Lesson 4: Rosh HaShanah

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help.

Sounding the Shofar on Rosh Hashanah That Falls on Shabbat — A Look at Halakhic (Jewish-Legal) Combinations

A. Sources

The primary mitzvah (commandment) of Rosh Hashanah is the sounding of the shofar. The Torah commands us to do so in Parashat Pinhas (Numbers 29:1):

In the seventh month, on the first day of the month, there shall be a holy convocation for you; you shall do no laborious work. It shall be a day of blasting for you.

Immediately afterward, the Torah gives the commandments concerning that day’s offerings. The wording of the verse implies that the essence of the day is the blast, for that is the very name of the day itself: “a day of blasting.” The Sages infer from the blast of the Jubilee that the blast here is specifically a shofar blast.

Maimonides writes in Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 170 (and the same appears in Sefer Ha-Hinnukh, commandment 405):

The 170th positive commandment is that we were commanded to hear the sound of the shofar on the first day of Tishrei. This is His statement, may He be exalted, concerning it: “It shall be a day of blasting for you.” The laws of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Rosh Hashanah, from 26a through 34b. Women are not obligated in it.

And similarly, in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Shofar 1:1, he writes:

It is a positive commandment of the Torah to hear the blast of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, as it says: “It shall be a day of blasting for you.” The shofar with which one sounds, whether on Rosh Hashanah or in the Jubilee year, is the curved horn of a ram. All other shofars are invalid except a ram’s horn. Although the Torah did not explicitly state that the blast of Rosh Hashanah is with a shofar, it says with regard to the Jubilee, “You shall cause the shofar blast to sound,” and by the oral tradition they learned: just as the blast of the Jubilee is with a shofar, so too the blast of Rosh Hashanah is with a shofar.

The Torah also mentions the sounding of the shofar in Parashat Emor (Leviticus 23:23–25), using the phrase “a remembrance of blasting”:

The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, saying: In the seventh month, on the first day of the month, there shall be for you a solemn rest, a remembrance of blasting, a holy convocation. You shall do no laborious work, and you shall bring a fire-offering to the Lord.

B. Rosh Hashanah That Falls on Shabbat: The Halakhic Basis

Against this background, it is especially surprising to read what the Mishnah states in Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 29b:

On a festival of Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, they would sound in the Temple, but not elsewhere. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should sound in every place where there is a court. Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted this only in Yavneh. They said to him: It is the same for Yavneh and for every place where there is a court. Jerusalem, however, had one further advantage over Yavneh: in every city that could see it, hear it, was near it, and could come to it, they would sound; but in Yavneh they would sound only in the court itself.

When Rosh Hashanah fell on Shabbat, they sounded in the Temple but not elsewhere. After the destruction of the Temple, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai ordained that they should sound before a court; there are many disputes among the medieval authorities about the scope of that enactment, but this is not the place to discuss them.

This is a surprising law. As we have seen, the Torah presents the sounding of the shofar as the essence of the day, and yet when the day falls on Shabbat, the shofar is not sounded. What remains of Rosh Hashanah without the shofar? How can Rosh Hashanah appear without the central law that defines the very character of the day?

In the Sifra, Behar, parashah 2, and likewise in Rashi on the Torah in the Jubilee section, a rabbinic midrash (interpretive exposition) appears as the source for this law:

“By day” and not by night. “On the Day of Atonement” — even if it falls on Shabbat. “You shall cause the shofar to sound throughout all your land” teaches that every individual is obligated. One might have thought that the blast of Rosh Hashanah likewise overrides Shabbat. Therefore Scripture says: “throughout all your land … and you shall cause the shofar blast to sound, in the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month, on the Day of Atonement.” It need not have said “on the tenth day of the month, on the Day of Atonement,” for once it says “on the Day of Atonement,” do I not know that it is on the tenth day of the month? Why then does it say “on the tenth day of the month”? To teach that the blast of the tenth day of the month overrides Shabbat throughout all your land, whereas the blast of Rosh Hashanah does not override Shabbat throughout all your land, but only in the court.

