V’zot HaBerachah (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — On the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Vezot HaBerakhah, 5766

Questions

1. Why are there hermeneutical principles that serve only aggadah?
2. Is there a field called aggadah (the non-legal domain of rabbinic teaching)?
3. What is the point of a negative definition?
4. What is the line that distinguishes halakhic midrash (scriptural exposition of Jewish law) from aggadic midrash?
5. Is there a distinction between aggadah and haggadah?
6. What is “midrash”?

The Principles

Juxtaposition. Analogy. Abbreviated expression.

“Moses commanded us the Torah, an inheritance for the congregation of Jacob.”
— Deuteronomy 33:4

Rabbi Simlai expounded: 613 commandments were stated to Moses: 365 prohibitions, corresponding to the days of the solar year, and 248 positive commandments, corresponding to the limbs of a human being. Rav Hamnuna said: What is the scriptural source? “Moses commanded us the Torah, an inheritance” — the numerical value of the word “Torah” is 611; “I am” and “You shall have no other gods” we heard directly from the mouth of the Almighty.
— Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 23b–24a

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

In the baraita (a tannaitic teaching) there appears a source for the number of the commandments from the verse in our portion, by means of gematria (numerical interpretation of letters). In our article we dealt with two topics: gematria as a hermeneutical principle, and the enumeration of the commandments.

Gematria is one of the hermeneutical principles, number 29, in the list of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. In the article for Parashat Balak, 5765, we discussed the principle that follows gematria in that list: notariqon (acrostic interpretation), and we mentioned gematria there as well. We also dealt there with the question whether these principles have the character of exposition or merely of hint. The conclusion there was that notariqon is a hint, and therefore it serves only in aggadic midrash. With regard to notariqon, we concluded that it is used when there is a superfluous, “available” word, one that has no independent meaning and is therefore clearly intended for exposition. We saw that with gematria the situation is more complicated.

In the commentary of the author of Keritut on the principle of gematria, Rabbi Samson of Chinon explains that Rabbi Ishmael did not count it because he disputed its validity, and he brings a source for such disagreement from the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 5a. We rejected the possibility of claiming that this principle serves only for supportive exposition. We also rejected the possibility of seeing it as a principle belonging only to aggadic midrash. We also tried to relate the disagreement to the speculative character of gematria. At first glance, one can prove almost anything in the world by gematria calculations, and therefore it is difficult to grant such a tool halakhic reliability. But in the end we rejected that proposal as well, on the basis of an examination of the discussion in Nazir there, which offers gematria an alternative that seems no less speculative.

An examination of the wording of the baraita of the 32 principles led us to the conclusion that Rabbi Ishmael disputes this principle in halakhic midrash, but accepts it in aggadic midrash. We explained that although it is possible to err in the use of gematria, the same is true of qal va-homer (argument a fortiori) and the other principles. Reasoning is what validates the results of exegetical derivations in general, and gematria expositions in particular. Sometimes the redundancy of a word can also serve as support for a gematria exposition. Sometimes, when the exegetical search is specifically for some number, that itself gives us a hint that we ought to use gematria.

We distinguished between several kinds of gematria: one based on the number of occurrences in the Torah, and one based on the numerical value of a biblical word. From the former we learn numerical data that would otherwise be missing, but we did not find that the latter yields reliable numerical results. We do not rely on it in such a delicate matter. Nor do we find that the appearance of words with the same numerical value leads us to compare two passages on the halakhic plane, as in gezerah shavah (verbal analogy).

