, or more precisely, it is optional for them, and therefore, according to halakha, it also does not override ritual impurity.

We propose that Pesach Sheni is an independent obligation upon individuals, whereas the first is an obligation upon the community. However, according to halakha, one who fulfilled the communal obligation thereby also fulfilled the private one.

We then turn to the punishment of karet. We argue that karet is imposed for failure to fulfill the communal obligation, even if it is administered through failure to observe Pesach Sheni. We continue to find similar phenomena with circumcision, which is also a positive commandment carrying karet. There too we find mechanisms of completion and the punishment of karet, but there, according to the Ra’avad, it is temporary—until one fulfills the commandment. Our claim is that punishments of karet attached to positive commandments are imposed for failure to be included within the community.

On Pesach Sheni

A. The Commandment of Pesach Sheni

Introduction

In our parashah the Torah commands Israel to observe the Pesach. After that, a question arises regarding one who was on a distant journey or was ritually impure at the time of the observance of the Pesach, and therefore could not fulfill the commandment. In response, the Torah commands such a person to observe Pesach Sheni, as stated in Numbers 9:3-13:

Moses spoke to the children of Israel, that they should observe the Pesach.

They observed the Pesach in the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at twilight, in the wilderness of Sinai; according to all that the Lord commanded Moses, so the children of Israel did.

But there were men who were impure through contact with a human corpse, and therefore could not observe the Pesach on that day; and they approached Moses and Aaron on that day. Those men said to him: “We are impure through contact with a human corpse. Why should we be diminished, not to bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time among the children of Israel?”

Moses said to them: “Stand by, and I will hear what the Lord will command concerning you.”

The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If any man is impure through contact with a corpse, or on a distant journey, among you or throughout your generations, he shall observe a Pesach to the Lord. In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall observe it; with matzah and bitter herbs they shall eat it. They shall leave none of it until morning, nor break any bone in it; according to every statute of the Pesach they shall observe it. But the man who is pure and not on a journey, and yet refrains from observing the Pesach, that soul shall be cut off from his people, because he did not bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time; that man shall bear his sin.”

This passage raises a number of difficulties. Chief among them is the uniqueness of the Pesach commandment: why is it specifically with respect to Pesach that the Torah sees fit to take into account one who was prevented by circumstances and could not fulfill it? Why, for example, do we not find in grace after meals the possibility of fulfilling it after the time has passed, or because someone was prevented and could not recite it? Moreover, it appears from the description here that those who could not observe the Pesach took it for granted that Moses would have to find a solution to their problem. That is, even before the Torah’s formal innovation, it was obvious to them that the possibility of fulfilling the commandment could not simply be sealed off to one who was impure¹ on the fourteenth of Nisan.

In any case, the course of the passage clearly shows that the commandment of Pesach Sheni is intended to complete the Pesach for one who was prevented and did not observe it at its proper time. Such a person must offer the sacrifice of Pesach Sheni on the fourteenth of Iyar, one month after the First Pesach. From the language of the Torah it is clear that the laws of Pesach Sheni are identical to those of the First Pesach, but the sages and later commentators identify several differences between them, as we shall see below.

Pesach Sheni for Future Generations

The commandment of Pesach Sheni is counted as an ongoing commandment by the codifiers of the commandments as well. There is a commandment to slaughter Pesach Sheni—Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 57, and Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 380; a commandment to eat the meat of Pesach Sheni—positive commandment 58 and commandment 381; a prohibition against leaving any of it until morning—negative commandment 119 and commandment 382; and a prohibition against breaking a bone in it—negative commandment 123 and commandment 383.

In negative commandment 123 there is a prohibition against taking the Pesach outside the registered group, but with respect to Pesach Sheni we do not find such a prohibition. More generally, there are no fixed eating groups for Pesach Sheni, and no law of prior registration for its consumption. The reason is apparently technical: Pesach Sheni deals, in essence, with individuals. If an entire community is impure, the First Pesach can be offered in impurity. Therefore one cannot require those bringing Pesach Sheni to form groups for offering and eating, since such groups will not necessarily exist.

There are additional differences between the First Pesach and Pesach Sheni, as can be seen in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 95a. The Gemara explains there that the laws of the offering itself—those intrinsic to the body of the sacrifice—are identical, and the differences exist only in the accompanying laws that come along with the offering.

Is Pesach Sheni a Make-Up for the First?

Everything we have seen so far suggests that Pesach Sheni is a solution for one who did not manage to observe the First Pesach for justified reasons. This is indeed what Sefer HaChinukh writes at the beginning of its discussion of the commandment:

That everyone who was unable to observe the First Pesach on the fourteenth of Nisan must observe the Second Pesach on the fourteenth of Iyar, such as because of impurity or because he was on a distant journey, as it says: “In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall observe it.” And our sages of blessed memory further taught us, in Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 93a, that impurity and distant journey are not the only cases. Rather, anyone who erred, or was prevented, or even acted deliberately and did not offer the first, offers the second.

Sefer HaChinukh adds that the sages expounded that Pesach Sheni is also a commandment for one who did not observe the first deliberately—that is, for anyone who did not offer the First Pesach.

