Shemot (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

---

With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve, Parashat Shemot, 5765

Please note: Sections 1-2 here are relevant both to the book and to the printed page.

1. The principles discussed here, for the side box:
   – Binyan av (an inference from a paradigm) from one text.
   – Binyan av from two texts.
   – The common denominator.

2. The questions in the subtitle:
   – What is “binyan av from one text” and from “two texts”? Who is the “father,” who is the “son,” and where is the “building” here?
   – Is the common denominator simply a shared feature? How does it operate?
   – The relevance of refutations in the scheme of the common denominator.
   – What is the refutation from a stricter aspect, and why does it not collapse the entire structure?
   – Can each law in the Torah have only one reason?
   – Was every divine speech to Moses preceded by the call, “Moses, Moses”?
   – The Torah teaches proper conduct: between courtesy and practicality.

3. The sources, not only those quoted in full, but every reference:
   – Bible:

   • Exodus 3:4.
   • Exodus 19:20-21.
   • Leviticus 1:1.
   • Rabbinic literature:
   • Sifra, Parashat Vayikra, Dibbura de-Nedavah, section 1.
   • Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 4b.
   • Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 25b.
   • Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 6a.
   • The baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s hermeneutical principles.
   • Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 115b-116a.
   • Exodus Rabbah, section 46; and there, section 19.
   • Commentators:
   • Rashi on Leviticus 1:1.
   • Rashi on Genesis 2:24.
   • Tosafot, s.v. “for,” on Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 32b.
   • Shitah Mekubetzet on Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 32b.
   • Ritva on Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 4b.
   • Rashi, Ra’avad, and Saadia Gaon on the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s hermeneutical principles, under the principle of binyan av.
   • Rosh on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma, chapter 1, section 1.
   • Halikhot Olam, gate 4.
   • Middot Aharon, chapter 4; and there, chapter 2, part 9.
   • Sefer Ha-Keritot, section 3.
   • Shelah, Oral Torah, “The Principle of a Fortiori Inference.”
   • Hiddushei Maran Riz HaLevi on Maimonides, Laws of Monetary Damages.
   • Shoshanat Ha-Amakim, Rabbi Yosef Teomim, author of Pri Megadim, rule 1.
   • Ginat Veradim, Rabbi Yosef Teomim, author of Pri Megadim, rule 18.
   • External:
   • Philosophy of Natural Science, Carl Hempel, translated by Gad Freudenthal, The Open University, chapter 4.
   • “Induction and Analogy in Halakha,” Michael Avraham, Tzohar 15.
   • Two Carts and a Balloon, Michael Avraham, pp. 404-406; see also the appendix there.

4. Points raised in the article regarding the hermeneutical principles:
   – Three different ways of understanding the scheme of the common denominator.
   – The logical assumption behind the principle of the common denominator, and the refutation from a stricter aspect.
   – Binyan av from one text and from two texts: the similarities and the differences.
   – The meaning of the term binyan av, and its connection to the scheme of the common denominator.
   – Whether the common denominator that begins with an a fortiori inference is itself an a fortiori inference or a binyan av.
   – Induction and analogy in the hermeneutical principles.
   – The demand that refutations be relevant: even the slightest refutation.
   – Three types of exposition: aggadic, halakhic, and exegetical.
   – “Two texts that come as one do not teach” versus “the common denominator.”
   – The reasons why a necessity relation is required between the two teaching sources in the common denominator.
   – A two-stage formulation of an exposition from the common denominator: repeated attempts at binyan av from one text, and only afterward the demonstration that both sources are necessary.

5. General points raised in the article:
   – The Torah teaches proper conduct.
   – A call precedes speech.

6. Points for research and further study, whether to examine suggestions made in the article or more generally in light of the article:
   – The differences between binyan av from one text and from two texts.
   – The general relation between analogy and induction, and their appearances in the principle of binyan av.
   – The meaning of “even the slightest refutation,” and why specifically in the common denominator. In which other principles can such a refutation be used, and in which can it not?
   – Occurrences of the common denominator: one-stage and two-stage formulations.
   – Exegetical midrash as a distinct category between aggadic exposition and halakhic exposition.

7. Concepts and keywords:
   – Proper conduct.
   – Refutation: in relation to the common denominator and to binyan av.
   – Even the slightest refutation.
   – Generalization.
   – Exegetical midrash.

8. Philosophical concepts and foreign terms:
   – Analogy.
   – Induction.

Please note sections 1-2 above. They are relevant both to the weekly printed page and to the book.

