Lesson 3: Nitzavim-Vayelech

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

The Commandment of Hakhel: A Look at the Relationship Between the Individual and the Collective

A. Introduction

In a surprising and unusual verse (Deuteronomy 31:9), the Torah tells us:

Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the priests, the sons of Levi, who carry the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, and to all the elders of Israel.

It appears that here Moses our teacher is summing up everything he has said, and writing the Torah scroll as it is known to us today.

Immediately after this brief description of the writing of the Torah scroll, the Torah, in Deuteronomy 31:10-13, commands us regarding the mitzvah (commandment) of Hakhel, the public septennial assembly:

Moses commanded them, saying: At the end of seven years, at the appointed time of the Sabbatical year, on the festival of Sukkot, when all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place that He shall choose, you shall read this Torah before all Israel in their hearing. Assemble the people, the men, the women, the children, and your stranger who is within your gates, so that they may hear, and so that they may learn and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this Torah. And their children, who have not known, shall hear and learn to fear the Lord your God all the days that you live upon the land to which you are crossing the Jordan to possess it.

This commandment is counted by all the classical enumerators of the commandments. Maimonides, in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 16, writes as follows:

The sixteenth commandment is that we were commanded to assemble the entire people on the second day of Sukkot at the conclusion of every Sabbatical year, and to read in their ears certain passages from Deuteronomy. This is His statement, exalted be He: “Assemble the people, the men, the women, and the children…” This is the commandment of Hakhel. In the first chapter of Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 34a, when they said that women are exempt from every positive time-bound commandment, the Talmud challenged and said: But Hakhel is a positive time-bound commandment, and women are obligated in it. They explained at the end of the discussion: One does not derive law from general rules. The laws of this commandment — namely, how one reads, who reads, and what is read — are explained in the seventh chapter of tractate Sotah, 32a and 41a.

B. Who Is Obligated in This?

There is an interesting phenomenon here that Maimonides saw fit to mention in his short description of this commandment: this is a positive time-bound commandment, and women should therefore have been exempt. Yet in this commandment women are obligated, and that is an exception.

True, one does not derive law from general rules, even where the formulation says “except,” but the matter still requires explanation. Why, in fact, are women obligated in this commandment?¹

Moreover, Maimonides notes, following the Torah itself, that children too are included in this commandment. About that he does not even add a comment of his own, following the Talmud, which also comments only about women. Possibly he relies on the answer given with regard to women as also applying to children.

Sefer HaChinukh also counts this commandment, as commandment 612. At the end of the discussion of the commandment, where he normally notes who is obligated in it — men, women, and so on — he does not address the question of who is obligated. Apparently he relies on the opening of his remarks there:

We were commanded that the entire people of Israel — men, women, and children — assemble at the close of the Sabbatical year, on the festival of Sukkot, on the second day of the festival, and that some of the book of Deuteronomy be read in their ears, namely “These are the words.” Concerning this it is said: “Assemble the people, the men, the women, and the children…” This is the commandment of Hakhel mentioned in the Talmud, as they said at the beginning of Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 34a: “But Hakhel is a positive time-bound commandment, and women are obligated in it.” And they explained at the end of the discussion: “One does not derive law from general rules” — that is, the truth is that women are obligated in this commandment.

And indeed, in this paragraph too he notes the Talmudic question in Kiddushin cited by Maimonides. Apparently this is the passage in which he addresses the question of who is obligated in this commandment.

However, at the end of his remarks he writes, as he does regarding all the other commandments:

One who violates this, whether man or woman, and does not come at this appointed time to hear the words of the Torah, and likewise the king if he does not wish to read, has neglected this positive commandment. Their punishment is very great, for this commandment is a mighty pillar and a great honor of the religion.

That is, it seems that both man and woman are obligated in this commandment. For some reason, minors are not mentioned in this rule at all. He mentions man and woman only with respect to the question of who violates the commandment, but regarding positive commandments he usually notes who is obligated, not who violates. There is therefore still an anomaly here that requires explanation.