The question that arises here is why the codifiers of the commandments needed to count Pesach Sheni as a commandment in its own right. At first glance it is merely one detail within the laws of Pesach: one who did not observe it for a justified reason makes it up with Pesach Sheni. Maimonides himself senses this difficulty, and this is what he writes in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 57:

The fifty-seventh commandment is that we were commanded to slaughter the Second Pesach for one who was prevented from the First Pesach, as He, may He be exalted, said: “In the second month, on the fourteenth day at twilight, they shall observe it.” Here an objector may object to me and say: Why do you count Pesach Sheni, when this seems to contradict what you laid down in the Seventh Root, namely, that a detail within the law of a commandment is not counted as an independent commandment? Let the objector who raises this question know that the sages already disputed whether Pesach Sheni has the same legal status as the First Pesach or whether it is an independent command stated in its own right, and the halakha was decided that it is an independent command stated in its own right. Therefore it is proper to count it separately.

Maimonides cites the tannaitic dispute as to whether Pesach Sheni is a make-up for the first or an independent commandment. According to halakha, we rule that it is an independent commandment and not a make-up for the first, and therefore it must be counted separately.

This dispute is very surprising, for the verses themselves indicate that Pesach Sheni is a solution for one who did not observe the First Pesach. None of the tannaim disagrees that the commandment of Pesach Sheni was stated only for one who did not offer the First Pesach for a justified reason. So why should Pesach Sheni be treated as an independent commandment?

Another puzzling point in the laws of Pesach Sheni appears in the words of Sefer HaChinukh regarding women’s obligation, based on Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 91b:

This commandment applies in Temple times, as an obligation for males and as an option for females, for our sages of blessed memory taught us there that women who were deferred to Pesach Sheni because of impurity or because of one of the other circumstances we mentioned observe Pesach Sheni only optionally. If they wish, they slaughter; if they do not wish, they do not slaughter. For this reason one does not slaughter for them alone on the Sabbath.

That is, for the First Pesach women are obligated, but for Pesach Sheni it is only optional and not obligatory. It is not clear why the First Pesach is obligatory and the second is not. It seems likely that this difference too is connected to the special character of Pesach Sheni as something more than a mere make-up for the first.

Is Pesach Sheni an Independent Commandment or a Make-Up?

As noted, the sages, in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 93a-93b and parallels, disagreed regarding the character of the commandment of Pesach Sheni:

Our Rabbis taught: One is liable to karet for the first, and liable to karet for the second—these are the words of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: One is liable to karet for the first, and exempt for the second. Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya says: One is not liable to karet even for the first unless he also failed to observe the second.

And they follow their own reasoning, for it was taught: A convert who converted between the two Pesachs, and similarly a minor who reached majority between the two Pesachs, is obligated to observe Pesach Sheni—these are the words of Rabbi. Rabbi Natan says: Whoever was subject to the first is subject to the second; whoever was not subject to the first is not subject to the second. What is the basis of their disagreement? Rabbi holds that the second is a festival in its own right. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is a make-up for the first; one cannot repair the first for someone who was never subject to it. Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya holds that the second is a remedy for the first. And all three expounded the same verse…

Therefore: if one acted deliberately regarding both, all agree he is liable. If he erred regarding both, all agree he is exempt. If he acted deliberately regarding the first and erred regarding the second, according to Rabbi and Rabbi Natan he is liable, while according to Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya he is exempt. If he erred regarding the first and acted deliberately regarding the second, according to Rabbi he is liable; according to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya he is exempt.

The basic dispute is between Rabbi and Rabbi Natan. They disagree over whether a convert who converted between the two Pesachs, or a minor who came of age between the two Pesachs, is obligated in Pesach Sheni. According to Rabbi Natan, they are not obligated in Pesach Sheni, because they were not obligated in the First Pesach, and Pesach Sheni is merely a make-up for one who was obligated in the first and did not observe it. Rabbi, by contrast, holds that they too are obligated in Pesach Sheni, because it is a commandment in its own right.

Still, the question of karet for the second remains. According to Rabbi, the second is like the first, and one who deliberately fails to observe either of them is liable to karet. Rabbi Natan holds that the second is indeed a make-up for the first, and therefore one who was not obligated in the first is not obligated in the second; yet observing the second does not exempt a person from karet for the first, if he failed to observe the first deliberately, that is, without a justified reason. Moreover, one who deliberately neglects the second is not liable to karet for the second, because it is not an independent commandment that carries karet, but only a make-up for the first. Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya holds that one who observes the second is also exempted from karet for the first. In that respect he clearly joins Rabbi Natan in seeing the second as a make-up for the first, but in his opinion the second also removes the karet of the first, and on this point Rabbi Natan disagrees.

The tannaim agree that even one who failed to observe the First Pesach deliberately, or for an unjustified reason, is obligated in the second. This seems, at first glance, contrary to the plain wording of the verses themselves, which mention only a distant journey or ritual impurity. The Gemara, in the omitted section of the passage cited above, explains this according to each of the disputing tannaim. In general, it says that a distant journey or ritual impurity are cases in which there is no karet for failing to offer the First Pesach, and therefore the Torah referred specifically to them. But the actual obligation of Pesach Sheni applies to anyone who did not offer the first.

A summary of the laws of karet according to the positions of the three tannaim appears in the final paragraph of the Gemara cited above. We should note that according to halakha the ruling follows Rabbi: Pesach Sheni is a commandment in its own right, and therefore a convert who converted between the two Pesachs, and a minor who came of age between them, are also obligated in it.

Preliminary Conclusions Regarding the Character of Pesach Sheni According to Halakha

It follows that according to halakha Pesach Sheni obligates anyone who did not offer the First Pesach, even if he had not been obligated in it at all. That is, it is not a make-up for failure to fulfill the commandment. It is a commandment in its own right, and therefore anyone to whom it is relevant is obligated in it, except that one who already fulfilled the First Pesach is exempt from the second.

