Vayikra (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Mida Tova — Sabbath eve, Parashat Vayikra, 5766

Questions

1. On two types of coherence: substantive coherence, and coherence of the sources of derash (rabbinic exegesis).
2. Are books of halakha (Jewish law) coherent, and on what plane?
3. Is it important to resolve contradictions in Maimonides with respect to the methodology of derash?
4. The combination and development of methodologies of derash over the course of history.

The principles

General-particular-general. Amplification-limitation-amplification.

“Or if a person swears, uttering with his lips to do evil or to do good, whatever a person may utter in an oath, and it was hidden from him, but later he comes to know, and he is guilty regarding one of these matters.”

— Leviticus 5:4

Rabbi Ishmael says: One is liable only for an oath concerning the future. The Rabbis taught:

“To do evil or to do good” — I know only matters that involve harm and benefit. From where do I know matters that involve neither harm nor benefit? Scripture says: “Or if a person swears, uttering with his lips.” I know only future matters; from where do I know past matters? Scripture says: “Whatever a person may utter in an oath” — these are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

Rabbi Ishmael says: “To do evil or to do good” — this refers to the future.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: If so, I know only matters that involve benefit and harm. From where do I know matters that involve neither harm nor benefit?

He said to him: From the amplification of Scripture.

He said to him: If Scripture amplified for that, then Scripture amplified for this as well.

Rabbi Akiva indeed spoke well to Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Ishmael, who studied under Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah, who interpreted the entire Torah by the method of general and particular, also interprets by general and particular. Rabbi Akiva, who studied under Nahum of Gimzo, who interpreted the entire Torah by amplification and limitation, also interprets by amplification and limitation.

What is Rabbi Akiva’s reason for interpreting by amplifications and limitations? For it was taught: “Or if a person swears” — an amplification; “to do evil or to do good” — a limitation; “whatever a person may utter” — Scripture again amplifies. Amplification-limitation-amplification includes everything.

What does it include? It includes all matters.

And what does it exclude? It excludes a matter of mitzvah (commandment).

And Rabbi Ishmael interprets by general-particular-general: “Or if a person swears, uttering with his lips” — a generalization; “to do evil or to do good” — a particularization; “whatever a person may utter” — Scripture again generalizes. In a general-particular-general, you infer only what is similar to the particular. Just as the particular is explicitly about the future, so too everything is about the future. The generalization serves to include even matters that involve neither harm nor benefit, so long as they concern the future. The particularization serves to exclude even matters that involve harm and benefit if they concern the past.

— Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a

“When a person sins and commits a trespass against the Lord, and deals falsely with his fellow concerning a deposit, or a pledge, or a robbery, or has oppressed his fellow; or has found lost property and lied about it and sworn falsely, regarding any one of all the things that a person may do and thereby sin; then it shall be, when he sins and becomes guilty, that he shall restore the stolen item that he stole, or the extorted item that he extorted, or the deposit that was deposited with him, or the lost property that he found; or anything about which he swore falsely. He shall pay it in full and add one-fifth to it; he shall give it to the one to whom it belongs on the day of his guilt offering.”

— Leviticus 5:21–24

Rabbi Eliezer interprets by amplifications and limitations, whereas the Rabbis interpret by generalizations and particularizations.

Rabbi Eliezer interprets by amplifications and limitations: “and deals falsely with his fellow” — an amplification; “concerning a deposit or a pledge” — a limitation; “or anything about which he swore” — Scripture again amplifies. Amplification-limitation-amplification includes everything.

What does it include? It includes all matters.

And what does it exclude? It excludes documents.

And the Rabbis interpret by generalizations and particularizations: “and deals falsely with his fellow” — a generalization; “concerning a deposit, or a pledge, or a robbery” — a particularization; “or anything about which he swore” — Scripture again generalizes. In a general-particular-general, you infer only what is similar to the particular. Just as the particular is explicitly something movable and intrinsically monetary, so too every included case must be something movable and intrinsically monetary. Therefore land is excluded, because it is not movable; slaves are excluded, because they are likened to land; and documents are excluded, because although they are movable, they are not intrinsically monetary.

— Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 37b

A. Summary of last year’s article

In last year’s article we dealt with the dispute between two schools of study regarding the derivations of general-particular and amplification-limitation. One school was that of Nahum of Gimzo, from whom the line passed to Rabbi Eliezer and then to Rabbi Akiva. They interpreted the Torah by amplification and limitation. Opposed to them was the school of Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKanah, followed by Rabbi Ishmael, who interpreted the Torah by general and particular.

What is unique about this dispute is that the Sages themselves describe to us — albeit laconically — the very existence of the two schools, the chain of their development, and the two general methods of derash practiced within them. The matter appears mainly in the discussion in Shevuot 26a, but also in several other places. From this discussion we traced a process of shaping and conceptualizing the methods of derash; see also the articles on Parashat Lekh Lekha and Nitzavim, 5765. We saw — as in several earlier articles — that over the generations the two methods become intermingled and fused into a synthesis, or into several different syntheses, which emerge in the Amoraic period.

We noted that this is reflected in halakhic rulings as well. For example, with respect to the discussion of the oath of deposit in Shevuot 37b, Maimonides rules like the Sages, who interpret by generalizations and particularizations; see Laws of Oaths 7:4. But in the passage concerning an oath about the past in Shevuot 26a, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Akiva, who interprets by amplifications and limitations; see Laws of Oaths 1:2.

In the course of that discussion, we also examined the schema of the derivations of general and particular and amplification and limitation, both synchronically and diachronically. We have already discussed this topic in several earlier articles — see also the articles on Parashat Va’era, Korah, Pinhas, Va’ethanan, and Re’eh, 5765 — and therefore we will not repeat those points here.

At the end of the discussion we considered the classificatory aspects that arise from these hermeneutical principles. We saw that the crucial parameter is the number of points of similarity between the source case and the group of cases derived from it. This is reflected in the division of halakhic situations into kinds and sub-kinds, and the various hermeneutical principles reflect different degrees of generalization. We have already dealt with this topic as well; see the articles on Parashat Korah, 5765, and Va’era, 5766.

B. Coherence of the midrashic (rabbinic-interpretive) sources of halakha

Introduction

As we noted, Maimonides rules in the various discussions in a non-uniform manner. Sometimes he rules in accordance with the school of Rabbi Ishmael, which interprets by generalizations and particularizations, and sometimes in accordance with the school of Rabbi Akiva, which interprets by amplifications and limitations.

This phenomenon raises difficulties and interesting points for reflection. One may consider the relationship between modes of derash and the laws derived from them. It also raises questions about the coherence of halakha in general, and of its sources in particular. In other words: must halakha be coherent only with respect to content — that is, there should be no contradictions between the contents of the laws — or must there also be coherence with respect to the methods of derivation? To put it differently: is there even such a thing as ruling, as a matter of halakha, which method of derash we ought to adopt and use?

All this also raises questions about the nature of halakha and halakhic decision-making, and about their relation to truth. If halakhic ruling is an arbitrary act intended for social order rather than for uncovering any truth, then there is no necessity that the halakhic system produced by the ruling be coherent. One must decide somehow, so that “the Torah should not become like two Torahs,” but the decision itself does not express truth, or even any conclusion. According to such an approach, substantive coherence would be required, but not necessarily consistency in hermeneutical methodology. If, however, halakhic decision-making expresses some truth, then one would expect a coherent system to emerge; otherwise, we have not arrived at the truth. Yet even according to this approach, coherence is required primarily on the plane of content. On the plane of sources, it is not at all clear that coherence matters, since the halakhic system is tested against some spiritual and evaluative reality, whereas its sources are not tested against anything else.

It should be noted that according to the approach of Rabbi David Cohen, known as the Nazir — see the article on Parashat Bereshit, 5765, and elsewhere — the hermeneutical principles themselves express a certain truth; they are not an arbitrary code or cipher. According to that view, one is naturally led to require coherence on the level of sources as well.

One should also note that, at first glance, the very existence of two schools of study testifies that the Sages did maintain coherence, since each sage belonged to a school that adopted a particular mode of derash. But this phenomenon may have been accidental. It is possible that a sage’s affiliation with the school of Rabbi Akiva or of Rabbi Ishmael resulted from technical circumstances — namely, where he studied Torah — and coherence in methods of derash followed from that. If so, this would not prove that one must preserve coherence in the methods of derash themselves, that is, coherence on the level of sources.

