Vaera (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — On the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Va’era, 5765

Over the past week I studied a talmudic discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 28a, dealing with the implications of the fundamental dispute whether one expounds by the rule of general, particular, and general, or alternatively by inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion.

Naturally, I turned to your wonderful book in order to see the analysis underlying the issue, and indeed I found a discussion of the distinction between the two schools of interpretation on this subject. On p. 198 there is a paragraph entitled “The Relation between the First General Term and the Last General Term,” and I was convinced that this chapter would contain an analysis of the dispute found in the discussion in Eruvin. It turns out, however, that in that paragraph you discuss a different dispute found in tractate Hullin, and do not address the dispute in Eruvin at all.

Since you are in the habit of expanding, in the weekly portions, on things you have written earlier, I would suggest—if it seems appropriate to you—that in the upcoming portion of Va’era you expand the wonderful analysis you presented and address as well the internal dispute within the school of Rabbi Ishmael: whether “the first general term is operative” or “the last general term is operative.”

While you present, rightly, the principled distinction between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva—whether the three-stage derivation forms a structure that amplifies the particular, or rather a structure that restricts the general—within this very dispute there are two opinions even within Rabbi Ishmael’s own tradition. The analysis above is not necessary, and the dispute in Eruvin can be viewed differently.

I would be very glad to hear your response to this topic, especially how the dispute in Eruvin is integrated into the general thesis proposed in your book.

David Kurzweil.

Please note: items 1-2 here are relevant both to the book and to the printed page.

1. The hermeneutical rules under discussion (for the side panel):
   – General and particular.
   – General, particular, and general: you derive only what is similar to the particular.
   – Inclusion and exclusion.

2. The questions in the subtitle:
   – Why is it important to know which waters were affected by the plague of blood?
   – Is “you derive only what is similar to the particular” an expansive directive or a restrictive one?
   – What is the relation between “similar to the particular” and “only what is in the particular”?
   – What is the difference between the school of Rabbi Ishmael, which expounds “generals and particulars,” and the school of Rabbi Akiva, which expounds “inclusions and exclusions”?
   – What is the meaning of an analogy? Is it a direct comparison, or the unpacking of a hidden generalization?
   – What does the family of general-and-particular rules reflect?

3. Sources:

• Scripture:
  • Exodus 7:19.
• Rabbinic literature:
  • Sifra, Vayikra, Dibura de-Nedava, parashah 1.
  • Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 66a.
  • Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 35b.
  • Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a.
  • Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 45b.
  • Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 50a.
  • The Baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s Hermeneutical Principles.
  • The Baraita of Examples.
  • Shemot Rabbah 9:11, and there also 9:10.
  • Midrash HaGadol on Exodus 7:19.
• Commentators:
  • Rashi on Exodus 7:19.
  • Tosafot, on “Ika,” Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 35b.
  • Ravad on the Baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s Hermeneutical Principles, on the rule of general and particular.
  • Rashi on Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 45b-46a; Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 50b.
  • Rabbenu Hananel on Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a.
  • Glosses of the Vilna Gaon on Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a.
  • Torah Shelemah on Exodus 7:19.
  • Radal on Shemot Rabbah 9:10-11.
• Secondary literature:
  • “Induction and Analogy in Halakha,” Michael Avraham, Tzohar 15.
  • Kol HaNevu’ah, fourth essay, sections 22-23.
  • The book on Roots 1-2.
  • A. J. Heschel, Torah Min HaShamayim BeAspaklaria Shel HaDorot.

4. Points raised in the essay regarding the hermeneutical rules:
   – A. Two different methods for understanding the scheme of general, particular, and general.
   – B. The logical root of the rule of general, particular, and general.
   – C. The relation between the methods of exposition used by the schools of Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva: from the particular to the general, or from the general to the particular.
   – D. Are there additional rules of aggadic exposition beyond the thirty-two rules of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean?
   – E. Is general, particular, and general an expansive rule or a restrictive one?
   – F. What practical directives does Rabbi Ishmael give regarding the application of the rules of general and particular?
   – G. General, particular, and general when the first general term is not equal to the last general term.
   – H. The relation between the Baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s Hermeneutical Principles and the Baraita of Examples, and the origin of the Baraita of Examples.
   – I. Is “you derive only what is similar to the particular” a practical directive, or part of the name of the rule?
   – J. Why do practical directives not appear in the other general-and-particular rules?