According to the position that Pesach Sheni is a make-up, then anyone who was obligated in the First Pesach and failed to fulfill that obligation is completed by the second. Only one who fell short regarding the first becomes obligated in the second. Therefore a minor or a convert is exempt. But according to the position that Pesach Sheni is an independent commandment, anyone who is obligated in commandments on the fourteenth of Iyar is obligated in Pesach Sheni, except for one who already offered the First Pesach. According to this view, offering the First Pesach is not a condition of obligation but a ground of exemption. As we have seen, this is also the halakhic ruling.

These two positions read the verses in two different ways. According to Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Chanania, the verses mean: one who offered the first is simply not obligated in the second; only one who did not offer the first becomes obligated. According to Rabbi, the verses mean something else: everyone is obligated, but one who already offered the first is exempted from the second.

Summary of the Differences and Difficulties

The very assumption that the commandment of Pesach is unique—that anyone who failed to offer the Pesach must be given an alternative solution—turns out to be mistaken according to Rabbi. In the commandment of Pesach Sheni there is no special “solution” for such people. Yet their initial assumption still requires explanation.

On the other hand, the fact that Pesach Sheni is only optional for women, even though the first is obligatory, seems to support Rabbi’s opinion. If this were merely a make-up, there would be no logic in exempting women who were obligated in the First Pesach.

Even so, Rabbi’s opinion, which is the halakha, is very difficult to reconcile with the plain language of the verses. There it clearly implies that this is a solution for one who did not offer the first. How was the problem of those who failed to observe the First Pesach solved by the commandment of Pesach Sheni? In the verses it clearly appears to be a solution to their problem. Moreover, if Pesach Sheni truly is not a make-up for the first but an independent commandment, then why is one who offered the first exempt from the second? We are therefore forced to conclude that there is some connection between the two Pesachs even according to Rabbi.

And indeed, we find a puzzling ruling in Maimonides, Hilkhot Korban Pesach 5:2:

How so? One who erred or was prevented and did not offer in the first—if he deliberately failed to offer in the second, he is liable to karet; and if he also erred or was prevented in the second, he is exempt. If he deliberately failed to offer in the first, he must offer in the second; and if he did not offer in the second, even though this second failure was inadvertent, he is liable to karet, for he did not bring the offering of the Lord at its appointed time and had acted deliberately. But one who was impure or on a distant journey and did not observe the first—even if he acted deliberately regarding the second—is not liable to karet, since he had already been exempted from karet with respect to the First Pesach.

Maimonides determines that one who did not offer in the first is liable to karet even if he erred in the second. It follows from his words that if he did offer Pesach Sheni, he is exempt from karet. The same follows from his words there in 5:4:

An impure person who could have become pure for the First Pesach but did not immerse and instead remained in his impurity until the time of the offering had passed, and similarly an uncircumcised person who did not circumcise until the time of the offering had passed—this person is considered deliberate with respect to the first. Therefore, if he did not observe the second, even inadvertently, he is liable to karet.

This stands in contradiction to his words in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 57, where he writes according to the plain sense of the Gemara that according to Rabbi, whose opinion he follows, karet for the first does not depend at all on the offering of Pesach Sheni:

And there, in Pesachim 93b, they said: Therefore, if he acted deliberately in both—that is, he did not offer the First Pesach or the Second Pesach intentionally—all agree he is liable. If he erred in both, all agree he is exempt. If he acted deliberately in the first and erred in the second, according to Rabbi and Rabbi Natan he is liable, and according to Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya he is exempt. And likewise, when he deliberately failed to observe the first and then offered the second, he is liable according to Rabbi, because in Rabbi’s opinion the second is not a make-up for the first. And the halakha in all this follows Rabbi.

Here it is stated explicitly that even if he offered the second, the karet for the first remains in place, because the second is not a make-up for the first.

It appears that in his code Maimonides retreated from this position. According to his view there, he explains Rabbi’s opinion differently: offering the second does not affect the karet of the first only if in practice he failed to offer the second, even if that failure was inadvertent. But if in practice he did offer the second, then he is exempt from karet for the first. This indicates that even according to Rabbi there is something like a make-up relation between the second and the first. In other words, according to Rabbi, the connection between the second and the first is not only negative—that one who offered the first is not obligated in the second—but the second also repairs the karet incurred by failing to offer the first.

Sign or Cause

The various tannaitic views raise another problem, one that touches the methodology of all areas of halakha. In Scripture we find that only those who did not offer the First Pesach are obligated in the second. How are we to interpret this? At first glance, the meaning is that Pesach Sheni is a completion for those who did not fulfill the first. That is, failure to offer the First Pesach is the cause of the obligation in Pesach Sheni. But according to Rabbi, failure to offer the first is only a sign, not a cause. Those obligated in the commandment are only those who did not offer the first, but the cause of the obligation is not the fact that they failed to offer it.

These are two possible ways of understanding any correlation, whether halakhic or otherwise. One can view it as accidental, and one can view it as the result of a cause-and-effect relationship. According to Rabbi, the correlation between not offering the First Pesach and being obligated in Pesach Sheni is apparently only “incidental.” Failure to offer the first is not the cause of the obligation in the second. By contrast, according to Rabbi Natan, that correlation is the result of a causal relationship: the fact that the first was not offered is the cause of the obligation in the second. This raises a general question: when do we treat a biblical or other correlation as a sign, and when as a cause? Are there rules for this?