Moreover, Sefer HaChinukh does indeed bring the explanation above from Kiddushin, but that too is itself a departure from his usual practice of saying everything at the end. Why does he depart here from his usual pattern?

With regard to children, the Babylonian Talmud, Chagigah 3a-3b, states:

The Sages taught: It once happened that Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar ben Hasma went to greet Rabbi Yehoshua in Peki’in. He said to them: What new teaching was there today in the study hall? They said to him: We are your disciples, and from your waters we drink. He said to them: Even so, a study hall cannot be without some novelty. Whose Sabbath was it? They said: It was the Sabbath of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah. He said: And on what subject was the discourse today? They said: On the passage of Hakhel. He said: And what did he expound on it? “Assemble the people, the men, the women, and the children” — if the men come to learn, and the women come to hear, why do the children come? In order to give reward to those who bring them. He said to them: You had a precious pearl in your hand, and you wished to withhold it from me! He further expounded: “You have affirmed the Lord today, and the Lord has affirmed you today.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Israel: You have made Me a unique entity in the world, and I will make you a unique entity in the world. You have made Me a unique entity in the world, as it is written: “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is One.” And I will make you a unique entity in the world, as it is said: “And who is like Your people Israel, one nation in the land.”

At first glance, this is not speaking about an obligation on the child himself, for he has not yet reached legal majority, as the Talmud there explicitly says with regard to the obligation of appearing at the Temple and the festival offering. The Talmud says here that children are brought in order to give reward to those who bring them. Apparently it is those who bring them who are obligated to bring the minors. So writes Minchat Chinukh, subsection 4, under the heading “children.” Later there he concludes from this that even a deaf child is included in Hakhel, since the obligation is on his father and not on the child himself, and therefore he does not have the exemption of deafness that an adult has.²

His assumption is that the child is not obligated to hear, only to come. Only the father is the hearer. And apparently the same is true of women: they have no obligation to hear, since they are exempt from Torah study, but only to come.

In Turei Even on Chagigah there, he investigates whether the obligation rests on the father or on the rabbinical court, and he leaves the matter unresolved:

“In order to give reward to those who bring them.” It has not been clarified to me upon whom the obligation to bring the children rests: specifically upon the father, or also upon the court. And if you should say that it is specifically upon the father — after all, earlier the Talmud derived the exemptions from the pilgrimage appearance obligation from Hakhel through the verbal analogy of “appearance” and “appearance,” and later it also says that for this reason the word “male” is written regarding appearance, so that women should not be learned from Hakhel. If so, the reverse should also follow: those exempt from the pilgrimage appearance obligation should be exempt from Hakhel through that same verbal analogy. Now in the first chapter of Babylonian Talmud, Pesachim 8a, Rabbi Ami said that one who has no land is exempt from the pilgrimage appearance obligation, and it seems to me that this is derived from the verse: “No man shall covet your land.” Certainly the verse is concerned with land in the Land of Israel. If so, the same should be true regarding Hakhel. Now then, if the Hakhel obligation of children falls specifically upon the father, from where would a child have land in the Land of Israel while his father is alive? Necessarily the case must be where his father died and he inherited land from him, for the Hakhel verse is stated in general terms, implying even at a time when the Jubilee is observed. Furthermore, the Sabbatical year is mentioned in the Hakhel passage, and there is an opinion in the fourth chapter of Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 36a, that the Sabbatical year applies only when the Jubilee applies. Certainly we should not be more stringent with children than with adults, who are exempt when they have no land. Since there would be no way to obligate children in Hakhel except in a case where their father died and they inherited from him, this proves that the obligation is on the court. This is no proof, for one can always say that his father is alive, and nevertheless it is possible that he has land in the Land of Israel — if his mother died, and she had been an heiress, and he inherited from her and not his father, according to the opinion that a husband’s inheritance is only rabbinic. Or in the case of one born from rape, according to all opinions. Or where she had been divorced. And know that this is so, for it is written regarding Hakhel: “and your convert.” From where does a convert have land in the Land of Israel? If by purchase, then according to the opinion that usufruct is not like ownership of the body, it is not called “your land,” as is said at the end of Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 48a. And if by marrying a Jewish heiress and inheriting from her, then according to the opinion that a husband’s inheritance is rabbinic, what can be said? Rather, it must be speaking of a convert whose father and mother converted and from whom he inherited.