5. General conceptual points raised in the essay:
   – A. The relation between analogy and induction.
   – B. Different kinds of analogy.
   – C. The acts of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the acts of human beings.
   – D. What contracts ritual impurity, and the character of the sources of ritual impurity.
   – E. Specification and interpretation.

6. Points for research and further study:
   – A. The general relation between analogy and induction, and its appearances in the rule of “general and particular.”
   – B. The mechanisms of the general-and-particular rules, and the relations among them.
   – C. Does the dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva also exist in aggadic exposition, and if so, how?
   – D. The school of Rabbi Akiva proceeds from the general to the particular, whereas the school of Rabbi Ishmael proceeds from the particular to the general.

7. Concepts and key words:
   – A. Generalization.
   – B. Specification.

8. Concepts in philosophy and foreign terms:
   – A. Analogy.
   – B. Induction.
   – C. Deduction.

Please note the two items 1-2 above. They are relevant both to the weekly printed page, and not only to the book.

A. “General, Particular, and General”

The Lord said to Moses: “Say to Aaron: Take your staff and stretch out your hand over the waters of Egypt—over their rivers, over their Nile-channels, over their pools, and over all their reservoirs of water—and they shall become blood; and there shall be blood throughout all the land of Egypt, in the wood and in the stone.”

Exodus 7:19

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: “General, particular, and general—you derive only what is similar to the particular. ‘Over the waters of Egypt’—this is the first general term. ‘Over their rivers, over their Nile-channels, and over their pools’—this is the particular. ‘And over all their reservoirs of water’—this is another general term. What do you include? Everything that resembles them.”

Shemot Rabbah 9:11

“And stretch out your hand over the waters of Egypt, over their rivers, over their Nile-channels, and over their pools”—everything that is in the river, in the pools, and in the rivers. “And over all their reservoirs of water”—what is in a jug. “And there shall be blood throughout all the land of Egypt”—even if an Egyptian spat, it was entirely blood.

Shemot Rabbah 9:10

Introduction

The verse cited above expresses the fact that the plague of blood struck all of Egypt, in every location and in every type of site—even in wood and stone. See Rashi here, who explains this as referring to water in wooden and stone vessels in houses. following this verse, many midrashim (rabbinic expositions) discuss the question of which waters in Egypt were transformed into blood during the plague. The expositors address this question in different ways and also arrive at different conclusions. Some go so far as to say that if a Jew and an Egyptian drank from the same vessel, the water in the Egyptian’s mouth became blood. The same is said of fruit juices, and of the saliva that every Egyptian spat out.

Above we cited two of the many such midrashim. The second midrash addresses this question through forms of amplification that are difficult to classify under any defined hermeneutical rule. It is possible that in that midrash there is no interpretive derivation at all, but rather a plain-sense reading. The first midrash quoted above, by contrast, uses the rule of “general, particular, and general,” one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded. This rule appears among the thirteen principles of Rabbi Ishmael, but it does not appear in the list of the thirty-two principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, which are usually classified as the principles of aggadic exposition. Against that background, it is interesting to note that our midrash is a clear case of aggadic exposition, and from this we see that “general, particular, and general” is a rule used in aggadic exposition as well, and not only in legal exposition. We also see that the principles of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean do not encompass all the principles of aggadic exposition. It is possible that here too lies the distinction between the interpretive principles of the school of Rabbi Ishmael and those of the school of Rabbi Akiva.

This midrash raises several questions. For example: why is it so important to know in which bodies of water the plague of blood struck, and in which it did not? What is meant by the words “those similar to them,” which indicate the full range of places where the plague struck? It is also unclear why the Torah divides the description in this verse in what appears to be an artificial way. At the beginning of the verse there appears the linguistic structure of “general, particular, and general,” and then there appears a further generalization—“and there shall be blood throughout all the land of Egypt”—followed by several additional objects, “in the wood and in the stone.”