We should note that according to our proposal above, the sharpness of this problem is greatly reduced. Even according to Rabbi, the correlation is not really accidental. Failure to offer the first is not the cause of the obligation in the second, but offering the first does exempt one from the second. Moreover, as we saw, according to Maimonides in the code, offering the second exempts one from karet for failure to offer the first. So this correlation has substantive significance even according to Rabbi. Of course, for Rabbi this definition is only formal. We still lack a substantive explanation: if failure to offer the first is not the cause of the obligation in the second, then why does offering the first exempt one from that obligation? And why, according to Maimonides, does even Rabbi agree that one is thereby exempt from karet for failure to offer the first?

B. Pesach as a Communal Offering

Introduction

The verse commanding us to offer the Pesach is formulated as a communal commandment, in Exodus 12:3-6:

Speak to the whole congregation of Israel, saying: On the tenth of this month they shall each take for themselves a lamb according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for each household. But if the household is too small for a lamb, then he and his nearest neighbor shall take one according to the number of persons; each according to what he eats shall be counted for the lamb. Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male in its first year; you may take it from the sheep or from the goats. You shall keep it until the fourteenth day of this month, and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.

It appears from here that the command is directed to the whole of Israel.

The commandment is listed by Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot as positive commandment 55:

The fifty-fifth commandment is that we were commanded to slaughter the Pesach lamb on the fourteenth day of Nisan, as He, may He be exalted, said: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at twilight.” One who transgresses this command and does not offer it at its proper time deliberately is liable to karet, whether man or woman. For it has already been explained at the end of Pesachim, 91b, that the First Pesach is obligatory for women and overrides the Sabbath—that is, its offering on the fourteenth when that date falls on the Sabbath—just like every man in Israel. The Torah’s language regarding liability to karet for it is: “But the man who is pure and not on a journey, and yet refrains from observing the Pesach, that soul shall be cut off.” And at the beginning of tractate Keritot, when the commandments whose violation incurs karet were counted, all of them were negative commandments, except that they said: and the Pesach and circumcision are positive commandments. We have already mentioned this in the introduction. The laws of this commandment have been explained in tractate Pesachim.

Is the Pesach Offering a Communal Offering?

The Pesach offering is unusual. On the one hand, the obligation rests on every individual in Israel, though within the framework of a registered eating group, that is, a family unit. That is unlike ordinary communal offerings, in which a single offering is brought on behalf of all Israel. On the other hand, the obligation to bring the Pesach is addressed to all Israel. There is thus an obligation imposed on the totality of individuals. This is unlike other individual offerings—such as a sin-offering or guilt-offering, a vow-offering or freewill offering, and the like—which are brought by an individual person when he becomes obligated. Those have no communal aspect.

Indeed, in Mikra’ei Kodesh by Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank, on Pesach, volume 1, section 2, he argues that the Pesach includes a communal obligation as well. He cites the Mekhilta, parashat Bo, section 5, and see also Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 41b:

From where do you say that if Israel has only one Pesach, all of them fulfill their obligation through it? Scripture says: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it.”

Already the wording of the Mekhilta sees the phrase “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel” as an expression of a community. But the content of the rabbinic exposition also moves in that direction. Rabbi Frank cites the commentary Berurei HaMiddot on the Mekhilta, which proves that according to the Mekhilta, eating the Pesach is indispensable. He explains that for this reason the Mekhilta writes that only if they have no possibility of offering more than one Pesach can they all fulfill their obligation with one Pesach. But if it is possible, they must offer in such a way that each person can eat at least an olive’s bulk of the Pesach meat.

But what happens when that is impossible? At first glance, if eating is indispensable, they do not fulfill their obligation; so how does offering one Pesach help? He explains that in such a case the Pesach has the status of communal offerings, in which eating is not indispensable.

Rabbi Frank then raises an objection from the Mishnah in Pesachim 96b, which states:

Five things are brought in impurity and are not eaten in impurity… The Pesach that is brought in impurity is eaten in impurity, because from the outset it comes only for eating.

If so, the Pesach comes only for eating, and therefore even when it is offered in impurity it is eaten in impurity. This is also the ruling of Maimonides in Hilkhot Korban Pesach 7:8.

He cites there, in the name of Rabbi Menachem Ziemba, a basic principle regarding the laws of the Pesach offering. According to him, just as the community is obligated to bring the daily offerings and additional offerings—meaning, the entire community brings a single offering—so too in the case of Pesach there is an obligation to bring a communal offering. However, in Pesach there is an additional obligation that each individual bring an offering so that he can also eat from it. When each person brings an offering in the normal case, those offerings also constitute the bringing of the communal offering, and there is therefore no need to add an extra communal offering beyond the private Pesachs. This is what the Gemara says in Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 51a: since Pesach is brought in a gathered assembly—all bring it together on the pilgrimage festival—it is considered a communal offering.

On this basis he explains what the Mekhilta above says: if they do not have a Pesach that can be eaten by all, they should at least bring one offering, because that offering fulfills the communal obligation. True, they do not thereby fulfill the private obligation, but at least they fulfill the communal one.

After that he cites his colleague Rabbi Abraham Aharon Prag, who says that a Pesach brought under the rubric of a communal offering would have to come from the Temple treasury contribution, and in that case it would be the property of all Israel even if each person’s share is worth less than a perutah.

He adds, however, that in the Babylonian Talmud it is difficult to say this, because the Bavli, in Pesachim 78b, tries to derive from this exposition that eating is not indispensable—and in fact the Bavli does not read the text as speaking specifically of a case where they have only one Pesach. This claim rejects the possibility that there is an additional obligation in the Pesach offering to bring a distinct communal offering. But the very idea of viewing the offering as a communal offering certainly exists in the Bavli as well, for the Bavli too learns from the verse “the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel” that all Israel can fulfill its obligation with one Pesach. According to that view, the ordinary offering of Pesach is itself the communal offering, and in this special communal offering there is nevertheless a law that eating is indispensable.