A. The Common Denominator

And the Lord saw that he had turned aside to look, and God called to him from within the bush and said, “Moses, Moses,” and he said, “Here I am.”
— Exodus 3:4

“And He called” and “He spoke”: He placed the call before the speech. Is this not a logical inference? “Speech” is said here, and “speech” is said at the bush. Just as the speech mentioned at the bush was preceded by a call, so too the speech mentioned here was preceded by a call.
But no: can you say this of the speech at the bush, which was the first of the speeches, and then say the same of the speech at the Tent of Meeting, which was not the first of the speeches? The speech at Mount Sinai proves otherwise, for it was not the first of the speeches, yet a call preceded the speech there.
But no: can you say this of the speech at Mount Sinai, which was addressed to all Israel, and then say the same of the speech at the Tent of Meeting, which was not addressed to all Israel? You are therefore reasoning by binyan av: the speech at the bush, which was the first of the speeches, is not like the speech at Mount Sinai, which was not the first of the speeches; and the speech at Mount Sinai, which was addressed to all Israel, is not like the speech at the bush, which was not addressed to all Israel. Their common denominator is that both are divine speeches addressed to Moses, and in both a call preceded the speech. So too every divine speech addressed to Moses was preceded by a call.
But perhaps their common denominator is that both are divine speeches from within fire addressed to Moses, and in both a call preceded the speech. If so, that would exclude the speech at the Tent of Meeting, which was not from within fire. Therefore Scripture says: “And He called … and He spoke” — He placed the call before the speech.
— Sifra, Parashat Vayikra, Dibbura de-Nedavah, section 1

“And He called to Moses, and the Lord spoke” — why did He place a call before the speech? The Torah teaches proper conduct: a person should not say anything to another unless he first calls him. This supports Rabbi Hanina, for Rabbi Hanina said: A person should not say anything to another unless he first calls him.
— Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 4b

Introduction

The central midrash (rabbinic interpretation) cited above discusses an exegetical question: whether and when the Holy One called to Moses before speaking with him, and from where we learn this. The midrash deals with God’s call to Moses at the beginning of the book of Leviticus, before his entry into the Tent of Meeting. We witness a multi-stage process in which, although a call indeed always precedes speech, in the end this cannot be derived as a general principle. The conclusion of the midrash is that this requirement cannot be learned from Mount Sinai or from the bush, and therefore the Torah itself, at the beginning of Leviticus, explicitly states that the Holy One called to Moses before speaking with him in the Tent of Meeting. Although the midrash does not say this explicitly, it already appears from here that one may infer a general principle: that the Holy One always preceded speech to Moses with a call.

It is difficult to classify this midrash on the axis between aggadah (non-legal rabbinic teaching) and halakha (Jewish law). It does not deal with aggadah, but neither is it easy to find in it a legal discussion. It is a purely exegetical discussion, dealing with a factual question: whether, and when, the Holy One called to Moses before speaking with him. This immediately raises a substantive difficulty: why is this apparently banal fact important to the interpreter? The interpreter is not supposed to search for the color of Moses’ clothing or any other factual detail, even if it could be extracted through the tools of exposition. So what exactly is the point of this midrash’s interest in the question whether the call preceded the speech?

In parallel midrashim, such as the passage in Babylonian Talmud, Yoma cited above, one learns from here a lesson in proper conduct: one should not begin speaking to another person before first calling him. Such a midrash already resembles, at least somewhat, a halakhic midrash, even though formally this directive is not included in halakha. It is a behavioral instruction that teaches proper conduct. Thus this is a factual-exegetical midrash situated between the category of halakhic midrash and the category of aggadic midrash.

One may ask about the logic of that second midrash: how does the interpreter know that proper conduct is really the reason why the Holy One preceded speech with a call? Might this not have been done for more prosaic reasons? Perhaps the Holy One called him simply because He wished to draw his attention. It is not plausible to classify such a practical principle as a foundational element in the hermeneutical principles and in “proper conduct.” On the other hand, it is genuinely unclear what “proper conduct” the Torah seeks to teach us in these verses. We shall now examine the scheme of the main midrash in greater detail, and at the end we shall return to the questions raised here.

The Scheme of the Common Denominator and the Course of Our Midrash

The structure of the midrash is complex, and at its center stands a scheme known to the sages as “what common feature do they share,” or “the common denominator.” In this kind of learning we derive a conclusion from two different sources. We shall begin by sketching the scheme of this kind of inference, and then illustrate it through the midrash before us.

Let us denote the two teaching sources by M1 and M2, and the context that we wish to learn about by L. We want to learn that property T exists in L because it exists in both teaching sources.

Stage A: the exposition from M1 to L. The inference begins with an attempt to derive the presence of property T in the learned case L from its presence in one teaching source, M1. Such a scheme sometimes uses binyan av, that is, an analogy between the teaching source and the learned case, and sometimes this stage rests on an a fortiori inference, that is, on a relation of lesser and greater stringency between M1 and L. If this inference is valid, then the conclusion is established and the midrash is complete.

In our midrash: M1 is the revelation at the bush, the property T is the precedence of the call over the speech, and the learned case L is the Tent of Meeting. At the first stage the midrash attempts to derive the precedence of the call from the bush to the Tent of Meeting. The form of exposition here looks like an analogy rather than an a fortiori inference, since the midrash gives no hint of a hierarchical relation of greater or lesser stringency between the two contexts.¹

Stage B: the first refutation. Sometimes a refutation is found against the initial inference. For example, M1 may possess a unique property X that does not exist in L, and perhaps it is precisely because of X that M1 has property T. If so, we cannot yet conclude that T exists in L as well, since L lacks X.

