Vayakhel-Pekudei (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help. Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve, Parashat Vayakhel, 5766

Questions

1. On three types of the interpretive rule: “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach.”
2. Can one derive from “a matter singled out from a general category in order to teach” when the general category and the particular appear in the same verse?
3. What happens when the particular contradicts the general category?
4. More on the relation between the rule “a matter singled out from a general category in order to teach” and hekkesh (textual analogy) and klal ufrat (general and particular).

The Principles

Hekkesh (textual analogy). A matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach. Klal ufrat (general and particular). Two verses that contradict one another.

A. Summary of Last Year’s Essay

Moses assembled the whole congregation of the Israelites and said to them: These are the things that the Lord has commanded you to do. Six days work shall be done, but on the seventh day you shall have holiness, a sabbath of complete rest to the Lord; whoever does work on it shall be put to death. You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings on the Sabbath day.
— Exodus 35:1-3

As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: “You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings on the Sabbath day” — what does this come to teach? Since it says, “Moses assembled the whole congregation of the Israelites… These are the things… Six days work shall be done,” “things,” “the things,” “these are the things” — these are the thirty-nine categories of labor that were stated to Moses at Sinai. One might think that if a person performed all of them in a single lapse of awareness, he would be liable for only one offering. Therefore Scripture says, “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest.” Yet I could still say: for plowing and harvesting he is liable for two, but for all the others he is liable for only one. Therefore Scripture says: “You shall not kindle fire.” Kindling was included in the general category; why was it singled out? To compare the others to it, and to tell you: just as kindling is a primary category of labor and one is liable for it on its own, so too every act that is a primary category of labor carries liability on its own. Samuel follows Rabbi Yose, who says: kindling was singled out merely as a prohibition. As it was taught in a baraita: kindling was singled out merely as a prohibition — these are the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Natan says: it was singled out in order to divide the categories of labor.
— Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 70a

“But for all the others only one” — because Scripture grouped them into a single labor and a single prohibition. And with respect to the rule “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach — it was singled out not to teach about itself, etc.” — we do not interpret it that way here, because the general statement is in the form of a prohibition while the particular is in the form of a positive commandment, and one does not interpret this as general and particular. Alternatively, plowing and harvesting are two verses that come together, and such verses do not teach further, for Scripture could have written only one of them.
— Rashi ad loc.

“To compare the others to it” — all the other labors that were included with it in the general category; for this is a principle in the Torah: any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was singled out not to teach about itself, etc.
— Rashi ad loc.

In last year’s essay we dealt with the issue of the division of labor categories with respect to sin-offering liability on the Sabbath — that is, one is liable for a separate sin-offering for each type of labor. The Talmudic passage cited above brings a source for this halakha (Jewish law) from the command concerning the prohibition of kindling fire on the Sabbath. In the background lies the fact that the Torah specifies the labor of kindling in a separate prohibition, whereas the other thirty-nine primary categories of labor are not specified explicitly in the Torah but are forbidden only in a general way.

Rabbi Natan holds that kindling was singled out in order to divide the categories — that is, to teach the principle of separate liability for each labor category. Rabbi Yose, by contrast, holds that kindling was singled out in order to teach that on the Sabbath it is forbidden only as an ordinary prohibition, and not under the more severe liability of stoning and excision, as with the other primary and derivative categories of labor on the Sabbath.

Rabbi Natan’s derivation, as presented in the passage above, is difficult on several grounds, and last year we explained it at length. It is presented as a hekkesh. But a hekkesh ordinarily compares two items that appear in a list within a verse. Here one of them — the entire cluster of prohibited labors — is not mentioned in the verse. Beyond that, in this derivation we learn from kindling a feature that does not characterize each labor separately; rather, we learn something about the relation among the primary categories. This is a collective feature of the set of labors as a whole, including kindling itself. If so, this is a generalization, not a comparison.

For this reason, Rashi suggests seeing Rabbi Natan’s hekkesh as an instance of the hermeneutical rule: “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category.”¹ As we explained there, unlike hekkesh and prototype-based inference, in which we learn from the teaching particular itself and from its properties, the inference in this rule is based on the fact that the particular was singled out from the general category, and not on the characteristics of the particular as such. The feature learned is likewise collective, and not a property of the derived item alone.

