Lesson 25: Tetzaveh

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• A mitzvah (commandment) consisting of an act, but not incumbent on a specific performer.
• Commandments of effort, commandments of action, and commandments of result.

Summary

In this week’s essay we discuss the mitzvah of tending the lamps. We present the main laws relevant to tending the lamps, and the dispute between Maimonides and the other medieval authorities regarding whether the lighting is part of the tending or a separate mitzvah.

A number of difficulties that arise both in Maimonides’ approach and in the approach of the other early authorities lead us to the conclusion that the primary mitzvah in tending the lamps is the preparation for lighting. The lighting is the goal, but the core obligation is specifically the preparation. We see a similar phenomenon in the mitzvah of circumcision: according to some early authorities, there too the obligation imposed on the father is only the preparation for the circumcision, not the circumcision itself.

The explanation we propose is that our service with the menorah, which symbolizes Torah study, and especially the Oral Torah, is primarily the preparation. After that, the flame is supposed to rise on its own. So too in learning: our main work is the labor and the preparation; afterward, understanding is a gift that comes to us of itself. We propose a similar explanation with respect to circumcision as well, at least according to Maharach Or Zaru’a: all of the father’s obligations toward his son are obligations of preparation for life and for the observance of mitzvot.

In the course of the discussion we define a third type of mitzvah: besides commandments of result and commandments of action, there are also commandments of effort, or preparation. These are mitzvot, such as tending the lamps and circumcising one’s sons, in which the obligation imposed on us is the preparation for the goal, not the goal itself. We note, in relation to what we saw in our essay on Parashat Bereshit, 5767, that in these mitzvot there is apparently no gap between the rationale and the legal definition.

In both of these mitzvot we arrive at an interesting definition regarding the obligation to complete the preparation. Although the completion seems to come on its own, there is still an obligation that pertains to it as well: the requirement is that an act be performed by a person who is personally subject to obligation. There is no obligation on the specific person to whom the mitzvah belongs — a priest in the case of the menorah, or a father in the case of circumcision — for he is obligated only in the preparation. But the completion cannot happen entirely by itself: a person, even a non-priest, must light the menorah, and a person who is himself obligated must circumcise the son. These are mitzvot in which an act — lighting the lamp or circumcision — must be performed, but there is no mitzvah imposed on a specific performer. In a note we compared this to definitions that appear in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 22a and 30a, regarding making produce susceptible to impurity and the disqualification of the heifer whose neck is to be broken when a yoke was placed upon it.

The rules and principles that emerge from the essay

Concerning the tending and lighting of the lamps

A look at mitzvah observance and effort

Introduction

In our parashah, the command to light the menorah appears as follows (Exodus 27:20-21):

And you shall command the children of Israel, and they shall bring you pure olive oil, crushed for lighting, to raise a continual lamp. In the Tent of Meeting, outside the veil that is before the testimony, Aaron and his sons shall arrange it from evening until morning before the Lord; it shall be an everlasting statute throughout their generations, on behalf of the children of Israel.

The enumerators of the mitzvot include this in their count as a distinct commandment. Yet the formulation here is “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it,” not “they shall light it.” What is the meaning of this “arrangement”? Is the mitzvah not the lighting of the menorah?

Ibn Ezra, in his commentary on the verse, writes:

Yefet said that “shall arrange” is like “according to your valuation the priest shall assess it” (Leviticus 27:12), meaning that he should measure the oil so that it would suffice for the lamps to shine from evening until morning; and so too “the lamps of arrangement” (Exodus 39:37). And this is a good explanation, since the sense of “shall arrange” may be due to the lamps being set in a semicircle. I will speak of this further.

The first explanation cited there is that “shall arrange” comes from the root meaning assessment. The priest must place oil and assess the quantity so that the lamp will burn from evening until morning. The second explanation is that he must arrange them, from the root used for setting a table, that is, shape or set them in form, here in a semicircle.

In the words of the Sages, two distinct actions arise in this context: tending the lamps and lighting the lamps. Both have roots in Scripture: “to arrange,” in our passage, apparently parallels tending, which also appears in Scripture, and “to raise,” at the beginning of Parashat Beha’alotekha, parallels lighting.

In general, all agree that the arrangement is the preparation for the raising, that is, the lighting of the lamps. We find this in Rashi on the verse that mentions the tending (Exodus 30:7):

And Aaron shall burn fragrant incense upon it every morning; when he tends the lamps, he shall burn it.

Rashi explains there:

“When he tends” — this is a term for cleaning the bowls of the menorah from the residue of the wicks that burned during the night, and he would tend them every single morning.
“The lamps” — the Old French term for lamps; and so with all occurrences of “lamps” regarding the menorah, except where the term “raising” is used, which is a term for kindling.

Thus, the tending is the cleaning out of the residue accumulated from the previous night’s lighting, and apparently also the filling of oil in preparation for lighting, as Ibn Ezra suggested above, and it is done in the morning. “Raising” is a term for lighting.

This week’s essay deals with the special relation between these two actions. We should recall that in our essay on Parashat Bereshit, 5767, we noted that the mitzvah of lighting the menorah seems to be a commandment of result. Here we will clarify that aspect and show that it appears in this mitzvah in a highly distinctive way.

A. The commandment of arranging the lamps: arrangement and kindling

Maimonides’ view: the lighting and the tending are one mitzvah

As noted, the enumerators of the mitzvot include this mitzvah in their count. Maimonides writes in Positive Commandment 25:

The twenty-fifth commandment is that the priests were commanded to light the lamps continually before the Lord, as He, exalted be He, said at the beginning of Parashat Tetzaveh: “In the Tent of Meeting, outside the veil that is before the testimony, Aaron and his sons shall arrange it.” This is the mitzvah of tending the lamps. The laws of this mitzvah are all explained in the eighth chapter of Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 86a, in the first chapter of Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 14a, 15a, and 21b, and in places in tractate Tamid, at the end of chapter 3 and the beginning of chapter 6.

From Maimonides’ wording it appears that the mitzvah imposed on the priests is to light the lamps, and he identifies the arrangement with the tending and with the lighting.

