Ha’azinu (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Erev Shabbat, Ha’azinu, 5766

Questions

1. What is the law of a half-measure?
2. Is it an independent prohibition, or an extension of the original prohibition?
3. Two types of binyan av: extending scope of application, and creating new prohibitions.
4. On ideological casuistry.
5. On the relation between a logical explanation and a content-based explanation.
6. What is the relation between analogy and induction?

Hermeneutical principles

Gezera shava (verbal analogy). Binyan av (derivation from a paradigm case).

“May my teaching drop like rain, my speech flow like dew, like showers upon the grass and like raindrops upon the herb.”

(Deuteronomy 32:2)

“Another interpretation of ‘May my teaching drop like rain’: Rabbi Nehemiah used to say, one should always gather the words of Torah as general principles. But perhaps, just as you gather them as general principles, so too you should present them as general principles? Scripture therefore says, ‘May my teaching drop like rain.’ And ‘drop’ here is merely a Canaanite expression. By way of illustration: a person does not say to his fellow, ‘Change this sela for me,’ but rather, ‘Break this sela down for me.’ So too, gather the words of Torah as general principles, but break them down and present them like drops of dew, not like drops of rain, which are large, but like drops of dew, which are small…”

“Another interpretation of ‘May my teaching drop like rain’: Rabbi Dostai ben Yehudah says, if you gather the words of Torah the way water is gathered in a cistern, in the end you will merit to gain command of your learning, as it is said, ‘Drink water from your cistern’ (Proverbs 5:15). And if you gather the words of Torah the way rainwater is gathered in pits, trenches, and caves, in the end you will trickle forth and water others, as it is said, ‘And flowing waters from within your well’ (Proverbs 5:15), and it also says, ‘Let your springs be dispersed abroad’ (Proverbs 5:16).”

“Another interpretation of ‘May my teaching drop like rain’: Rabbi Meir used to say, one should always gather the words of Torah as general principles, for if you gather them as particulars they will weary you, and you will not know what to do with them. It is like a person who travels to Caesarea and needs one hundred or two hundred zuz for expenses: if he takes them as individual coins, they weigh him down and he does not know what to do with them; but if he combines them into selaim, then he can break them down and spend them wherever he wishes. Similarly, if someone goes to the market at Beit Ilai and needs one hundred maneh or twenty thousand for expenses, if he carries them as selaim they weigh him down and he does not know what to do with them; but if he combines them into gold dinars, then he can break them down and spend them wherever he wishes. ‘Like showers upon the grass’: when a person goes to study Torah, at first he does not know what to do, until he has learned two books or two orders; afterward, it continues from there like abundant rain. Therefore it says, ‘like abundant rain upon the herb.'”

(Sifrei Devarim, piska 306, s.v. “Another interpretation”)

A. Summary of Last Year’s Essay

In last year’s essay we dealt with the relation between general principles and particulars, both in Torah study and more generally. We also discussed the hermeneutical principles as a kind of meta-halakhic rules.

We saw that gathering particulars into general principles is important, and that it is also important afterward to bring those principles back down into practical particulars. The rabbinic expository passages cited above deal with these two aspects, and our essay discussed at length which of them addresses which aspect.

The importance of collecting particulars into general principles is very clear: the collection helps us remember the particulars, and it also makes them more available to the thinker, so that using and applying them becomes easier. But what is the importance of translating them back into particulars?

We discussed casuistic legal systems, which are based on particular rulings and are not inclined to collect those rulings into general laws. By contrast, positivist systems prefer bodies of law composed of general rules, so that particular rulings are derived from those rules by various logical and interpretive tools. The more naive positivists would say: by deductive tools.

We noted that halakha (Jewish law) is, in its essence, a casuistic system. The early texts contain no general rules, but rather a collection of particular cases. Formalization and codification are historical processes, and halakha reaches more “positivist” stages beginning with the time of Maimonides. The give-and-take of the Talmud expresses the superiority of the casuistic approach, and provides the reader with interpretive and analytical tools that allow him to draw conclusions by analogy to the particular cases discussed and decided in the past. We also discussed the controversies over codification, which express the value that the sages saw in preserving the casuistic character of halakha.

Our essay focused on the logical relation between general principles and particulars, rather than on the question of utility—that is, the advantages and disadvantages of different modes of presenting a legal or halakhic system. That latter issue is generally treated in jurisprudence. First, however, we had to examine whether these are in fact two equivalent modes of presentation. Do general principles contain the same information as particulars, and vice versa? Does every casuistic system necessarily have a set of general rules that contains exactly the same information? Can such a system always be constructed in practice?