This source gives a biblical exposition for the rule that one does not sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on Shabbat. Does that mean that on such a day there is no obligation to sound at all, or that the obligation exists but is pushed aside for some reason? The midrash explicitly speaks in terms of overriding Shabbat, not in terms of the mitzvah’s becoming irrelevant. That is, there is some prohibition against sounding because of the laws of Shabbat, not merely an absence of obligation. Another indication is that in the court they did indeed sound even on such a day.

The problem, then, is: what prohibition could possibly be involved in sounding the shofar? In practical halakha, decisors even disagreed over whether there is any rabbinic prohibition here at all. It is true that playing musical instruments is forbidden because of the decree lest one come to repair an instrument. But with respect to the shofar, some wrote that this decree does not apply at all — for otherwise we should have had to forbid sounding it even on an ordinary Rosh Hashanah. So it is clear that the Sages did not decree against sounding the shofar as such, and certainly not on Rosh Hashanah itself. So too writes Magen Avraham, Orah Hayyim 588:4. Even in practical law, most decisors permit casual shofar blowing on an ordinary Rosh Hashanah, even after one has already discharged the obligation of hearing the shofar — whether for practice, or even simply without any particular purpose.

Now, in the Jerusalem Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 4:1, another source is brought:

“On a festival of Rosh Hashanah…” Rabbi Abba bar Pappa said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish were sitting and raising a difficulty. They said: We learned, “On a festival of Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, they would sound in the Temple, but not elsewhere.” If this is a law of the Torah, then it should override Shabbat even in the outlying areas; and if it is not a law of the Torah, then it should not override Shabbat even in the Temple. Kahana passed by. They said: Here is a great man; let us ask him. They asked him, and he said to them: One verse says, “It shall be a day of blasting for you,” and another says, “a remembrance of blasting.” How so? When it falls on a weekday, it is “a day of blasting”; when it falls on Shabbat, it is “a remembrance of blasting” — one mentions it, but one does not sound it. Rabbi Zeira instructed the colleagues: Go in and hear Rabbi Levi’s voice expounding, for it is impossible that he would deliver his lesson without something learned. He went in and said before them: One verse says, “It shall be a day of blasting for you,” and another says, “a remembrance of blasting.” How so? When it falls on a weekday, it is “a day of blasting”; when it falls on Shabbat, it is “a remembrance of blasting” — one mentions it, but one does not sound it. If so, then even in the Temple it should not override Shabbat. It was taught: “On the first day of the month.” If so, then even in a place where they know that it is indeed the first day of the month, it should override Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai taught: “And you shall offer” — in the place where the offerings are brought.

So the Jerusalem Talmud explains that there is a contradiction between two verses: “a day of blasting” and “a remembrance of blasting.” It resolves the contradiction by saying that one refers to an ordinary Rosh Hashanah, and the other to Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat.

At the end of the Jerusalem Talmud there is a hint of a connection to doubts concerning the fixing of the beginning of the month; that also seems to be the position of Ran, as cited by the Magen Avraham mentioned above. On that reading, the matter becomes clearer, because in truth they did not abolish a biblical positive commandment; rather, they refrained from sounding only in a place of doubt, where there is no certain obligation.¹ At first glance, according to this, in a place where the date is known with precision one should sound even on Shabbat — but we do not in fact act that way.

It is also difficult to interpret the intention of the Jerusalem Talmud itself in that manner, for it is discussing an ordinary case of Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, and it learns from the verse that the sounding does not override Shabbat. If so, Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai’s remark is probably an independent statement, not an agreed conclusion.

In any event, surprisingly, even in the exposition of the Jerusalem Talmud — which is also presented as a biblical source — the implication is that sounding is forbidden because it does not override Shabbat, not that there was simply no obligation in the first place. In other words, the Jerusalem Talmud establishes a prohibition against sounding on Shabbat, not merely the absence of a duty to do so. Here too the question returns: what prohibition is involved in sounding the shofar? As noted, the plain sense of the biblical wording as expounded by the Sages seems to be that when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat there is no obligation to sound at all, but only to remember the blast. For some reason, however, the Sages understand this as a case of the obligation’s being suspended rather than simply not applying.