So too we find in Maimonides, Laws of Daily Offerings and Additional Offerings 3:12:

What is the cleaning out of the menorah? For every lamp that has gone out, he removes the wick and all the oil in the lamp … and he lights a lamp that has gone out. And the lighting of the lamps is their tending …

Maimonides broadens the picture here and writes that the mitzvah includes both the cleaning out — that is, cleaning and preparation, namely tending — and the lighting. In any case, at the end of that ruling he explicitly identifies the lighting with the tending.

The view of the commentators on Sefer HaChinukh: the lighting and the tending are two separate mitzvot

The author of Sefer HaChinukh, by contrast, also cites another interpretation, and this is the interpretation accepted by most commentators. He writes as follows in mitzvah 98:

The commandment of arranging the lamps of the Temple: to tend the lamps continually before the blessed Lord, as it says, “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it” (Exodus 27:21), meaning that he shall arrange the lamp before the blessed Lord, and this is the mitzvah of tending the lamps mentioned in the Gemara.
… Included in the mitzvah of tending is the cleaning out, and the cleaning out of the menorah and its tending are positive commandments in the morning and in the late afternoon. The cleaning out means that for every lamp that has gone out, he removes the wick and all the oil in the lamp and wipes it clean, and puts in another wick and other oil. A lamp that has not gone out he adjusts, and if the middle lamp has gone out he lights it from the fire on the outer altar, while the others are lit from one another, by drawing the wick and inclining it until the fire catches it, since it is not honorable to the mitzvah to light them from another lamp.
This is the view of Maimonides, of blessed memory, in this mitzvah: that the tending of the lamps is their lighting, as we explained. But many commentators hold that the tending is the cleaning out, the wiping, and the adjusting of the wicks, and that this is a mitzvah in its own right, and so it also appears in the chapter dealing with tekhelet in Babylonian Talmud, Menachot 50a.
It applies when the Temple stands, and to priests. A priest who violates it and does not arrange the lamps as the mitzvah requires has neglected a positive commandment.

The author of Sefer HaChinukh explains that the arrangement is the tending, and at first glance it seems that he does not mean the lighting. But immediately afterward he explains that the tending includes cleaning the lamp, preparing it for lighting, and lighting it. That is, all of these actions together comprise the mitzvah: the preparation and the lighting. This is exactly Maimonides’ view.

But in the end he also cites the opinion of many commentators — see, for example, Meiri on Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 22b, and further below — that the tending is the mitzvah to clean and prepare the lamps and wicks, and it is a mitzvah in itself, while the lighting is a separate mitzvah. He writes that this also appears from the discussion in Menachot 50a.

He concludes by saying that the mitzvah is imposed on the priests. Apparently this determination does not depend on the dispute between the interpretations cited above, in which case both the tending and the lighting are imposed on the priests, whether they are two separate mitzvot or together constitute one mitzvah. Below we will examine this point in greater detail.

The times of lighting and tending the menorah

As noted, several Temple services related to the lighting of the lamps are performed in the menorah. The main ones are the lighting and the tending. Maimonides writes in Laws of Daily Offerings and Additional Offerings 3:10-12 as follows:

10. The cleaning out of the menorah and the tending of the lamps in the morning and in the late afternoon are a positive commandment, as it says, “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it”; and the lighting of the lamps overrides Shabbat and impurity, like sacrifices for which a fixed time is set, as it says, “to raise a continual lamp.”
11. How much oil does he put in each lamp? Half a log of oil, as it says, “from evening until morning” — give it a measure so that it will burn from evening until morning. And the menorah is inaugurated only by the lighting of its seven lamps in the late afternoon.
12. What is the cleaning out of the menorah? For every lamp that has gone out, he removes the wick and all the oil in the lamp and wipes it clean, and puts in another wick and other oil in the proper measure, namely half a log. What he removed he throws in the place of the ashes beside the altar, together with the ash removal of the inner and outer altars, and he lights a lamp that has gone out. And the lighting of the lamps is their tending. A lamp that he finds still burning he adjusts.

The cleaning out must be done twice daily, in the evening and in the morning. The lighting is done in the evening. The lamps must continue burning until the morning.

From the simple sense of Maimonides’ wording it follows that in the morning too one must relight lamps that have gone out, since in his view the lighting is the completion of the mitzvah of tending and cleaning out. According to the other commentators cited above, however, we have seen that these are two different mitzvot. If so, according to them it seems that tending is required morning and evening, while lighting is done only in the evening. The western lamp, however, according to all views, burned from evening until evening. And this is indeed what the author of Kesef Mishneh writes on ruling 12:

As for what he wrote, “and the lighting of the lamps is their tending” — this is our teacher’s view, for he holds that one also lights the lamps in the morning, since when it is written, “Aaron shall burn fragrant incense every morning, when he tends the lamps,” the meaning of “when he tends” is “when he lights.” But the other authorities disagree with him and say that the lighting of the lamps is only in the late afternoon, and “when he tends” does not mean lighting but rather adjusting the wicks. All of this is discussed at length in the responsa of Rashba, nos. 309 and 49. From the words of Rashi that I cited above, and from what he wrote in his Torah commentary, it appears that his view is like that of the other authorities, and so too that seems to be the view of the Raavad from what he wrote in chapter 2 of Laws of the Service of Yom Kippur, and likewise the view of Onkelos. And regarding what he wrote, “a lamp that he found not extinguished he adjusts” …

The view of Rashba in the responsa cited here in Kesef Mishneh, and of Rashi, whom we cited above, and of the Raavad, whom we will cite immediately, as well as of the Meiri mentioned above, and Sefer HaChinukh, which brought proof from Menachot 50a, is that the lighting is done only in the evening. It should be noted that according to these views there is no need for tending in the evening, and therefore in principle the tending is done only in the morning, after the lamps have gone out. So what is the meaning of the obligation to tend the lamps in the evening? According to the Rashi cited above, it indeed appears that the tending is only in the morning, so that there is a mitzvah of lighting in the evening and a mitzvah of tending in the morning. But there is room to say that there is also tending in the evening, only that this applies solely to the western lamp, which burned the whole day, from evening until evening. And indeed this is what we find in the Raavad’s glosses to Laws of the Service of Yom Kippur 2:2:

“And he tends the lamps,” etc. I object: that is indeed the language of the Mishnah, but in the late afternoon there was no tending except for the western lamp alone, which burned from evening until evening.