Pesach in Ritual Impurity

The sages teach us that ritual impurity is permitted, or at least set aside, in the community. That is, in communal offerings impurity does not prevent the offering from being brought. This law is learned explicitly with respect to the Pesach offering, where we learn that if the majority of the community is impure, the Pesach is not deferred to Pesach Sheni but is rather offered in impurity. Thus Maimonides writes in Hilkhot Korban Pesach 7:1:

If many people were impure through corpse impurity at the First Pesach: if they were a minority of the congregation, they are deferred to Pesach Sheni like other impure persons. But if they were the majority of the congregation, or if the priests or the service vessels were impure with corpse impurity, they are not deferred. Rather, they all offer the Pesach in impurity, the impure together with the pure, as it is said: “There were men who were impure through a human corpse”—individuals are deferred, but the community is not deferred. This applies only to corpse impurity, as we explained in Hilkhot Bi’at Mikdash.

That is, the fact that the Pesach overrides impurity is learned from our verses.

It should be noted, however, that the Gemara in Yoma 50a debates whether this rule of overriding is stated only because these offerings have a fixed time, or whether it applies to all communal offerings. The conclusion seems to be that the overriding is because the time is fixed, even in an individual offering. So Maimonides writes in Hilkhot Bi’at Mikdash 4:9:

Any offering that does not have a fixed time overrides neither the Sabbath nor ritual impurity, for if it is not offered today it can be offered tomorrow or the day after. Any offering that has a fixed time, whether communal or individual, overrides the Sabbath and overrides ritual impurity—but not all forms of impurity. It overrides only corpse impurity.

But the “individual offering” under discussion there is only the Pesach,² and even in Pesach it is clear that the overriding was stated only in a case where the majority of the community is impure. That is, this overriding has a communal aspect, just as the Gemara says there in Yoma 51a: since it is brought in a gathered assembly, it is considered a communal offering. It is obvious that if there were some theoretical case in which the majority of the community became obligated to bring a sin-offering while impure, that would not override impurity.³ It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Pesach offering has an aspect of a communal offering. The overriding of impurity by offerings is called by the sages “impurity is permitted in the community,” meaning that it is not only the fixed time that overrides impurity, but also the communal character of the offering.

This is also the conclusion that emerges from our earlier discussion of a case in which all Israel fulfills its obligation with a single Pesach.

Women’s Obligation

We see that although this is a positive commandment dependent on time, women are obligated in it. The sources for this are brought in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 91b. At the end the Gemara states:

In accordance with whom is the statement of Rabbi Elazar, that a woman is obligated in the first, optional in the second, and it overrides the Sabbath? If it is optional, why should it override the Sabbath? Rather say: in the second it is optional, in the first it is obligatory, and it overrides the Sabbath.

That is, the Gemara’s conclusion is that the First Pesach is obligatory for women and overrides the Sabbath. What is the connection between these two laws? We suggest that the fact that women are obligated in it, despite its time-bound character, stems from the fact that it is a communal offering. Women are obligated in bringing the Pesach offering because the one obligated in it is the community, and women are part of the community. In other words, women are not independently obligated as isolated individuals to bring a Pesach offering; rather, the community is obligated, and women are included within it. Therefore they do not enjoy an exemption by virtue of the commandment’s dependence on time.

From this it also follows that the Pesach offering overrides the Sabbath, because communal offerings with a fixed time override the Sabbath. Thus these two laws are connected to one another, for both derive from the fact that the Pesach offering is a communal offering. Indeed, Maimonides in positive commandment 55 brings these two laws together:

For it has already been explained at the end of Pesachim, 91b, that the First Pesach is obligatory for women and overrides the Sabbath—that is, its offering on the fourteenth when that date falls on the Sabbath—just like every man in Israel.

If so, women’s obligation here derives from their inclusion within the community, and therefore they are obligated despite the commandment’s dependence on time.

In an article on parashat Ki Tissa, from 5767, we pointed out that women and minors are obligated in the commandment of the half-shekel as part of the community. There too we showed that the obligation is imposed on the community and women are included in it.

Another example is women’s obligation in the commandment of Hakhel, the septennial public assembly. In the discussion in Kiddushin 33b, the Gemara cites the following baraita:

Every positive commandment dependent on time… Our Rabbis taught: Which are positive commandments dependent on time? Sukkah, lulav, shofar, tzitzit, and tefillin. And which are positive commandments not dependent on time? Mezuzah, parapet, returning lost property, and sending away the mother bird.

The Gemara objects:

Is that really a rule? Behold matzah, rejoicing, and Hakhel: these are positive commandments dependent on time, and women are nevertheless obligated. And further, behold Torah study, procreation, and redemption of the firstborn son: these are not positive commandments dependent on time, and women are exempt.

And it answers:

Rabbi Yochanan said: One does not derive law from general rules, even where an exception was stated. For we learned: one may establish an eruv and join in a shared eruv with anything, except water and salt. Are there no other exceptions? There are mushrooms and truffles as well. Rather, one does not derive law from general rules, even where an exception was stated.