We will open the discussion by presenting the difficulty in Maimonides’ method.

The discussion in Shevuot 26a: an oath about the past

As we described, in the discussion in Shevuot 26a Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael disagree over whether one incurs liability for an utterance-oath concerning the past. According to Rabbi Ishmael, one is liable only for an oath concerning the future, and he learns this through general-particular-general. The particularization is “to do evil or to do good,” which sounds like language referring to future oaths. From this Rabbi Ishmael generalizes that liability applies only to future oaths, not to oaths about the past, since only cases similar to the particular are included. By contrast, Rabbi Akiva employs amplification-limitation-amplification, and therefore imposes liability for every type of oath, excluding only one who swears concerning a matter of mitzvah.

Maimonides, in Laws of Oaths 1:2, rules like Rabbi Akiva, and writes as follows:

An utterance-oath applies only to matters that it is possible for a person to do, whether with respect to the future or with respect to the past.¹ How so with respect to the past? “I ate,” or “I threw a stone into the sea,” or “So-and-so spoke with So-and-so,” or “I did not eat,” or “He did not throw a stone into the sea,” or “So-and-so did not speak with So-and-so.” How so with respect to the future? “I will eat,” or “I will not eat,” or “I will throw,” or “I will not throw a stone into the sea.” These are two concerning the past and two concerning the future.

At first glance, this follows from the rule that the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva against a single colleague. However, the Kessef Mishneh, on Laws of Vessels 18:13, already questions the application of that rule with respect to Rabbi Ishmael and offers several possible explanations why it would not apply in his case — for example, because he was Rabbi Akiva’s teacher. See also Sefer ha-Mafte’ach in the Frankel edition.

The discussion in Shevuot 37a-b: the oath of deposit concerning land

In last year’s page we also mentioned the dispute in the discussion on 37a concerning the guilt-offering brought for an oath of deposit involving land and slaves. According to Rabbi Eliezer, who interprets by amplification and limitation, the Torah includes everything and excludes only documents, whose intrinsic substance is not monetary value. According to the Sages, who interpret through generalizations and particularizations, the Torah includes only what resembles a deposit or a pledge; that is, it excludes land, which is not movable, and also slaves, which are likened to land.

In Laws of Oaths 7:3-4, Maimonides rules like the Sages, who exclude land and slaves:²

3. Likewise, if one claimed from another land, or a slave, or a document, and the latter denied it and swore, he is exempt from the oath of deposit, but liable for an utterance-oath, since he swore falsely.

4. And why is he exempt from the oath of deposit, even though had he admitted it he would have been liable and would have paid what he denied? Because it is said: “concerning a deposit, or a pledge, or a robbery, or he oppressed his fellow, or found a lost item” — all these are movable things such that, if he admitted them, he would remove money from his possession. Land is excluded, because it is not movable; indeed it stands before its owner and remains in his possession. Slaves are excluded, because they are likened to land. Documents are excluded, because they are not intrinsically monetary.

Here, the direct rules of decision do indeed support this ruling, since Rabbi Eliezer is associated with the School of Shammai, and therefore the halakha usually does not follow him. Beyond that, here he is opposed by the many — that is, by the Rabbis — and in a dispute between an individual and the majority, the halakha follows the majority.

The comments of the Lehem Mishneh on Laws of Oaths 7:4

These two rulings raise the difficulty described above in the introduction. On the one hand, the direct rules of decision in each passage fit Maimonides’ rulings. Moreover, there is no substantive contradiction between his ruling regarding an utterance-oath about the past and his ruling regarding the guilt-offering for an oath of deposit involving land. There is no content-based link between the two discussions, and therefore a ruling in one does not compel any specific ruling in the other. And yet a problem remains on the level of the sources of halakha: with respect to an utterance-oath, Maimonides rules in accordance with the one who interprets by amplification-limitation-amplification, whereas in the discussion of the oath of deposit he rules in accordance with those who interpret by general-particular-general.

It is interesting that most commentators on Maimonides, especially the modern ones with a more analytic and juristic orientation, do not note this difficulty. It seems that they are not disturbed by inconsistency on the level of the sources of halakha. By contrast, the classical commentators are certainly troubled by this contradiction, and they do point it out.