Priest or non-priest

It is explicit in the verses cited above that the tending is valid only if done by a priest and invalid if done by a non-priest, as it says: “Aaron the priest and his sons shall arrange it.” In practice every Temple service requires a priest and is invalid if done by a non-priest. This is explained by Maimonides in Laws of Entering the Sanctuary 9:1, where he also mentions “shall arrange,” that is, the lighting of the menorah:

A non-priest who performed service in the Sanctuary — his service is invalid and he is liable to death at the hand of Heaven, as it says, “and the outsider who approaches shall die.” By oral tradition they learned that this liability applies only to approaching for service. And where was he warned? “And no outsider shall approach you.” Who is an outsider? Anyone who is not from the male descendants of Aaron, as it says, “the sons of Aaron shall arrange,” “the sons of Aaron shall burn” — the sons of Aaron, and not the daughters of Aaron.

But a non-priest who tended and cleaned out the lamps is not liable to death, as explained there in rulings 2-5:

2. Although non-priests are warned not to engage in the services of the sacrificial rites, they are liable to death only for a complete service, not for a service after which another service follows. And a non-priest is liable to death only for four services: the sprinkling, the burning, the water libation on the festival, and the regular wine libation.
3. One who arranges the two logs of wood on the pyre is like one who burns the limbs and is liable to death, because the wood is itself an offering. But one who pours, mixes, breaks apart, salts, waves, presents, arranges the showbread or the bowls on the table, tends the lamps, kindles a fire on the altar, takes the handful, or receives the blood — although these acts are invalidated, and he is warned regarding all of them and receives lashes, he is not liable to death, because each of them is a service after which another service follows and is not the completion of the service.

From ruling 6 onward, Maimonides specifies which acts are valid even if done by a non-priest. Among them are slaughtering, flaying, cutting into pieces, and the like. And in ruling 7 there he writes:

Likewise, the lighting of the lamps is valid when done by non-priests. Therefore, if the priest tended the lamps and brought them outside, a non-priest may light them.

Thus, in contrast to the tending, which requires a priest and is invalid when done by a non-priest, the lighting is valid even if done by a non-priest. The source is Babylonian Talmud, Yoma 24b.

The Raavad, however, objects to Maimonides here and writes:

“And brought them outside, it is permitted,” etc. I object: he went too far when he said that it is permitted for a non-priest to light them; rather, if he lit them, they are valid.

Maimonides therefore holds that a non-priest may light them even from the outset, while the Raavad holds that this is valid only after the fact; ideally, even the lighting should be done by a priest. Minchat Chinukh, on mitzvah 98, section 13, brings a practical difference between them in a case where all the priests are impure. Should we then light the menorah through ordinary Israelites, or should we say that ritual impurity is merely set aside in communal Temple service? According to Maimonides, we would light through a non-priest, since the lighting is valid for a non-priest even from the outset. But according to the Raavad, ideally the lighting should be done by a priest, and therefore if all the priests are impure, ritual impurity is set aside in communal service, and the menorah may nevertheless be lit by an impure priest.

Now in ruling 8 there, Maimonides suddenly repeats once again the rule that a non-priest who tended the lamps is not liable to death:

Lifting the ashes requires a priest, as it says, “And the priest shall put on his linen garment,” etc. If an Israelite lifted them, he receives lashes but is not liable to death, even though no service follows it, as it says, “a service of gift” — it is only a service of gift that must be done solely by a priest, and if a non-priest approaches it he is liable to death; but for a service of removal there is no death liability. Likewise, if he cleaned out the inner altar and the menorah, he is not liable to death.

This ruling in Maimonides is puzzling from four main angles:

1. It repeats a rule that was already stated above, in ruling 5.
2. The reasoning here seems different, since it depends here on the fact that this is a service of removal, not on the fact that it is a service after which another service follows.
3. This repetition appears after an interruption of several rulings that detail the acts that are valid when done by a non-priest.
4. According to Maimonides, lighting is not a Temple service, and therefore it is valid from the outset when done by a non-priest. If so, the tending is a service after which no service follows. Why then is a non-priest who performs it not liable to death?

Perhaps one could see the closing sentence as a third reason: after ruling 5 listed services that are not complete, that is, services after which another service follows, and ruling 8 listed services of removal, the end of ruling 8 lists two additional exemptions for cleaning out the inner altar and the menorah, for which the non-priest is also not liable to death, but for a separate reason, not one of the previous two. But even this is unclear: if lighting is not a Temple service, then the tending is indeed a service after which no service follows, and it is certainly also a service of removal. Why, then, are the first two exemptions not sufficient?

B. Effort and fulfillment

Introduction

Up to this point we have reviewed the laws of lighting and tending the lamps in the Temple. In this chapter we will examine a number of difficulties that arise from the halakhic picture presented above, and through them we will arrive at a renewed definition of this mitzvah. We will see and explain how this definition resolves all the difficulties we have presented.

Difficulties in the laws of tending and lighting

Let us first list the difficulties that arise upon reading the sources:

1. We saw that according to Maimonides the lighting is valid from the outset when done by a non-priest, while the Raavad holds that this is only after the fact. Now, several commentators challenged Maimonides from the fact that with regard to lighting it is stated explicitly in the passage in Parashat Beha’alotekha that it is done by a priest. According to the Raavad this is not difficult, because in sacrificial law we require Scripture to repeat a requirement in order for it to be indispensable. When there is no repetition, the rule applies only ideally but does not invalidate. But according to Maimonides it is difficult, for he writes that even from the outset one may light through a non-priest.
2. The very assertion that cleaning out the lamps is a Temple service, and therefore invalid when done by a non-priest, whereas the lighting is not a Temple service and is therefore valid for a non-priest, is puzzling. At first glance, the cleaning out is only a preparation that makes the lighting possible. How can the preparation be more important than the mitzvah itself?
3. The legal category itself is also difficult, specifically according to the Raavad. According to Maimonides, the lighting is not a Temple service, like slaughtering, and therefore it is valid from the outset when done by a non-priest, as Kesef Mishneh writes there. But according to the Raavad it is not clear why there should be an ideal prohibition for a non-priest. If it is a Temple service, then a priest should be required even after the fact; and if it is not a Temple service, then it should be permitted for a non-priest even from the outset.

Rabbi Yosef Korkos, in his commentary on Maimonides there, cites the Ritva, who also agrees with the Raavad, and according to him the verse teaches that a priest is preferable, but this does not invalidate. The lighting is “a partial service.” But this too is unclear: what is the definition of “a partial service” as opposed to a full Temple service, and from where do we derive such a distinction?