That is, one may not derive law from general rules, even if the rule says “except,” which seems like a precise formulation. Still, the question why women are obligated in Hakhel, despite its dependence on time, remains unanswered. According to our approach, we would say that in Hakhel too the verse uses language of obligation addressed to all Israel, and therefore women are obligated in this commandment as part of the community—exactly as we saw regarding the Pesach offering.⁴

C. Between the First Pesach and Pesach Sheni

Returning to Pesach Sheni

What is the law regarding Pesach Sheni? Are women obligated in it? Does it override the Sabbath and ritual impurity? The Gemara itself, in Pesachim 91b and parallels, addresses these questions. It even points out that Pesach Sheni too is brought in a gathered assembly, see Yoma 51a. And yet we saw above that according to halakha both Maimonides and Sefer HaChinukh rule that for women Pesach Sheni is optional.

At first glance, the conclusion that follows from this is that Pesach Sheni is not a communal offering. On the contrary: by its very nature it is an individual offering, for if an entire community were obligated in it, that observance would already have taken place in the First Pesach. Pesach Sheni is the Pesach of individuals, and therefore women are exempt from it like from any other positive commandment dependent on time.

As for the Sabbath and ritual impurity, the tannaim disagreed, see Yoma 51a and Pesachim 95a-95b. According to halakha, Maimonides rules that Pesach Sheni does not override ritual impurity. It does, however, override the Sabbath, as Maimonides writes in Hilkhot Korban Pesach 10:15:

What is the difference between the First Pesach and the Second Pesach? In the first, leaven is forbidden under the prohibitions that it may not be seen and may not be found; it may not be slaughtered while one possesses leaven; none of it may be taken outside the eating group; Hallel is required during its eating; and a festival offering is brought together with it. It may also be brought in impurity if the majority of the congregation became impure through corpse impurity, as we explained. But with Pesach Sheni, leaven and matzah may be present together in the house; Hallel is not required during its eating; it may be taken outside its group; no festival offering is brought with it; and it is not brought in impurity. Both override the Sabbath; both require Hallel during their preparation; and both are eaten roasted, in one house, with matzah and bitter herbs. One may not leave any of them over, and one may not break a bone in them. Why, then, is the second not equal to the first in all respects, since it says: “According to every statute of the Pesach they shall observe it”? Because some of the statutes of the Pesach were specified explicitly concerning it, teaching that it is equal to the first only in those matters that were explicitly stated with respect to it—namely, those commandments intrinsic to the offering itself, and these are the “statutes of the Pesach”…

Maimonides here summarizes the similarities and differences between the First Pesach and Pesach Sheni. Among other things, he rules that Pesach Sheni is not brought in impurity, though it does override the Sabbath.

In simple terms, it does not override impurity because it is not a communal offering. For that same reason, women are not obligated in it.⁵ And indeed, this is what Tosafot write on Yoma 51a, s.v. “it overrides the Sabbath”:

It overrides the Sabbath but does not override impurity—It seems to me that both Rabbi Yehudah and the Rabbis derive this from “according to every statute of the Pesach,” and on this reasoning they disagree. The first tanna holds: just as the statute of the First Pesach does not override impurity except in the case of a majority of the community, but in the case of a minority of the community it is deferred because of impurity, so too Pesach Sheni. Rabbi Yehudah holds that this is what it means: just as the First Pesach is not entirely nullified, so too…

That is, Tosafot explain that according to all the tannaitic views, Pesach Sheni resembles the First Pesach, and the dispute concerns only how the comparison is to be drawn. According to halakha we rule like the first tanna, and according to him Pesach Sheni resembles the First Pesach in the sense that just as in the First Pesach, if only a minority is impure the offering is deferred because of impurity, so too in Pesach Sheni. See there also regarding the difference concerning the Sabbath.

The Meaning of Pesach Sheni

We saw above that the Pesach offering has two dimensions simultaneously: it is an offering of individuals, and at the same time it is a communal offering of all Israel. When a minority is impure, the Pesach brought by the majority constitutes the offering of the communal sacrifice, while completion is needed with respect to the individual dimension for those who were impure. That completion takes place through Pesach Sheni. But when the majority is impure, the Pesach is performed in the first month, because in halakha there is no possibility of completion for the communal aspect of Pesach. If even in such a case the offering were deferred to Pesach Sheni, the result would be that no communal offering at all was brought that year. In Pesach Sheni, even if the majority of the community were to bring it, there would still be only the aspect of an individual offering.

It may be that the reason for this is that the Exodus from Egypt is the creation of the nation, and the Pesach offering is the act that incorporates all individuals and fuses them into one community. Through Pesach Sheni one may complete the obligation to bring an offering, which is an obligation of the individual, but not the creation of the nation. That is not the relevant time for such a thing.

Something similar was noted in our article on parashat Ki Tissa, 5767, where we argued that the commandment of the half-shekel has two faces: the obligation of individuals to contribute to the Temple treasury, and the obligation of individuals to be included within the community. This is very similar to what we are uncovering here.

Indeed, the point is explicit in the discussion in Yoma 51a, where it says:

Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rava: As for the tanna, why is it that he calls the Pesach an individual offering, but the festival offering a communal offering? If because it comes in a gathered assembly—Pesach too comes in a gathered assembly! There is Pesach Sheni, which does not come in a gathered assembly.

That is, the First Pesach is defined by the fact that it comes as the entire community gathered together, whereas Pesach Sheni does not come that way and is therefore an individual offering.