In our midrash: property X is that the speech at the bush was the first divine speech to Moses, “the first of the speeches.”² The refutation claims that perhaps this is precisely why the Holy One was careful to precede the speech with a call at the bush. In other words, X characterizes M1, the revelation at the bush, and perhaps property T, the precedence of the call, existed there only because of that special property X. If so, we cannot learn from here that the Holy One always preceded speech to Moses with a call.

Stage C: the exposition from M2 to L. At this point we bring in the second source, M2, in which X is absent but T nevertheless exists, and we try to learn from it that T exists in L as well. The basic necessity is that M2 not contain X. If it did, we would gain nothing from this stage, and it would be rejected by the same refutation as its predecessor. As we shall see below, the absence of X from M2 has an additional significance.

In our midrash: M2 is the revelation at Mount Sinai. There too a call preceded the speech, as it is said: “The Lord called to Moses … and the Lord said to Moses …” (Exodus 19:20-21). At Mount Sinai this was not the first speech, and therefore the exposition cannot be refuted here in the same way as at Stage A. If this argument were valid, the midrash would now be complete.

Stage D: the second refutation. Here another refutation arises, for example property Y, which characterizes M2 but not L. This blocks the inference of Stage C, since it is possible that the presence of Y in M2 is what causes the presence of T there as well. Therefore, regarding L, which does not have Y, we cannot infer that T will be present there. This is exactly parallel to the refutation of Stage B.

In our midrash: property Y is that the speech was directed to all Israel. Only at Mount Sinai was the divine speech addressed to all Israel; not at the bush, and not at the Tent of Meeting, where the speech was directed only to Moses. The refutation claims that perhaps it was precisely because the speech was to all Israel that there was a need to call Moses before speaking, unlike the case of the Tent of Meeting. Once again, one cannot derive from Mount Sinai that a call always preceded speech.

Stage E: learning from the common denominator. We now arrive at the main stage of the scheme of the common denominator. The midrash uses both sources together and performs a kind of miracle: what could not be done with either source alone is achieved by joining the two. This is done without using any additional information. How does that work?

To understand this, let us return to our earlier observation that the unique property X, which blocked the inference from M1, is absent from M2, and the unique property Y, which blocked the inference from M2, is absent from M1. Above we saw that the absence of X from M2 is necessary so that the inference from M2 not be rejected in the same way as the inference from M1. Now we can see that this has another crucial role. In fact, it is the decisive factor in every scheme of the common denominator.

The inference now returns to M1, from which we again try to learn to L, just as in Stage A. But now one can no longer object on the basis of M1’s unique property X, because the second source, M2, proves that X is irrelevant. It shows that X is not what causes the presence of T, since M2 itself lacks X and yet still has T. Of course, one may reverse the roles of M1 and M2 and obtain another valid scheme.

This description opens three possibilities for understanding the mechanism of the common denominator:

1. The learning proceeds as in Stage A: from M1 to L, while M2 merely removes the refutation based on X.
2. The learning proceeds as in Stage C: from M2 to L, while M1 merely removes the refutation based on Y.
3. The learning is different from both previous attempts: ultimately we have ruled out the claims that either X or Y is what causes T. It therefore follows that what causes T is the common denominator shared by the two sources, and from that common denominator we learn to L.

These three possibilities are described schematically in Figures A-C. The meaning of Figure D, and of the various symbols surrounding the figures, will be clarified below.

In our midrash: the speech at Mount Sinai was not the first speech to Moses, and therefore M2 lacks X. Yet we still see there that a call preceded the speech. Hence the firstness of the speech is not what causes the precedence of the call, and we may therefore return and learn it again from the bush, M1. The refutation of Stage B no longer stands, since X, firstness, has now been shown to be irrelevant to the presence of T. The same applies to learning from Mount Sinai: the revelation at the bush shows that speech to all Israel is not a relevant parameter for the precedence of a call, since at the bush there was no speech to all Israel and yet a call still preceded the speech.

Summary of the midrash. A scheme of the common denominator usually ends with an explicit summary by the interpreter, who concludes from the two contexts that the common denominator in the two sources is apparently what caused property T, and therefore T also exists in L, since the common denominator characterizes L as well. The unique properties missing from L, X or Y, have been shown to be irrelevant to T.

Stage F: a refutation of the common denominator. At the conclusion of our midrash there is yet another stage, after the derivation from the common denominator. This stage does not belong to the basic scheme itself, which normally ends at Stage E. In this final stage the midrash refutes the common denominator by identifying a property Z that characterizes both teaching sources, M1 and M2, but not the learned case L. This refutation works according to the same logic as the earlier refutations of Stages B and D: perhaps property T in both teaching sources is due to their possession of Z, and therefore even from the two together we cannot conclude that T exists in L, which does not possess Z.

In our midrash: property Z is speech from within the fire. At Mount Sinai and at the bush the speech came from within the fire, and perhaps that is precisely why the Holy One preceded the speech there with a call. But with respect to the Tent of Meeting, where the speech did not come from within the fire, we cannot infer that a call also preceded the speech there.