Foremost among them is the Lehem Mishneh on 7:4, who senses the problematic nature of Maimonides’ method and writes as follows:

“And land is excluded, etc.” It appears that our master, of blessed memory, interprets by general and particular, like the Rabbis who say so in the chapter on the oath of deposit, 37b, and not like Rabbi Eliezer, who interprets by amplifications. But one must raise a difficulty here, for above, in the first chapter, our master ruled like Rabbi Akiva, who obligates an offering for both future and past oaths, and in the third chapter of tractate Shevuot it is said that he interprets by amplifications and limitations. And from the discussion at the beginning of tractate Shevuot it appears that whoever interprets by generalizations and particularizations disagrees with Rabbi Akiva. There is also, in that same discussion, the case of the awl of the pierced slave, where generalizations and particularizations are employed, and our master rules accordingly in the Laws of Slaves. These things appear contradictory. The matter is lengthy, and in my commentary on the beginning of tractate Shevuot I elaborated in reconciling the discussion according to our master.

Already from his wording at the opening of the paragraph, something emerges that may sound strange to a contemporary student: “our master interprets by general and particular.” It seems that the Lehem Mishneh understands that Maimonides does not rule on laws solely on the basis of local and direct considerations, detached from their midrashic sources. The Lehem Mishneh understands that in this halakha Maimonides did not decide only the question of liability for the offering in an oath of deposit involving land, but also the interpretive question itself. He takes Maimonides to have decided here that the verse must be interpreted by the principle of general-particular-general, and not by amplification-limitation-amplification. If so, in his view a halakhic ruling is the result of a methodological and midrashic ruling.

Precisely because of this fundamental conception, the Lehem Mishneh lays out the difficulties and contradictions that he finds in this ruling of Maimonides. According to the conception that no coherence is required in the midrashic sources of halakha, no difficulty would arise here at all.

The Lehem Mishneh mentions two contradictions in Maimonides’ words. First, as we have seen, in the discussion of the utterance-oath Maimonides employs amplification and limitation. Beyond that, he cites the discussion on 4b regarding the awl of the pierced slave, where Maimonides too — in Laws of Slaves 3:9 — employs generalizations and particularizations. One may add still more cases to the list. For example, in Laws of First Fruits 11:6 Maimonides rules that a firstborn son may not be redeemed with land or slaves, and the Gemara likewise connects this to the dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva; see the commentators on Mishnah Bekhorot 8:8.

First precedent: Rabbi’s method in the discussion in Shevuot 4b-5a

There is another discussion that deals with documents, slaves, and land, this time with respect to redeeming a firstborn son. According to Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, one may redeem with anything except documents. According to the Sages, one may redeem with anything except documents, which are not intrinsically monetary; except land, which is not movable; and except slaves, which are likened to land. Exactly as in the discussion on 37b, the Gemara there too explains that the dispute revolves around hermeneutical methodology: Rabbi interprets by amplifications and limitations, whereas the Sages interpret by generalizations and particularizations.

In the course of that discussion, the question of coherence in the sources of halakha is raised explicitly, for the Gemara challenges its explanation of Rabbi’s view on the basis of the fact that Rabbi himself interprets by generalizations and particularizations with respect to the awl of the pierced slave. The Gemara explains there that Rabbi indeed follows the school of Rabbi Ishmael, and that with respect to the redemption of the firstborn son they too interpret by amplification and limitation, because the verse contains two adjacent general clauses; see the article on Parashat Va’ethanan, 5765, chapter 2.² The Sages, however, interpret even such a case by the principle of general-particular-general.

Thus, the simple assumption is that tannaitic sages, even those of the later generations such as Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, are expected to possess a coherent method of derash that is applied consistently throughout the Torah. This is not surprising, since in those generations the sages still used methods of derivation themselves, and it is therefore reasonable that each had a consistent exegetical methodology.

Second precedent: Tosafot, s.v. “And Rav said” (Shevuot 25a)

The question of coherence in the sources of halakha also arises in several places in the writings of the Rishonim, the medieval authorities. Here too there are several examples that bear on our issue — generalizations and particularizations versus amplifications and limitations.