It is strained to say that the Sifra and the Jerusalem Talmud hold that shevut — that is, Sabbath-rest restrictions of rabbinic type — is biblical, as Nahmanides suggests on Parashat Emor and as Ritva cites in Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 33a, and that for this reason the mitzvah is displaced. In the Temple that would indeed fit well, since rabbinic Sabbath-rest restrictions do not apply there. Yet even according to Nahmanides, the term does not refer to every ordinary rabbinic infraction, but rather to public desecration. Perhaps public shofar sounding would count as a biblical violation of that kind. In any event, this conception of a biblical shevut is not generally accepted, so it is not the standard interpretation of the Jerusalem Talmud.

Indeed, in the Jerusalem Talmud’s initial question there is a suggestion that the rule might be rabbinic, but that possibility is rejected because, if so, there would be no justification for setting aside a Torah law on its account. This is yet another indication that the Jerusalem Talmud is not hanging everything on uncertainty about the calendar. Its conclusion is that this is a Torah law, derived from the exposition based on the contradiction between the verses.

By contrast, the Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 29b, concludes as follows:

Gemara: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Levi bar Lahma said in the name of Rabbi Hama bar Hanina: One verse says, “a sabbath-rest, a remembrance of blasting,” and another says, “it shall be a day of blasting for you.” This is no difficulty: here it speaks of a festival that falls on Shabbat, there of a festival that falls on a weekday. Rava said: If this is a law of the Torah, then how do we sound in the Temple? Moreover, this is not a labor for which a verse would be needed to exclude it, as the school of Samuel taught: “You shall do no laborious work” — this excludes shofar blowing and drawing bread from the oven, for it is a skill and not a labor. Rather, Rava said: By Torah law it is fully permitted, and it is the Sages who decreed concerning it, in accordance with Rabbah. For Rabbah said: Everyone is obligated in the sounding of the shofar, but not everyone is expert in the sounding of the shofar. Therefore the Sages decreed lest one take it in hand and go to an expert to learn, and carry it four cubits in the public domain. And this is the reason for lulav, and this is the reason for the Megillah.

The first explanation raised in the Gemara is the contradiction between the verses, just as in the Jerusalem Talmud. Immediately afterward, however, that explanation is rejected: if this were truly biblical, then how could they sound in the Temple? The Jerusalem Talmud asked the same question, and its answer is not entirely clear. Here, though, the assumption is that there is a biblical prohibition, not merely the absence of an obligation. For if the point were only that the obligation had been canceled, why would there be any difficulty with sounding in the Temple? Perhaps there the obligation still applies. The language of the Gemara implies that the exposition teaches a prohibition, not merely the cancellation of the duty.

More than that: this is not a problem of shevut, for even if it were, the difficulty would not be strong, since in practical law it is accepted that rabbinic Sabbath restrictions do not apply in the Temple.

What did the Jerusalem Talmud answer to this difficulty? It seems that this is precisely its answer: there is no prohibition here, only the cancellation of the obligation.² Therefore there is no difficulty as to why they did sound in the Temple. Admittedly, in the Jerusalem Talmud there is a second formulation of the exposition, and there it appears that there is a special derivation explaining why one does sound in the Temple. It is possible that there is a disagreement there over whether the exposition is built on a prohibition or on the absence of obligation.

So even at the stage where the Babylonian Talmud cites the exposition found in the Jerusalem Talmud, it does not understand it as the Jerusalem Talmud itself understands it, at least in its first formulation. In the Jerusalem Talmud, the conclusion is that the obligation is canceled, whereas in the Babylonian Talmud this would amount to an actual Torah prohibition. Naturally, the question we raised above returns with even greater force: what biblical prohibition — and perhaps even what rabbinic prohibition — is there in sounding the shofar?