In the second part of the article we dealt with the question why there are principles that are not used for halakhic midrash but only for aggadic midrash. We also asked why the opposite phenomenon — principles used only in halakha (Jewish law) — does not exist. Perhaps this is indeed a hint of doubt arising from the speculative nature of these principles. The standards in halakha are more stringent.¹

A conclusion that emerges from this is that one can use principles of aggadic midrash in halakha as well, in places where there is no concern for error. For there is no fundamental difference between the fields, aside from the stricter demand for reliability in the exegetical tools. Therefore we should not be surprised if we find exceptions — that is, expositions using these principles in the realm of halakha. There may be cases in which we have sufficient confidence that we have not erred, on the basis of various indications, as in the confirmatory exposition mentioned above, and in such cases we may allow ourselves to use the principles of aggadic midrash in the realm of halakha as well.²

In the second part of the article we also dealt with the enumeration of the commandments. We saw that the count is nearly agreed upon, even though the written sources for it are rather sparse.³

We then dealt with the relationship between prohibitions and positive commandments, and with the expression of this relationship in the foundational midrashim concerning the number of the commandments.

We asked why it is important at all to count the commandments, and we saw that the chief importance lies in the count itself. It gives us indirect hints about the nature of various commandments, because of the constraint that the total number must come to 613.

We concluded the article with a discussion of the character of the midrash cited above: is it halakhic or aggadic?⁴ The conclusion was not unequivocal, but it is likely that this midrash is confirmatory rather than creative. In this sense, its character fits gematria midrashim better, since tradition provides good confirmation of the reliability of the midrash, as mentioned above.

B. On Aggadah and Aggadic Midrash

Introduction

In this article, which concludes two years of Midah Tovah essays on the ways of exposition, especially halakhic exposition, we shall deal with the problematic relationship between halakhic exposition and aggadic midrash. Even two of the terms involved in this title are vague and disputed. We have not yet directly addressed the question what “midrash” is, and still less the question what “aggadah” is. It is likely that only after this conceptual clarification will it be possible to discuss halakhic and aggadic midrashim and the relations between them. But since we cannot properly clarify these concepts here, we shall try at present only to sketch the contours of these problems.

Is “Aggadah” Everything That Is Not “Halakha”?

The accepted definition of the term “aggadah” is usually set in contrast to the term “halakha.” The assumption, of course, is that the concept “halakha” is unambiguous and well understood, and many have tried to use it in order to define “aggadah.” But that assumption too is not so simple, as is evidenced by the many apparently halakhic Talmudic conclusions that do not appear in the halakhic codes, and by the disputes over quite a few such conclusions.⁵ In Alei Shur, Rabbi Wolbe defines as halakha everything that appears in the rulings of Rabbi Isaac Alfasi, and everything else as aggadah. This definition is highly problematic, both because Alfasi is not a good measure for such a definition — if only because he does not bring laws that are not practiced in our time, even though no one disputes that they belong to the realm of halakha — and because of the implicit assumption that everything that is not halakha is aggadah.

And indeed, the definition usually offered for the term “aggadah” is a negative one: everything that is not halakha is included in aggadah. This negative definition has roots throughout the literature of the Sages, among the Rishonim (medieval rabbinic authorities), and certainly among the Aharonim (later rabbinic authorities) and modern scholars.⁶

The Problems with This Definition

In his article, Lifshitz raises several difficulties regarding the negative definition. The main one is that this definition does not help us understand the positive content of the field of aggadah. But this difficulty begs the question, for it assumes that this field does indeed have positive characteristics — something that those who advocate the negative definition presumably do not accept.

But one could also raise a logical difficulty with this definition. Lifshitz opens his article with the statement, found in Jerusalem Talmud, Hagigah 1:8 and parallels:

“One does not issue rulings on the basis of halakhot, nor on the basis of haggadot, nor on the basis of supplementary teachings, but only on the basis of the Talmud.”

And similarly in Jerusalem Talmud, Horayot 3:5:

“A master of aggadah neither forbids nor permits; he neither declares impure nor declares pure.”

The Sages tell us that one does not derive halakha from haggadot. But according to the negative definition, this is nothing more than a tautology: one does not derive halakha from what is not halakha. If we do not want to see this saying as a mere tautology, we must infer from this rule that aggadah, or haggadah, has positive characteristics.

More generally, any characterization that can be given to the term “aggadah” in its negative sense will be no more than the negation of some characterization of halakha. It is not plausible that there should be something that positively characterizes this whole domain, beyond the fact that it is not halakha. To sharpen this further, let us discuss the matter from the standpoint of the hermeneutical principles.