In the discussion in Shevuot 25a, Rav and Shmuel disagree over whether an oath that “So-and-so threw something into the sea” creates liability as an utterance-oath. Rav holds that it does, since the statement can be framed both negatively and affirmatively. Shmuel holds that it does not, since such an oath has no future form — that is, an oath concerning the future would not create liability, because the matter is not within the swearer’s control. The Gemara discusses the basis of their disagreement and raises several possibilities. The first possibility is that they disagree along the lines of the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva. Rav follows Rabbi Akiva, who also imposes liability for past oaths — and the oath under discussion concerns an act that took place in the past — whereas Shmuel follows Rabbi Ishmael, who imposes liability only for future oaths. The Gemara then rejects this and explains that even Shmuel speaks in accordance with Rabbi Akiva. In any case, the conclusion is that Rav, according to all opinions, cannot hold like Rabbi Ishmael; in fact, this is perfectly clear from his position.

Tosafot, in the gloss beginning “And Rav,” there raise an objection to Rav’s method, and this is their wording:

Rav, who said in accordance with Rabbi Akiva — Rabbi Ezra ha-Navi raised a difficulty. For now Rav interprets by amplifications and limitations, yet in the first chapter of Bava Kamma, 96b, Rav holds like Rabbi Meir, who says that with regard to slaves one may say: “Here is yours before you,” because slaves are not subject to robbery, just as land is not. And anyone who holds that slaves are like land interprets by generalizations and particularizations, as is proven below in the chapter on the oath of deposit, 37b, and in the last chapter of Bava Kamma, 117b. One may answer that he accepts some limitation that excludes slaves, as I explained above at the beginning of the tractate, 4b, s.v. “Rabbi Akiva.”

Already at the opening of their remarks, Tosafot use precisely the same language as the Lehem Mishneh: “Rav interprets by amplifications and limitations.” That is, they too demand coherence in the sources of halakhic midrash. Therefore they raise parallel discussions in which Rav appears to interpret specifically by generalizations and particularizations, like Rabbi Ishmael. Among other things, they cite the discussion on 37a-b mentioned above concerning the oath of deposit.³

In fact, Rav’s method is the source of Maimonides’ own method. On the one hand, as we already noted, Maimonides rules like Rav in Laws of Oaths 5:1. On the other hand, he rules like the Sages in the discussion on 37, and as Tosafot noted, that too seems to go in accordance with Rav. True, this source does not solve the problem; it merely pushes it back in time. Already Rav, a first-generation Babylonian Amora who still sat as a student in Rabbi Judah the Patriarch’s court, uses both methods of derivation alternately. Maimonides merely follows him.

Still, with respect to Rav — a first-generation Babylonian Amora — it remains plausible to say that he “interprets” by some method. The sages of the Talmud in that period still actively produced derashot, and therefore it is reasonable that each of them had a principled method even on the exegetical plane.

Resolutions of the contradiction

As stated, the Lehem Mishneh assumes that coherence must be found in the sources of halakha even with medieval codifiers. There are precedents for this in the Talmud and among the medieval authorities, but applying this assumption to medieval decisors is far more far-reaching. According to this assumption, when Maimonides issued any halakhic ruling he had to attend not only to its consistency with parallel laws, or with laws contradictory in content, but also to the consistency of its sources — that is, he could not alternate between different hermeneutical methods. This generates the difficulty we found above in Maimonides, who appears to alternate between the methodologies of the school of Rabbi Ishmael and that of Rabbi Akiva.

We already noted that many later authorities do not seem troubled by this kind of contradiction. It appears that they hold that Maimonides, living in an age that had long ceased to use these methods of derash directly, is bound to consistency only on the plane of content, not on the midrashic plane.

But the Lehem Mishneh was certainly troubled by this, because of the assumption just described. He therefore had to find an explanation for the contradiction in Maimonides.

He remarks that he resolved the contradiction in his Talmud commentary, which is not extant. Other later authorities offered additional explanations; see Sefer ha-Mafte’ach in the Frankel edition, Laws of Oaths 1:2, and especially Pri Hadash, Yoreh De’ah 84:7, and Noda BiYehuda, second edition, Yoreh De’ah 203, at length. Nearly all of them propose that Maimonides indeed rules like the school of Rabbi Akiva, which interprets by amplifications and limitations, and that the exceptions are all the places dealing with land, slaves, and documents — redemption of the firstborn son, the guilt-offering for an oath of deposit, and so forth — where Maimonides relies on some other special exclusion. In fact, Tosafot on Shevuot 25a says this as a resolution of Rav’s view, which, as we have seen, is the source of Maimonides’ method.