4. Minchat Chinukh, on mitzvah 98, section 9, further asks that in practice we accept regarding the menorah that the lighting performs the mitzvah, not the placing. The proof is that Maimonides rules in Laws of Daily Offerings and Additional Offerings 10:10 that the lighting of the lamps overrides Shabbat because it has a fixed time. If the lighting did not perform the mitzvah, but only the placing, then the lighting would not override Shabbat, for one could light before Shabbat and place it on Shabbat. Rashi writes this explicitly in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 22b, on the words “If lighting performs the mitzvah.” If so, it is not clear how it helps for the menorah to be lit by a non-priest outside, as Maimonides writes in Laws of Entering the Sanctuary 9:7, cited above, since afterward it still requires placing the menorah in its proper place. And regarding the Chanukah lamp, where lighting performs the mitzvah, the Gemara in Shabbat there explains that it does not help to place it already burning in its location, at the entrance of one’s house. Minchat Chinukh adds that this is also explicit in Sifra on Parashat Emor, and likewise in Nahmanides on Leviticus 24:2, that lighting outside is invalid.
5. Maimonides writes there in ruling 5 that if a non-priest tended the lamps, they are invalidated. Minchat Chinukh asks what the language of invalidation means here: either the lamp is clean or it is not clean. Is this really a Temple service that can be invalidated?
6. It is also difficult what Maimonides wrote there in ruling 8, that if a non-priest cleaned out the inner altar and the menorah he is not liable to death. At the end of the previous section we saw four difficulties in this ruling.
7. If according to Maimonides the tending is invalid when done by a non-priest but the lighting is valid, then it follows that tending is not lighting. How, then, did he rule in chapter 2 of Laws of Daily Offerings and elsewhere, as cited above, that the tending is also the lighting? In other words: in the Torah the requirement of a priest is written regarding the tending, that is, the arrangement, and according to Maimonides the lighting is part of the tending, so apparently what the Torah requires of a priest regarding the tending should automatically be required regarding the lighting as well.

The basic thesis: effort as mitzvah fulfillment

To explain all these difficulties, we propose that this mitzvah is a special kind of mitzvah, the like of which we do not find in most other mitzvot. The mitzvah imposed on the priest is to make the effort toward lighting the menorah, not the bare act of lighting itself. The work of cleaning out the lamps is the preparation for lighting, as is explicit in Maimonides, since he counts them both as one mitzvah. But the mitzvah of effort is the one imposed on the priests, and that is what is defined as Temple service; therefore it is invalid when done by non-priests. The mitzvah of lighting is a mitzvah, but not a Temple service. Minchat Chinukh notes there, in section 14, a practical consequence: the lighting would be invalid if done by a deaf-mute, a mentally incompetent person, or a minor, exactly as with slaughtering, even though it is not Temple service. The reason is that the lighting is a mitzvah, and such persons are not valid performers of mitzvah acts.

According to what we have said, difficulty 2 is resolved. The preparation is not more important than the mitzvah itself; rather, only the preparation falls under the category of Temple service, whereas the mitzvah itself does not. Therefore the preparation is invalid when done by a non-priest, but the lighting is not. Yet there still remains a difficulty: why is the tending Temple service while the lighting itself is not, if the tending is only preparation for the lighting?

We are therefore forced to continue and say that once the priest has prepared the lamp, the lighting is attributed to him. He is the one who did it. The non-priest who lights merely completes and brings into actuality the act that the priest has already performed. It follows that the tending is not merely preparation for the lighting; from the legal standpoint it is considered the lighting itself, and what remains lacking is only the bringing of that act from potential into actuality.

It should be noted that according to this explanation difficulty 1 is also resolved. In fact, it is the priest who lights the lamps, except that his role is the preparation for lighting, and the assumption is that causing the lighting counts as an act of lighting in itself. This is Maimonides’ intent when he says that the lighting is the continuation of the tending and arranging. The lighting is the finishing stroke of an act that has already been done in the tending and cleaning out.

Indeed, it is far more reasonable to say that the tending and cleaning out are part of the lighting, that is, the beginning of the lighting, than the reverse, namely that the lighting is the end of the cleaning out. If we understand Maimonides literally, that the lighting is part of the tending, this seems like a strange assertion: is it correct to define the goal as part of the means to that goal? It therefore seems more reasonable to say that the tending is part of the lighting: the cleaning out is the beginning of the lighting. According to Maimonides, it may be that this entire process is what our verses call “arrangement.”

Perhaps this also explains the view of the Raavad and the Ritva, who held that lighting by a non-priest is ideally disqualified. The purpose of the cleaning out is the lighting, and therefore the lighting has some dimension of Temple service, even though it is not the principal service. They too agree that the cleaning out is the main service, but in the end its purpose is the lighting, and therefore the lighting too is a kind of service. As stated, the lighting is the bringing into actuality of the tending, and the act of cleaning out already contains the beginning of the lighting; therefore the lighting has “some measure of service.” This resolves difficulty 3, because it now becomes clear why, according to the Raavad and the Ritva, ideally a priest is required even for the lighting.

This also allows us to explain why the lighting is valid outside, even though with the menorah lighting performs the mitzvah, as is proved by the fact that the lighting overrides Shabbat. The goal here is indeed the lighting, but the Temple service is the cleaning out, and with respect to that there is no significance to place. When lighting takes place in some place, it illuminates there. If it is supposed to illuminate in a certain place, that defines its place. But cleaning out is done to the lamp itself, and has no connection to any place at all, so it makes no difference where it is done. In our case, the lighting is only a goal, that the lamps be burning, not necessarily that someone light them there. Therefore this is not comparable to the Chanukah lamp, and it does not require lighting specifically in its place. That is, there is indeed a mitzvah concerning the act, but not a mitzvah imposed on the performer; the only requirement is that an act be performed upon the lamps.¹

We may note that from the fact that the lighting overrides Shabbat, it certainly follows that there is also a mitzvah in the very act of lighting, as Minchat Chinukh wrote, since otherwise we would have lit them earlier. But in light of what we have said thus far, it seems that the definition of this mitzvah is that the lamp be lit, not that someone light it, and therefore the one who lights may even be a non-priest.² For this reason, in the case of the lighting as well, and not only the cleaning out, the place of lighting is apparently not significant. This resolves difficulty 4.