The Babylonian Talmud itself raises this question, and on that basis rejects the exposition above and offers another explanation: the rule that one does not sound outside the Temple is rabbinic, out of concern that one may go to an expert and carry the shofar four cubits in the public domain, just as we find regarding lulav and Megillah.

At this point we are certainly dealing with a prohibition and not merely the absence of obligation. There is a rabbinic prohibition, lest one carry it, and by its force the duty to sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat is suspended. Later authorities noted that ordinary rabbinic prohibitions, such as the concern lest one repair a musical instrument, cannot serve as the basis for this rule; for if that were the basis, we would not sound the shofar even on an ordinary Rosh Hashanah that falls on a weekday.

Are the expositions cited above merely an asmakhta — that is, a rabbinic rule supported by a scriptural allusion? It does not seem so. The Gemara offers the rabbinic explanation as an alternative to the exposition; it does not say that the exposition is merely an allusive support. Therefore, in the Jerusalem Talmud, the exposition remains at the conclusion as a biblical law.

C. The Philosophical-Halakhic Significance

In the end, the Babylonian Talmud, which holds that the rule is rabbinic, must still face the same difficulty found in the Jerusalem Talmud: how can the Sages, on the basis of a technical concern, uproot the very essence of the day? We have seen that Rosh Hashanah is called “a day of blasting”; that is its core.

It is worth noting that several other rabbinic prohibitions are set aside in order to enable the sounding of the shofar, such as clearing away a heap of rubble in order to retrieve a shofar with which to sound. True, the medieval authorities disagree on this point, and one may distinguish between a prohibition involved in the very act of sounding and a prohibition involved only in preparing the shofar for the mitzvah. Still, in the straightforward sense, we do not ordinarily allow a rabbinic prohibition to uproot the essence of the day. Admittedly, the decree of “lest one carry it” is different, because it involves the concern that one may come to a biblical prohibition, namely carrying four cubits.³

Some have wanted to say that refraining from sounding because of Shabbat is itself the fulfillment of the mitzvah of shofar; see Meshekh Hokhmah on Leviticus 23:24 and elsewhere. Others have said — see Eleh Hem Moadei, sec. 15 — that by virtue of observing Shabbat we receive the benefit brought by the shofar even without actual sounding, through remembrance alone. All of this belongs to the plane of religious thought. But what about halakha itself? How was the obligation to sound nullified, and what remains of the essence of the day without it? The answer must be rooted in the exposition. If so, in some sense the exposition remains in force even in the conclusion of the Babylonian Talmud.

D. Syntheses

At first glance, this proves that the Babylonian Talmud too holds that Rosh Hashanah falling on Shabbat is not the same kind of day as ordinary Rosh Hashanah. Something has changed in the very nature of the day. Perhaps precisely for that reason there was room to be stringent and refrain from sounding because of the prohibition. In any event, the option of “remembrance of blasting” exists in the Babylonian Talmud as well. Its source can only be the exposition that was, apparently, rejected there. Something of it nevertheless remains in the law.

According to the Jerusalem Talmud this is certainly a Torah law. But in truth, although practical law follows the Babylonian Talmud and treats the matter as rabbinic, in practice we still preserve a trace of the Jerusalem Talmud’s exposition and relate to Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat as a day of “remembrance of blasting.”

As noted in the footnote, the verse “a remembrance of blasting” introduces not only a leniency but also a stringency. It not only exempts one from sounding on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat; it also obligates one to remember the blast. That is a Torah requirement that binds us on such a day. Does that requirement remain in force in practical law, even though the exposition was rejected — or is it only an asmakhta?

Rashi, on Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 29a, s.v. “a remembrance of blasting,” writes that there is an obligation to recite the liturgical passages of Kingship, Remembrances, and Shofarot. That is an obligation on every Rosh Hashanah, but on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat only that obligation remains.