As noted, the conclusion of the midrash is that one cannot derive from Mount Sinai and the bush, whether separately or together, that a call also preceded the speech in the Tent of Meeting. Therefore the verse at the beginning of Leviticus had to state this explicitly: “And He called to Moses, and the Lord spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting, saying.” As we noted in the introduction, from this point one can apparently derive a general principle.

B. The Two Forms of Binyan Av and Their Relation to the Principle of the Common Denominator

Binyan Av

In the terminology of the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael, the scheme of the common denominator belongs to one of the hermeneutical principles called binyan av. In the list of principles, two principles appear under this heading: “binyan av from one text” and “binyan av from two texts.” The medieval authorities divide into two main camps in their interpretation of these principles:

1. One camp, represented by Rashi, Saadia Gaon, and Ra’avad in their commentary on the baraita of principles in Sifra, explained “binyan av from one text” as an analogical inference from one source to another place that resembles it, like Stages B and D of the exposition described in the previous section. According to this approach, “binyan av from two texts” is the structure of the common denominator, which learns some property from two sources together, as described above.
2. Others, such as Sefer Ha-Keritot, section 3; Halikhot Olam, gate 4, citing “some who say”; and Middot Aharon, chapter 4, hold that ordinary analogy is not included in the list of principles at all, because it involves no real novelty. According to this view, both forms of binyan av are structures within the scheme of the common denominator. The difference between them lies only in whether this is “from one text,” meaning that the two teaching sources are found in one verse or within one subject, or whether they appear in two different contexts in the Torah.³

At first glance these two camps differ only on a semantic level, in how they understand the names of the principles. But it turns out that they probably differ in several additional respects as well, for example in their understanding of the term binyan av itself, and as a consequence also in logic.

As noted, the two camps explain the term binyan av in different ways.

1. According to the first camp, binyan av is an analogy, whether from one source or from two sources. But what is the “building” when there is only one teaching source? Presumably the “building” is the teaching source together with the learned case, both of which are particular instances of some “father,” namely the common denominator. This is also the meaning when there are two teaching sources. The teaching sources and the learned case are all derived from one parental principle, and are therefore described as belonging to one building.

It may be that binyan av from one text is an analogy, that is, a comparison from one particular to another. But it is more likely a generalization based on a single datum, for otherwise the interpretive process is only a relation between two particulars, and the term “father” has no meaning.⁴ Binyan av from two texts is certainly induction, that is, generalization: from two sources we infer a general phenomenon. In any event, on this approach the “building” is created by the exposition itself, through all three stones together: the two sources and the learned case.

2. By contrast, according to the second camp, the term binyan av describes only inferences of the common-denominator type. A conception of this sort probably arose because here the “building” is the structure created by the two sources even before the exposition itself. Therefore both principles must express a two-source scheme.

Indeed, some of the commentators in this camp explain the term binyan av in precisely this way: the “building” is the two teaching sources, which form a structure by means of a common stone placed upon both of them, namely their common denominator.⁵ Thus, unlike the previous direction, here the “building” exists even before the exposition and is composed of the two sources, M1 and M2, while the common denominator is what connects them. They explain the term “father” through a biological analogy: a father acts upon his child through an intermediate, namely the mother. The father acts upon the mother, and she acts upon the offspring. Thus the two teaching sources generate the common denominator, which is the “son,”⁶ and from it one learns to all the cases characterized by it. According to this approach, then, the common denominator of the two teaching sources is described as the “son,” not the “father.” It is born from the two teaching sources, and from it one learns to all similar cases. The “father,” on this approach, is the teaching source M1, not the common denominator. The second source, M2, is the “mother,” and the common denominator is their “son,” from whom we learn to all similar cases. Thus the father acts upon the offspring through the mother.

It seems that these two approaches also express two distinct logical conceptions of the scheme of the common denominator:

1. According to the first camp, the true teaching source, the “father,” is the common denominator. The two teaching sources are merely different manifestations of it, from which one forms, by generalization, the broader class characterized by the same property that constitutes the common denominator. A mechanism of this sort is described in Figures C-D.⁷
2. According to the second camp, the true teaching source is one of the teaching sources, M1 or M2, the “father,” and not the common denominator. The second source, the “mother,” merely helps from the side by removing the refutation based on X, as in Figures A-B, and takes no part in the inference itself. The common denominator, the “son,” is the true learned entity, which includes within it all the other contexts learned from the sources, such as L, as particular cases. Mechanisms of this kind are described in Figures A-B. It may be that, according to this approach, the term better suited to the scheme is “what common feature do they share,” which is also used to describe it, rather than “the common denominator.”

The distinctions we have presented between the two camps may be summarized as follows:

• Camp 1: Rashi, Saadia Gaon, Ra’avad
• “From one text”: generalization from one text.
• “From two texts”: generalization from two texts.
• Logic of the common denominator: Figures C-D.
• The “father”: the common denominator.
• The “building”: the teaching sources together with the learned case.
• When the “building” is formed: only as the result of the exposition itself.