This is the basis of what the Gemara expounds in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 21a:

Rami bar Chama taught: The wicks and oils about which the Sages said that one may not light with them on Shabbat — one may not light with them in the Temple either, because it says, “to raise a continual lamp.” He taught it and he himself explained it: so that the flame should rise on its own, and not rise by means of something else.

If so, the raising must be something that happens by itself. What is imposed on us is only the preparation, so that the flame can rise — that is, choosing suitable oil. The Gemara derives this from the verse “to raise a continual lamp.” Below we will note a possible legal implication of this explanation.

As for what Minchat Chinukh asked, what can invalidation mean in the cleaning out of the menorah? Is the menorah not now clean? According to our explanation, perhaps one can say that since the cleaning out is the preparation for the lighting, and we have also seen that the act of cleaning out is itself considered the beginning of the lighting, cleaning out that was not done properly invalidates the lighting. What is invalidated here is the lighting that follows such a cleaning out. It is not the mitzvah itself, namely the cleaning out, that is invalidated, but the essential goal for which it is done. This resolves difficulty 5.

We can now also understand what Maimonides writes in ruling 8. Above we raised the possibility that Maimonides is speaking there about a third kind of exemption, one that is not based either on a service followed by another service or on a service of removal. We asked why the first two exemptions would not suffice. We can now understand that the exemption from death for a non-priest who cleaned out the lamps cannot be only because it is a service followed by another service, for the lighting is not a Temple service. But it is also not a service of removal, for the cleaning out is not merely cleaning; it is the beginning of the lighting. Thus, although a service of removal and a service followed by another service appear to be two opposite categories with no third possibility between them, we find here that neither of them applies to cleaning out: no service follows it, yet it is not a service of removal. This is a third category of Temple service.

If so, why really should a non-priest who cleaned out the lamps not be liable? According to what we have said, one may answer that the cleaning out is a preparation for lighting, and it is not appropriate to impose death liability for preparations, even if they themselves are defined as Temple service. This may be inferred a fortiori from a service after which another service follows. If a service that prepares for another service does not incur death because it is lighter — it is a means and not an end — then here the Temple service is a preparation for something that is itself not even a Temple service, namely the lighting, and therefore it is reasonable that it should be even lighter. In other words: if a non-priest may even light from the outset, then a service that is merely preparation for lighting cannot make him liable to death.³ This resolves difficulty 6.

Only the final point now remains. According to Maimonides, lighting is called in the Torah “tending,” because it is part of it; yet he still rules that the cleaning out is invalid when done by a non-priest, while the lighting is valid. According to what we have said, this can be explained as follows: although the tending is indeed lighting, the principal mitzvah here is the preparation for lighting, and therefore only there does the non-priest violate a prohibition and invalidate the process. The lighting itself, which is part of the mitzvah as its goal, is not Temple service, and therefore there a non-priest is valid from the outset. As we saw, the mitzvah is that the lamps be lit, not that someone light them. This resolves difficulty 7 as well.

Connection to Root 12

We should note that according to our proposal in Maimonides, the preparation and the lighting are two stages in carrying out the action of lighting. It is therefore clear that Maimonides would not count them as two separate mitzvot, in accordance with the principle described in Root 12 and discussed in our essay from last week. We saw there that generally the instrumental acts that enable a mitzvah are not counted because they are not independent commands; this is the subject of Maimonides’ tenth root. But we noted that sometimes the instrumental acts appear in the Torah in the form of a command, and nevertheless they are not counted as separate mitzvot, because they are included within the principal mitzvah itself, which is already in the count. That is the case here as well.

“That the flame should rise on its own”: is this a legal requirement?

We saw above the Gemara’s exposition in Shabbat 21a, that one must light with oil of such a kind that the flame will rise on its own. At first glance, from the plain sense of the sugya it appears that this is only an exegetical flourish, whose purpose is merely to say that one must use oil that will allow the fire to ignite well and smoothly. But according to our explanation, this requirement is essential: there is a specific idea that the priest’s role should be the preparation, and that the flame should rise on its own. We will explain this in the next chapter.

Perhaps one can even suggest a legal consequence. According to our explanation, this is not only a criterion for the kind of oil used, but also a requirement that at the time of lighting one should not be tending the lamps and preparing them for lighting. The lighting must be by itself, once the preparation has already been completed in the morning. And if the lighting does not proceed properly, then he is in effect tending the lamps at the time of lighting. As we saw, the lighting itself may be done by a non-priest. If a non-priest were to do it and also need to tend the lamps, then that would be tending by a non-priest, which invalidates the lighting, as explained above. If so, we must ensure that the flame rises on its own and does not require substantive assistance. In practical halakha, however, this innovation still requires examination.

The Raavad’s view

We saw that the Raavad disagrees with Maimonides in Laws of the Service of Yom Kippur, and he holds that the tending is not the lighting. If so, he is consistent with his view when he says that ideally it is preferable for the lighting to be done by a priest. In his view, the raising of the flame has greater significance; it is not merely a mitzvah that follows automatically.

It should be emphasized that even according to the Raavad one must perform the tending in the morning, although the lighting is only in the evening. At first glance it is not clear why one should prepare so long before the lighting. It is evident from this that even according to the Raavad the preparation is a task in itself, indeed one that requires a priest even after the fact; but in his view the lighting too is a significant stage, and not only the preparation is important. Therefore, ideally, it too should be done by a priest.

C. The rationale of the verse: study of the Oral Torah as preparation of a treasury

Introduction and apology

Throughout our discussion we have assumed that the cleaning out is a means to the lighting, yet precisely the means is the Temple service, while the goal is something that happens on its own. The lighting is done at the time of the cleaning out, and that is performed by a priest, whereas the actual raising — the practical ignition of the fire — is valid even when done by a non-priest, because it is only the completion of the act and not really Temple service. According to the Raavad and the Ritva it is “some measure of service.” But until now we have not explained why the Torah defined it this way. If it indeed desires the lighting, and that is the goal, why should it not define its primary desire as the Temple service, and the preparation merely as an enabling condition for that service?

We did explain that in principle the act of lighting is indeed the Temple service, except that halakha sees the true lighting as the act of cleaning out, not the actual raising of the flame. But this too requires explanation: why should the raising of the flame not be seen as the service of lighting, and instead the preparations for that raising be regarded as the true service of lighting?