Nahmanides, on Leviticus 23:24, disagrees with Rashi and writes as follows:

“A remembrance of blasting” — verses of remembrance and verses of shofar, so that the binding of Isaac may be remembered for you, since a ram was offered in his place; that is Rashi’s language. But the master should also have cited the verses of kingship from the midrash, for it is impossible that Scripture should mention verses of remembrance and shofar without mentioning kingship. Indeed, they already derived them from the verse, “and they shall be for you a remembrance before the Lord your God” (Numbers 10:10): it need not have said, “I am the Lord your God.” Why then does it say, “I am the Lord your God”? Rather, this is a paradigm: wherever you say remembrances, you adjoin kingship to them, as appears in Torat Kohanim, parashah 11:2, and in Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 32a. But all of this is merely an asmakhta of rabbinic origin, and they explicitly said there, in Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 34b: one goes to a place where they sound, and one does not go to a place where they merely recite the blessings. Is that not obvious? One is biblical and the other rabbinic. No, it was needed even though the one is certain and the other doubtful. But “a remembrance of blasting,” like “it shall be a day of blasting for you” (Numbers 29:1), means that we should sound on this day, and it will serve for us as a remembrance before the Lord, as it says later: “And you shall blow the trumpets, and they shall be for you a remembrance before your God” (Numbers 10:10).

Nahmanides writes that this is only a rabbinic obligation, and that the derivation is merely an asmakhta. His proof is from Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 34b, where the Gemara says that the obligation to recite these verses is rabbinic; that is why it is preferable to go to a place where they sound the shofar than to a place where they merely recite the verses.

Rashi’s view may be reconciled — see Yom Teru’ah by Maharam ibn Habib, and see Mitokh Shiurim by Rabbi Elyashiv on Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 16a — by saying that only on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat is there, in place of actual sounding, a biblical obligation to remember the blast. The Gemara is speaking about ordinary Rosh Hashanah, where the obligation to recite is rabbinic. Obviously, where it is possible to sound the shofar, that is preferable; the recitation of verses is then only rabbinic.⁴

Indeed, Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 28b, raises the possibility that sounding the shofar requires intention even according to the view that mitzvot do not require intention, on the basis of the verse “a remembrance of blasting.” This would be a different kind of intention, not merely the intention to discharge one’s obligation. Presumably it is the intention to remember what the blast is meant to evoke. Although that suggestion is rejected, according to our approach the rejection means only that when one actually sounds the shofar there is no need for an accompanying intention beyond the intention to fulfill the mitzvah. But on Shabbat, when there is no actual sounding, the obligation of this additional intention — to remember the “remembrance of blasting” — remains biblical. That is precisely Rashi’s point.

Perhaps one may also invoke here the words of the Zohar, volume 3, on Parashat Vayikra, 18b, which says:

Therefore we find in the book of Rabbi Hamnuna the Elder, concerning the prayers of Rosh Hashanah, that he said: the prayer and the sound of the shofar — that sound brings forth the righteous one found in that shofar, from his spirit and soul, and that sound rises upward. On that day the accusers stand above, and when that sound of the shofar rises, all of them are thrust aside before it and cannot endure. Happy is the portion of the righteous, who know how to direct their will before their Master and know how to order the world on this day through the sound of the shofar. Therefore it is written, “Happy is the people who know the blast” (Psalms 89:16) — who know, and not merely who blow. On this day the people need to focus on a person complete in every respect, who knows the ways of the holy King, who knows the honor of the King, who can present their request on this day and send forth the sound of the shofar through all the worlds with intention of heart, wisdom, desire, and wholeness, so that judgment may be removed from the world through him.

The Zohar infers from the verse that it says “who know the blast,” not “who sound the blast.” Even the sounding itself is meant to bring one to a form of knowledge, and that is what must be remembered.

And what is the practical law?

We find in Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 582:7:

If it falls on a weekday, one says: “a day of blasting, a holy convocation”; and if it falls on Shabbat, one says: “a remembrance of blasting.”