In the second part of the essay, we dealt with the characterization of the term “hekkesh.” We saw that in rabbinic literature it appears with several meanings, only one of which is a hermeneutical principle — namely, a comparison between two items in a list. What they all share is that they are non-deductive inferences, or in our terminology, “synthetic” ones. The distinctive feature of synthetic inferences is that they are not logically necessary and that they add information beyond what is contained in their premises. By contrast, analytic, that is, deductive, inferences are indeed necessary — but precisely for that reason they add nothing beyond their premises.

We noted that the entire system of hermeneutical principles is synthetic in character — that is, innovative rather than necessary. This stands in contrast to Aristotelian logic.

In the essay on Parashat Yitro, 5765, we discussed Maimonides’ position, which sees the system of hermeneutical principles as a set of tools for expanding the biblical text, not as tools for uncovering what is already present within it. Their synthetic nature necessarily follows from that function. Analytic tools cannot add anything beyond what is already in the text; therefore, tools of expansion must necessarily be synthetic. That is why the term “hekkesh” sometimes denotes the entire body of hermeneutical principles.

B. A Matter That Was Included in a General Category and Then Singled Out in Order to Teach

Introduction

The rule “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach” differs from ordinary hekkesh in two main respects:

1. The basis of the inference is not the characteristics of the particular that left the general category, but the very fact that it left the general category. In hekkesh, by contrast, the comparison is between the properties of the teaching item and those of the derived item.
2. It follows that in the case of a matter singled out from a general category, what we learn is some feature that pertains to the whole set, whereas hekkesh transfers properties to another particular.

In this week’s essay we shall broaden the picture, present another manifestation of this rule, and suggest connections among the traits of its various manifestations. At the end of the essay we will apply some of these ideas to a puzzling midrash.

The Rule “A Matter That Was Included in a General Category and Then Singled Out in Order to Teach”

The example brought in the illustrative baraita for this rule — which we discussed in our essays on Parashat Tzav and Parashat Pinhas, 5765, and therefore will not elaborate on here — is the following:²

Any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire category. How so? “And the person who eats flesh from the sacrifice of the peace-offerings that belong to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him, that person shall be cut off.” Were not peace-offerings included among all sacred offerings, as it is written: “This is the law for the burnt-offering, the meal-offering, the sin-offering, the guilt-offering, the consecration-offering, and the sacrifice of peace-offerings”? When they were singled out from the general category in order to teach, they were singled out not to teach about themselves, but to teach about the whole category — to tell you that just as peace-offerings are distinctive in that they possess sacrificial sanctity, so too I include only things whose sanctity is sacrificial sanctity; excluded are things consecrated for Temple maintenance.

This midrash (rabbinic exposition) deals with the punishment of excision for one who eats consecrated food while impure. In one place the rule is stated regarding all consecrated things. Elsewhere the Torah repeats it with respect to peace-offerings, which were singled out from the general category in order to teach. In such a situation we learn from that singling out about the whole category: the punishment of excision for eating consecrated food in impurity applies only to sacrificially consecrated offerings, not to things consecrated for Temple maintenance.

Two Types of Difficulty

The formulation of Rabbi Ishmael’s baraita says: “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach.” In those earlier essays we noted that this wording implies that there are also cases in which a matter is singled out from a general category but not in order to teach, and in those cases we derive nothing. How, then, do we know whether the particular was singled out in order to teach? Where the singling out gives rise to some difficulty, it is clear that the particular was singled out in order to teach — otherwise it would not have been singled out at all.

There, we pointed to two different ways of understanding the difficulty involved in a particular’s departure from the general category:

1. A difficulty of unnecessary repetition: why does the Torah specify the particular in addition to the general category? This is a textual-interpretive derivation.
2. A difficulty of contradiction: if we assume that by specifying the particular the Torah means to say that the law applies only to that particular, then this contradicts the verse that applies the law to the general category as a whole. This is a derivation grounded in logic, akin to the rule of “two verses that contradict one another.”

In both cases, the solution proposed by the hermeneutical rules is that the singling out from the general category is meant to teach something about the general category.

Two Types of Learning

In the essay on Parashat Tzav, 5765, we saw two kinds of conclusions derived by means of this rule:

1. A conclusion about the relation between the singled-out particular and the other members of the general category — as in the derivation that kindling was singled out in order to divide the categories. There is a whole group of derivations of this sort: we learn that any two acts of labor incur two sin-offerings, and not just one.
2. A conclusion about a feature that characterizes all the members of the general category — as in the case of peace-offerings, where we learned that all the members of the category are sacrificially consecrated.