• The “son”: the learned case, L.

• Camp 2: Sefer Ha-Keritot, Halikhot Olam, Middot Aharon

• “From one text”: the common denominator from nearby sources.
• “From two texts”: the common denominator from distant sources.
• Logic of the common denominator: Figures A-B.
• The “father”: M1.
• The “building”: the two teaching sources together with the common denominator that connects them.
• When the “building” is formed: before the exposition itself, from the teaching sources alone.
• The “son”: the common denominator, including L.

An Implication for Cases in Which the Sources Have Different Characteristics

Beyond the semantic differences and the logical divergence, it now appears that the different schemes may also lead to different legal implications. A clear case arises when the two teaching sources have different characteristics, and the question then becomes which characteristics we will assign to the learned case. If the inference is from M1, then L will have the characteristics of M1 and not those of M2. But if the inference is from the common denominator, then L will have the characteristics of both. Let us now present a brief schematic example of such a case.

This is precisely the situation in the context of the primary and derivative categories of torts. There are several primary categories of damage, each of which has special characteristics; that is, each is exempt in a certain circumstance different from the circumstances in which the others are exempt. For example, fire is exempt for damage to concealed property, and a pit is exempt for damage to vessels. What will be the the law of a form of damage learned as a derivative of these two primary categories? Which exemptions, if any, will apply?

The Rosh, in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma, chapter 1, in the middle of section 1, cites a three-way dispute on precisely this point. The issue concerns a discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 6a, dealing with a derivative category learned from fire and pit by way of the common denominator:

1. Some great authorities hold that the derivative case, that is, the learned case, has the special characteristics of both teaching sources. In other words, it would be exempt both for vessels and for concealed property.
2. Some were uncertain about the matter. From their wording it appears that one of the possibilities they entertained was that the derivative would have no exemptions at all, for this view is presented as contrasting with the first even before the Rosh’s own third view is cited.
3. The Rosh himself holds that the derivative has only the exemptions of pit, because it is learned primarily from pit.

The view of the Rosh is clear: he understands the common denominator in the way described in Figures 1A-B. He also proposes a criterion for deciding between A and B: which is the primary teaching source, that is, which source is more similar to the learned case. Those who were uncertain apparently understood the common denominator, at least as one of the possibilities they entertained, as in Figure 1C.⁸ The great authorities understood the common denominator as described in Figure 1D. The learned case emerges from the two teaching sources themselves, not from the common denominator, and therefore it has the exemptions of both. In more precise terms, liability can be imposed in the learned case only in a situation where both sources would have incurred liability. This is a combination of two partial analogies.

Another Implication: The Status of the Common Denominator When Stage A Begins with an A Fortiori Inference

Let us briefly present one more clear implication of this dispute. As noted, the scheme begins with Stage A, an inference from M1 to L. This stage can employ either an a fortiori inference or an analogy. In cases where Stage A is an a fortiori inference, the commentators disagree whether the final inference thereby produced has the status of binyan av, as written by Halikhot Olam, gate 4, chapter 2, and by Middot Aharon, chapter 2, part 9, or the status of an a fortiori inference, as written by the Shelah in Oral Torah, under the principle of a fortiori inference, and by Middot Aharon there in the name of Rabbi Yosef Almosnino.⁹

It is quite clear that if we learn from the common denominator itself, then after the two teaching sources are joined together we indeed have binyan av, a non-hierarchical comparative inference from the common denominator to the learned case. But if M2 merely removes the refutation raised against the inference from M1, then in the end the original inference from M1 remains in force, and what we have is an a fortiori inference.¹⁰

The Logic of the Common Denominator: The Refutation from a Stricter Aspect

The medieval authorities note that there is an inherent problem in the scheme of the common denominator.¹¹¹² At first glance, any inference of this type can be refuted by what they call a refutation from a stricter aspect: what can you say of M1 and M2, since each contains some stricter aspect? More precisely: what can you say of M1, which has X, and of M2, which has Y? Would you say the same of L, which has neither X nor Y? In ordinary language: perhaps property T, which characterizes both M1 and M2, derives in M1 from its possession of X and in M2 from its possession of Y. If so, even from the two together one cannot infer that T exists in L, since L has neither X nor Y, and perhaps therefore lacks T as well.

Tosafot in Ketubot, who raise this objection, give a technical answer: if one were to make this objection, then there would be no place at all for the principle of the common denominator. It is a refutation that attacks the very foundational assumption of every inference of this sort. Tosafot do not explain why, in fact, this objection is not made. What, then, is the rational basis of the scheme of the common denominator?

It seems that this scheme assumes a sweeping principle about halakha: for every legal rule there can be only one cause. Put differently: it is impossible for the same legal rule to have two different causes. From this assumption it follows clearly that the rule T cannot be caused in M1 by X and in M2 by Y. If it exists in both, then there must be a common reason shared by both, that is, a common denominator, and that is what causes the rule. From this we can learn that T exists in other contexts as well, such as L.¹³

This is, in itself, a very interesting claim about halakha, and perhaps it also has broader philosophical implications, for example with respect to concepts of causality.¹⁴

C. The Torah Teaches Proper Conduct

Returning to the Midrash: The Relevance of Refutations

Let us now return to the midrash quoted above. At its end, in Stage F, a refutation appears according to which the property common to both teaching sources, namely that the Holy One preceded speech with a call, is attributed to the fact that the speech came from within fire. Therefore one cannot infer from here anything about the speech in the Tent of Meeting, which did not come from within fire.