This chapter will attempt to explain these unique features of the mitzvah of tending the lamps. We should note that here we are moving into the realm of reasons for mitzvot, so the explanation will clearly not be a legal one but a philosophical one. On the other hand, although in the essays of Mida Tova we are usually concerned not with the reasons for mitzvot but with their legal definitions and modes of halakhic formulation, because of the unusual phenomenon that we have uncovered here, it is almost impossible to avoid trying to seek a philosophical reason for it.

The menorah as a symbol of the Oral Torah

As is well known, the menorah is a symbol of wisdom, as the Sages said in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 25b:

Rabbi Yitzchak said: Whoever wants to become wise should turn south, and whoever wants to become wealthy should turn north. And your mnemonic is this: the table was in the north and the menorah in the south. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: A person should always turn south, for through becoming wise he becomes wealthy, as it is said: “Length of days is in her right hand; in her left hand are riches and honor.”

Two vessels stood in the Sanctuary: the ark and the tablets within it symbolize the Written Torah, which was given to Moses directly by divine speech. The menorah symbolizes the Oral Torah. This is the Torah created by human beings and by their wisdom. Therefore the menorah specifically expresses wisdom. There are many additional midrashim that support this symbolic claim, but this is not the place to elaborate.

The importance of preparation for acquiring Torah

In many places the Sages describe learning and acquiring wisdom as the preparation of a receptacle. For example, the Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Taanit 7a says:

Rabbi Chanina bar Idi said: Why are words of Torah compared to water, as it is written, “Ho, everyone who thirsts, come to the water”? To tell you: just as water leaves a high place and goes to a low place, so words of Torah endure only with one whose spirit is humble. And Rabbi Oshaya said: Why are words of Torah compared to these three liquids — water, wine, and milk? As it is written, “Ho, everyone who thirsts, come to the water,” and it is written, “Come, buy and eat; come, buy wine and milk without money and without price” (Isaiah 55). To tell you: just as these three liquids are kept only in the humblest of vessels, so words of Torah endure only with one whose spirit is humble.

Humility is one of the preparations for acquiring Torah. In the chapter Kinyan Torah, sometimes regarded as the sixth chapter of Pirkei Avot, there are many modes of preparation, and likewise in dozens and hundreds of rabbinic teachings. The principal preparation required is fear of Heaven, as is explained in Pirkei Avot 3:9:

Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa says: Anyone whose fear of sin precedes his wisdom, his wisdom endures; and anyone whose wisdom precedes his fear of sin, his wisdom does not endure. He would also say: Anyone whose deeds exceed his wisdom, his wisdom endures; and anyone whose wisdom exceeds his deeds, his wisdom does not endure.

So too Nefesh HaChayim, gate 4, chapters 4-9, demonstrates at length from rabbinic sources and from the Zohar, on the basis of the verse (Isaiah 33:6):

And the faithfulness of your times shall be a store of salvations, wisdom and knowledge; the fear of the Lord, that is His treasure.

He explains that fear of Heaven is like a treasury into which Torah can enter.

Torah as a gift

In Babylonian Talmud, Nedarim 55a, and see also Eruvin 54a, we find one further stage in this picture:

He said to him: Do not sit down until you explain to me the meaning of this verse. What is the meaning of that which is written, “And from the wilderness to Mattanah, and from Mattanah to Nahaliel, and from Nahaliel to Bamot”? He said to him: Once a person makes himself like a wilderness, ownerless to all, the Torah is given to him as a gift, as it says, “and from the wilderness to Mattanah.” Once it is given to him as a gift, God makes it his inheritance, as it says, “and from Mattanah to Nahaliel.” And once God has made it his inheritance, he rises to greatness, as it says, “and from Nahaliel to Bamot.” But if he grows arrogant, the Holy One, blessed be He, lowers him, as it says, “and from Bamot to the valley.” And not only that, but they sink him into the ground, as it says, “and it looks over the face of the wasteland.” But if he repents, the Holy One, blessed be He, raises him, as it says, “Every valley shall be lifted up.”

From here we learn that a person must prepare himself, becoming like a wilderness that is ownerless to all, and then Torah has a place to enter. But beyond that, the Gemara describes the next stage, the acquisition of Torah, as a gift given to the person. Torah is not acquired by one’s labor alone; it is given to the person who prepares himself, as a gift.

This is often linked, by way of homiletic interpretation, to the language of the Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Megillah 6b: “I labored and found — believe it.” After toil, Torah comes like a found object, something that reaches a person unexpectedly.⁴

Why is tending the lamps itself the Temple service?

We can now return and understand why the Torah defines specifically the tending of the lamps as the principal Temple service, while the lighting is not an essential part of that service — “the flame rises on its own,” in the Gemara’s formulation in Shabbat 21a, cited above. We saw that the menorah corresponds to the Oral Torah, which is the wisdom of Torah. We also saw that in Torah, preparation is the main thing, and afterward Torah enters a person’s treasury of fear of Heaven on its own, as it were, as a gift. Therefore in the menorah too, which symbolizes wisdom, the main thing is the preparation for lighting, and the flame rises on its own. That is why even a non-priest may do the lighting, for it is only a result that completes, automatically, the “act of lighting” in the legal sense that already took place in the cleaning out.

As we defined above, even with respect to the raising of the flame, the mitzvah is not that someone light it, but that the lamp be lit. The Torah wishes to teach us the fundamental principle of Torah study: the preparation — fear of Heaven first, and afterward toil and labor — is itself the essence of learning. As we saw above, the cleaning out and the tending are not only the principal Temple service, but the act of cleaning out is itself what is called, from the legal standpoint, “lighting.” Just as the toil over the passage under study is what is called learning, and not the understanding that is produced in the wake of that toil, which is only a gift given to us on its own, like that flame of the lamp that rises by itself.

A similar process in creation generally

It should be noted that in all our significant acts of creation as human beings, although at times we feel that we create things with our own hands, in fact that feeling is only an illusion. Let us give a few examples.