But it seems that this resolution too is difficult, for several reasons. First, the Gemara itself presents the matter as a dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva. On what basis, then, could Maimonides invent a distinction of his own?⁴ Further, as the Lehem Mishneh already noted, Maimonides also rules by the principle of general-particular-general regarding the awl, and there the discussion is an entirely different one. The Noda BiYehuda there adduces still more examples of this kind. One should also note that the combination of Rabbi Akiva’s methods together with Rabbi Ishmael’s general-and-particular derivations is not found only in the context of general-particular-general versus amplification-limitation-amplification. It is quite clear that, as a matter of halakha, we do employ derivations from the system of general and particular — and there are several hermeneutical principles of that sort — even though, at least ostensibly, we ruled like the school of Rabbi Akiva. If one accepts derivations of general and particular, is one then never to employ amplifications elsewhere in the Torah? It is obvious that the halakhic system is full of laws derived by both methods, and it is hard to assume that each one of these phenomena has a separate, unique explanation.⁵ It is more plausible that a different system emerged here, one that integrates the two earlier systems.

If so, a full and genuine resolution of Maimonides’ method requires entering into the world of these derivations in order to understand how the methodologies of the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael can be reconciled in a way that accords with the laws actually ruled upon. This is not the place for such an investigation.

Summary and conclusions

Here we return to our starting point. We have seen that Maimonides apparently does not adhere rigidly to a single methodology of derash. We have also seen that this phenomenon has antecedents among the Sages themselves. Admittedly, among the Sages it seems reasonable to demand coherence, since they themselves were actively engaged in producing such derivations. And as we have already noted several times in the past, the methodology of derash changed over the generations, and over the course of history the methods of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael were combined. There are many examples of this, and therefore it is very likely that the case of general-particular-general versus amplification-limitation-amplification is not exceptional in this respect.

The question is how one should understand this. We raised the possibility that coherence with respect to the sources of halakha is simply not required. But it seems that most commentators reject this out of hand and take for granted that such coherence must exist — although there are some who do not seem troubled by this type of question, and the matter requires further inquiry.

It is very likely that the reason for this is that the very system of hermeneutical principles reflects a coherent and complete method, and therefore anyone who adopts such a system must be consistent. This phenomenon hints at the conception of the Nazir — see the article on Parashat Bereshit, 5765 — according to which the system of principles is not merely an arbitrary code, but possesses meaning in itself.

If so, how are we to explain the combination of different methodologies in halakha and in the later midrashim? It seems that new methods were formed there, and these too possess an internal coherence of their own. The combination of methods must likewise have an internal order and structure, for as we have seen, the laws cannot be severed from their exegetical source.

The implication of this conclusion is that what is needed is a new line of research that addresses the complex system of derash — that is, the system of the later generations, which combined the methods of the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael. These combinations too should express a full system. We should not rest content with the claim that there is some isolated exclusion that explains each departure from the methodology of the school of Rabbi Akiva.

A similar remark concerning legal codes

Many have raised a similar difficulty with respect to some of the canonical legal codes of halakha, such as the Shulhan Arukh and Maimonides. In the Shulhan Arukh there appear to be quite a few contradictions between its rulings. Many have labored to reconcile each of these contradictions, but some have argued that no such reconciliation is needed, because the Shulhan Arukh does not purport to present an ordered and systematic doctrine but merely a compilation.⁶ This claim is rather strained, since it runs contrary to the author’s own declarations.

It should be noted that in that case the question concerns consistency on the level of content, not necessarily on the level of sources. With respect to content, it is very difficult to assume that a halakhic work lacks coherence, even if one might entertain such a hypothesis regarding the midrashic sources of the laws, as noted above in the introduction.

With respect to the coherence of the midrashic sources, it should be said that the Shulhan Arukh tends to follow Maimonides in those laws that it does rule on, since it does not deal with laws that are not practiced in our time. Therefore, a substantial portion of the problems we have pointed out here in Maimonides also arise with respect to the Shulhan Arukh.

Footnotes