There is another question, touching the hermeneutical rule that appears here. The directive that follows the rule of “general, particular, and general” in Rabbi Ishmael’s list is: “you derive only what is similar to the particular.” At first glance this is a restrictive rule. We restrict the general term by excluding everything that is not similar to the particular. Yet our midrash concludes with language that points specifically to amplification rather than restriction: “What do you include? Everything that resembles them.” How are we to understand this?¹

Perhaps the matter depends on the angle from which we view this structure. If we begin from the two general terms at the sides, then the enclosure of a particular between them narrows the scope of meaning. But if we begin from the particular enclosed in the middle, then we may say that the general expressions on either side expand the meaning beyond what is included in the particular itself. In the end, in both approaches the scope of the interpretive result lies between the scope of the particular and the scopes of the general terms that envelop it. Therefore it can be regarded both as amplification and as restriction.

At the outset, let us become more closely acquainted with the rule of “general, particular, and general,” which has not yet appeared in our discussions.

“General, Particular, and General” — You Derive Only What Is Similar to the Particular

In the Baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s Hermeneutical Principles, at the beginning of the Sifra, several principles appear that concern the relation between the particular and the general:

“General and particular; particular and general; general, particular, and general—you derive only what is similar to the particular; a general term that requires a particular, and a particular that requires a general term.”

It is worth noting that in all these principles only the name of the rule appears—a name defined on the basis of the linguistic form in Scripture to which it refers—but the practical instruction for how to apply the relevant rule to that linguistic form does not appear. Such an instruction appears only in the rule of “general, particular, and general,” where Rabbi Ishmael himself gives us the practical directive: “you derive only what is similar to the particular.”²

Perhaps the reason is that this directive provides an indirect definition for all the general-and-particular rules. It is also possible that this is not really an instruction for operating the rule at all, but rather part of the name of the rule. According to this suggestion, the name of the rule is: “general, particular, and general—you derive only what is similar to the particular.” A possible reason for this could be that perhaps there are other appearances in Scripture with the structure of “general, particular, and general,” in relation to which we must proceed differently—for example, when the last general term differs from the first, as we shall discuss below.

After the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael, which enumerates the thirteen principles, there appears the Baraita of Examples.³ There all the principles are spelled out, and examples are also given of how the rule operates. In our case it appears there as follows:

“How does ‘general and particular’ work? ‘From the animals’ is a general term; ‘from the cattle and from the flock’ is a particular. In a general followed by a particular, the general contains only what is in the particular. How does ‘particular and general’ work? ‘If a man gives his fellow a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep’ is a particular; ‘or any animal, to keep’ is a general term. A particular followed by a general becomes a general that adds to the particular. How does ‘general, particular, and general’ work? ‘And you shall spend the money for whatever your soul desires’ is a general term; ‘for cattle, for flock, for wine, or for strong drink’ is a particular; ‘or for whatever your soul asks of you’ returns and gives a general term. In a general, particular, and general, you derive only what is similar to the particular, teaching you that just as the particular explicitly refers to something that derives from what grows from the earth and is sustained by the soil, so too I include only anything that derives from what grows from the earth and is sustained by the soil, excluding mushrooms and truffles.”

The terms “general” and “particular” in these hermeneutical principles refer to modes in which words appear in Scripture. The rule of “general, particular, and general,” which concerns us here, refers to a linguistic structure that begins with a term that describes a general category—the “first general term”—followed by one or more terms that describe particulars, and finally another term that describes a general category—the “last general term.” In our example, “the waters of Egypt” is a general expression; “their rivers,” “their Nile-channels,” and “their pools” are three particular expressions; and finally “all their reservoirs of water” is the general expression that closes the structure. This is the biblical linguistic structure with which the rule of “general, particular, and general” deals.⁴