Artificial fertilization, or genetic cloning, can never really be done entirely by us. At most, we can perform in place of nature only the last part of the process. We cannot create a reproductive cell ourselves ex nihilo. At most, we can clone it from an existing cell. And in fertilization we take existing sperm and egg cells and imitate the natural process of their union under laboratory conditions. There is never here a complete creation ex nihilo by ourselves. At most, we exploit properties that the Holy One, blessed be He, created in His world in order to develop them. After our preparations, the Holy One, blessed be He — through the laws of nature — comes and completes the task.

Therefore in many respects, in creation too, and not only in wisdom, we only prepare for an act that the Holy One, blessed be He, performs from above. The term “formation” by its very definition refers to making something from something, unlike creation, which is ex nihilo. See our essay on Parashat Va’era, 5767.

The midrash in Vayikra Rabbah (Vilna edition, section 27, under the opening “Rabbi Tanchuma”) says on this:⁵

Rabbi Tanchuma opened: “Who has preceded Me, that I should repay him? Whatever is under the whole heaven is Mine” (Job 41). A bachelor living in a town pays the wages of scribes and teachers. The Holy One, blessed be He, says: It is upon Me to repay his recompense and reward, and to give him a male child. Rabbi Yirmiyah son of Rabbi Elazar said: In the future, a heavenly voice will burst forth on the mountaintops and say: Whoever has worked together with God, let him come and take his reward, as it is written, “At this time it shall be said to Jacob and to Israel…” The Holy Spirit says: Who has preceded Me, that I should repay him? Who praised Me before I gave him a soul? Who spoke for My name before I gave him a male child? Who made Me a parapet before I gave him a roof? Who made Me a mezuzah before I gave him a house? Who made Me a sukkah before I gave him a place? Who took a lulav for Me before I gave him money? Who made fringes for Me before I gave him a garment? Who left the corner of the field for Me before I gave him a field? Who set aside terumah for Me before I gave him a threshing floor? Who set aside challah for Me before I gave him dough? Who set aside an offering for Me before I gave him an animal? As it is written: “an ox, or a sheep, or a goat.”

A similar process in the other sciences

We may note briefly the connection to the philosophical discussion conducted at the end of our essay from last week. We saw there that generalization and the distinguishing of collective entities, as well as the distinguishing of relations between events, such as causality and the like, are not done through the senses. We can measure the results of an experiment in the laboratory, but there is no way to arrive specifically at the correct generalization from among all the possible generalizations.

The justification we proposed there for the validity of our scientific generalizations is by a path that lies above the senses. These matters are described in detail in the first two books of the quartet by M. Avraham, and it is explained there that this fit between the way we think and the world, by virtue of which we arrive at correct generalizations, is a gift from above. In other words, scientific research too is built in a way similar to what we have described here: after the collection of data, which is our preparation, the generalization comes to us as a gift from above.

In the philosophy of science these two stages are distinguished from one another. The first is called the context of justification, and the second the context of discovery, and the latter lies outside the domain of science. A person arrives at the generalizations and scientific laws that he proposes for empirical testing in many and varied ways, and there is no restriction on those ways; in the past some of them were openly mystical. The scientific restriction is placed on the context of justification: after a general law is proposed, it is tested rigorously by laboratory experiments.

In more general terms, something similar may be said about all synthetic a priori propositions, that is, propositions that make claims about the world in a way that is not based on sensory experience but on thought alone. See at length in Shtei Agalot VeKadur Pore’ach, especially in the first section and throughout the work. Kant showed that all scientific laws, and all the generalizations we make, are propositions of this type. None of them is based on observation. They come to us as a gift from above, of course only if we have made the necessary preparations: careful observation, study, and analysis of the material.

D. The relation to circumcision

Introduction: the father’s obligation in the mitzvah of circumcision

There is one more mitzvah in which we find a principle like the one we found in tending the lamps, at least according to some of the early authorities: the mitzvah of circumcision.

The Gemara in Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 29a brings a verse to exempt women from the obligation to circumcise their sons: “him” and not her. The early authorities there, see Tosafot on the words “him” there, ask why a verse is needed, since circumcision is a positive commandment dependent on time. Tosafot Rid there brings the difficulty and answers it as follows:

How do we know that she is not obligated? As it is written, “which God commanded him” — him and not her. If you ask: why do we need a verse? Let us derive it from the fact that circumcision is a positive commandment dependent on time, for first, it is written, “and on the eighth day he shall be circumcised,” and second, the mitzvah of circumcision applies only by day and not by night, as stated in tractate Megillah, that one circumcises only by day…
The answer is this: when we say that women are exempt from positive commandments dependent on time, that applies to a mitzvah that pertains to her own person, where she is commanded only at a known time and not at all times. But a mitzvah that does not pertain to her own person, such as circumcising her son — although the son’s circumcision has a fixed time, and that time is fixed for the son who is to be circumcised, for the father whom the Creator commanded to occupy himself with his son’s circumcision, that occupation has no fixed time. By day and by night he must exert himself and prepare the needs of his son’s circumcision. Therefore, were it not for the word “him,” we would have obligated the woman as well. The fixed time does not exempt her, for I would have said that she too must involve herself by day and by night until her son is circumcised at his proper time. But fringes are a mitzvah that pertains to a person’s own body, and if we were to obligate a woman, her mitzvah would indeed depend on time. Therefore she is exempt.

Tosafot Rid explains that the mitzvah of circumcision imposed on the father is not a time-bound positive commandment, because the father’s mitzvah is not to circumcise his son personally, but only to exert himself and see to it that his son is circumcised on the eighth day. This is not a time-bound mitzvah, because the preparations for the circumcision are made both by day and by night, and even before the eighth day. If so, it is a commandment not dependent on time, and women should have been obligated. Therefore a special verse is needed to exempt women, that is, mothers, from this mitzvah.