The second type is a genuine hekkesh, except that it teaches about a group of derived items rather than about only one. The first type, however, is not ordinary hekkesh, because there is no comparison here between one particular and another. Rather, there is a generalization about the relation among the particulars included in the category — namely, that two errors incur two sin-offerings and not one. Perhaps this is why, in the formulation of the illustrative baraita, this derivation is not described as a “hekkesh,” unlike the derivation concerning kindling.²

The Connection Between the Type of Difficulty and the Conclusion of the Derivation

It is possible to connect these two distinctions. Where we perceive a contradiction between the particular and the general category, the solution must involve dividing the field into two parts, that is, into two groups. In the midrash about peace-offerings, for example, we encounter a contradiction. On the one hand, the text says that in the case of all consecrated foods there is excision for eating them in impurity. On the other hand, another verse says that this applies only to peace-offerings. The natural resolution is that there is one class of consecrated things that resembles peace-offerings, and for that class the rule of excision applies; and there is another class of consecrated things that does not resemble peace-offerings — namely, items consecrated for Temple maintenance — and to them it does not apply. This solution narrows the scope of the law to those particulars that possess the characteristic of the teaching particular, namely sacrificial sanctity. As noted, this is a midrash of hekkesh. Thus, a hekkesh-type derivation is a solution to a contradiction.

By contrast, in the derivation concerning kindling, the problem may not be contradiction but unnecessary repetition. For such a problem, the solution need not be a partition of the field, or a narrowing of the general category. Rather, the singling out is there to teach something. That “something” can be a feature of the relation among the particulars in the group, and that is indeed what happens in the derivation about kindling. But here another solution is also possible — for example, Rabbi Yose’s view, according to which kindling was not singled out to teach about the general category but merely as a prohibition, that is, to introduce the novelty that kindling carries only the status of an ordinary prohibition and not that of excision and stoning like the other labors.

It may be that, according to Rabbi Yose, a mere case of repetition is not interpreted at all through this rule — since in such a case the particular teaches about itself rather than about the category — and only a case of contradiction is so interpreted.

Why Is There Really a Difference Between These Two Derivations?

In both derivations we have a particular that was included in a general category and then specified separately. Why, then, do we treat the departure from the general category in two different ways? Why, in the case of kindling, is it understood as unnecessary repetition, whereas in the case of eating consecrated food in impurity it is understood as contradiction?

The answer may begin with the wording and the context. In the case of kindling, the labors themselves are not itemized anywhere in Scripture. The biblical expression is “any labor.” The detailed list is learned from other derivations, or from tradition. Kindling, by contrast, is written explicitly. The question therefore arises: why is this one labor, specifically, spelled out? That is not a contradiction, but rather a case of repetition or exceptionality.

The verses concerning eating consecrated food in impurity, on the other hand, appear to stand in blatant contradiction to one another. On the one hand, there is a verse that specifies: “This is the law for the burnt-offering, the meal-offering, the sin-offering, the guilt-offering, the consecration-offering, and the sacrifice of peace-offerings,” meaning that the law of excision applies to all kinds of offerings. Here there is no general statement about all types of offerings, but an explicit list of them. When we then see an additional verse that speaks specifically about peace-offerings, we naturally read it as though the law applies only to peace-offerings. In that case, the basic difficulty is logical — contradiction — and the solution is to divide the field into two parts, or to narrow the scope of the law.

A Further Division Within Type 2

The medieval authorities divide the second type of derivation under this rule into two subtypes:⁴

1. Applying an explicit characteristic of the singled-out particular to the other particulars in the category.
2. Deriving a conclusion that applies both to the singled-out particular and to the category as a whole.

In the examples we have encountered so far, we have seen only subtype 2a. For example, eating peace-offerings in impurity teaches that the punishment of excision is stated only with respect to sacrificially consecrated offerings — a feature that characterizes the peace-offerings themselves. With respect to peace-offerings, it is already known that they possess sacrificial sanctity, and it is known that one who eats them in impurity is liable to excision. Their departure from the general category teaches only about the category, namely, that there too one is liable to excision only for sacrificially consecrated offerings.

An example of the second subtype, 2b, appears in Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 4a. The Gemara says:

Rather, ov and yidoni were included among sorcerers. Why were they singled out? To compare the others to them, and to tell you: just as ov and yidoni are punishable by stoning, so too the sorceress is punishable by stoning.

And Rashi comments there:⁵

“To compare the others to them” — for this is a principle in the Torah: any matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category.