Later in that Gemara they explain the opinion of the first tanna, which is also the halakhic ruling, as to why Pesach Sheni does not override impurity:

For it was taught: Pesach Sheni overrides the Sabbath, but does not override ritual impurity. Rabbi Yehudah says: It even overrides ritual impurity. What is the reasoning of the first tanna? He will tell you: Was it not because of impurity that you deferred them? Shall they now perform it in impurity? And Rabbi Yehudah will tell you: The verse says, “According to every statute of the Pesach they shall observe it”—even in impurity. The Torah gave him another chance to do it in purity; if he did not merit that, let him do it in impurity.

The first tanna holds that the very fact that they were deferred because of impurity means that these are only individuals bringing it; and for that very reason Pesach Sheni cannot override impurity. By its essence it is an offering of individuals—for had they been the majority of the community, they would have had the status of a community and would have brought it in the first month even in impurity. Rabbi Yehudah disagrees, because he sees Pesach Sheni as a completion of the First Pesach, that is, as another opportunity to perform it in purity. If that is still not possible, it may then be brought in impurity as well.

Resolving the Difficulties Concerning Pesach Sheni

Above we wondered how one can interpret the verses regarding Pesach Sheni in a way that severs the connection between the first and the second, contrary to the plain sense of Scripture. Our conclusion was that there is a connection between the two Pesachs even according to Rabbi: one who offered the first is exempt from the second, though it is not correct to say that the second is a completion of the first—that is Rabbi Natan’s view. We can now see the matter more deeply. The First Pesach has two aspects: a communal offering and an offering of individuals. Pesach Sheni too provides a possibility of fulfilling the obligation of the individual, but this is not a completion in the ordinary sense. It is another opportunity to fulfill that obligation.

One might perhaps go even further and say that this is not merely an additional opportunity to fulfill the individual’s obligation, but that the obligation of the individual exists only in Pesach Sheni. According to our approach, the Pesach offering contains two obligations: the obligation of the community to bring Pesachs on the First Pesach in order to establish the nation as a community, and the obligation of individuals to bring a Pesach, which exists only in Pesach Sheni. What is newly established according to Rabbi is that one who observed the first—that is, who participated in bringing the communal Pesach—thereby also fulfilled the obligation of the private Pesach, and therefore when Pesach Sheni arrives he is already exempt from that obligation. According to this proposal, in a certain sense the First Pesach is a “completion,” in advance, of Pesach Sheni.

Perhaps here we can also find an explanation for what troubled us at the beginning of our discussion. In Scripture it seems that it was obvious to Moses and the people that there had to be some way to complete the commandment of Pesach. We wondered why Pesach should be exceptional among all other commandments, so that if one did not fulfill it he could still complete it later. The answer is that the communal aspect truly cannot be completed. But the obligation of the individual is, from the outset, specifically in Pesach Sheni—except that those who offer in the first month also thereby fulfill the individual obligation. The people now ask: why should one who could not offer the first lose the possibility of offering the second and thereby fulfilling his obligation to bring an individual Pesach offering? To this Moses answers that indeed he may do so. It will not be a completion of the First Pesach, for the communal offering has already been brought, but the individual obligation can still be fulfilled.

Fulfilling the Communal Obligation

We may now ask how those individuals who brought Pesach Sheni fulfilled their communal obligation. At first glance, they brought only an individual offering. It is certainly possible to say that in truth they lost the communal commandment, and that this is precisely what the entire discussion revolves around: Pesach Sheni is not, or not fully, a completion of the first.

But if we notice that we are dealing here with a communal commandment, then the one addressed by the commandment is the community. If the majority offered in the first month, then the community fulfilled its obligation. What remains is the obligation of individuals, and that is fulfilled in Pesach Sheni. The individuals who were deferred to Pesach Sheni fulfilled their communal obligation together with the community even without bringing an offering, because they are included in the community that fulfilled its duty.

Perhaps this is also the explanation of the innovation we found above in Maimonides: that one who offered Pesach Sheni is rescued from karet for deliberately failing to bring the First Pesach. This seems contrary to the plain sense of the sugya, as we already noted. According to our approach, it may be understood as follows: if someone offered Pesach Sheni, he is thereby included within the community that offered the first. He fulfilled his individual obligation, and as an individual included in the community he has fulfilled the obligation of Pesach through their offering.

This also explains why one who erred or was prevented in the first and therefore did not incur karet, but then deliberately neglects the second, becomes liable to karet. The reason is not failure to fulfill his individual obligation. Rather, failure to offer the second prevents his inclusion in the community that brought the first, and he becomes liable to karet on account of the first. Thus the karet associated with Pesach Sheni is in fact, in essence, karet for the first. The punishment of karet applies only to failure to fulfill the communal obligation, not the private one.

Indeed, we found that this is what the Kesef Mishneh writes on Hilkhot Korban Pesach 5:2: that the principal karet is for the first. It is possible, however, that this is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Chanania ben Akavya; see there.

D. A Note on Karet in Circumcision and in Positive Commandments Generally

We find one other positive commandment that carries karet, namely circumcision. This commandment too is imposed on the individual, but its meaning is the covenant of inclusion within the people of Israel. Therefore, although it is a positive commandment, it carries karet. The punishment of karet means severance from the people of Israel—“that soul shall be cut off from its people”—and therefore it is imposed only for commandments whose significance is inclusion in the people of Israel.

It is interesting to note that in the commandment of circumcision, as in Pesach, we also find a possibility of completing the commandment. The initial obligation is on the father to circumcise his son. If he failed and did not circumcise him, the court circumcises him, or when he grows up the son himself is obligated to circumcise himself. Thus Maimonides writes in Hilkhot Milah 1:1-2:

1. Circumcision is a positive commandment for which one is liable to karet, as it is said: “And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from its people.” It is a commandment upon the father to circumcise his son, and upon the master to circumcise his slaves born in the household and acquired with money. If the father or master transgressed and did not circumcise them, he has nullified a positive commandment but is not liable to karet, for karet depends only upon the uncircumcised male himself. The court is commanded to circumcise that son or slave at the proper time, and not to leave any uncircumcised male in Israel or among their slaves.