He adduces a proof from the fact that a minor has no ownership of land: how then can he be obligated in Hakhel? The only possibility is that he inherited land from his father, and then he has land. But in that case it follows that his father died, and if the obligation is on the father, how is he now obligated in Hakhel? This proves, according to him, that the obligation is on the court. He then rejects the proof: perhaps it is a case where the mother died, according to the opinion that a husband’s inheritance is rabbinic.

Clearly, in light of the remarks of Minchat Chinukh above, this proof does not exist at all. It is clear that the child need not meet the requirements that apply to an adult, just as he may be deaf.³ Turei Even apparently understands that the obligation rests on the child himself, and not on the father. What the Talmud says is only the reason why an obligation was imposed on a minor. In other words, one comes with demands to the father or to the court, who are supposed to ensure the child’s attendance. But the obligation itself rests on the child. Minchat Chinukh, by contrast, understands that the basic obligation rests on the father or the court, and not on the child.

How can obligations be imposed on a minor? We find here a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot — see Kehillot Yaakov, Sukkah, no. 2 — in Berakhot and Megillah. True, there the matter concerns the rabbinic obligation of education, but it is still a source for the proposition that demands can be made of minors. Even so, it is clear that the father is the one who must ensure that the minor fulfills his obligations, and when the father is not present the obligation passes to the court.⁴

We have dealt with minors and women. What about slaves? Maimonides, Laws of the Festival Offering, beginning of chapter 3, writes as follows:

1. It is a positive commandment to assemble all Israel — men, women, and children — at the close of every Sabbatical year, when they go up for the pilgrimage festival, and to read in their ears from the Torah passages that encourage them in the commandments and strengthen their hands in the true faith, as it is said: “At the end of seven years, at the appointed time of the Sabbatical year, on the festival of Sukkot, when all Israel comes to appear…” “Assemble the people, the men, the women, and the children, and your stranger who is within your gates…”

2. Everyone exempt from the pilgrimage appearance obligation is exempt from the commandment of Hakhel, except for women, children, and an uncircumcised man. But one who is impure is exempt from the commandment of Hakhel, as it is said: “when all Israel comes,” and this person is not fit to come. It is clear that one of indeterminate sex and one who is androgynous are obligated, since women are obligated.

There is an analogy between those exempt from the pilgrimage appearance obligation and those exempt from Hakhel, in one direction; we saw this also in the proof of Turei Even above. But there are categories exempt from the pilgrimage appearance obligation who are nevertheless not exempt from Hakhel: women, children, and the uncircumcised. The commandment of Hakhel is more inclusive. It follows from this that slaves are exempt from Hakhel.

And this is indeed how Lechem Mishneh understands it there, in 3:2, and he asks:

Everyone exempt from appearing is exempt from the commandment of Hakhel, except for women, children, and an uncircumcised man, etc. One may ask: why did he not also say “except for slaves”? For in the first chapter of Chagigah 4a, with regard to the pilgrimage appearance obligation, it is said: why do I need a verse? After all, every commandment that a woman is obligated in, a slave is obligated in, since we learn the latter from the former. One may answer that here it is different, because Scripture says: “when all Israel comes to appear,” and that implies the exemption of slaves, as our teacher wrote above. Even so, perhaps our teacher found this proof elsewhere, for in our Talmud it does not seem so. Since it says there: from where do we know it regarding slaves? And when it goes back to find a verse from “before the Lord, the Master,” it does not mention this verse at all. I have already written about this above. As for what our teacher wrote, that everyone exempt from appearing is exempt from Hakhel — he derived this from what is said there in the first chapter of Chagigah, that we learn “appearance” from “appearance” from Hakhel.