The Principles of Aggadic Midrash

As we have already mentioned more than once, the author of Sefer Keritut explains the difference between the 32 hermeneutical principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean and the 13 principles of Rabbi Ishmael, and offers several lines of explanation. Some of the principles are disputed, and were therefore not included by Rabbi Ishmael. Others are regarded as plain meaning rather than exposition. A third group among the 32 principles are principles of aggadic midrash only, and were therefore not included in Rabbi Ishmael’s baraita. From his words it emerges that there are hermeneutical principles that serve only aggadic midrash and not halakhic midrash. For example: abbreviated expression, “from above,” “by parable,” “by contrast,” and others. Regarding some of these principles, the author of Keritut writes that they are intended only to elucidate the verses, and that no laws are learned from them.

But how are we to understand this characterization, if the meaning of “aggadah” is simply everything that is not halakha? At most, one could say that these principles cannot serve halakhic midrash. But how can they be designated for aggadic midrash, if that category includes so many different fields? Now if these principles were self-evident methods, and tradition merely came to tell us not to use them with respect to halakha, then they would automatically remain principles of aggadic midrash. But a considerable number of these principles are not intuitive, and it seems evident that they are part of the tradition that we received together with the Torah itself at Sinai. If so, how can these principles be specific to aggadic midrash, when that term includes quite a number of subfields? What do all those subfields share?

What Does the Negative Definition of the Term “Aggadah” Include?

Let us examine the negative definition in greater detail. What does the Torah include beyond halakha? Various sources speak of theology, that is, understanding divinity; matters of faith and wisdom; maxims; parables; witty sayings; human nature; ethics and values; interpretation of Scripture; stories; and the disclosure of historical events not found in Scripture, such as Abraham in the fiery furnace, and the like.

But already here one can see that we must distinguish among these different fields. Some of them do not concern Scripture at all, such as many aggadic passages in rabbinic literature. Some designate only form and genre, not content — for example, maxims, parables, and the like. Let us focus more sharply: to which of these fields can one apply the principles of aggadic midrash at all? Quite clearly, only to a mode of learning that elucidates the verses, in the language of the author of Keritut, or brings out of them matters hidden within them. Of course, the contents can concern divinity, ethics, good conduct, hidden biblical events, and the like. In fact, this is the field that Lifshitz calls “haggadah,” as opposed to “aggadah,” which is the study of divinity and the hidden.

If so, the principles of aggadic midrash are tools intended for the interpretation of the non-halakhic parts of the Torah. In Lifshitz’s terminology, we shall call them “the principles of haggadah.” There is no point in dividing this definition into subfields, since it is a definition concerned with form rather than content. These are analytical tools, and the contents uncovered by them can belong to different subfields of aggadah.

Why Are These Principles Not Useful for Halakha?

Why indeed are these principles not used for the halakhic parts of the Torah? Some perhaps because of their ambiguity. It is difficult to rely on inferences based on these principles in a way that would allow us to permit the forbidden or forbid the permitted. Halakha requires a higher threshold of reliability. See the discussion of this in our articles for Parashat Balak and Vezot HaBerakhah, 5765–5766.

With regard to some of the other principles, the reason is far more prosaic, as the author of Keritut writes concerning several of them. Let us take as an example the principle of “abbreviated expression,” principle 9:

“By abbreviated expression — how so? ‘And I have gone from tent to tent and from one tabernacle’ (1 Chronicles 17). It should have said, ‘and from one tabernacle to another,’ but Scripture spoke briefly. When is a passage interpreted by abbreviated expression? When the matter definitely requires it to be said. Similarly, ‘And David longed to go out’ (2 Samuel 13). It should have said, ‘David’s soul longed to go out,’ but it spoke briefly. Although there is no proof for the matter, there is a reminder of the matter: ‘My soul longs, indeed faints’ (Psalms 84).”