2. One does not circumcise a man’s son without his knowledge, unless he has transgressed and refrained from circumcising him, in which case the court circumcises him even against his will. If the court overlooked the matter and did not circumcise him, then when he grows up he is obligated to circumcise himself…

The relationship between these two obligations is complex and we will not enter into it here. In general, we may say that the father serves as the representative of the community, who is meant to receive the child into the people of Israel. If he does not fulfill his duty, then the court, or the child himself, performs it in his place. This continues the parallel between Pesach and circumcision: the community in Pesach corresponds to the father in circumcision.

In any event, the well-known dispute between Maimonides and the Ra’avad appears later in that same halakha:

And every day that passes after he has reached maturity and has not circumcised himself, he nullifies a positive commandment. But he is not liable to karet until he dies deliberately uncircumcised.

Ra’avad’s gloss: “But he is not liable to karet until he dies,” etc.—This is unconvincing. Is one therefore exempt in Heaven because of uncertain warning? Every single day he stands under liability to karet.⁶

Maimonides holds that karet is imposed on the result. If in the end a person remains deliberately uncircumcised, he is liable to karet. The Ra’avad, by contrast, holds that there is liability to karet for every day in between.

The Minchat Chinukh, commandment 2, section 26, notes two implications of this. First, regarding repentance on Yom Kippur in the interim: if the transgression is one that carries karet, repentance alone is insufficient, and additional elements of atonement are needed—Yom Kippur itself and suffering. See Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah 1:4. Second, in the case of one who deliberately failed to circumcise himself and then, at the end of his life, was prevented by circumstances from doing so: according to Maimonides he is exempt, since in the end he was prevented; according to the Ra’avad he is liable, because he was already liable to karet from the moment he failed to circumcise himself upon reaching adulthood, and the later prevention merely kept him from escaping that karet.⁷

Now the Minchat Chinukh there remarks that with respect to the Pesach offering, Maimonides rules in Hilkhot Korban Pesach 5:2 that if one deliberately neglected the first and erred in the second, he is liable to karet—and this seems to contradict his position in Hilkhot Milah that karet is only at the end. For if karet is only at the end, then when he is prevented at the end he should be exempt from karet. He explains that with the Pesach offering the main karet is for the first, as the Kesef Mishneh noted above.

Still, it is not clear in what respect the Pesach offering differs from circumcision. According to our approach, the answer seems to be that in Pesach the first obligation is essentially different from the second, and therefore the main karet in Pesach is for the first—that is, for the communal obligation. By contrast, in circumcision it is clear that circumcision by the court or by the person himself is a full completion of the father’s obligation, and therefore there is no special karet specifically on the first obligation. On the contrary, as is apparent from the quotation above, the father is not liable to karet if he did not circumcise his son, for the obligation rests upon the son. Therefore in circumcision the primary obligation is on the son himself for remaining uncircumcised.

It seems that on precisely this point the Ra’avad disagrees with Maimonides, and in his view even in circumcision the primary liability attaches from the very first moment—when he reaches adulthood. The Minchat Chinukh already noted this as well in commandment 5, section 16.

Insights

1. From the plain sense of the verses, Pesach Sheni appears to be a make-up for the First Pesach.
2. Yet it can be seen as a correlation only. This yields two possible understandings:
3. A is the cause of B.
4. There is a correlation between A and B, but no causal relationship.
5. This is apparently the tannaitic dispute over whether Pesach Sheni is a make-up or an independent offering. According to halakha, the ruling is that it is independent.
6. The tanna who holds that it is a make-up maintains that only one who failed to offer the first is obligated in Pesach Sheni. The tanna who holds that it is an independent offering maintains that the obligation to offer Pesach Sheni rests on every individual, except that one who offered the first is exempt from this obligation. Thus, according to both, there is a connection—active or passive—between the two offerings.
7. The First Pesach is a communal offering brought by the collection of individuals. Some see in it two aspects: a communal offering and an individual offering. Therefore one who offered it thereby also fulfilled the obligation of Pesach Sheni.
8. Pesach Sheni is, by its very essence, an individual offering, and therefore it cannot be a full make-up for the First Pesach. Even so, it repairs the karet obligation for one who did not offer the first.
9. Women’s obligation and the overriding of ritual impurity are two implications of this distinction. Women are obligated in the First Pesach even though it is a positive commandment dependent on time, because the obligated party is the community, and therefore they too are obligated in it as part of the people of Israel. In Pesach Sheni there is no communal aspect, and therefore women are not obligated in it. With respect to impurity, the implication is straightforward: only a communal offering overrides ritual impurity.
10. Communal obligations are imposed on the community, but each individual is commanded to take part in them in order to ensure their fulfillment.
11. Maimonides and the Ra’avad disagreed regarding circumcision: is there a temporary karet liability upon one who remains uncircumcised until he circumcises himself? In Pesach the situation is different according to all views.
12. Liability to karet, at least in the case of positive commandments, is imposed for withdrawal from a communal obligation—in both circumcision and Pesach. Therefore, even when there is karet for failure to offer Pesach Sheni, that exists only because the first was not offered, and not on account of the second itself, since only the first is a communal obligation.

Footnotes