That is, we see that this exposition leaves a residue even in practical halakha. Indeed, Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat is, in practical terms as well, “a remembrance of blasting.”

Now Mishnah Berurah there, 19, writes:

One says “a day of blasting,” etc. — even in the night prayer or in Kiddush, for although one does not sound the shofar at night, nevertheless the day is a day of blasting, since on the following morning they will certainly sound. The later authorities wrote that, post factum, if on a weekday one said “a remembrance of blasting” and completed the blessing, he does not repeat it, since the Torah itself says “a remembrance of blasting,” even though by Torah law sounding is permitted on Shabbat. The same applies on Shabbat: if one said “a day of blasting,” he also does not repeat it.

So on a weekday it is also appropriate to say “a remembrance of blasting,” and on Shabbat it is also appropriate to say “a day of blasting.” At first glance, this would seem to mean that the exposition was canceled, since we interpret “a remembrance of blasting” even with reference to ordinary Rosh Hashanah. But according to our explanation, that is not so. As we have explained, every Rosh Hashanah contains an element of “remembrance of blasting”; ordinarily that remembrance is realized through the act of sounding. On Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, we realize only that dimension, because the decree forbids us to sound.

The source of the Mishnah Berurah is Pri Hadash, Orah Hayyim 582, where he writes:

One says “a day of blasting,” etc. Yet it is obvious to me that if one said “a remembrance of blasting,” we do not require him to repeat, for the Torah itself says “a remembrance of blasting,” even though by Torah law sounding is permitted on Shabbat, as stated at the beginning of the last chapter of Tractate Rosh Hashanah. The only point of doubt is the reverse case: if on Shabbat one said “a day of blasting,” do we require him to repeat or not? It seems to me that we do not, since according to all views, wherever there was a fixed and ordained court in the Land of Israel they would sound there on Shabbat, and so it is called a day of blasting. Alternatively, one may say that since in other years it is a day of blasting, the fact that in this particular year it is not makes no difference.

So we see that the exposition remains in practical law at least at the level of liturgical wording. In addition, we see that even on a weekday there is room for the idea of “remembrance of blasting,” as we explained in Rashi.

Indeed, we find several other commentators who attempt to connect the Babylonian Talmud with the Jerusalem Talmud, and thus to see the exposition as still operative even in the conclusion, not only at the level of wording.

The simplest path is to see the exposition as an asmakhta for the rabbinic law rooted in the concern “lest one carry it”; see Penei Moshe and Korban Ha-Edah there in the sugya. Some commentators, however, move in the opposite direction. Let us cite Shibbolei Ha-Leket and Penei Yehoshua.

1. The author of Shibbolei Ha-Leket, sec. 294, writes:

The law of the shofar as to whether it overrides Shabbat, or whether one may clear rubble for it on a festival, take it beyond the boundary, bring it down from a tree, or cut and prepare it.

On a festival of Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, they would sound in the Temple but not elsewhere. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should sound in every place where there is a court. Nowadays that enactment no longer applies, and throughout all Jewish communities the simple custom is not to sound on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat. And we say in the Gemara: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Levi bar Hama said in the name of Rabbi Hanina: One verse says, “a sabbath-rest, a remembrance of blasting,” and another says, “it shall be a day of blasting for you.” This is no difficulty: here it speaks of Shabbat, there of a weekday. But in the conclusion we say: Rava said that by Torah law it is fully permitted, and it is the Sages who decreed concerning it because of Rabbah, who said: Everyone is obligated in the sounding of the shofar, but not everyone is expert in it; therefore a decree was made lest one take it in hand and go to an expert to learn, and carry it four cubits in the public domain.

Some ask: why do we need Rabbah’s decree, when two verses are written, “a remembrance of blasting” and “a day of blasting,” and we interpret one as referring to Shabbat and one as referring to a weekday? They explain that Rabbah himself interprets the verses in this way: why did the Torah say “a remembrance of blasting”? Because of the decree lest one go to an expert to learn, and so forth.