Similarly, we find in Responsa of Maharach Or Zaru’a, responsum 11, cited by Kli Chemdah on Parashat Lekh Lekha, section 4, under the words “However” — and see there for the entire discussion and the proofs — the following:

Regarding circumcision, it appears that the father is not obligated to circumcise his son with his own hands, but to occupy himself that he be circumcised. This is like all those things listed there: to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, to teach him to swim in the river. Surely he does hire a teacher for his son for Torah and for all those matters … In all these, the essence of the mitzvah is not the act itself, but that the circumcision be sealed in his flesh … And circumcision too is essentially of that kind. For otherwise, King David, of blessed memory, who was distressed when he entered the bathhouse and saw himself naked without a mitzvah, would not have been comforted by remembering the circumcision. If the mitzvah of circumcision were only the act itself, why was he gladdened by it more than by his head and arms and entire body, with which he had fulfilled the mitzvot of phylacteries, fringes, and many other mitzvot? Rather, circumcision is a mitzvah at every moment.⁵

Further, if the father himself were obligated to circumcise him, or specifically he or his agent, then if another person circumcised him without the father’s permission, because the father did not want him as his agent, the child would not be considered circumcised, and one would have to draw covenantal blood from him again. This would be like one who says to his agent, “Go and separate terumah,” and then went and found it already separated, where we say perhaps another person heard and went and separated it, while the Merciful One said, “just as you, with your own intention,” etc. See Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 12a. Rather, it is certainly not the case that the father is obligated to circumcise with his own hand, but only to occupy himself so that his son be circumcised, and there is no need to elaborate.

From his words it emerges, and the later decisors indeed inferred this from his view, that the father need not appoint the circumciser as his agent at all. The mitzvah of circumcision is not imposed on the father, and therefore if someone else performs it, he need not be the father’s agent. The father is obligated only to see to it that his son is circumcised — to bring the circumciser and supply the needs of the circumcision — and thereby he fulfills the mitzvah imposed on him.⁶ This is a legal consequence that follows naturally from the approach of Tosafot Rid that we saw above.

The parallel to tending the lamps

We have seen that in circumcision the father is not commanded to circumcise, but only to see to it that the son be circumcised. This is a situation exactly parallel to what we saw in the lighting of the menorah. There too the principal service is the preparation, and the raising of the flame comes afterward in a quasi-automatic way.

Still, circumcision too requires a circumciser who is himself obligated, and the definition is not merely that the son be circumcised and that is all. The act of circumcision is also a mitzvah, and therefore the definition is that the son must undergo an act of circumcision, and not merely end up circumcised. The practical difference concerns one who was born circumcised, but that is not our concern here. This too is exactly like what we saw regarding the lighting of the menorah: there too it is not entirely automatic. The Torah requires an act done by a person who is obligated, though not specifically by a priest.

At the level of the rationale of the verse as well, the parallel between the two mitzvot may be carried forward. In the lighting of the lamps we saw that the idea is akin to Torah study, where the main thing is the preparation for the lighting, meaning the learning. So too in circumcision, the idea is that the father prepares his son to be a Jew, and thereby to receive Torah. That is not really in his hands, aside from the foundational preparations he makes. The rest, as it were, comes by itself.

This is why Maharach Or Zaru’a writes in the responsum cited above that this understanding is true of all the father’s obligations toward his son, for the essence of all of them is the preparation of his son to enter the covenant with the Holy One, blessed be He, and to fulfill the Torah and its mitzvot.⁷ Therefore in all of these the main mitzvah is the preparation, not the act itself.⁸

A puzzling midrash in Tanchuma

In Midrash Tanchuma (rabbinic exposition), at the beginning of Parashat Tetzaveh, there appears a puzzling midrash:

Our masters taught us: At what age is a child circumcised? Thus our rabbis taught: a child is circumcised at eight days. What is the reason? Just as our father Isaac was circumcised. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said: Come and see that nothing is dearer to a person than his son, and yet he circumcises him. Why is all this so? Another sage said: In order to do the will of his Creator.

This midrash is very puzzling from several angles — did the author of the midrash not know at how many days children are circumcised? Is the source really from our father Isaac? And more. But for our purposes we will focus on the question: what does circumcision have to do with the beginning of Parashat Tetzaveh, which deals with the menorah? The author of Kli Chemdah here, in section 1, makes the connection between these two mitzvot just as we have presented it here, and thereby explains this puzzling midrash.⁹ He says that the mitzvah of circumcision concerns the preparation of the son by his father, just as in the mitzvah of the menorah the central matter is the preparation by the priest.

In fact, one may observe a similar phenomenon with respect to the Tabernacle as a whole. The seven days of inauguration are seven days of bringing offerings, during which Moses officiated. Afterward, on the eighth day, which is also called a day of inauguration, the service enters its regular course, and therefore the other priests join Moses as well; they too sanctify their hands and feet, as recounted in our parashah. In fact, these are only seven days of preparation, for the eighth day is already a regular day of service, on which the Tabernacle enters its ongoing course. Once the preparation of the construction and the seven days of inauguration are completed, the Divine Presence enters and dwells there as a gift from above, in an almost automatic way. The eighth day of inauguration is not part of the preparation; it is the stage at which the gift, namely the Divine Presence, enters the treasury prepared for it.¹⁰

Perhaps there is room to compare this also to the creation of the world. There too the world was created in six days, and afterward rest was created on the seventh day. The author of Beit HaLevi, in his Torah commentary, explains that on Shabbat there was created the state of ongoing existence, the state of a world proceeding according to its regular order, continuing to move and endure. This too is a kind of creation. That is to say, in the creation of the world too, only six days are preparation of the world for activity. The seventh day is already the conduct itself.

A note on the rationale of the verse, and on action-commandments and result-commandments

The discussion here is connected to the distinction with which we have dealt several times in the past between commandments of action and commandments of result. See our essay on Parashat Bereshit, 5767, and elsewhere. Here we encounter mitzvot that are clearly commandments of action and not commandments of result. But it is clear that in our present essay we have advanced one step further: these are commandments of action in which the action is a preparation for a desired state, and not that the action itself is the thing desired by the Holy One, blessed be He. In fact, this is a third category: beyond commandments of result and commandments of action, there are also commandments of preparation, or effort.

In our essay on Parashat Bereshit mentioned above, we noted that sometimes the Holy One, blessed be He, specifically desires the action, while the result is placed before us as a goal only so that we will perform the action. We saw that this is one of the mechanisms for explaining the rule that one does not derive law from the rationale of the verse. From the perspective of the reason for the mitzvah, clearly the goal is the result, for that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, ultimately wants. But the legal definition of the mitzvah pertains only to the preparation, or to the action, because that is what is placed in our hands. Here, however, we see a more extreme mechanism: the goal is placed before us only so that we will make the preparations for it. The preparation is imposed on us not because of a technical constraint, namely that it alone is what is in our power in reality, but because the goal itself is specifically the preparation, not the result. If so, in these cases it may be that the reason does indeed coincide with the halakhic definition of the mitzvah.

Footnotes