It should be noted that he prefers the analogy between slaves and women over the analogy between Hakhel and the pilgrimage appearance obligation. At first glance, one might have learned that slaves are exempt because of the analogy to the pilgrimage appearance obligation, and that should take precedence over the analogy to women.

Lechem Mishneh explains that this is an exclusion derived from the verse “when all Israel comes,” as in chapter 2, law 1, regarding the pilgrimage appearance obligation.

C. Obligations Imposed on a Collective

It seems that the obligation of women, despite the fact that this is a positive time-bound commandment, can be explained by saying that the obligation rests on the collective of Israel. This is explicit in the verse — “Assemble the entire people…” — and likewise in the language of all the enumerators of the commandments cited above. We have here a collective commandment, not a commandment imposed on each individual separately. If so, women are not actually obligated as individuals, but they are obligated as part of the collective.

For this reason Halakhot Gedolot counts Hakhel among the commandments imposed on the community. The addressee is the community, not the individuals included within it.

Therefore Sefer HaChinukh does not address, at the end of his remarks, which persons are obligated, for the one obligated is the collective, as he wrote at the beginning of his remarks.

This also explains the position of Lechem Mishneh and Maimonides: women are included because they are part of the collective, but slaves are not included in the collective. That is the meaning of the verse he cites: “when all Israel comes” — whoever is included in the collective of Israel. The analogy between slave and woman applies with respect to obligations imposed on a woman. But with respect to obligations of the collective, the woman as an individual is not obligated in them, and therefore there is no room to extend them by analogy to the slave. On his own, he is certainly not obligated, for he is not included in the collective so long as he has not converted.

This also clarifies how Turei Even can understand that the obligation rests on the children themselves. The answer is that they are part of the collective, and the obligation rests on the collective, not on them as individuals. Therefore Turei Even raises the possibility that the obligation is on the court, even though the Talmud says that this is “to give reward to those who bring them.” The basic idea is that obligations imposed on the public are imposed on the court. It is the addressee of the command.

However, as Sefer HaChinukh writes at the end of his discussion, every individual, male or female, who does not fulfill his duty as part of the collective is liable for neglecting this positive commandment. That is, there is an obligation on the individual to see to it that the collective fulfills its duty, or at least to fulfill his share in that. There is an interesting combination here between the basic obligation, which rests on the collective, and the practical implementation, which depends on every individual, since the collective cannot act apart from the individuals who compose it.

Sefer HaChinukh writes that one who did not come has neglected a positive commandment. True, the positive commandment is imposed on the community. The one that must appear at the Hakhel gathering is the community. But the one who neglects the commandment is every individual who did not appear. Responsibility for the fulfillment of the commandment is expressed thereby: one who did not contribute his part has neglected a positive commandment, even though the commandment itself was fulfilled by those who did appear, despite the fact that the entire collective was not there, since some were absent.

In the case of minors too, the obligation is on them, but there is someone else who is obligated to ensure that they fulfill their obligation — namely, those who bring them. Therefore Turei Even writes, as above, that the court or the father is charged with bringing them, even though he holds that the obligation of the commandment itself is on them. If the father did not bring them, he has neglected a positive commandment, not they, since minors are not legally accountable. One cannot make claims against them for what they failed to do.