The wording in this baraita indicates that the closing clause, “you derive only what is similar to the particular,” is a practical directive and not part of the name of the rule. If so, we remain with the question: why is it only in this rule that the baraita spells out the practical directive? As we suggested above, perhaps this directive somehow contains within it guidance for all the rules that concern the relation between the general and the particular, and thus serves as a general summary for them. Indeed, from observing the language of the baraita it seems that all these structures operate according to the same principle, implemented in accordance with the form that appears in Scripture. It should be noted that the Talmud in several places remarks that the mode of exposition called “generals and particulars” belongs to the school of Rabbi Ishmael. By contrast, the school of Rabbi Akiva expounds those same linguistic phenomena differently, in what is called “inclusions and exclusions,” as we shall see below.

How the Rule Works

Understanding the logic and mode of operation of this rule is very complicated, and depends on different interpretations of the discussions in Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 66a and Nazir 35b—whether the last general term is primary, or the first general term is primary, and so forth. There are even opinions according to which, with respect to the rule of “general, particular, and general,” there is no dispute at all between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva. Here we shall try to present the standard explanations found in the anonymous talmudic discussions, and to address only the general scheme, and even that only briefly. To do so, we turn to Rashi in Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 50b and Sanhedrin 45b-46a. In both those discussions, and see also Shevuot 26a, Rashi explains the exposition of the school of Rabbi Ishmael through “generals and particulars,” and over against it the exposition of the school of Rabbi Akiva through “inclusions and exclusions.”

Let us begin with the rule of “general and particular.” This rule is applied to a two-stage biblical linguistic form, in which there appears a general term followed by a particular term. The Baraita of Examples gives the practical instruction regarding such a form: “the general contains only what is in the particular,” that is, only the particular itself, with no further expansion. This stands in contrast to the instruction in the rule of “general, particular, and general,” which is: “you derive only what is similar to the particular,” that is, everything that resembles the particular.

Rashi in the discussions mentioned above explains that according to Rabbi Ishmael, who expounds through “generals and particulars,” in such a case the particular interprets the general that precedes it. Rashi writes that the word “particular” is from the root meaning interpretation. Apparently his intention is that the particular specifies the preceding general, and thereby interprets it. Therefore, the general contains only what clearly characterizes the particular, and one may not extend the conclusions beyond that, not even to what merely resembles the particular. Therefore, in the rule of “general, particular, and general,” where a second general term appears after the particular, it returns and includes everything that resembles the particular: “you derive only what is similar to the particular.” This explanation of the second stage is explicit in the discussion in Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 35b, which explains the conclusion by noting that otherwise the second general term would add nothing.

By contrast, the school of Rabbi Akiva, which expounds by inclusion and exclusion, understands the particular in the two-stage structure as a restriction on the scope of the general term, and not as an interpretation of it. Therefore, already in the two-stage structure we are in a situation where the scope includes everything similar to the particular—something that for Rabbi Ishmael is achieved only as the result of the three-stage structure of “general, particular, and general.” If so, we must now understand why the Torah adds the final general term. According to the school of Rabbi Akiva, the final general term comes to include beyond that, and in practice we return to the original scope. If so, why was this restrictive structure needed at all? Rashi answers this in the discussion in Sanhedrin 46a, s.v. “for a curse,” that in the end we exclude one thing—apparently the thing that it is most reasonable to exclude from the general category.⁵

The conclusion is that according to the school of Rabbi Akiva the three-stage structure indeed works symmetrically: restriction followed by amplification. Yet the whole structure is intended to exclude one detail, or one type of case, from the first general category. By contrast, according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael the three-stage structure works asymmetrically: interpretation, not restriction, followed by amplification. Yet the whole structure is intended to expand the particular into a group that includes everything similar to it. Viewed as a whole, according to Rabbi Ishmael the structure amplifies the particular, while according to Rabbi Akiva it restricts the general. These are precisely the two possibilities we described above in the introduction, except that now it is clear that there is a real difference between them in the scope of the interpretive result.⁶

The two mechanisms may be summarized in the following table:

School	First stage	Second stage	Third stage
School of Rabbi Ishmael	General term	Interprets: only the particular itself	Includes: everything similar to the particular
School of Rabbi Akiva	General term	Restricts to: everything similar to the particular	Includes: the entire original general term, except for one item

It should be noted that from the approach of Rabbenu Hananel in Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a—and this also seems implied by the Glosses of the Vilna Gaon there—it appears that he understood the dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva differently.⁷ According to his view, both understand the two-stage rule of “general and particular” in the same way: the particular interprets the general, and the result is only what is exactly identical to the particular, not everything “similar to the particular.” Their dispute concerns only the question whether the second general term expands the particular minimally—to the level of “similar to the particular”—or whether it expands it in the maximal possible way, almost back to the original general category, except for one thing, for otherwise the whole structure would have no significance. According to Rabbenu Hananel, both structures are interpretation and amplification; the dispute is only about how much amplification there is.

School	First stage	Second stage	Third stage
School of Rabbi Ishmael	General term	Interprets: only the particular itself	Includes: everything similar to the particular
School of Rabbi Akiva	General term	Interprets: only the particular itself	Includes: the entire original general term, except for one item

It should be noted that the claim of the school of Rabbi Akiva that a two-stage structure of “general and particular” is intended to restrict the scope relative to the general term, and define it as the domain of “what is similar to the particular,” is problematic. If only the particular itself had been written, we would have reached the same conclusion, for by analogy from a paradigm case we would learn from the particular to everything similar to it. If so, the question arises: what purpose does the first general term serve?

Several early authorities raise this problem—see Ravad in his commentary to the Baraita of the Principles, and Tosafot, s.v. “Ika,” Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 35b, and others—and answer that the purpose of the first general term is to prevent expansion of the particular by analogy from a paradigm case. It seems that precisely because of this problem Rabbenu Hananel argues that the two-stage structure is not disputed, and that its function is interpretive. That is, if only the particular had been written, I would expand it by analogy from a paradigm case, and therefore the Torah writes in the form of “general and particular” in order to prevent that and establish that the particular may not be expanded.

According to Rashi, however, the difficulty remains: why, according to the school of Rabbi Akiva, do we need the first general term? From another angle, one can raise the opposite objection against the school of Rabbi Ishmael, whether according to Rashi or according to Rabbenu Hananel. According to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, the three-stage structure teaches us to judge “similar to the particular.” But that is exactly the result we would have obtained if the Torah had written only the particular, and we had expanded it by analogy from a paradigm case. If so, the entire structure is superfluous.

These questions take us more deeply into the discussions in Nazir 35b and Hullin 66a, which is not the place to analyze in detail. Let us say only in general that there are several different kinds of similarity between two contexts, and each of the thirteen hermeneutical principles deals with a different form of similarity.⁸ One may distinguish between similarity based on a larger or smaller number of parameters—“sides,” in the terminology of those talmudic discussions—and one may also distinguish between two ways of inferring similarity: one is based on a generalization that applies to both particulars and stands behind the analogy; the other infers similarity from a direct analogy between the two particulars under discussion. In the next section we shall expand a bit on this.⁹

Analogy and Induction

We have already noted elsewhere that there are three fundamental forms of inference in logic: deduction, induction, and analogy. See the page for Parashat Noah, part 2. The relation between the last two is not clear. On the one hand, when a person infers from the fact that frog A is green, with no further information, that frog B is also green, it is quite clear that this conclusion would then be valid for all frogs. If so, one might think that a hidden induction lies behind this analogy. In effect, we are concealing here a generalization about all frogs, and expressing only the specification of that generalization with respect to frog B, which is one detail within the broader group. On the other hand, one may ask from where we got the initial conclusion—the generalization standing in the background—if not by tacitly assuming that this conclusion is true for every individual case within the general category. We observe one frog, and from that immediately infer that the color of all frogs is green. Presumably this generalization is based on a collection of analogies regarding each frog separately, and only afterward, from the accumulation of those analogies, is formed the general claim that concerns the whole group of frogs.