Concerning this principle, the author of Keritut explains why Rabbi Ishmael did not include it in his count:

“This principle entails neither leniency nor stringency, but only the elucidation of the verses and their meaning. Therefore Rabbi Ishmael did not count it. This tanna counted matters of haggadah, for that is the elucidation of the verses and their meaning.”

If so, the reason that this principle is not used in halakhic midrash is simply that, in practice, its use has no halakhic consequences. This principle serves to elucidate the verses, not to derive new laws. Within these comments, Rabbi Samson of Chinon offers us a definition of the term “haggadah”: the elucidation of the verses and their meaning. This is very similar to Lifshitz’s proposal mentioned above.

Distinguishing Between the Different Contexts of the Discussion

It is important, however, to emphasize that our concern here is with the term “haggadah” or “aggadah” in the context of aggadic midrash, not in rabbinic literature in general. In that literature these terms appear in several quite different senses, and therefore a large part of the disagreement between Frankel and Lifshitz stems from the fact that they assume a uniform meaning for the term “aggadah” everywhere. That assumption is entirely unreasonable, especially in a field as varied and context-dependent as aggadah. Here, in Midah Tovah, we are naturally concerned mainly with this context.

Several Questions About the Relation Between Halakhic and Aggadic Midrash

After focusing the discussion on the field of aggadic midrash, or haggadic midrash, we must ask ourselves several general questions about this field and its relation to halakhic midrash:

• Why do these two fields come under the same heading, “midrash”? What do they share?
• Can we learn something from this about the meaning of the term “midrash” in general?
• How far can one carry this comparison? For example, are there expositions in the field of aggadah that should be treated as asmakhta (a scriptural support rather than the true source), as opposed to full expositions? Are there any full expositions in aggadah at all?

What Is “Midrash”?

The method adopted by Lifshitz is etymological. He tries to characterize the field of aggadah and haggadah, as opposed to halakha, through the meaning and etymology of the terms “aggadah” — which, according to him, derives from a root meaning “bound,” and hence hidden — and “haggadah” — which, according to him, derives from a root meaning “telling” or “explaining Scripture,” that is, what Scripture tells us.⁷

If we adopt that approach with respect to midrash, it would seem that the root d-r-sh appears in Scripture and in the literature of the Sages chiefly in the sense of searching and inquiry; some connect it to the root meaning “to thresh.” Among the Sages there is “examination and inquiry,” meaning the probing of witnesses’ statements, or of reports concerning an idolatrous city. Its source is in Scripture: “You shall inquire and investigate thoroughly; and behold, if it is true and the matter is established…” Likewise with regard to a lost object: “until your brother seeks it,” in the sense of searching. And similarly regarding Rebecca: “She went to inquire of the Lord,” and many more examples.

If so, according to this proposal, midrash is the search and inquiry into what is hidden in the verses and not found on their surface. To expound Scripture is to thresh it. In this sense it is quite clear that both halakhic midrash and aggadic midrash seek something hidden between the folds of the biblical text.⁸

Continuing the Comparison: Aggadic Asmakhta

With regard to halakha, we know that the hermeneutical principles were transmitted to us by Moses at Sinai; see our articles on Parashat Lekh Lekha and Nitzavim, 5765, and elsewhere. Presumably, the modes of using those same principles were transmitted together with them. Therefore it is clear that there are canonical uses of the principles of exposition and uses that are not canonical. Uses according to the rules are full expositions, and the laws learned from them have the status of biblical laws, according to most opinions, aside from Maimonides’ view. If we make non-standard use of the principles of halakhic exposition, the resulting laws are rabbinic laws, and the exposition is only an asmakhta. As we saw in the article for Parashat Yitro, 5765, asmakhtot must be defective expositions from the standpoint of the rules of exposition.

Several times over the last two years we have emphasized that an exposition is not the logical-mechanical result of applying the hermeneutical procedures. Clearly, the mechanical and canonical ways of using the principles are only a framework, within which and into which the interpreter’s reasoning enters. The result of midrash is the combined operation of these two tools. For example, gezerah shavah, verbal analogy, is a rule that tells us that if there are two identical words in two contexts, we should compare them. But that principle does not tell us with respect to what we should compare them. Here the interpreter’s reasoning must enter. The principle is a textual hint to make a comparison or a generalization, but the actual execution is the product of the reasoning of the sage who expounds.