The author of Shibbolei Ha-Leket explains that Rabbah’s rabbinic reason is itself the basis of the biblical exposition in the Jerusalem Talmud. But one should notice: he is not saying that the exposition is merely an asmakhta. On the contrary, the explanation that appears to be merely rabbinic is, for him, the reason for the biblical rule.

It has already been noted that this seems to contradict the Gemara. After all, the Gemara rejected the exposition because of the question: why then do they sound in the Temple? Perhaps his intention is that this question does not really displace the exposition, because its plain meaning is that there is no obligation, not that there is a prohibition. If so, perhaps there is an implicit answer here: in the Temple they sounded because of the duty to remember, whereas elsewhere they did not sound because of Rabbah’s concern.

That is, his claim is that the exposition underlies the rabbinic decree; otherwise the Sages would not have nullified a biblical mitzvah. On the biblical level, the very essence of the day has indeed changed. There still remains a framework of obligation connected to the shofar, but its core is remembrance; when actual sounding is possible, one fulfills the remembrance through the act of sounding as well. On the rabbinic level, however, the obligation to sound was removed, and only the obligation to remember remained; that obligation is fulfilled by reciting the verses. But everything rests on the biblical rule that on Rosh Hashanah falling on Shabbat, the primary obligation is remembrance and the rule of actual sounding lapses, unlike ordinary Rosh Hashanah.

If so, the change in the nature of the day, as compared with ordinary Rosh Hashanah, is biblical. Only the abolition of actual sounding is rabbinic. The absence of a biblical obligation to sound is itself biblical, though one still could have sounded and thereby fulfilled the obligation of remembrance. The prohibition is rabbinic, precisely because the biblical obligation can be fulfilled even in silence.

This explains well what we asked above: how can the Sages abolish the essence of the day because of such a secondary and marginal concern? According to this approach, they did not abolish the essence of the day at all. On the contrary, they constituted it.

2. Penei Yehoshua, on Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 30a, s.v. “In Tosafot, s.v. ‘No, rather…,’” proposes a different direction. In his words:

Tosafot, in the comment beginning “No, rather when the court is in session,” ask: even so, the wording in Rosh Hashanah remains difficult … whereas here it teaches “each man in his house,” and they answer accordingly, through the end of that comment. In truth, their answer is very forced, and it seems that they were compelled to interpret and press the matter that way because of their position stated in the previous comment. But according to what I wrote regarding Rashi’s view, there is no need to force the matter. Rather, everything works well even in the straightforward sense of the baraita. Even so, there is no difficulty from Rosh Hashanah, for when Rosh Hashanah in its first formulation says specifically “before the court,” that means only before people had yet heard the sounding that took place in the court. By contrast, what is taught here — that the shofar blasts of Rosh Hashanah outside the Temple override Shabbat, each man in his house — refers to a case after they had already discharged their obligation and heard the blasts sounded in the court. Even so, they would return and sound in their own houses, either as an enhanced way of fulfilling the mitzvah or in order to discharge the obligation of their household members. If so, the decree “lest one carry it” no longer applies, for they sounded in their own houses; and the wording “in his house” is exact, precisely because in one’s own house that decree does not apply.

It seems to me that there is clear proof for this approach from the baraita in Torat Kohanim that Rashi cited in his commentary on the verse “On the Day of Atonement, on the tenth day of the month, you shall cause the shofar to sound throughout all your land” (Leviticus 25:9). He writes there: Since it says “on the Day of Atonement,” do I not know that it is on the tenth day of the month? Why then does it say “on the tenth day of the month”? To tell you that the blasts of the tenth day of the month override Shabbat throughout all your land, whereas the blasts of Rosh Hashanah do not override Shabbat throughout all your land, but only in the court. On this Nahmanides wrote in his Torah commentary that Rashi’s view here is contrary to the conclusion of the Gemara, since we concluded above that the shofar blasts on Shabbat are forbidden only rabbinically, because of the concern lest one carry it. Therefore that baraita in Torat Kohanim must, according to Nahmanides, be only an asmakhta, as Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrahi wrote here in his commentary. He concludes that although the language is indeed redundant — for once it says “on the Day of Atonement,” do I not know that it is on the tenth day of the month? — he is nevertheless very pressed in the interpretation of the verse; see there, as is clear to anyone who studies his words.