We noted that similar questions arise in the philosophy of science. There too we ask: what is the relation between particular facts and phenomena, on the one hand, and the general laws of nature, on the other? Naturally, that field deals extensively with the question of the reliability and validity of generalization. We pointed to two approaches to these questions:

1. Positivism holds that the general laws really do exist in the world, and that all particular cases are derivatives of those laws.
2. In the world there are only particulars, and general laws are merely fictions that help us think about them. The laws of nature exist only in our own minds, not in the world itself.¹

This dispute concerns the ontological status of general laws—whether they truly exist—and not the question whether we can arrive at them. One may hold that such laws can indeed be reached, while still maintaining that they do not represent real entities, but only our own fictions. We therefore concluded that there are three types of questions regarding general principles:

1. Are there, in fact, general principles corresponding to the totality of particulars?
2. Do those principles reflect real existing entities?
3. Can we reach them through our own cognitive activity?

We saw that the midrashic approach grants real importance to general principles, but also holds that relying on them alone may lead us into error. Therefore they must be broken down into particulars and constantly tested against them. This is the root of the casuistic ideology of halakha.

Our conclusion was that general principles are indeed doomed to be imprecise—and hence the casuistic ideology of halakha—but this does not follow from the claim that there are no real general principles, that they are merely human fictions. Rather, it follows from the fact that there are very many principles, and any partial description that does not take all of them into account will always reveal mismatches with the particulars. We also brought examples of this from science.

One must therefore be careful not to treat general principles as binding truth in themselves. They must always be compared with the particular facts. For this reason, the midrash insists on the importance of translating principles back into particulars.

We also discussed the question: what is the goal of study, both in Torah and in science? Are the particulars merely a means for reaching the general principle, which is the goal, or is the reverse true? We argued in favor of the view that the general principles are the primary goal of study, and that the individual halakhot—at least in the context of Torah study, just as empirical particulars in scientific research—are merely auxiliary tools for formulating those principles. We cited Rabbi Yisrael Salanter’s proof for this view from the law of the stubborn and rebellious son.

We concluded that essay with rabbinic passages that emphasize the advantage of general principles, and the idea that general principles contain more information than isolated particulars. We also proposed an identification between the Written Torah and general principles, and between the Oral Torah and particulars.

B. The Nature of the Midrashic Analogy: Two Types of Binyan Av

Introduction

Last year’s essay emphasized the importance of moving from particulars to general principles. In a certain sense, all the hermeneutical principles are merely tools of generalization and comparison. The clearest examples of the move from particulars to general principles are found in the various applications of binyan av. The Torah reveals one or two particulars to us, and we use analogy and induction to generalize them and arrive at the principle reflected through them. Several times in the past we have discussed binyan av from one verse and from two verses, which are simply different ways of ascending from the level of particulars to the general level.

In our essay from last week, we argued that a gezera shava between two Torah passages reveals a common aspect present in both. We saw that Maimonides does not treat two such prohibitions as two distinct prohibitions, whether with respect to the count of the commandments or with respect to separate sin-offerings. In this week’s essay we will examine generalization through binyan av as a tool that takes us from the particular to the general principle that contains it. After that, we will return to the question of the casuistic character of halakha, which we also discussed in last year’s essay. We will open the discussion with an example from the Talmudic discussion of half-measure.

The Law of Half-Measure and Its Sources

In almost all Torah prohibitions of eating, the punishable quantity is an olive’s bulk. Everyone agrees that one who has eaten less than an olive’s bulk—that is, less than the minimum measure; hereafter: a half-measure—is not punished. The question is whether he has nevertheless violated a prohibition, or whether no prohibition has been transgressed at all. Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagree on this question in Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 74a:

“To the matter itself: With regard to a half-measure, Rabbi Yohanan said: it is forbidden by Torah law. Resh Lakish said: it is permitted by Torah law. Rabbi Yohanan said: it is forbidden by Torah law; since it is fit to be combined with more, he is eating a forbidden substance. Resh Lakish said: it is permitted by Torah law; the Merciful One said ‘eating’—and here there is no eating. Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Resh Lakish: I know only that whatever is subject to punishment is also included in the warning prohibition. As for a koy, and a half-measure, since they are not subject to punishment, one might think that they are not included in the warning prohibition. Scripture therefore says: ‘all fat’! He answered: that is only rabbinic, and the verse is merely a textual support.”