That is, ov and yidoni are included within sorcery, and were singled out in order to teach that they themselves are punishable by stoning; from them we then learn that all sorcerers are punishable by stoning.

One might have argued that a derivation of this kind is not a hekkesh, since there is no comparison here between teaching item and derived item. Here, the very fact of singling out from the general category is what teaches, and the characteristics of the teaching particular are themselves learned from that singling out; from there they are applied to the other particulars in the category. Still, the second stage is indeed a hekkesh between the particular and the category, and that is why we find the term “hekkesh” here as well.³

The Derivation in Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 120a

To conclude, let us discuss the passage in Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 120a in light of what we have said:

It was taught in accordance with Rava: “For six days you shall eat matzot, and on the seventh day there shall be a solemn assembly to the Lord your God.” Just as the seventh day is optional, so too the six days are optional. What is the reason? It is a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out in order to teach: it was singled out not to teach about itself, but to teach about the whole category. One might think that even the first night is optional; therefore Scripture says: “They shall eat it with matzot and bitter herbs.” I know this only when the Temple stands; when the Temple no longer stands, from where do we know? Scripture says: “In the evening you shall eat matzot” — Scripture established it as an obligation.

The discussion concerns whether there is an obligation to eat matzah during the days of Passover, apart from the first night. Rava brings a verse that compares the six days to the seventh day, and learns from it that just as eating on the seventh day is optional, so too on the first six days. On its face, however, this derivation is difficult, and the commentators discuss it at length:

1. The general category and the particular appear in the same verse. This raises two distinct difficulties:

a. This is an ordinary hekkesh — a comparison between two items in the same verse — and not a case of a matter singled out from a general category. One might perhaps answer that when one of the items is itself a general category that contains the other item, we do not use hekkesh but the rule of a matter singled out from a general category. It should be noted, however, that although the Sages use that rule here, in this case the general category does not really appear to contain the particular at all; see below under difficulty 2.

b. When the general category and the particular appear in the same verse, we usually apply the rule of general and particular, not the rule of a matter singled out from a general category in order to teach. See Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 55b and Pesahim 6a, and our essays on Parashat Ki Tissa, Tzav, and Re’eh, 5765.

2. Why is there here a particular singled out from a general category at all? The seventh day is not included in the first six days.

Some commentators suggested that this derivation really concerns another verse, Exodus 13:6: “Seven days you shall eat matzot, and on the seventh day there shall be a feast to the Lord.” There, the particular is indeed singled out from a general category that contains it. See the commentary of Rabbi Hillel, and also Ra’em and Korban Aharon on the passage in Parashat Emor. But Malbim on the spot proved that the correct reading is the one found before us. We will return to this proposal at the end of the essay.

3. The explanation proposed by Rashi, Rashbam, and Ra’em in the passage in Pesahim is that the particular that was singled out is interpreted as though on the seventh day there is only a solemn assembly, and no eating of matzot. This creates a contradiction to the six days, on which there is eating of matzot. That is what produces the singling out from the general category. Indeed, several commentators — see Ra’em and Malbim there, and Horovitz’s notes to the parallel Mekhilta there — objected that this derivation is unlike the usual derivations of singling out from a general category, for usually the singling out takes the form of unnecessary repetition, whereas here it is a case in which the particular contradicts what was stated in the general category.

An Explanation of Difficulty 3

First, one can see that the derivation here is of the second type — like the case of eating consecrated food, and unlike the case of kindling. In fact, it is a derivation of subtype 2b, namely, an inclusion followed by a hekkesh. We learn from the singling out of the general category some feature of the particular that was singled out, and from it we proceed to all the other particulars in the category. According to the commentators mentioned under point 3, however, the fact that on the seventh day eating is optional is not learned from the singling out, but is explicit in the verse itself: the seventh day is for solemn assembly, not for eating matzah. If so, then according to that explanation this is a derivation of subtype 2a, that is, a pure hekkesh.

The comments of those commentators under point 3 show us that this is a case of singling out from the general category in which the underlying difficulty is contradiction rather than repetition. In the essays cited above we showed that this is a legitimate and common manifestation of the rule of “a matter singled out from a general category in order to teach” — and we noted above that according to Rabbi Yose it is possible that repetition is not interpreted in this way at all. Therefore, the commentators’ objection does not seem compelling. To be sure, the contradiction here is not direct, since the seventh day is not included within the first six. That is difficulty 2, to which we return below.