At first glance, according to our discussion above, Rashi’s words fit his overall position. He held that on Rosh Hashanah falling on Shabbat there is no obligation of actual sounding, but only “remembrance of blasting,” and that this is biblical. Therefore he cites the exposition of the Sifra as though it were still normative. There is no difficulty for him from Nahmanides’ objection. Nahmanides too is following his own approach: for him, the essence of the day did not change on the biblical plane, and everything occurs only on the rabbinic plane.

Later in his discussion, however, Penei Yehoshua offers a different explanation:

However, according to what I explained in Rashi’s view, this fits very well. For when we concluded above that the prohibition of sounding on Shabbat is only the decree “lest one carry it,” that is because it is implied by the Mishnah that they sounded only in the Temple and not even in Jerusalem, although they always knew that Rosh Hashanah had been fixed on its proper day; and nevertheless they did not sound, which must mean because of the concern lest one carry it. By contrast, in that exposition of the baraita in Torat Kohanim, the core derivation is from the words “throughout all your land,” which do not refer to Jerusalem. The exposition then fits very well, for this is the intent of the verse itself: specifically on Yom Kippur, which falls on the tenth day of the month and everyone knows that the day is Yom Kippur, they would sound everywhere; whereas on Rosh Hashanah, which is on the New Moon itself, they would sound only in the court, because people do not know the exact fixing of the month. And although shofar sounding is not a full-fledged labor, so that it is excluded from “laborious work,” nevertheless it is still called labor in some sense. That is why the Gemara brings the verse of “laborious work.” According to this, it is like a prohibition generated by a positive command, and we find something similar with respect to the resting of one’s utensils according to Beit Shammai, and the resting of one’s animal according to all opinions: in both cases there is only a biblical prohibition. True, since such a prohibition does not involve karet or capital punishment, but only a simple prohibition, the positive commandment of shofar sounding could in principle override it. Even so, it is forbidden to sound outside the court, since they do not know the exact fixing of the month, and thus one may come to sound on Shabbat, which would be a biblical prohibition where no mitzvah is involved. So it seems to me right and clear in resolving Rashi’s view in this sugya; and his explanation fits exactly with the plain meaning of his Torah commentary, and the language of Scripture and the baraita support him. Study this carefully; it is correct.

He ties the matter to uncertainty about the fixing of the month, but according to our approach there is no need for that.

E. A Sound Rising from Silence

We thus learn that for both the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud, the combination of Shabbat with Rosh Hashanah creates a day of a third type. This is not a blended fusion, but a juxtaposed compound.

Rabbi Akiva Eger and Magen Avraham discuss whether there remains a mitzvah for one who has already sounded; compare Tosafot on Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 3a. But one may reject that comparison and defend Rabbi Akiva Eger: on Rosh Hashanah that falls on Shabbat, the mitzvah was canceled altogether, unlike the cases of sukkah and of reciting the Shema while leaning in accordance with Beit Shammai, where in both cases the mitzvah remains fully in force.

The meaning of this combination is that “remembrance of blasting” is silence. The sound of the shofar is a simple sound, without melody. God is not found in tumult; a voice emerges from silence. On Shabbat there is complete stillness: “a remembrance of blasting.”

F. Halakhic Combinations

There are several examples of this:

• Ohr Sameach, Laws of the Yom Kippur Service 4:1.
• Tzafnat Paneah, Responsum 2: the “must die” aspect remains in place.
• The High Priest and the ordinary priest, in Tosafot on Nazir.
• Note 10 in Two Wagons and a Hot-Air Balloon.

Footnotes