Rabbi Yohanan’s position is that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law even though one is not punished for it, and that is also the accepted halakhic ruling. The source of this law is a matter of reasoning: the half-measure is “fit to be combined.” Several later authorities explained that the point of this reasoning is that the food already possesses the qualitative character of the prohibition, for when it is combined with another half-measure like it, the result is a full halakhic prohibition, and it is unreasonable to suppose that this prohibition comes into being out of nothing. Thus, where the prohibited quality exists without the requisite quantity, there is a prohibition but no punishment. Punishment requires not only the prohibited quality, but also a minimum quantity.

Rabbi Yohanan then brings an additional source for the law of half-measure, this time from the verse “all fat,” which forbids eating forbidden fat. The word “all” is interpreted as prohibiting even the smallest amount. Resh Lakish replies that this is merely a textual support, and that there is no Torah prohibition of half-measure. The relation between these two sources—the verse and the reasoning—according to Rabbi Yohanan is disputed among the commentators, and we will not discuss it here.

What Is the Nature of the Derivation from “All”?

How do we derive from the word “all” that the Torah prohibits even less than an olive’s bulk of forbidden fat? In several places in the rabbinic literature we find expositions of the type: “‘all fat’—any amount of fat at all.” It seems that the exposition here is of that type as well. If so, this is an inclusive derivation: the word “all” comes to include even small quantities. All forbidden fat, in whatever quantity, constitutes a Torah prohibition when eaten.

The Generalization

Up to this point, we have seen that the Torah reveals to us, in the prohibition of forbidden fat, an inclusive derivation that prohibits by Torah law the consumption of quantities smaller than the measure required for punishment, namely an olive’s bulk. But we must remember that the discussion in Yoma is not concerned only with the prohibition of forbidden fat; it arises in the context of the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. The quantity for which one incurs karet (spiritual excision) for eating on Yom Kippur is the size of a large date, because that is the amount that settles a person’s mind and appetite; see Yoma 79a. How do we know that there is also a prohibition against eating less than that measure on Yom Kippur, or in any other eating prohibition?² From Rabbi Yohanan’s exposition regarding the prohibition of forbidden fat. Thus, although the source is a verse dealing specifically with forbidden fat, the conclusion applies to other prohibitions as well.

The wording of the Talmudic passage likewise presents the question under discussion as a general one, and not as a question in the laws of forbidden fat: how do we know that there is a Torah prohibition in eating a half-measure? This is not a question in the specific laws of forbidden fat, but a general halakhic question. The reasoning given there—”fit to be combined”—is in no way unique to forbidden fat. True, the source that resolves the question, according to Rabbi Yohanan, is taken from the prohibition of forbidden fat, but from there we learn to all the other prohibitions of the Torah.

Although the Talmud does not explicitly mention any hermeneutical principle here, it seems that the extension it makes is based on binyan av from one verse. The verse regarding forbidden fat teaches us that there is a prohibition of half-measure for all prohibitions of eating in the Torah. We may note that the Talmud does not even bother to mention that a generalization has been made here by means of binyan av. To it, this appears self-evident. The particular case is immediately understood as representing a general principle, and this apparently requires neither argument nor even explicit mention of a generalizing hermeneutical principle. This is one example, among many, of the casuistic reading of Scripture by the sages: the isolated case is perceived as an illustration of a general principle. There are, of course, hundreds of further examples of this.

A Remark on the Uniqueness of Binyan Av

One might, however, say that this is a feature specific to binyan av, since that principle is really just another name for analogy. We use analogy in every area of thought and life, and halakha is no exception. It is plausible that even without the tradition concerning binyan av, we would have used this tool of thought. An interesting question is which uses of binyan av should count as applications of a formal hermeneutical rule—that is, as something distinctive to halakhic thinking, such that without the legitimacy conferred by tradition we would not have used them—and which uses are merely ordinary analogy that we would have made in any case. We will not deal here with this interesting question, because it requires research that would include a comprehensive examination of all the expositions in which the sages explicitly state that binyan av has been used, and a characterization of what is unique about those expositions as opposed to other analogical considerations employed within halakha and outside it.

A Preliminary Methodological Inquiry: Is the Product of the Derivation an Independent Prohibition?