What happens when there is interpreter’s reasoning, by virtue of which he compares two contexts, but the hermeneutical basis for that comparison is shaky? It would seem that here too the exposition will be an asmakhta, even though its conclusion is probably correct. Perhaps such a law will be considered a law based on reasoning rather than on exposition, and the exposition serves merely as an asmakhta for it.⁹

In the field of aggadah, the situation is much more ambiguous. In the interpretation of the non-halakhic parts of the Torah there is much more room for the reasoning of commentators, and it may be that more expositions are merely asmakhtot for such reasoning. Some have concluded from this that the entire world of aggadic midrash does not possess a status comparable to that of halakhic midrash. The word “derashah,” or “derush,” has become for many, including medieval and later authorities, a synonym for mere reasoning without a real source, something without real substance.¹⁰

The feeling is that aggadic midrash is no more than the interpreter’s game, in which he does with the text as he pleases. He decides what he wishes to say, and afterward finds a more or less dubious anchor for his claims in Scripture by means of vague hermeneutical methods. Well known are statements of the Geonim and others — see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. “Aggadah,” note 28 and following; Lifshitz, chapter 3; and Seridei Esh, vol. 4, “On the History of the Translations,” chapter 2, and more — that attribute all these expositions to the interpreter’s own reasoning, and therefore do not attach much importance to them.

This is reinforced by the fact that, regarding the principles of aggadic midrash, we have no clear source indicating that they are in the category of halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, a law transmitted to Moses at Sinai. This stands in marked contrast to the existing consensus with regard to the principles of halakhic exposition.

And Yet: Aggadah as Torah Given to Moses at Sinai

In light of the mechanism we proposed above, it seems that the fact that these expositions rely on the interpreter’s reasoning does not mean that they are “inventions.” Even in halakhic midrash we clearly see a strong dependence of the halakhic results on the reasoning of the interpreter. Clearly, some aggadic midrashim are indeed of the nature of asmakhta in the first sense — a support for rabbinic law, or an exposition that does not really claim to reveal what is present in Scripture — but that does not mean that there are no aggadic midrashim of other kinds.

Indeed, although we did not find references to the principles of aggadic midrash, we did find references to aggadah itself as part of Torah. For example: “The words of Torah are all one: Scripture, Mishnah, halakhot, and aggadot” — Sifrei, Ha’azinu. Or: “Mishnah is threefold: Talmud, halakhot, and aggadot” — Tanhuma, Yitro. We also find that it too was transmitted to Moses at Sinai: “And all of them were said to Moses at Sinai” — Jerusalem Talmud, Megillah 4:1. So too Rabbi David ben Zimra in Responsa, part 4, no. 232.

If so, there is certainly room to view the principles of aggadic midrash as hermeneutical tools that were likewise transmitted to us at Sinai, like the principles of halakhic exposition. And of course, like those principles, they too underwent generalization, abstraction, and conceptualization.

There are, however, two kinds of statements with respect to such expositions that require examination:

1. One does not derive halakha from such expositions, for the Sages tell us: “One does not derive from haggadot.” But this is not necessarily because they are not true or not reliable. It may simply be because halakha is not their concern. Sometimes the moral or historical lesson can be learned specifically on the basis of a legal position that was not accepted in practical halakha.
2. There is no formal legal ruling in questions of aggadah. See the article for Parashat Bemidbar, 5766. At first glance this suggests a conception according to which these are not questions of truth and falsehood, and everyone is equally right. But one can show that in halakha as well this is the case,¹¹ and therefore this too is not a sufficient basis for distinguishing halakha from aggadah.