We find additional commandments whose addressee is the collective. These are the communal sections in Halakhot Gedolot and in those who followed him, until Maimonides and his followers abandoned that classification. And indeed, Halakhot Gedolot counts the commandment of Hakhel as one of the sixty-five communal sections — the last of them:

These are the sections of statutes and ordinances entrusted to the community:

1. The section of the Great Sanhedrin and the Small Sanhedrin, capital law and monetary law, the Hebrew slave, one who sells himself, one sold by the court, one sold to a gentile, and the Hebrew maidservant.
2. The section of the six cities of refuge and the forty-two cities.
3. The section of damages: one who injures his fellow, the goring ox, assault, theft, and monetary law.
4. The section of the Tabernacle and all its vessels, the oil for lighting, the vestments of service, the consecration of the priests, and the dedication of the altar.
5. The section of the anointing oil and the spice incense.
6. The section of supplications.
7. The section of burnt offerings, meal offerings, and peace offerings.
8. The section of the sinner and the graduated sin offering.
9. The section of the definite guilt offering and the suspended guilt offering.
10. The section of sacrilege against consecrated property.
11. The section of the impurity of carcasses and their purification, the impurity of creeping things and their purification, and the impurity of vessels, persons, foods, and liquids.
12. The section of the woman after childbirth.
13. The section of leprous afflictions.
14. The section of the man with a discharge, the woman with a discharge, the menstruant, intercourse with a menstruant, and seminal emission.
15. The section of the Day of Atonement.
16. The section of the betrothed bondwoman.
17. The section of the prohibition of a tree’s first three years.
18. The section of blemishes in animals.
19. The section of vows and freewill offerings.
20. The section of the two loaves.
21. The section of the showbread.
22. The section of one who inflicts a blemish on his fellow.
23. The section of the Sabbatical year.
24. The section of the Jubilee.
25. The section of sales, houses in walled cities, houses of villages, and the stranger and resident.
26. The section of valuations.
27. The section of consecrated property and things devoted.
28. The section of the priests and the meal offering of Israelites.
29. The section of sending away the impure.
30. The section of the sotah.
31. The section of the nazirite.
32. The section of the priestly blessing.
33. The section of the dedication of the altar.
34. The section of the second Passover.
35. The section of the trumpets.
36. The section of libations.
37. The section of an erroneous communal ruling.
38. The section of the priestly gifts.
39. The section of the red heifer.
40. The section of inheritances and a daughter who inherits an estate.
41. The section of the daily offerings.
42. The section of the twenty additional offerings.
43. The section of vows and oaths.
44. The section of the levy-offering from the spoil.
45. The section of one who acquires utensils from gentiles.
46. The section of sanctifying the land to give the Levites cities of refuge.
47. The section of the false prophet.
48. The section of the idolatrous city.
49. The section of the king.
50. The section of conspiring witnesses.
51. The section of the priest anointed for war.
52. The section of a city that makes peace and a city that does not make peace.
53. The section of the decapitated heifer.
54. The section of the beautiful captive woman.
55. The section of the law of the firstborn.
56. The section of the stubborn and rebellious son.
57. The section of false accusation.
58. The section of the rapist and the seducer.
59. The section of marriage and divorce.
60. The section of levirate marriage.
61. The section of the woman who stretches out her hand to a man’s private parts.
62. The section of first fruits.
63. The section of the great stones.
64. The section of blessings and curses.
65. The section of Hakhel.

The commandment of appointing a king, building the Temple, waging war against Amalek, and conquering the land, according to Nahmanides — these are commandments whose addressee is the collective and not the individuals.⁵

To summarize: the basic obligation is on the collective, and everyone included in the collective is included in it. Therefore, exemptions that apply to the pilgrimage appearance obligation do not automatically apply to Hakhel; many categories are still included in Hakhel, except for the deaf, the mute, and the mentally incompetent. The problem in those cases is that they are not included in the assembly. With regard to the deaf person, this follows Maimonides’ explanation of the Sages’ treatment of a deaf person as mentally incompetent: he lacks developed understanding because he is not involved with other people, since he has no communication with them. He is not part of the collective.

Yet one cannot simply impose duties on a collective: a pot owned by partners is neither hot nor cold. Therefore, as we have seen, an obligation is imposed on the individuals to ensure that the collective fulfills its duty.