Let us now return to the discussion of half-measure. The exposition that teaches us the prohibition of half-measure is composed of two parts:

1. An inclusive derivation within the prohibition of forbidden fat, from which we learn that forbidden fat is prohibited in any amount.
2. An extension of the prohibition of half-measure from the prohibition of forbidden fat to the other prohibitions.

That is, we have here a use of the hermeneutic of inclusion followed by a use of binyan av.³

With respect to each of these two components, we must examine the question: what is the nature of the midrashic product? Is it an extension of the original prohibition from which it is included or learned, or are we dealing with a new prohibition? At the first stage, we ask ourselves whether the prohibition against eating a small amount of forbidden fat is simply the prohibition of forbidden fat, or a new prohibition. Afterward we ask whether the prohibition against eating half an olive’s bulk of pork is a subsection of the prohibition learned from forbidden fat, or whether it is another prohibition—a subsection of the pork prohibition, or perhaps even a third prohibition.

With respect to the hermeneutic of inclusion, we dealt with this question in the essay for Naso, 5765. We saw there that it may be disputed among the medieval authorities, Maimonides and Nahmanides. In our case two possibilities arise:

1. The prohibition against eating a small amount of forbidden fat is simply the prohibition of forbidden fat itself, except that one is not punished for it.
2. The prohibition against eating a small amount of forbidden fat is an independent prohibition, additional to the ordinary prohibition of forbidden fat, and that is why one is not punished for it. In the ordinary prohibition of eating forbidden fat there is punishment, but here one has not violated that prohibition; one has violated another one.

With respect to the second stage as well—the one based on generalization by binyan av from the prohibition of forbidden fat to the other Torah prohibitions—two parallel possibilities arise, similar to what we saw in the essay for Ki Tavo, 5766, regarding gezera shava:⁴

1. The prohibition regarding a half-measure in another prohibition, such as eating pork or eating on Yom Kippur, is the very same prohibition as in the half-measure of forbidden fat.
2. The prohibition regarding a half-measure in another prohibition is a different prohibition from the half-measure of forbidden fat.

Correlation Between the Two Questions

At first glance, these two questions appear independent. One could adopt either of the two approaches regarding the nature of inclusion, independently of what one decides regarding binyan av. Even so, there is a connection between the two questions, because both bear on our basic conception of the nature of analogy in general, and of midrashic analogy in particular.

With respect to inclusion, we saw in the essay for Ki Tavo, 5766, that Nahmanides’ view is that inclusion from the word et constitutes an extension of the original law, whereas Maimonides disagrees and holds that inclusion creates an independent law. With respect to binyan av, M. Avraham argues, in the essay mentioned above in Tzohar 15, which appears in the appendix, that Maimonides holds that analogy creates an independent conclusion, whereas Nahmanides sees the product of analogy as an extension of what is already found in Scripture itself.⁴ Thus, not surprisingly, although the connection between the two questions is not logically necessary, we still find a correlation between the positions of Maimonides and Nahmanides on both questions. In both cases, these conceptions emerge from a comprehensive position regarding the nature of analogy: does analogy uncover what is already present in the teaching source, as Nahmanides held, or does it expand what is present there and create a new principle, as Maimonides held?

Application to Half-Measure: Is Half-Measure an Independent Prohibition?

In this section we will examine the relation between these two questions from a different angle: through the actual contents involved. A priori, in light of the previous discussion, we would have expected with high probability that whoever answers the question concerning inclusion by choosing option 1 would also answer the question concerning binyan av in the same way, and vice versa. Yet examining the actual content will show that, in a two-stage derivation in which the product of the first stage serves as the teaching source for the second, the conclusions are almost necessarily reversed. We will now explain this briefly.

If the prohibition against eating a half-measure of forbidden fat is simply the prohibition of forbidden fat, and not an independent prohibition, then it is not plausible that the prohibition against eating a half-measure of pork is the very same prohibition as the one from which it is learned. It is highly implausible that eating a half-measure of pork should count as violating the prohibition of forbidden fat. By contrast, if the prohibition of a half-measure of forbidden fat is an independent prohibition—that is, the prohibition of half-measure—and is not a subsection of the prohibition of forbidden fat, then there is room to ask whether the prohibition against eating a half-measure of pork is the very same prohibition, namely the prohibition of half-measure, or whether it constitutes yet another, fourth prohibition.⁵ In that case, however, it is precisely the latter that seems implausible, because then we would wind up with three hundred and sixty-five half-measure prohibitions, metaphorically speaking, parallel to the ordinary prohibitions. Therefore, according to option 2 on the first question, concerning inclusion, it is more reasonable to adopt specifically option 1 with respect to the second stage of the derivation, the one that uses binyan av.