Moreover, as we saw above, when the fundamental difficulty is contradiction, the solution must resolve it. When the basic difficulty is repetition, by contrast, the singling out teaches something, but one can imagine several possible kinds of conclusion. If our case is indeed one of contradiction, then we must find a solution that resolves it, that is, one of the type-2 solutions. Here we determine that eating matzah is optional throughout all the days of the festival, apart from the first night.⁴ This is a type-2a derivation, and it fits very well with a case whose underlying difficulty is contradiction.

The First Two Difficulties (1a-b)

The first difficulty was that the general category and the particular appear in the same verse. In such a case we would ordinarily be expected to interpret the verse by means of general and particular, or by hekkesh, and not by the rule of a matter singled out from a general category in order to teach. But as we have seen, here the general category and the particular contradict one another. In such a situation they cannot be compared to one another. The very wording of the verse suggests that its purpose is contrast rather than comparison. Moreover, when the items in the verse are cast in the form of general and particular, there is no room for hekkesh, but only for a general-and-particular derivation.

But for precisely the same reason, this biblical instance also cannot be interpreted through general and particular. General and particular are interpreted only when the two move in the same direction. In such a case, the particular qualifies the general category: “only what is in the particular.” In our case, however, there is no basis at all for qualifying the six days so that they should be like the particular.

In addition, the expressions “like the particular” and “what is in the particular” concern the properties of the particular itself, not its legal characteristics — for example, that peace-offerings are offerings of lesser sanctity, or that kindling is a prohibited form of labor on the Sabbath even when done in a way not needed for its own purpose.⁵ But the characteristics of the particular singled out here — the seventh day — cannot be applied to the first six days. Are they also to become a seventh day, or a solemn assembly? Only its legal characteristic can be applied in that way — namely, that eating matzah on it is optional.

The Second Difficulty (2)

This difficulty seems to us the most serious of all. The particular is not included in the general category that precedes it, and it is therefore unclear how the rule of “a matter that was included in a general category and then singled out from it” is relevant here at all. On the face of it, only if the verse had begun with all the days of Passover, without specifying them, could we have applied this rule here.

Yet the straightforward reading of the verse is also problematic. We must remember that in the background stands another verse, Exodus 13:6: “Seven days you shall eat matzot.” If so, it is difficult to interpret our verse as though matzah were to be eaten only for six days. Why, then, does the verse not simply say: “Seven days you shall eat matzot, and on the seventh day there shall be a solemn assembly”? It would seem that this proves that the Torah is hinting to us that the seventh day is not merely a solemn assembly, but is also in some way reduced from the seven days of Passover with respect to the eating of matzot. Therefore the Sages saw in the term “solemn assembly” a diminution of the obligation to eat matzot, as those commentators explained.

But if so, we must read the verse as follows: “Seven days you shall eat matzot, but on the seventh day you shall not eat matzot; rather, it is only a solemn assembly to the Lord your God.” We see, then, that the particular at the end is indeed part of the general category at the beginning. Alternatively, we may read it this way: “For six days you shall eat matzot — and also on the seventh day. But the seventh day is a solemn assembly, and is therefore diminished with respect to the eating of matzot.” The conclusion is that on the seventh day the eating of matzot is optional. But we have already seen that in the background stands the verse that binds all the days into a single general category — “Seven days you shall eat matzot.” There is no escape from the conclusion that the particular teaches us that on all the days the eating of matzot is optional.

A Renewed Summary of the Midrash

From an overall perspective, it may be possible to understand the whole structure differently from the way we have described it until now. The particular, namely the seventh day, does indeed appear in our verse. From the opening clause of our verse we learn that this particular is diminished with respect to the eating of matzot, as explained above, and therefore that eating matzot on the seventh day is optional. But the general category from which this particular emerges is not the opening clause of our verse; rather, it is the verse in Exodus: “Seven days you shall eat matzot.” We now have a general category and a particular that are distant from one another, and therefore they are not interpreted byhekkesh or by general and particular. Instead, they are interpreted by the rule of a matter singled out from a general category, and the contradiction between the particular and the general category forces us to mediate between the two verses, as explained above.

The conclusion is that the commentators’ proposals mentioned above, which apply the derivation to the verse in Exodus, do not really contradict Malbim’s interpretation. The general category is indeed found in Exodus, and the particular, which is included in it and then singled out from it in order to teach about it, is written here. If so, this may well be a standard instance of the rule of a matter singled out from a general category in order to teach.

Footnotes