Halakhic Conclusions from Aggadic Midrashim

As we saw above, the rule is that one does not derive halakha from aggadic midrashim. However, there are aggadic midrashim from which halakhic conclusions can be drawn, and some have indeed done so.¹² An example of this we saw in the article for Parashat Devarim, 5765–5766, where halakhic conclusions regarding Ammon and Moab can be learned from a midrash that appears to be aggadic.

Are these exceptions? Or perhaps, despite their aggadic appearance, they are in fact halakhic midrashim. In our articles on Parashat Devarim, we raised the possibility of viewing that midrash as halakhic. Likewise, in last year’s article on Vezot HaBerakhah, we hesitated over the midrash about the 613 commandments, which also has a great many halakhic implications, at least de facto.

We shall now look at several examples of cases in which the distinction between halakhic and aggadic midrash is extremely blurred.¹³

Magnifying Sins

The Rivash, in Responsum 171, states that it is the way of the Sages to magnify sins so that a person will guard himself against failing in them. For example, the Sages say in Babylonian Talmud, Arakhin 15b:

“Whoever speaks slander incurs guilt equivalent to the three sins of idolatry, sexual immorality, and bloodshed.”

And likewise in Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 40a:

“Rabbi Akiva went out and expounded: Whoever does not visit the sick is as though he sheds blood.”

And there are many more statements of this kind. Clearly, one cannot derive full halakhic conclusions from such passages; these are statements meant to stress the gravity of those sins.

However, we do find a case in which the Tosafists derive a halakhic conclusion from such a statement. The Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 10b states:

“It is preferable for a person to cast himself into a fiery furnace rather than publicly shame his fellow.”

Now in Tosafot there, s.v. “Noaḥ,” it is determined that this transgression falls under the category of “be killed rather than transgress,” like idolatry, sexual immorality, and bloodshed. They connect it to bloodshed, and the discussion is well known. This is admittedly a minority view; see Rabbi Sperber, pp. 197–205. But it nevertheless demands explanation. Would the Tosafists say something similar regarding the previous citations? Would slander, or baseless hatred, which was also equated with the three grave sins, and the failure to visit the sick, likewise be matters of “be killed rather than transgress”? Presumably not.

The Question of the Distinction

If so, what is the line that separates aggadic statements from halakhic statements? Most of these citations are not midrash in the sense of scriptural exposition. They are not “haggadah” in Lifshitz’s terminology. However, with regard to public shaming, Rashi on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 59a, s.v. “She is brought out,” explains that this principle is learned from the story of Tamar. Here there was room to see the matter as a plain interpretation, perhaps not even as midrash, and yet according to most opinions this is still not halakha.

The question of the distinction arises in the Talmud itself. In Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 10a, we find a statement of Rabbi Yohanan:

Rabbi Yohanan said: If a teacher is exiled, his academy is exiled with him. Is that so? But Rabbi Yohanan said: From where do we know that words of Torah provide asylum? As it is said, “Bezer in the wilderness,” and immediately afterward it is written, “And this is the Torah.” This is no difficulty: here it refers to a time when one is engaged in Torah, and there to a time when one is not engaged in Torah. And if you wish, say: What does “provide asylum” mean? It means protection from the angel of death.

At the beginning of the discussion, this saying is understood as a halakhic statement, for it is used to challenge the law that when a teacher is exiled, as an inadvertent manslayer, his academy is exiled with him. The same follows from the answer that distinguishes between a case in which one is engaged in Torah and one in which one is not. But later in the discussion it is explained that the intention of this saying is actually aggadic, concerning rescue from the angel of death. If so, the wording of the statement does not indicate whether it is aggadic or halakhic. Here too, the matter rests on an exposition of the verses “Bezer in the wilderness” and “And this is the Torah.” This is a kind of analogy between two adjacent verses, or an exposition based on juxtaposition; see our article on Parashat Kedoshim, 5765.¹⁴

On the other hand, see a sharp distinction between halakhic exposition and aggadic exposition from the same verse in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 60b, concerning “If fire breaks out and finds thorns.”

As for the question of the criterion by which to distinguish between the two fields, we remain uncertain.

Footnotes