This raises the question of the relevance of the specific properties used as refutations. In Stage A the interpreter wishes to learn that the Holy One preceded speech with a call, from the passage of the bush to the speech in the Tent of Meeting. He rejects this in Stage B on the ground that the bush involved God’s first speech to Moses. This is a relevant refutation, since it is highly plausible that when the Holy One first addresses Moses He first calls him and only then begins speaking. In Stage C the second source, Mount Sinai, is introduced. In Stage D the inference from there is refuted on the ground that at Mount Sinai the speech was to all Israel. This too seems relevant, since when the Holy One speaks before all Israel He must call Moses in order to direct his attention to the fact that He is speaking to him personally. Thus these two are cases in which it is entirely plausible that the Holy One would precede speech with a call.

But with regard to the final refutation, it is not clear what relevance this property, speech from within fire, has to our subject. Is there some reason that the Holy One would precede speech with a call specifically when speaking from within fire?

Our assumption is that the properties used in refutations, X and Y, must be relevant to the property being learned, namely T. For example, it would make no sense to offer the following refutation: what can you say of Mount Sinai and the bush, since the letter samekh appears in both names? That parameter is irrelevant to the question whether the call precedes the speech.¹⁵

Difficulties in the Course of the Midrash

In light of what has been said here, it seems that there are several difficulties in the course of the midrash:

1. We have already noted that this is not a halakhic midrash. Does the rule that the same phenomenon cannot have two different causes also hold in aggadah? And what about exegetical midrash, since, as we noted, the present case does not really look like aggadic midrash either?
2. Another side of the same difficulty: why is it really not plausible to make here the refutation from a stricter aspect and say that perhaps the Holy One called Moses only when He first began speaking to him, or when He wished to draw his attention from within a crowd of listeners? Does every divine act have only one reason? Put differently: the precedence of a call in these two cases may indeed have had one common reason, namely the desire to draw Moses’ attention, but that reason does not apply in the Tent of Meeting. If so, why does the interpreter, at this stage, before the refutation based on Z arises, think that one can learn from those two cases to the Tent of Meeting?
3. Finally, it is not clear why the fact that at Sinai and at the bush the speech came from within fire is relevant to our subject, namely the precedence of the call. Why should speech from within fire require a preceding call more than any other form of speech?

The Course of the Midrash: The Torah Teaches Proper Conduct

It seems that the answer to these difficulties lies in the lesson the midrash wishes to teach. Above we connected our midrash with the passage in the Talmud, cited earlier, which teaches us the obligation to precede speech with a call as a matter of proper conduct. The simple impression is that the midrash comes to teach us that one should call a person in order to draw his attention when necessary. But the interpreter assumes that such a lesson is trivial and therefore superfluous. He concludes that the Torah wishes to teach something altogether different: the obligation to precede speech with a call is an obligation grounded in courtesy and proper conduct, not merely in practicality. As anyone who reflects on the matter will notice, when Reuven begins speaking to Shimon without first addressing him, that is offensive and disrespectful behavior. Hence the instruction to call Shimon before beginning to speak to him, out of proper conduct.

In light of this, the course of the midrash is as follows. The interpreter wishes to teach us that the Holy One preceded speech with a call specifically in the Tent of Meeting. That is the focus of the midrash, because only there is there no other reason for such behavior apart from considerations of proper conduct.¹⁶ The initial inference is from the bush. Here a refutation arises: perhaps at the bush the call was only because this was the first address. That is, perhaps it was done for practical reasons rather than out of proper conduct. In any event, even if the reason there involved proper conduct, it could be learned only with respect to a first address from Reuven to Shimon. In the Tent of Meeting this was not the first address, and thus we still have not achieved our goal.

The midrash then brings Mount Sinai, where the speech was not the first speech, yet the Holy One still preceded it with a call. Here too a similar refutation arises: perhaps this was done for purely practical reasons, in order to draw Moses’ attention from within the whole assembled people standing there. The midrash now examines the two sources together and constructs the “building,” or the common denominator. First, it determines that each source is necessary and cannot be learned from the other. If one could be learned from the other, then these would be “two texts that come as one,” and nothing could be learned from them at all. See the page on Parashat Toledot.¹⁷

Thus, in both sources the reason for the call may indeed be practical. But if that is so, then the whole discussion is trivial. More than that: if in both sources the same reason is at work, then they amount to two texts that come as one. We therefore have two sources in which speech is preceded by a call, but in each the circumstances are different. The conclusion is that neither of the two practical reasons is sufficient by itself to explain the precedence of the call. That is the logical assumption of the common denominator. It therefore seems that the reason lies in what the two cases share. At first glance, however, they seem to share nothing, if we ignore the trivial practical factor. We therefore conclude that there is a general obligation of proper conduct, not mere practicality: in every situation we must precede speech with a call. Hence the same is true of the Tent of Meeting.