It is quite possible that the second path of analogy mentioned above—direct analogy between two particulars—ultimately yields a generalization of the observed frog of the type “only what is in the particular.” In this way each frog is examined on its own against the given and known frog, and the conclusion of the inference applies only to those that are identical to it. In that case, the group is formed out of the collection of analogies. By contrast, the first path of analogy—the one that proceeds by way of a hidden generalization—yields a broader generalization, “similar to the particular,” since the hidden conclusion was inferred all at once regarding the group as a whole, and the property of the particular that we inferred is obtained by specifying the characteristics of the hidden general category.¹⁰

We saw above that a structure of general and particular can be understood either as an interpretation of the general term—Rashi according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, and Rabbenu Hananel according to everyone—or as its narrowing—Rashi according to the school of Rabbi Akiva. If it is interpretation, then the properties of the particular are obtained through the specification of the properties of the general. This is a focusing on that part of the properties of the general that is found in the particular. Such a process yields a narrow result: “only what is in the particular.” This is the view of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, and according to Rabbenu Hananel it is the agreed view. By contrast, if one understands general and particular as narrowing, then this is an operation on sets, a reduction by which we extract a smaller set out of a larger set, and the particular is only a hint to its characteristics. The smaller set is selected by generalizing from the particular. What results is: “only what is similar to the particular.” This is Rabbi Akiva’s view, at least according to Rashi. Thus there is a clear logical root to the disputes we saw above: the question is how one should understand the analogical process—whether as the specification of a hidden generalization, or as a process of direct comparison between particulars.

Up to this point we have dealt with the two-stage rule: general and particular. In the next section we shall see an implication of the distinction between analogy based on hidden induction and direct analogy for understanding the three-stage rule: general, particular, and general.

The Relation between the First General Term and the Last General Term

We shall discuss here a biblical instance of general, particular, and general in which the two general terms are not identical. The Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 66a, reports a dispute whether one expounds general, particular, and general when the first general term is not equal to the last general term. According to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, one does expound general, particular, and general even in such a case; according to the tanna of the school of Rav, who is associated with the school of Rabbi Akiva, one does not.

This dispute as well reflects the different positions regarding the way these rules operate. According to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, we saw that the two general terms function symmetrically. In the final analysis, the particular determines the scope of the law, while the two general terms around it merely expand it to the group that resembles it—“similar to the particular.” According to this approach, the comparison between the two general terms is not very important, since each performs its function independently. The first general term serves interpretively: “only what is in the particular.” It merely prevents expansion of the particular by analogy from a paradigm case. The second general term expands that by induction to “similar to the particular.” By contrast, according to the school of Rabbi Akiva the two general terms are the dominant elements, and in the end we return to a scope that fits both general terms. The particular merely excludes a small subset from the scope of the general terms. According to this, it is quite clear that if the two general terms are not identical, then we do not even have a basic scope on which this operation is performed. The scope to which we return is not the scope from which we began, and therefore there is no room to expound general, particular, and general in a biblical instance where the two general terms are not identical.

Thus, in summary, according to the school of Rabbi Akiva the mechanisms of the general-and-particular rules are throughout operations on sets. One begins from the set defined by the scope of the first general term, and the second as well, narrows it—or, according to Rabbenu Hananel, interprets it—and establishes it as a more restricted set, and finally expands it again to a set whose scope is almost like the original one. The content of the particular is obtained through specifying the properties of the general terms. By contrast, according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, the operation of general, particular, and general is an operation on particulars. The particular removes the first generalization and turns it into a particular case, and the second general term expands the resulting particular to the other particulars that are “similar to the particular.” At the end of the process, out of the collection of these particulars, a group is formed. This is a direct analogy that indirectly creates an induction.

Here we may once again see the claim made by Heschel in his book Torah Min HaShamayim BeAspaklaria Shel HaDorot. See also the page for Parashat Toledot at the end of part 1. Rabbi Akiva deals with groups and general categories, not directly with concrete particulars. His concern is abstraction, and from it he derives his concrete conclusions through specification—from the top downward. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, has his feet on the ground; he grasps concrete particulars, and from them gradually builds more general groups. His basic process is generalization—from the bottom upward.