Thus, at least in a two-stage derivation, there is a connection between these two questions, and the map of possible answers includes only two types, not four, as one might have expected from two independent questions:

1. The prohibition of half-measure in all prohibitions of eating is an independent prohibition, and in all of them it is one and the same prohibition: the prohibition of half-measure. This corresponds to option 2 on the first question, and option 1 on the second.
2. The prohibition of half-measure in each prohibition is a different prohibition, branching out from the same prohibition that exists at the full measure. For example, a half-measure of pork is a subsection of the prohibition of eating pork. A half-measure of forbidden fat is a subsection of the prohibition of eating forbidden fat. This corresponds to option 1 on the first question, and option 2 on the second.

Halakhic Ramifications

We find both of these approaches to the law of half-measure among the decisors and commentators. Here we will mention only one example of a halakhic consequence of this dispute, in order to illustrate the point more concretely.

The decisors disagree on the question whether, when a sick person must eat something prohibited, and it is possible to feed him each time less than the minimum punishable measure—”less than the measure each time”—there is reason to do so according to the rule of “the lesser prohibition first.”⁶ For example: if a sick person can eat less than an olive’s bulk each time, is it preferable to feed him pork, which is a negative prohibition punishable by lashes, rather than terumah—produce designated for priests—which is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven, and is therefore more severe? If the prohibition of half-measure is an independent prohibition that applies across all Torah prohibitions, then there is no difference at all between eating half an olive’s bulk of terumah and half an olive’s bulk of pork: in both cases the sick person transgresses, permissibly of course, the prohibition of half-measure. By contrast, if the prohibition of half-measure is an extension of the local prohibitions, then when the sick person eats half an olive’s bulk of pork he violates the pork prohibition, and when he eats half an olive’s bulk of terumah he violates the terumah prohibition. As noted, the prohibition of terumah is more severe than that of pork, so it would be preferable to feed him a half-measure of pork.

It may be that these approaches depend on the relation between the logical reasoning and the textual derivation. The argument of “fit to be combined” is naturally understood as proof that half an olive’s bulk already possesses the quality of the full measure, and lacks only quantity. If so, then it is plausible that the prohibition being violated is the original prohibition. According to this, eating a half-measure of pork is a pork prohibition. By contrast, if one sees the main point in the inclusive derivation from “all fat,” there is more room to view the prohibition as a comprehensive and independent one.

Two Types of Binyan Av

If we look carefully, we will see that the two approaches presented above reflect two different ways of applying binyan av.

Approach A. According to this approach, we begin from an independent prohibition of half-measure that was introduced in the context of forbidden fat, and by means of extension we apply that very same prohibition—the prohibition of half-measure—to additional contexts. We do not create new prohibitions; rather, we use binyan av to extend the scope of application of an existing prohibition.

Approach B. According to this approach, by contrast, we begin from a prohibition of half-measure that is a subsection of the prohibition of forbidden fat, and by means of binyan av we create other prohibitions, different from the half-measure prohibition of forbidden fat, for additional halakhic contexts. Here binyan av does not extend the scope of application of an existing prohibition; rather, it creates additional prohibitions through analogy.

Explaining the Difference Between the Approaches

The difference between the approaches apparently begins with one’s conception of the result of the first stage of the derivation, that is, the product of the inclusion. If the prohibition created in stage one is an extension of the prohibition of forbidden fat, then the analogy tells us that we must extend the other prohibitions in the same way. By contrast, if the product of stage one is an independent prohibition, then the analogy can operate in either of the two ways—creating additional prohibitions, or extending the scope of application of the existing prohibition. As noted, an examination of the content makes it seem more reasonable, at least in our case, though it is not clear that this is always so, to choose extension of scope rather than the creation of three hundred and sixty-four additional parallel prohibitions.

These two approaches parallel the two conceptions of analogy mentioned above. According to approach A, analogy uncovers the nature of the particular case we are examining, and thereby sees it as a casuistic representative of some general principle. The prohibition of half-measure with respect to forbidden fat is not a prohibition that concerns forbidden fat alone, but all prohibitions of eating in the Torah. According to approach B, by contrast, analogy extends the conclusion beyond what is latent in the particular case from which we begin. It does not uncover what lies behind that particular, but extends it and creates a rule that contains it as one of its particular cases.