Kehillot Yaakov, cited above, brings the view of Tosafot on Berakhot 48a, according to which the obligation of education rests on the minor himself, and adds that in Babylonian Talmud, Nazir 29a, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagree as to whether there is an obligation of education on the mother or only on the father. It follows that there is an obligation on the parents, and not only on the minor himself. And indeed, for that reason Rashi took the view that there is an obligation only on the parents and not on the minor. According to Tosafot, Kehillot Yaakov says that there are two laws in the obligation of education: an obligation of the father and an obligation on the son.

This is a technical formulation, but its intention is probably what was written here: the obligation to perform the commandment is on the child; the responsibility to ensure that this is done, that the child fulfills his obligations, is on the parents.

From where did these two laws emerge? Were there two different enactments regarding education? Clearly his intention is what we wrote above: there is an obligation on the child, but it is impossible to demand from him responsibility for fulfilling this obligation, since he is a minor. That responsibility rests on the parents. And this is, of course, a single enactment.

All this means that there are two meanings to the concept of “obligation”:

1. Who is obligated to perform, and who has fulfillment in performing the commandment — see Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik on a minor who became an adult between the two Passovers, who has fulfillment even though he was not commanded.
2. Who is obligated to ensure that it is done.⁶

We thus learn that there are two innovations in the commandment of Hakhel and similar commandments:

1. There are commandments whose addressee is the public and not the individuals.
2. Even when the addressee is the public, the responsibility for fulfillment rests on each individual.

We will illustrate these two innovations in the following chapters.

D. An Example from the Commandment of Public Torah Reading

See Rabbi Blumentzweig’s general lecture on tractate Berakhot regarding public Torah reading. There are several proofs that the commandment of public Torah reading is a reenactment of the giving of the Torah. Therefore it is a commandment imposed on the public. But there are two types of public commandments that require a quorum of ten. The Mishnah in Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 23b, does not count the reading of the Megillah among the matters that require ten, but it does count public Torah reading. Nahmanides, in Milhamot Hashem there, explains that Megillah is a commandment imposed on the individual, but it must be performed within a group of ten. Public Torah reading, by contrast, is a commandment imposed on the ten themselves. The practical difference is whether one may gather nine people who have already read, in the case of Megillah, or not, in the case of public Torah reading.

Usually the following practical difference is cited: if the commandment is communal, the individual can leave in the middle. The community will fulfill the obligation, but it is not imposed on him personally. With Megillah, of course, this is impossible.

But there is room to say that even in public Torah reading this is impossible: the individual is obligated with responsibility that the community fulfill its obligation, exactly as we saw above regarding Hakhel. And indeed this can be seen in Mishnah Berurah. In section 135 he discusses bringing a Torah scroll to one who does not have one, for example a prisoner. He explains that the obligation of reading does not apply to the individual when there is no quorum of ten there.

On the other hand, in the laws of public Torah reading, Biur Halakha raises a difficulty against Halakhot Gedolot: in Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 39a and Berakhot 8a, how did Rav Sheshet turn his face away? Halakhot Gedolot explains that this was because there were already ten present. Biur Halakha asks: where, then, did Rav Sheshet fulfill his own obligation? In other words, he assumes that there is an obligation on each individual. How does that fit with what was written above?

The answer is that when there is a public, the obligation rests on each individual. But when there is no public, there is indeed no obligation. This is unlike the way people usually understand the Mishnah Berurah, as though he held that the obligation in public Torah reading is on every individual, except that it must be done with ten, like Nahmanides regarding the reading of the Megillah.

The commandment of Hakhel is like public Torah reading before the many — not merely before ten, but before all Israel. It is a reenactment of the giving of the Torah, and therefore the obligation is communal, though it applies to every individual.

E. What Is a Collective?

• The income-tax paradox: the argument, “What if everyone did the same thing?”
• Collective concepts, following Searle.
• Note 15 from “Two Carts.”
• Jenin.
• The article in Tzohar 14.

Footnotes