It should be noted that the cumbersome formulation of this midrash is unusual. After trying to learn from each side separately and refuting each attempt, the midrash establishes the necessity of both teaching sources, and only at the end learns from the two together. Usually a scheme of the common denominator appears either in the form of the first half alone, namely the double attempt to learn from the sources to the learned case, or in the form of the second half alone, namely the argument that both sources are necessary. It seems that there is a wish here to emphasize that this exposition is not an inference from one teaching source while the other merely removes refutations, as in Figures 1A-B. It is an inference from the common denominator of the two. In other words, the midrash emphasizes that what we have here is an inference from a shared feature of both teaching sources, a feature that also exists in the learned case, namely the Tent of Meeting. What is that shared feature? The obligations of proper conduct.

But at the end of the midrash, after the entire learning process based on the common denominator, another refutation is raised: both teaching cases involve speech from within fire. If so, we still have no proof that proper conduct requires one to call a person before speaking to him, since perhaps this was done because of the fire.¹⁸ If we assume that this exposition must yield a nontrivial conclusion, namely a norm rather than a practical instruction, then even the slightest refutation is enough to undermine it.¹⁹

The midrash ends by saying that there is in fact no way to learn this from the two teaching sources, and therefore the verse itself must explicitly state that here too the Holy One preceded the speech with a call. But why did He indeed do so? The midrash in Exodus Rabbah, section 46, answers by telling of three things that Moses did on his own initiative and to which the Holy One assented:

He further expounded and said: If at Mount Sinai, whose sanctity was only temporary, He did not speak with me until He called me, as it is said, “And the Lord called to him from the mountain, saying,” then all the more so at the Tent of Meeting. The Holy One knew this and called him, as it is said, “And He called to Moses.”

Thus we see the conclusion of our midrash stated explicitly: in this verse the Torah taught proper conduct, and that is exactly our point.²⁰

Returning to the Relation Between the Midrashim

We began this page with a difficulty in the first midrash: why is it important to know that the Holy One preceded speech with a call in the Tent of Meeting? We then moved to a difficulty in the second midrash: from where do we know that there is an obligation of proper conduct to precede speech with a call? The conclusion we have now reached is that the first midrash answers the second. The first midrash explains how we know that the precedence of the call is the result of considerations of proper conduct rather than mere practicality. By contrast, the second midrash answers the difficulty that arose in the first: why is the discussion important at all? “The Torah teaches proper conduct.”

A Call in Two Voices

The Midah Tovah association was founded in recognition of three facts:

1. The importance and necessity of the various hermeneutical principles as a foundation for understanding the halakhic discourse in rabbinic literature, and the Talmudic and Jewish discourse more generally, including in our own time.
2. Following the teaching of Rabbi Ha-Nazir, of blessed memory, we see in the methods of exposition a unique Hebrew logic, one that also has universal dimensions, and whose loss has affected additional dimensions of Jewish life ever since the close of the Talmud.
3. In principle, there is no obstacle to using the hermeneutical principles in regular learning and in halakhic decision-making even today, apart from the obstacle created by lack of knowledge and skill. As far as we know, ordination or any other formal condition is not required for this.

From a methodological standpoint, we see important potential in this kind of research, both in the yeshiva world and its traditional mode of study, and in the academic world and its accepted research methods, and especially in combining these two approaches in an effort to draw the best from both.

In light of these principles, we set out to publish the weekly Midah Tovah newsletter, which would express these principles to the best of our ability and would arouse public interest, as well as the interest of institutions and individuals who could contribute to this field. Of course, the newsletter is not based on systematic research, nor on comprehensive knowledge, and therefore we view it more as a catalyst than as a source of information.

In light of the favorable and interested responses of many readers, we now wish to take one further step and move to a more systematic study of the various methods of exposition and their significance. To that end we have decided to establish two additional platforms that will advance this trend: books of collected essays, and a journal.

We note that the weekly newsletter will continue to appear regularly for the time being, alongside these two additional platforms.

We also wish to inform interested readers that we have begun building an indexed database of all expositions in rabbinic literature. Such a database is an essential basis for systematic research into the hermeneutical principles. Once established, it will, with God’s help, be made available to all students of Torah everywhere.

Anyone who can assist us — whether with advice, knowledge, or in any other way (Gabi: should we add “financial,” or leave this vague?) — is asked to contact us at the e-mail address appearing in the newsletters.

Gabi, should we add that articles already published elsewhere will not be accepted, or should we say that their publication will be considered case by case?

Should we not open a separate box, or sub-box, for articles?

We need to prepare a guideline sheet for the book series and the journal, so that it will be ready for inquirers immediately after the Parashat Shemot announcement.

Call for Papers — No. 1

The editors of Midah Tovah intend, with God’s help and without making a vow, to publish a series of books devoted to the study of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded. One or more volumes will be devoted to each principle, according to need and developments.