Logical Explanation and Content-Based Explanation

The explanation we proposed above is a content-based explanation. The choice between use A and use B of binyan av is based on how we understand the teaching particular, namely the half-measure prohibition of forbidden fat. But the two general approaches to analogy itself—whether it uncovers or extends—also have a general logical basis.

In the essay reproduced in the appendix, it was explained that the approach that sees analogy as uncovering understands every analogy as based on a hidden induction. When I compare the prohibition of half-measure in forbidden fat and in pork, I understand that the extension to half-measure is not unique to forbidden fat, but should characterize all prohibitions of eating in the Torah. From the fact that I understand the prohibition as relevant to all prohibitions of eating, I then infer the specific case of pork. The analogy is nothing more than a specific application of the hidden induction on which it rests.

By contrast, the approach that sees analogy as extending understands the picture in the opposite way: induction itself is based on a collection of many analogies. With respect to the half-measure prohibition, the comparison between forbidden fat and pork is made directly. Additional comparisons are made in parallel between forbidden fat and creeping creatures, blood, eating on Yom Kippur, and so forth. The result of all these comparisons is a generalization that establishes the prohibition of half-measure with respect to all prohibitions of eating. Here induction is understood as the outcome of many analogies.

The Relation Between the Two Explanations

What is the relation between these two explanations? Are the positions of the decisors in this discussion determined by theses concerning the relation between analogy and induction, or are those positions determined by the contents involved in the derivation? Is the correct explanation the logical one, or specifically the content-based one?

In the essays for Vayetze, 5765, chapter 3, and for the portions of Lekh-Lekha, Shemot, and Bemidbar, 5766, we argued that two explanatory planes do not necessarily have to contradict one another. In our case, however, the situation is different. For if we adopt the general logical approach, then we must apply it both with respect to inclusion and with respect to binyan av. We saw above that Maimonides and Nahmanides do indeed follow these approaches consistently. This apparently indicates that, with regard to their dispute, the correct explanation is the logical one—or at least also the logical one. It is a general conception characteristic of these two medieval authorities.

In our case, however, we saw that the only way to proceed with full logical consistency is to define every half-measure in every prohibition as a separate and independent prohibition. If one adopts such an approach, then one is committed to a conception of analogy as extension, both with respect to inclusion and with respect to binyan av. Yet we have not found any decisor or enumerator of the commandments who understands the law of half-measure in that way. Perhaps the reason is the need to preserve the overall count of the commandments.⁷ If so, then all the commentators and decisors in the discussion of half-measure apparently proceed in a logically inconsistent way. The content level stands in tension with the logical level: the content does not allow one to preserve full logical consistency.

Conclusions Regarding the World of Midrash in General: Ideological Casuistry

This is a common phenomenon in the halakhic world, and perhaps in human thought generally. To ground the whole system exclusively on logical foundations is problematic. True, contradictions are impossible in any system that seeks to make claims and remain consistent. One cannot act contrary to logic. But what we have here is not anti-logical thinking; it is non-logical thinking.

General rules are not necessarily exhaustive or universally applicable. The sages already taught us the rule—surprising as it may sound—”one does not derive from general statements, even where an exception is specified,” which we discussed in last year’s essay. The claim that general rules do not apply in every context, even if they are formulated in general terms, involves no inconsistency. This is ideological casuistry, whose reasons were discussed in the sources cited above. We see it here on two different planes: first, with respect to binyan av, which sees Scripture as a casuistic text; and second, with respect to our own relation to this principle—whether we ought to see it, and its modes of application, as rigid rules, or as guidance that provides a rather flexible framework for the work of the interpreter.

We saw that even one who tends to view analogy as a concrete application of induction, or vice versa, cannot assume this in a sweeping and a priori way. In every context, one must examine the matter anew and decide, in light of the contents involved in the derivation, what logical infrastructure underlies it. There is no possibility of mathematizing and completely mechanizing the plane of interpretation. As we have mentioned more than once, there is always an important place for the reasoned judgment of the interpreter and for his understanding of the contents involved, beyond the formal rules of the hermeneutical principles; see the essay for Vayechi, 5766, and elsewhere. We repeatedly encounter the fact that midrashic formalism is only a preliminary infrastructure within which interpretation takes place. It is a framework into which, and from which, the interpreting sage enters together with his entire logical, interpretive, and evaluative world.

Footnotes