Back to Our Midrash

Now let us retrace our steps and return to Egypt—to the midrash with which we began. In this midrash the rule applied is general, particular, and general, not inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion. It is therefore likely that the expositor belongs to the school of Rabbi Ishmael.¹¹ By contrast, the second midrash we cited derives its conclusions through amplification, and it may well stem from the school of Rabbi Akiva.

Beyond that, we see that the first general term, “over the waters of Egypt,” is not equal to the second general term, “over all their reservoirs of water.” The first general term concerns all water, while the second concerns only bodies of water. Saliva, or water in vessels in the house, certainly is not included in the second general term.

According to Rabbi Ishmael, we saw that the rule of general, particular, and general yields the inclusion of “what is similar to the particular.” That is, we learn from this that the midrash includes everything that resembles the particular, and therefore we should not be surprised that it uses language of inclusion, even though the rule is described with the restrictive word “only.” The restriction is relative to the general terms, but relative to the particulars—rivers, Nile-channels, and pools—the rule includes what resembles them.

If so, the continuation of the verse is also well explained. There the Torah includes the water in household vessels as well, and as we have seen, such water really is not included in the result of the derivation by general, particular, and general. This is what Midrash HaGadol writes here:

“‘In the wood and in the stone’—what does this teach? Has it not already been said, ‘and over all their reservoirs of water’? Rather, from here we learn that drawn water in vessels is not called a reservoir of water.”

However, if the result is that in the end all the water in Egypt became blood, then the whole structure remains unclear. The Torah could have written a single general term—for example, the first general term, “all the waters of Egypt”—and reached the same result. Therefore it seems that, even after all this, there are two different groups here. The plague of blood appeared in one way, or in one sense, in the group of water-stores similar to Nile-channels, rivers, and pools, and in another way in household vessels. What significant difference exists between these two groups? Why could they not have been united and included in one expression?¹² We find an answer to this in the continuation of the previous midrash, in Midrash HaGadol:

“This is what the Sages said: Drawn water can contract ritual impurity, but a reservoir does not contract ritual impurity; therefore it says, ‘in the wood and in the stone’—these are drawn waters. ‘And over all their reservoirs of water’—these are waters that are not drawn. I have only water in stone and wood; from where do I know that all drawn waters in all vessels were transformed? Scripture says: ‘He turned their waters to blood.’ Even all the juice extracted from fruit, once it is squeezed, becomes blood, as it says, ‘in the wood and in the stone.’”

This midrash does not mention our derivation, and it seems to learn this from the expression “all their reservoirs of water.” Even so, it is entirely possible that according to our midrash as well, the result of the derivation is a generalization to all non-drawn pools of water. At the end of the verse drawn water is also included, and that is a different kind of water. The expositor in Midrash HaGadol learns from here a legal conclusion: drawn water can contract ritual impurity; this is water that is the work of human hands. Water that is not drawn is the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He, and ritual impurity does not apply to it. So too with wood and stone, and any raw material: they are the work of God, and therefore do not contract ritual impurity. Susceptibility to ritual impurity is unique to objects made by human beings—vessels, and food rendered susceptible by human action.¹³

Thus, the division of the verse into two parts deals with two kinds of water: reservoir water, that is, living water, and drawn water. Both kinds of water were turned into blood: both the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the handiwork of human beings—the Egyptians—were struck in this plague.

We can now understand what troubled us above. Why was it important for the expositor to clarify this issue? We now see that there are conceptual implications here: to determine whether the plagues struck the works of God as well, or only the works of the Egyptians. And, as we have seen, there are even legal implications here: the distinction between the two kinds of water with respect to the laws of ritual impurity and purity.

Let us note that the second midrash broadens the picture even to the saliva that came from the Egyptian’s mouth. For this we have no source in the derivation of general, particular, and general, and this is further evidence that that midrash emerged from the school of Rabbi Akiva. As we have seen, the school of Rabbi Akiva expounds by inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion, and the result is broader than that of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, and in practice is not tied to the characteristics of the middle particular.¹⁴

Footnotes