The order of appearance of the books will probably follow the order of the thirteen principles in the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael.

A call is hereby extended to rabbis, researchers, and all who are able, to contribute from their writings, knowledge, and reasoning, and to participate in this important project. The first volume will be devoted to the principle of a fortiori inference.

Suggested topics for research and writing:

1. Types of a fortiori inference: “if two hundred, then one hundred”; an a fortiori inference from places.
2. The characteristics of the rabbinic a fortiori inference. Is there an Amoraic a fortiori inference and a Tannaitic a fortiori inference? Different manifestations.
3. The parts of the a fortiori argument, its scheme, and its logic.
4. The logical status of the a fortiori inference: syllogism, analogy, or something else. Its relation to ordinary human logic.
5. The halakhic status of the a fortiori inference: punishment derived from logical inference; rabbinic law or biblical law.
6. May a person derive an a fortiori inference on his own?
7. Types of refutations and the ways they work: structure, logic, manifestations — inclusion, circularity, as in “an a fortiori inference from places” in the Mishnah on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 24b, displacement or transformation of an a fortiori inference, objections from the initial legal premise and from the final legal premise.
8. Its relations to other principles: learning a learned rule from another learned rule; even the slightest refutation.
9. The history and development of the a fortiori inference.
10. Foundational laws in rabbinic literature and afterward that are based on a fortiori inference.
11. The rule of dayyo: logic or interpretation, legal or otherwise. History, the rules of dayyo, disputes about it in rabbinic literature and afterward, and its various manifestations.
12. A bibliography on the a fortiori inference: books and articles, both in rule literature and in research literature.
13. Can this principle be used today?

Call for Papers — No. 2

The editors of Midah Tovah intend, with God’s help and without making a vow, to establish a journal that will deal with various topics related to the hermeneutical principles.

The journal will not deal with programmatic declarations, journalism, or vague and unargued assertions, however important they may be.

A call is hereby extended to rabbis, researchers, and all who are able, to contribute from their writings, knowledge, and reasoning, and to participate in this important project.

Suggested topics for research and writing:

1. Research on a particular hermeneutical principle: philology, logic, history, and its relations with other hermeneutical principles. See the details above in Call for Papers No. 1 as a general model.
2. The logical character of the principles in general.
3. The relation between exposition and plain meaning.
4. Hermeneutics: the relation to other forms of legal interpretation and to interpretive theory in general.
5. Internal classification of the system of principles.
6. The relation between different systems of principles.
7. Different methods and disciplines, and their combination in the study of the principles.
8. Bibliography on particular principles and on the principles in general.

General Guidelines for Both Calls

The journal and the book series are open to writers of every shade and orientation. However, every article will undergo a process of review and criticism as a condition for publication in the journal.

There is no a priori restriction on the discipline or method used in the articles, whether philology, history, halakha, yeshiva-style conceptual analysis, philosophy, logic, mathematics, or anything else.

The topics may be varied, but what is required is systematic treatment and a good level of argument, both in terms of sources and in logical terms.

For articles not yet written, we recommend contacting the editors before writing, in order to avoid disappointment and misunderstanding. Each inquirer will receive more detailed guidelines.

Assistance on particular topics is possible, according to need and ability.

We shall be happy to help create collaborations, interdisciplinary and otherwise, among interested parties of whose existence we become aware.

Please send the articles, typed in Microsoft Word, to the e-mail address appearing in the Midah Tovah newsletters.

Footnotes

In fact, there is also a third reason. The two sources M1 and M2 are known particulars on which we base a generalization. In order for the generalization to be more persuasive, we need to support it by two particulars of different character. This is the criterion called, in philosophy of science, “diversity of evidence.” See, for example, Philosophy of Natural Science, Carl Hempel, The Open University, at the beginning of chapter 4. It is quite clear that this reasoning is related to the understandings expressed in Figures C-D, whereas the first two reasons are more closely related to the understandings expressed in Figures A-B.

We may add that, according to the second camp, this may well be the root of the difference between binyan av from one text and binyan av from two texts. We saw above that according to this view, “from one text” means from the same context, while “from two texts” means from two different contexts. What is the difference between these two cases? Why are there two separate principles in the list if the logical scheme is similar? It is quite plausible that an inference based on one context is an analogy, whereas an inference from two different contexts is a generalization, that is, induction, and therefore requires diversity, namely that both contexts be necessary. As noted, this gives a stronger basis to the generalization. This proposal requires extensive research, and we therefore raise it here only as a possibility.

Here the consideration is presented as Moses’ courtesy toward the Holy One, yet it is still the same interpretive move and based on the same source. We may note that, on this line, there is a good possibility for explaining refutation Z, namely that the speech was from within the fire. For when Moses is meant to enter the fire in which the Holy One is present, he will not enter until he is called into the holy place. Therefore the Holy One calls him. But at the Tent of Meeting Moses is not entering a place of fire; he is simply speaking with the Holy One. Here one might have thought that perhaps there was no need to precede speech with a call.